The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in culture generally, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and methodological innovations.
HUSSERL’S
LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
IN THE NEW CENTURY:
WESTERN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

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Why another volume of essays devoted to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* after several collections of a similar nature have been published in the recent years? First of all, this publication is of considerable historico-cultural significance: most of the papers derive from an international conference held in Beijing in October 2001 to mark the centenary of the foundational work of the phenomenological movement.¹ This conference was the first of its kind in which phenomenologists from the West—Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, USA—joined hands with specialists from Korea, mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan to discuss the heritage of Husserl. Whereas all Western contributors to the present volume—Rudolf Bernet, David Carr, Steven Crowell, John Drummond, Bernhard Waldenfels, and Kah-Kyung Cho who is of Korean origin but has had a long and successful career in USA—are scholars who possess indubitable authority in phenomenology, their Chinese counterparts are much less well-known in the Western academic arena. Yet the latter’s contributions are of the utmost interest. From them readers will learn of the early reception of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* in China through the work of Youding SHEN, one of the most distinguished Chinese logicians of the twentieth century (JIN Xiping’s paper). The readers will also understand in what way Husserl’s doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness in the *Logical Investigations* paved the way for Scheler’s phenomenology of feeling (NI Liangkang’s contribution), for a novel phenomenological explication of religious experience (KWAN Tze-wan’s article), as well as for the little known young Foucault’s tentative formulation of a paradoxical phenomenology of the dream (LAU Kwok-ying’s paper). Last but not least, readers will also discover how a young Chinese scholar undertakes a thorough reassessment of the problem of being in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* in the light of Heideggerian ontology (DING Yun’s paper). With these joint perspectives—Western and Chinese—we hope that this volume will demonstrate the surprisingly rich and inexhaustible life that Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* continues to enjoy in the new century.

We would like to thank the director of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and the editor of the series “Contributions to Phenomenology.” Without their constant support this project would not have materialized.

LAU Kwok-ying

¹ The full title of the conference was “International Conference On Phenomenology: Phenomenology and Chinese Culture, and The Centenary of Edmund Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*,” October 13-16, 2001, Beijing, China, co-organized by the Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University, and the Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, co-sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, USA, and the Hong Kong Society for Phenomenology.
History and Substance of Husserl’s
Logical Investigations

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When the *Logical Investigations* was published a little over a hundred years ago, it was heralded as the work that set the agenda of Husserl’s phenomenology with its methodological “breakthrough.” In the eyes of many uninitiated readers, however, it was not immediately clear what exactly the nature of this breakthrough was. Already the division of this work into two volumes with three different parts was a somewhat confusing arrangement. While the first volume had the clear-cut title of *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, the second volume was divided in two separate “sub-volumes” which were named Part I and Part II of the *Investigations on Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge*. Oddly, this full title was printed only on the head page of Part I. Thus readers found, not without a certain sense of asymmetry,\(^1\) that Part II of the second volume was bearing its own separate title: *Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge*.

If these three titles did not imply any underlying contradictions, they were certainly not designed to facilitate the understanding of the continuity between the volumes. Much less did they suggest a clue as to the central, unifying theme of the entire work. It is the peculiarity of the *Logical Investigations* that so many diverse impulses and fruitful insights could spring forth from its study as though Husserl’s stated aim in this work had been anything but laying a solid and unshakeable methodological foundation. Yet in truth the fine distinctions and rich insights found in the *Logical Investigations* were not the result of freely shifting foci or pluralistic methods applied to varying fields of objects. Quite to the contrary, it is safe to say that one unique and consistent method opened up a new way of looking at the wealth in consciously experiencing the world that otherwise would have remained largely hidden.

