Published by the Penguin Group
Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England
Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA
Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.)
Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd)
Penguin Group (Australia), 707 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3008, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd)
Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi – 110 017, India
Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, Auckland 0632, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd)
Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, Block D, Rosebank Office Park, 181 Jan Smuts Avenue, Parktown North, Gauteng 2193, South Africa
Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England
www.penguin.com
First published in the United States of America by The Penguin Press, a member of Penguin Group (USA) LLC 2013
First published in Great Britain by Allen Lane 2013
Published in Penguin Books 2014
Copyright © Eric Schlosser, 2013
The moral right of the author has been asserted
Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to reprint an excerpt from ‘Anthem’ from Stranger Music: Selected Poems and Songs by Leonard Cohen.
Copyright © 1993 Leonard Cohen. Reprinted by permission of McClelland & Stewart.
Cover illustration by Matthew Young
All rights reserved
ISBN: 978-0-141-94317-6
Author’s Note
Selected Cast of Characters
Acronyms and Abbreviations
PART ONE
THE TITAN
Not Good
New Wave
No Lone Zones
Spheres Within Spheres
Potential Hazards
PART TWO
MACHINERY OF CONTROL
The Best, the Biggest, and the Most
In Violation
Megadeath
PART THREE
ACCIDENTS WILL HAPPEN
Acceptable Risks
The Optimum Mix
Breaking In
PART FOUR
OUT OF CONTROL
Decapitation
The Brink
An Abnormal Environment
PART FIVE
DAMASCUS
Balanced and Unbalanced
The Wrong Tape
Like Hell
Confirm or Deny
The End
Epilogue
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
Follow Penguin
For my father
Ring the bells that still can ring
Forget your perfect offering
There is a crack, a crack in everything
That’s how the light gets in.
Leonard Cohen
Captain Michael T. Mazzaro, the commander, a young officer from Massachusetts with a pregnant wife
Lieutenant Allan D. Childers, the deputy commander, raised in Okinawa, a former DJ in his late twenties
Staff Sergeant Rodney L. Holder, the ballistic missile systems analyst technician, son of a Navy officer, responsible for keeping the Titan II ready to launch
Staff Sergeant Ronald O. Fuller, the missile facilities technician, responsible for the equipment at the launch complex
Lieutenant Miguel Serrano, a trainee studying to become a deputy commander
Senior Airman Charles T. Heineman, the team chief
Senior Airman David Powell, an experienced Titan II repairman, twenty-one and raised in Kentucky
Airman Jeffrey L. Plumb, nineteen and from Detroit, a novice receiving on-the-job training
Sergeant Jeff Kennedy, a quality control evaluator for the 308th Strategic Missile Wing, perhaps the best missile mechanic at Little Rock Air Force Base, a former deckhand from Maine in his midtwenties
Colonel James L. Morris, the head of maintenance at the 308th Strategic Missile Wing
Senior Airman James R. Sandaker, a young missile technician from Evansville, Minnesota
Technical Sergeant Michael A. Hanson, the team chief
Senior Airman Greg Devlin, a junior middleweight Golden Gloves boxer
Senior Airman David L. Livingston, a twenty-two-year-old missile repairman from Ohio with a fondness for motorcycles
Sid King, the twenty-seven-year-old manager of a local radio station
Gus Anglin, the sheriff of Van Buren County
Sam Hutto, a dairy farmer with land across the road from the missile site
Colonel William A. Jones, the head of the force as well as the base commander
Captain Donald P. Mueller, a flight surgeon manning the force’s ambulance
Richard L. English, head of the Disaster Preparedness Unit, a civilian in his late fifties, still fit and athletic, nicknamed “Colonel,” who’d served in the Air Force for many years
Technical Sergeant David G. Rossborough, an experienced first responder
Technical Sergeant Thomas A. Brocksmith, the on-scene police supervisor at the accident site
Technical Sergeant Donald V. Green, a noncommissioned officer in his early thirties who volunteered to escort a flatbed truck to Launch Complex 374-7
Technical Sergeant Jimmy E. Roberts, a friend of Green’s who accompanied him on the drive to Damascus
Colonel John T. Moser, commander of the 308th Strategic Missile Wing
General Lloyd R. Leavitt, Jr., the vice commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command
Colonel Ben G. Scallorn, a Titan II expert at the Eighth Air Force who’d worked with the missiles since the first silos were built
General Leslie R. Groves, director of the project, who led the effort to build an atomic bomb
J. Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist, later known as “the father of the atomic bomb,” who served as the first director of the Los Alamos Laboratory
Edward Teller, a physicist later known as “the father of the hydrogen bomb,” often at odds with the other Los Alamos scientists
George B. Kistiakowsky, a chemist and perhaps the nation’s leading explosives expert, later the science adviser to President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Bob Peurifoy, an engineer from Texas who joined Sandia in 1952 and subsequently became its leading advocate for nuclear weapon safety