It is, of course, the “final cause” of the following deliberations to clarify the substance of Husserl’s groundbreaking methodological advance. But in order to reach that goal, we will for the most part let ourselves be guided by what we may call the hindsight of a century-old global reception of the Logical Investigations. This means that the question of substance will be taken up more toward the end, when an adequate comprehension of the historical background is achieved. This is no simple recounting of this history. What is at stake is grasping the essential “connection of meaning” (Sinnzusammenhang) of a series of historical events. It would be anachronistic to say that the jury is still out and the final verdict is pending. For without doubt the Logical Investigations is one of the most closely scrutinized philosophical texts of our time. Its place in the history of 20th century philosophy and possibly beyond should be considered secure. And yet if the question is raised whether Husserl’s work was understood in the intervening years the way it was expected to be understood, one will have to point to the proverbial truism that thoughts take on their own life once printed on paper. As it stands, the Logical Investigations is a high profile case of philosophical literature that has been read very differently in the English-speaking world than in places like Freiburg or Prague. We owe part of the explanation for such difference to the hindsight that the English-speaking world continued judging Husserl by the Logical Investigations even after he had in a sense “outgrown” it. Typically, Anglo-American readers preferred to see in Husserl the logician with a flair for linguistic and syntactic analysis, and an anti-metaphysical bent. Even when his focus shifted to “life-world” and “history,” they made little or no effort to search for an essential connection between Hussel’s earlier and later works. Many in Anglo-American philosophy would have no qualms if their only choice were to keep the Logical Investigations and forget the rest of Husserl’s writings.

The other, even larger part of the explanation may be sought in the real or perceived tension running through Husserl’s philosophy as a whole. Husserl himself called it the “paradox” (Crisis §53) of the “founding” and the “founded” relationship between the transcendental and empirical Ego, and between man as subject for the world and man as only a part, indeed a partial object within the world. We might add one more such tension that exists between the “normative power” of the factual and the “unity-bestowing power” (einheitsstifteende Kraft) of the universal reason. All such difficulties were taken by critics more or less as liabilities in Husserl’s phenomenology that stem from the “idealistic” or metaphysical turn he took in his middle period. His otherwise salutary and scientific reasoning, so clearly demonstrated earlier in his logical analyses, critics say, fell victim to an aggrandized constructivism. As a result, the originally well-defined method of pure description of conscious experience was overextended to
“constitute” the whole of Being. This is the gist of criticism\(^2\) by Marvin Farber who refused to follow Husserl beyond the stages of his logical studies. If the *Logical Investigations* was the watershed for two largely unequal interpretations of Husserl—one by the English-speaking world, and the other, more or less, by the rest of the world,—then it was Farber who, like hardly anyone else, stood at that cross section, and he has become an instrument of history and its witness at the same time.

In our hindsight, furthermore, Husserl’s attempt to justify the place of his philosophy within the objective history of philosophy coincided with his increasing recognition of the historicity of human *existence*. No philosophical work, certainly not the *Logical Investigations*, can surge into the air of its own accord and claim its place outside of history. It has its roots in the life of an existing philosopher, and its essential content cannot be separated from the concrete existence of the philosopher within a historical world. The last large treatise of Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology*, says the following:

Thus reflection is required in every sense to right ourselves. The historical reflection we have in mind here concerns our existence (*Existenz*) as philosophers and correlative, the existence of philosophy, which, for its part, *is* through our philosophical existence.\(^3\)

Notice how Husserl links reflection to “righting ourselves.” It is obvious that he is reproachful of philosophers who refuse to engage in historical reflections. What have they neglected or forfeited by this refusal? According to Husserl, it is the “well-grounded common opinion” (*communis opinio*) of “the most advanced sciences” that they can forgo historical reflections because they have effectively organized the science as an enterprise that is carried out “in the present (*Gegenwart*).” They, and those philosophers who take their cues for “rigorous science” from them, are content that the total body of knowledge acquired by today’s science is systematically thought through and thoroughly “tested logically.” Should difficulties arise, these are “overcome in logical thinking” so that as *knowledge executed in the present*, science does not need to “revive the history of science.”

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\(^1\) Marvin Farber’s criticism of Husserl was directed mainly to his “subjective” method. “From subjectivity only subjectivity can be derived...subjectivity is an artifice, a device of method for descriptive analysis. (We) require a group of methodological devices and procedures to meet the many types of problems.... To restrict our philosophical method to subjectivism would be an error of one-sidedness as well as overextension.” M. Farber, *Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy within Nature* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 234.

However, Husserl’s quite different usage of the words “revival” and “history” must be noted. For him, what is to be revived is not an antiquarian interest in facts and deeds of the bygone days. Nor should “history” be taken in its objective or natural sense. It actually means “origin” or “source,” specifically “source of evidence.” Normally, the “logically first principles” are accepted without question as “self-evident,” but Husserl scorned the deceptive front of such authority, including the authority of mathematical science that rests on deduction from principles which are unquestioned, behind which, however, one could easily detect a “horse leg.” Only the directly intuitable, pre-logical evidence that is prior to theoretical constructions retains the genuine “birth right” of being truly the first principle. All other propositions must appeal to this authority for substantiation.

We look at the *Logical Investigations* as an integral part of the systematic development of Husserl’s philosophy. As an integral part, its relationship to the whole of Husserl’s writings can be understood according to the model of hermeneutic circularity. If *The Prolegomena to Pure Logic* or its serial parts contain unclear or insufficiently developed ideas, these can be clarified and their missing links supplemented by going back to the reading of Husserl’s later publications that allow a broader overview. And we can reverse the direction to better understand the meaning of the larger connections by recourse to parts that already have well defined, stable meaning. As we have glimpsed above, it is the *Crisis*, more than *Ideas* (1913) or *Cartesian Meditations* (Paris 1931) that offered important insights into certain ideas germinating in the *Logical Investigations*. Most conspicuous among such early prefigurations is the methodical principle that the philosophical grounding of logic and mathematics must begin with the analysis of the experience that lies before all logical thinking.

This insight was to be fully fleshed out in *Experience and Judgment* (1939) and formulated specifically in the *Crisis* as the primacy of the life-worldly evidence over the logico-mathematical evidence. Therefore, to isolate the *Investigations* from the rest of his writings and give it the status of a self-enclosed universe, however rewarding it may be to read it as such, would seem a rather flawed approach in that it fails to shed light on the inchoate, rich suggestiveness of the *Investigations* itself. For there has to be a light cast from the side, from other works, that can effectively enhance some of the tentatively carved profiles of the *Investigations*. Later, we shall listen to what Husserl had to say in the *Crisis* retrospectively about the “breakthrough” taking shape in the *Logical Investigations*.

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4 The English translation of *Crisis* did not include Appendix XXV where the word *Pferdefuß*, hoof or leg of the horse, occurs. Its colloquial meaning is “sham” or “gimmick.” Cf. German edition, *Husserliana VI* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), 496.
But it must be admitted that such integrated understanding of the *Logical Investigations* was rendered extremely difficult by the historical circumstances. When we say a work begins its separate existence from the moment it leaves its author, we do not stipulate that this is so only in peaceful times. Such normalcy within the academia is taken for granted. But the two World Wars disrupted the flow and exchange of thought of mankind in an unprecedented scale. With the exception of those who had to go into exile, few philosophers with such an unblemished, even honorable record as a German citizen, had to endure as much ignominy as Husserl. He and his work were condemned to non-existence under the relapsed barbarism that consumed Germany and soon spread to all of Europe. To be sure, the original edition of the *Logical Investigations* had been published more than thirty years before the National Socialism came to power. But by 1939, the year World War II broke out, only the Russian (1909) and the Spanish (1929) translation had seen the light of day. Actually, the Spanish translation was the only one published during the lull between two world wars. Even after the end of the war in 1945, the next translation in one of the world’s major languages, the French, was not completed until 1959. And it was still ten years later that the Italian and Japanese translations (both 1968) followed. The most pivotal translation of all, English, did not arrive until 1970, exactly seventy years after the first German edition.

The long interval in which Husserl was *incommunicado* is significant and may tell something about the need for a healing time in the war-ravaged cultural climate of Europe. However, beneath this surface level stagnation, varied and lively international and personal activities were unfolding. It is a grim irony that the National Socialist policy that had systematically banned phenomenology inside Germany helped it to develop into a thriving multi-national and global movement. Manuscripts and personnel were smuggled out of Germany to neutral countries often under dramatic circumstances. To former students of Husserl living overseas in a relative isolation, it was a welcome synergetic event to be joined by many newly exiled or displaced European scholars. And one particular such connection was about to touch the heart and soul of the issue of the English version of the *Logical Investigations*. It is a must-tell story affecting Husserl’s reception in the English-speaking world.