Harold Agnew, a physicist from Colorado who helped create the first manmade nuclear chain reaction, filmed the destruction of Hiroshima from an observer plane, and played an important role in nuclear weapon safety efforts at the Los Alamos Laboratory
Carl Carlson, a young physicist at Sandia who in the late 1950s recognized the vulnerability of a nuclear weapon’s electrical system during an accident
Bill Stevens, an engineer who became the first head of Sandia’s nuclear safety department and worked closely with Bob Peurifoy
Stan Spray, a Sandia engineer who burned, crushed, and routinely tortured nuclear weapon components to discover their flaws
General Curtis E. LeMay, an engineer who revolutionized American bombing techniques during the Second World War and turned the Strategic Air Command into the most powerful military organization in history
General Thomas S. Power, an Air Force officer who led the firebombing of Tokyo during the Second World War, followed LeMay to the Strategic Air Command, and gained the reputation of being a mean son of a bitch
General Maxwell D. Taylor, an Army officer who championed the nuclear strategy of limited war and served as influential adviser to President John F. Kennedy
David E. Lilienthal, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a strong believer in civilian control of nuclear weapons
Fred Charles Iklé, a RAND analyst who studied the potential consequences of an accidental nuclear detonation and later served as an undersecretary of defense in the Reagan administration
Donald A. Quarles, an engineer whose work at Sandia, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of Defense helped to promote nuclear weapon safety
Robert S. McNamara, a former automobile executive who, as secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, struggled to formulate a rational nuclear strategy
A-Bomb—an atomic bomb, a weapon deriving its explosive power from the fission of uranium or plutonium atoms
AEC—Atomic Energy Commission, the civilian agency created in 1947 to oversee nuclear weapons and nuclear power
AFSWP—Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, a military agency formed in 1947 to deal with nuclear weapons
B.E. Number—a unique eight-digit number that identifies each of the targets in the Air Force’s Bombing Encyclopedia
BMEWS—Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, the radar system built after Sputnik to detect Soviet missiles heading toward the United States
BOMARC—a ground-launched antiaircraft missile with an atomic warhead, designed by Boeing (BO) and the Michigan Aerospace Research Center (MARC), that was deployed at sites in the United States and Canada
CND—Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a British antiwar group whose logo later became known as the “peace symbol”
DEFCON—Defense Readiness Condition, the American military’s readiness for hostilities, ranked on a scale from DEFCON 5 (the lowest level of alert) to DEFCON 1 (nuclear war)
DEW Line—the Distant Early Warning Line, a radar system that extended across the Arctic in North America to detect Soviet bombers
DIRECT—Defense Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System Replacement Command and Control Terminal, the Pentagon computer system currently deployed to send and receive a nuclear attack order
DUL—the Deliberate, Unauthorized Launch of a missile
ENIAC—the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer, America’s first large-scale electronic, digital computer, built for the Army to calculate the trajectory of artillery shells and later used at Los Alamos to help design a thermonuclear weapon
EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the rendering safe of warheads, bombs, and anything else that might detonate
FCDA—the Federal Civil Defense Administration, which from 1951 until 1979 advised the American public on how to survive a nuclear war
H-Bomb—a hydrogen bomb, the most powerful weapon ever invented, deriving its explosive force not only from nuclear fission but also from nuclear fusion, the elemental power of the sun
ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, a missile that can propel a nuclear warhead more than 3,400 miles
JAG—the nickname for a military attorney, a member of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps
K crew—a backup crew for the Titan II missile, on call to give advice during an emergency
LOX—liquid oxygen, a propellant that was used as an oxidizer, in combination with rocket fuel, to launch Atlas and Titan I missiles
MAD—Mutually Assured Destruction, a nuclear strategy that seeks to maintain peace by ensuring that adversaries have the capability to destroy one another
MANIAC—the Mathematical Analyzer, Numerical Integrator, and Computer, an early electronic, digital computer used at Los Alamos to help design the first hydrogen bombs
MART—Missile Alarm Response Team, the security police who responded to problems at Titan II missile sites
MFT—Mobile Fire Team, a heavily armed four-man team of Air Force security officers
MIMS—Missile Inspection and Maintenance Squadron, the repair crews who kept Titan II missiles ready to launch
MIRV—Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle, a ballistic missile carrying two or more warheads that can be aimed at different targets