In mid-1930s, toward the end of his life, Husserl was quite certain that Germany and Europe as a whole no longer held any promise for the future of his philosophy. Fortunately, Prague turned out in many ways to be the alternative haven when his activities in Freiburg were severely restricted under the anti-Semitic policy of the German government. Alone for having safeguarded his guest lectures and eventual publication of his important manuscripts such as *Experience and Judgment* and *The Crisis of European Sciences*, the significance of Prague as the German University town away from Germany could hardly be exaggerated. Husserl could get some consolation not only from the fact that there was already a center for
phenomenology in Prague, but also from the news that his dedicated followers in France and Spain have begun their cooperative work. Moreover, he knew that a number of his former Japanese students had laid early cornerstones upon which to build phenomenology eventually as one of the most widely accepted and productive Western philosophies in modern Japan.

But it was to the English-speaking world, especially the United States, that Husserl turned directly for help in an attempt to ensure his legacy. First such contact began with a rather personal note as Husserl and his wife Malvine were deeply concerned about the future of their son Gerhart, a law professor in Kiel recently suspended from his position. They decided to contact Marvin Farber in Buffalo who had studied earlier (1923–24) in Freiburg and had occasionally corresponded with Husserl. Mrs. Malvine Husserl wrote to Farber on February 17, 1936, beseeching him to help find an academic position in America for Gerhart. Husserl himself sent his own letter the following day, in which he introduced his son as a scholar who had already achieved a “considerable reputation” through his researches that provided a “phenomenological grounding to jurisprudence.”

In a subsequent letter to Farber on August 9, Malvine thanked him heartily for his “kind considerations” for her son. Through Farber’s good offices, Gerhart Husserl was eventually placed in a college in Pennsylvania. Husserl himself on August 18 sent a two-page, minutely hand-written letter to Farber from his Black Forest retreat in Lenzkirch. It began with his words of sincere appreciation for what Farber and other “prominent intellectual personalities in the USA” had done for his son. This gave him “a great joy in the middle of the pathetic situation in which all we nationally ostracized people find ourselves.” But this letter also contained a “report” on the progress he has made in his phenomenological researches. “Since the time you were my student in Freiburg,” wrote Husserl, “I have made great strides in the systematic perfection of phenomenology and in the fundamental reflective clarification of the method of transcendental reduction.” No doubt with reference to the state of the “pure logic” of the Logical Investigations,

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5 Phenomenology had from its beginning a unique appeal to Asian students. Though Husserl was introduced to Japan quite early in the 20th century, Heidegger dominated for several decades, until, in what may be called a “symmetrical development,” both the Heideggerian and Husserlian phenomenology became the staple diet in contemporary philosophy seminars in Japan and Korea. Demographically, Japan boasts the largest contingent of academically engaged phenomenologists, next only to the U.S. and Canada combined. For an index, Genshōgaku Nenpō, The Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, has upward of 450 regular subscribing members. The quality of the journal invites comparison with any other such major publications.

6 All letters between Husserl and Farber quoted or referred to here are documented and annotated in Kah Kyung CHO, “Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence during 1936–37,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. L. Supplement (Fall 1990): 27–43.
Husserl saw his phenomenology today “in its mature form,” and characterized this difference as analogous to what “Leibniz’s differential calculus was in comparison to today’s infinitesimal analysis.” Then, after mentioning that Dorion Cairns had already finished translating major parts of the *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl broached the subject of another, more serious translation:

…In the eyes of the world, I am still the author of the *Logical Investigations*, and this book is, especially to the Anglo-American audience, the necessary foundation for understanding the new problems and ways of thinking of phenomenology…. Wouldn’t you rather be willing to undertake the translation of this work, of course, first its *Prolegomena*? In September, my former assistant Dr. Landgrebe (Dozent at the University of Prague), whom I have authorized to secure my manuscripts in archives, will be coming to Freiburg, in order to translate and prepare them for publication. I shall discuss with him whether an appropriate, smaller manuscript should be readied for English translation, if you so desire.7