MIT—Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MSA—a nickname for the vapor-detection equipment built by the Mine Safety Appliance Company and installed in Titan II silos
NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the military alliance formed in 1949 to defend Western Europe against an attack by the Soviet Union
NORAD—North American Air Defense Command, an organization created in 1958 by the United States and Canada to defend against a Soviet attack, later renamed the North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRC—Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency that licenses and regulates civilian nuclear power plants
OPLAN—Operations Plan, the term used since 2003 to describe the nuclear war plans of the United States
PAL—Permissive Action Link, a coded device installed within a nuclear warhead or bomb, much like a lock, to prevent unauthorized use of the weapon
PK—Probability of Kill, the likelihood of a target being destroyed
PPM—Parts per Million
PTPMU—Propellant Tank Pressure Monitor Unit, the gauge in a Titan II launch control center that provided digital readouts of the fuel and oxidizer pressures within the missile
PTS—Propellant Transfer System, the facilities and equipment used to handle the fuel and oxidizer for a Titan II missile
RAF—Royal Air Force, the armed service in Great Britain that during the Cold War was responsible for land-based aircraft and missiles
RAND—a think tank in Santa Monica, California, created by the Air Force after the Second World War, whose name was derived from the phrase “Research ANd Development”
RFHCO—Rocket Fuel Handler’s Clothing Outfit, a liquidproof, vaporproof outfit with an air pack and a bubble helmet that looked like a space suit, commonly known among Titan II crews as a “ref-co”
RV—Reentry Vehicle, the nose cone of a missile containing its warhead
SAC—Strategic Air Command, the organization that until 1992 was responsible for the long-range bombers, the land-based missiles, and most of the nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. Air Force
SAGE—Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, an air defense system built in the late 1950s that linked hundreds of radars into a network guided by computers in real time
SIOP—Single Integrated Operational Plan, the name given to the nuclear war plan of the United States from 1960 until 2003
SOCS—Strategic Operational Control System, a communications network employed by the Strategic Air Command during the 1950s, featuring a red telephone at its headquarters in Omaha that could be used to call every SAC air base simultaneously and broadcast a war order through their loudspeakers
SRAM—Short-Range Attack Missile, a missile with a nuclear warhead, launched from the air to hit targets on the ground, that was carried mainly by B-52 bombers, from the early 1970s until 1993
TAC—Tactical Air Command, the organization that from 1946 until 1992 was responsible for the ground support fighter planes of the U.S. Air Force
TACAMO—Take Charge and Move Out, a communications system created by the U.S. Navy that uses aircraft to transmit a nuclear attack order during an emergency
TASS—Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza), the official news agency of the Soviet government
TATB—1,3,5-triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene, an “insensitive” high explosive that cannot easily be detonated by fire, shock, or impact
USAAF—United States Army Air Forces, the organization responsible for America’s land-based bombers during the Second World War
USAF—United States Air Force, the new and independent armed service that replaced the USAAF in 1947
WSEG—Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, a high-level research unit, employing both military and civilian personnel, that from 1948 until 1976 advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff
WWMCCS—World Wide Military Command and Control System, an organization formed during the Kennedy administration to combine the sensors, computers, command posts, and communications networks of the different armed services into a single centralized system
ZI—Zone of the Interior, a phrase used by the military to describe the continental United States
On September 18, 1980, at about six thirty in the evening, Senior Airman David F. Powell and Airman Jeffrey L. Plumb walked into the silo at Launch Complex 374-7, a few miles north of Damascus, Arkansas. They were planning to do a routine maintenance procedure on a Titan II missile. They’d spent countless hours underground at complexes like this one. But no matter how many times they entered the silo, the Titan II always looked impressive. It was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile ever built by the United States: 10 feet in diameter and 103 feet tall, roughly the height of a nine-story building. It had an aluminum skin with a matte finish and U.S. AIR FORCE painted in big letters down the side. The nose cone on top of the Titan II was deep black, and inside it sat a W-53 thermonuclear warhead, the most powerful weapon ever carried by an American missile. The warhead had a yield of 9 megatons—about three times the explosive force of all the bombs dropped during the Second World War, including both atomic bombs.
Day or night, winter or spring, the silo always felt the same. It was eerily quiet, and mercury vapor lights on the walls bathed the missile in a bright white glow. When you opened the door on a lower level and stepped into the launch duct, the Titan II loomed above you like an immense black-tipped silver bullet, loaded in a concrete gun barrel, primed, cocked, ready to go, and pointed at the sky.
The missile was designed to launch within a minute and hit a target as far as six thousand miles away. In order to do that, the Titan II relied upon a pair of liquid propellants—a rocket fuel and an oxidizer—that were “hypergolic.” The moment they came into contact with each other, they’d instantly and forcefully ignite. The missile had two stages, and inside both of them, an oxidizer tank rested on top of a fuel tank, with pipes leading down to an engine. Stage 1, which extended about seventy feet upward from the bottom of the missile, contained about 85,000 pounds of fuel and 163,000 pounds of oxidizer. Stage 2, the upper section where the warhead sat, was smaller and held about one fourth of those amounts. If the missile were launched, fuel and oxidizer would flow through the stage 1 pipes, mix inside the combustion chambers of the engine, catch on fire, emit hot gases, and send almost half a million pounds of thrust through the supersonic convergent-divergent nozzles beneath it. Within a few minutes, the Titan II would be fifty miles off the ground.
The two propellants were extremely efficient—and extremely dangerous. The fuel, Aerozine-50, could spontaneously ignite when it came into contact with everyday things like wool, rags, or rust. As a liquid, Aerozine-50 was clear and colorless. As a vapor, it reacted with the water and the oxygen in the air and became a whitish cloud with a fishy smell. This fuel vapor could be explosive in proportions as low as 2 percent. Inhaling it could cause breathing difficulties, a reduced heart rate, vomiting, convulsions, tremors, and death. The fuel was also highly carcinogenic and easily absorbed through the skin.
The missile’s oxidizer, nitrogen tetroxide, was even more hazardous. Under federal law, it was classified as a “Poison A,” the most deadly category of man-made chemicals. In its liquid form, the oxidizer was a translucent, yellowy brown. Although not as flammable as the fuel, it could spontaneously ignite if it touched leather, paper, cloth, or wood. And its boiling point was only 70 degrees Fahrenheit. At temperatures any higher, the liquid oxidizer boiled into a reddish brown vapor that smelled like ammonia. Contact with water turned the vapor into a corrosive acid that could react with the moisture in a person’s eyes or skin and cause severe burns. When inhaled, the oxidizer could destroy tissue in the upper respiratory system and the lungs. The damage might not be felt immediately. Six to twelve hours after being inhaled, the stuff could suddenly cause headaches, dizziness, difficulty breathing, pneumonia, and pulmonary edema leading to death.
Powell and Plumb were missile repairmen. They belonged to Propellant Transfer System (PTS) Team A of the 308th Strategic Missile Wing, whose headquarters was about an hour or so away at Little Rock Air Force Base. They’d been called to the site that day because a warning light had signaled that pressure was low in the stage 2 oxidizer tank. If the pressure fell too low, the oxidizer wouldn’t flow smoothly to the engine. A “low light” could mean a serious problem—a rupture, a leak. But it was far more likely that a slight change in temperature had lowered the pressure inside the tank. Air-conditioning units in the silo were supposed to keep the missile cooled to about 60 degrees. If Powell and Plumb didn’t find any leaks, they’d simply unscrew the cap on the oxidizer tank and add more nitrogen gas. The nitrogen maintained a steady pressure on the liquid inside, pushing downward. It was a simple, mundane task, like putting air in your tires before a long drive.
Powell had served on a PTS team for almost three years and knew the hazards of the Titan II. During his first visit to a launch complex, an oxidizer leak created a toxic cloud that shut down operations for three days. He was twenty-one years old, a proud “hillbilly” from rural Kentucky who loved the job and planned to reenlist at the end of the year.