Before concluding his letter, Husserl urged Farber to get in touch with Cairns who studied at Freiburg in 1924–26 and 1931–32, stressing that phenomenology is a “cooperative affair, a bond that binds us together *sub specie aeterni*.” At this stage, Farber seemed to be taking almost every word of Husserl to heart. He established contact with Cairns within a few months, according to Husserl’s letter of thanks to him dated November 20. Shortly after Husserl’s death two years later (1938), Farber organized, together with Cairns and over a dozen “founding members,” the International Phenomenological Society. At its first meeting in New York on December 26, 1939, Farber and Cairns were elected president and vice-president respectively. This was a gathering of stellar international scholars whose names are worth quoting here: Aron Gurwitsch, Charles Hartschorne, W.E. Hocking, Gerhart Husserl, L.O. Kattsoff, Felix Kaufmann, Jacob Klein, Helmuth Kuhn, V.J. McGill, Alfred Schütz, Herbert Spiegelberg, Hermann Weyl, and John Wild. After this event, Farber wasted little time in taking further initiative and, in 1940, inaugurated the journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Husserl had hoped before his death that Farber would, in cooperation with Dorion Cairns, carry out the large task of translating the *Logical Investigations*. But mindful of the voluminous and complex nature of its content, he would settle, for the time being, only on the translation of the *Prolegomena*. Husserl must have felt instinctively that Farber in the early 1940s was probably the only philosopher in America with the overall resources, coupled with a personally compelling sense of obligation to

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7 Ibid.
Husserl, to fulfill this mission. His organizational talent and energy exhibited in inaugurating the phenomenological society and its journal as well as in publishing a memorial volume for Husserl after his death, hardly need a special mention. With good reason, perhaps, Husserl did not dare burden Cairns, a more mild-spoken and willing disciple who already was deeply involved in various translations, with this additional workload. Thus, had Farber so set his mind at all cost, the rendition of Husserl’s *magnum opus* in English would have secured its chronological place in the mid-1940s, or somewhere before 1950 at the latest. It would have obviated the colossal effort of J.N. Findlay a quarter of a century later.

Notwithstanding Husserl’s encouraging words of send-off that phenomenology is a “cooperative” task (*symphilosophiein*), and that those cooperating colleagues should think *sub specie aeternitatis*, Farber’s strong-willed personality put his own purpose and his own agenda before anything else. His idea of phenomenological cooperation was gratifying to Husserl only during their initial phase of personal friendship, and Farber did not necessarily share Husserl’s “aspect of eternity” either. At no point did Farber try to hide the right of due criticism from his motive of studying Husserl. In the beginning, Husserl fascinated him with his finesse in logico-mathematical analysis and descriptive rigor in the study of conscious experience. On the other hand, the overextension of this descriptive method, and the absence of any hint at socially and materially beneficial praxis in Husserl’s transcendental idealism were the main reasons for Farber’s growing disenchantment with his former teacher.

Farber operated with a sense of urgency of an emancipated apostle, who now had to bring his own message to the world. It was called “naturalism,” in conscious opposition to Husserl’s critique of the “natural attitude.” But, of course, he had to first attend to his gentlemanly agreement with Husserl. When the *Foundation of Phenomenology* came out in 1943, Farber declared in its Preface that, in this volume, “the main content of his (Husserl’s) most famous work…is included, in essential fulfillment of the promise made to Husserl to render that work in English.” However, as the title made it obvious, the *Foundation* was by no stretch of imagination a translation of the *Logical Investigations*. Nor was the translation of *Prolegomena*, as suggested by Husserl, either wholly or in part, included in it. It was a compromise in the form of an extensive commentary to Husserl’s phenomenology from the early period of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* up to the *Ideas*, with paraphrased passages from the *Logical Investigations* occupying the largest space in between.

Within the selective scope in which Farber wished to bring Husserl’s seminal ideas to bear upon logical and epistemological studies, his

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8 Cf. the text quoted in note 2 above.