Plumb had been with the 308th for just nine months. He wasn’t qualified to do this sort of missile maintenance or to handle these propellants. Accompanying Powell and watching everything that Powell did was considered Plumb’s “OJT,” his on-the-job training. Plumb was nineteen, raised in suburban Detroit.
Although an oxidizer low light wasn’t unusual, Air Force technical orders required that both men wear Category I protective gear when entering the silo to investigate it. “Going Category I” meant getting into a Rocket Fuel Handler’s Clothing Outfit (RFHCO)—an airtight, liquidproof, vaporproof, fire-resistant combination of gear designed to protect them from the oxidizer and the fuel. The men called it a “ref-co.” A RFHCO looked like a space suit from an early-1960s science fiction movie. It had a white detachable bubble helmet with a voice-actuated radio and a transparent Plexiglas face screen. The suit was off white, with a long zipper extending from the top of the left shoulder, across the torso, to the right knee. You stepped into the RFHCO and wore long johns underneath it. The black vinyl gloves and boots weren’t attached, so the RFHCO had roll-down cuffs at the wrists and the ankles to maintain a tight seal. The suit weighed about twenty-two pounds. The RFHCO backpack weighed an additional thirty-five and carried about an hour’s worth of air. The outfit was heavy and cumbersome. It could be hot, sticky, and uncomfortable, especially when worn outside the air-conditioned silo. But it could also save your life.
The stage 2 oxidizer pressure cap was about two thirds of the way up the missile. In order to reach it, Powell and Plumb had to walk across a retractable steel platform that extended from the silo wall. The tall, hollow cylinder in which the Titan II stood was enclosed by another concrete cylinder with nine interior levels, housing equipment. Level 1 was near the top of the missile; level 9 about twenty feet beneath the missile. The steel work platforms folded down from the walls hydraulically. Each one had a stiff rubber edge to prevent the Titan II from getting scratched, while keeping the gap between the platform and the missile as narrow as possible.
The airmen entered the launch duct at level 2. Far above their heads was a concrete silo door. It was supposed to protect the missile from the wind and the rain and the effects of a nuclear weapon detonating nearby. The door weighed 740 tons. Far below the men, beneath the Titan II, a concrete flame deflector shaped like a W was installed to guide the hot gases downward at launch, then upward through exhaust vents and out of the silo. The missile stood on a thrust mount, a steel ring at level 7 that weighed about 26,000 pounds. The thrust mount was attached to the walls by large springs, so that the Titan II could ride out a nuclear attack, bounce instead of break, and then take off.
In addition to the W-53 warhead and a few hundred thousand pounds of propellants, many other things in the silo could detonate. Electroexplosive devices were used after ignition to free the missile from the thrust mount, separate stage 2 from stage 1, release the nose cone. The missile also housed numerous small rocket engines with flammable solid fuel to adjust the pitch and the roll of the warhead midflight. The Titan II launch complex had been carefully designed to minimize the risk of having so many flammables and explosives within it. Fire detectors, fire suppression systems, toxic vapor detectors, and decontamination showers were scattered throughout the nine levels of the silo. These safety devices were bolstered by strict safety rules.
Whenever a PTS team member put on a RFHCO, he had to be accompanied by someone else in a RFHCO, with two other people waiting as backup, ready to put on their suits. Every Category I task had to be performed according to a standardized checklist, which the team chief usually read aloud over the radio communications network. There was one way to do everything—and only one way. Technical Order 21M-LGM25C-2-12, Figure 2-18, told Powell and Plumb exactly what to do as they stood on the platform near the missile.
“Step four,” the PTS team chief said over the radio. “Remove airborne disconnect pressure cap.”
“Roger,” Powell replied.
“Caution. When complying with step four, do not exceed one hundred sixty foot-pounds of torque. Overtorquing may result in damage to the missile skin.”
“Roger.”
As Powell used a socket wrench to unscrew the pressure cap, the socket fell off. It struck the platform and bounced. Powell grabbed for it but missed.
Plumb watched the nine-pound socket slip through the narrow gap between the platform and the missile, fall about seventy feet, hit the thrust mount, and then ricochet off the Titan II. It seemed to happen in slow motion. A moment later, fuel sprayed from a hole in the missile like water from a garden hose.
“Oh man,” Plumb thought. “This is not good.”