Foundation certainly filled a large gap that existed during the early period of Husserl reception in America. But a commentary, however exhaustive, cannot be a substitute for the complete original text. This is all the more so when Husserl’s work has been known for its “immensely rich content” (Findlay). For those who had more than a passing interest in Husserl and strove for a firsthand knowledge of him, this dependence on a commentary was at best a mixed blessing. It may have given them a shortcut access to the issues, but most likely the subtleties of Husserl’s handiwork, which consisted in a finely differentiating step-by-step analysis leading up to the heart of the matter, were blurred. It is likely that Farber had also knowingly imposed quarantine on what he often perceived to be an excessively otiose rigmarole that should have been trimmed. In his own mind, there was no alternative to a clearer paraphrasing of selected passages, eliminating much of the drearily technical jargon. In addition, the rejection of his proposed English translation of the Investigations by the Harvard University Press made it painfully clear to him that the philosophical climate in America wasn’t quite ripe. Actually it seemed to Farber that time would never be right for this sort of tireless reflection prying into the inner recess of subjectivity. Thus Farber’s decision not to risk the translation of the Investigations should be appraised with a much broader awareness of the historical background. Similarly, one needs to know more about the role of the personality and the philosophical persuasions of the man who was the party to the shaping of the Husserl-Farber understanding.

One historically undeniable fact we have to be clear about is that the year 1970, the year of the birth of the Logical Investigations in English by the hands of Findlay, did not necessarily mark anything like an “official” start of Husserl studies in the United States. There was a delay, technically speaking, only in the publication of a translation, while the content of the original book itself has been circulating among interested scholars long since. The late delivery of the English version of the Investigations had, generally speaking, as little significance as the opposite case of the surprisingly early Russian translation in 1909. For phenomenology in the former Soviet Union had no follow-up development thereafter because man like Semen L. Frank (1877–1950), a Russian Jew and one of the few philosophers who knew Husserl’s work, had to go into exile in 1922 and was permanently expelled from his country in 1938. By contrast, phenomenological research in America had its own momentum independently of the availability of an English translation of the Investigations. Former students of Husserl and new immigrant scholars simply carried on based upon their pre-existing acquaintance with the Investigations in whatever forms. Under the overarching dynamics of the international phenomenological movement, which propelled one event after another onto the stage, the protracted debut of the English edition of the Investigations was nearly irrelevant. Among such events were the establishment of the International Phenomenological Society and the inauguration of the journal Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, all bearing the signature of Marvin Farber. By 1943, when Farber’s selective commentary was published, it only added a wrinkle of its own to the already quite discriminating reception of Husserl by America’s scholarly community.

The other, more personal reason that led Farber to forgo a complete translation of the Investigations was a kind of domestic pendant to the larger, international development of phenomenology. In the process of coming to terms with the reality in America, Farber knew he had to make some adjustment to his relationship with phenomenology. He was certainly a major global player as far as the organizational activities were concerned. With the launching of the journal, a distinguished group of scholars, from both America and overseas, were invited to serve on the editorial and advisory board. The journal also served as a vital professional outlet for numerous refugee scholars from Europe. Then there was something almost nobody remembers today, namely, the humanitarian help Farber extended to friends and colleagues in the impoverished post-war Europe, in the name of the International Phenomenological Society. But once the dust has settled and Farber had to squarely face the everyday business, the editing of the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research soon became a hot issue between him and several editorial board members. Herbert Spiegelberg, Helmut Kuhn and Gerhart Husserl were among the more vocal critics who expected the journal to continue the spirit and tradition of the old Jahrbuch that Edmund Husserl founded.

Farber’s declaration of the editorial policy of the journal was initially identical with the stated aim of his new organization, the International Phenomenological Society: “to further the undertaking, development, and application of phenomenological inquiry as inaugurated by Edmund Husserl.” Then with the passage of time, as the practical necessity to accommodate to diverse interests of both contributing authors and readers got the upper hand, Farber appealed to the spirit of America’s foremost pragmatist philosopher:

In actual practice, the publication (of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) is characterized by the spirit of William James. A modus vivendi in the United States could hardly have been secured otherwise. The opposition to ‘schools’ in the traditional sense, and a spirit of readiness to offer ideas and findings for their further independent use

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10 Soon after 1945, Farber organized CARE, a relief-package program for his colleagues in the war-stricken parts of Europe. Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink were among those to whom Farber remembered sending a package.


12 Farber, Phenomenology and Existence, 18.
by scholars in all fields and traditions, are indeed typical both of Husserl and James…. But it is the freer and easier manner of James in his practical relations with others—students and scholars—which is meant here, and which is more suitable for a publication than the stern and, in effect, isolationist policy of the *Jahrbuch*, which could not hope to get general hearing in our time.\(^{13}\)

This is a very frank admission of conformism to America’s real situation which is only thinly clothed in philosophical argument. The reference to certain traits common to Husserl and James was nothing new, but it was usually centered on the similarity of their views about the nature of consciousness, including the aspect of what Husserl called “horizons.” By his own admission, Husserl was stimulated by the notion of “fringes” which William James used as essential features of the make-up of our consciousness.\(^ {14}\) Husserl on his part developed this notion to an all-encompassing transcendental concept of “world-horizon” which functions, so to speak, on the back of everyday consciousness. But Farber bypassed such theoretical resemblances and tried to extract from them a “moral” support. He appealed to their spirit of openness to different views in order to justify his disengagement from the phenomenology-centered editorial policy. Farber knew very well that it was Husserl’s “absorbing plans for work” that kept him from listening to diverse opinions. But later he would realize that Husserl’s excessive preoccupation with his own work and the subjective, praxis-alienated character of his phenomenology are of one and the same origin. For all practical purposes, Farber felt no urgency to neatly separate “openness” from “tolerance.” A charitable interpretation would read “openness” in the sense of being receptive to all that is worthy of emulation. Lacking in such charity, one would brand “tolerance” easily as a compromising attitude, as “permissiveness” toward less than praiseworthy ideas and conducts.

Farber concluded that Husserl’s phenomenology was too rigid and subjective, while he promoted his “critical naturalism” as open to all pluralistic views. The same conclusion was used to wean his journal gradually from the confining influence of phenomenology. On the other hand, the backstage story, if any, of the *Foundation of Phenomenology* should not have been as seedy as in the case of the journal. The journal had been exposed to the watchful eyes of Husserl loyalists for a long time. By contrast, the *Foundation* was not a co-authored or co-edited volume. Farber had no reason to be self-conscious about its being criticized for whatever ideological reasons. All he actually did was dutifully paraphrase Husserl’s main ideas. But what strikes readers today, again in hindsight, is the flatly

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 19.

low-key matter-of-factness and reservation with which Farber annotated Husserl’s “most important work.” Farber never raised his voice to a pitch resonating Husserl’s enthusiasm for the “breakthrough.” True, a commentary must ideally keep to its own track and guard itself against any judgmental remark that is ajar with the verbal meaning of the text. Farber could stay in bounds much easier because of his conviction that phenomenology had no other function than to be purely descriptive.

But all this was in such a stark contrast to the ebullient eulogy to Husserl with which Findlay opened his Translator’s Introduction to the Investigations. Findlay’s exuberance was almost deafening, but it was never hollow. He stated his motives for devoting himself to the task of complete English translation in these words:

> It is because I have found the writings of Husserl so superlatively valuable, and so deeply stimulating even when I rejected their detail, and because I so deeply regretted his inadequate accessibility in English…. It is important not because it can now count as a valuable contribution to the logical syntax of our language, but because it uses its investigations of logic to illuminate much more fundamental topics: the nature of meaning, the ontology which meaningful discourse presupposes, and, infinitely most important, the nature of those conscious acts in virtue of which alone there is a world for us and any fellows with whom we can communicate.¹⁵

Faced with this inspired and inspiring lavish praise, we are again reminded of the proverb that a work can have its own life after leaving its author. It is a course with twists and turns that the Logical Investigations has taken. The promise of an English translation made to Husserl by a young American scholar in 1936 was to have been only partially fulfilled in 1943. With this the matter has come, apparently, to a closure, as the public opinion in America also seemed to put the seal of approval on the Foundation of Phenomenology. But there was to be a second lease of life as far as this particular instance of Husserl’s legacy in the English-speaking world was concerned. Thirty four years later, an elderly Englishman, unbeknownst to Husserl, fully made the old promise good.

Findlay’s Introduction hits the nail on the head as regards the question of the essence of Husserl’s methodological “breakthrough.” Among the “fundamental topics” Husserl illuminated in the Investigations—it should be underscored—was “the nature of those conscious acts in virtue of which alone there is a world for us and any fellows with whom we can communicate.” In Husserl’s language, it is the meaning-constituting acts of consciousness which let an object, or, for that matter, ultimately the “world” itself, emerge before us. Object correlated to intentional act is not a physical

¹⁵ J.N.Findlay, translator’s introduction to LI, 2 ff.