INDIA AND TAIWAN
From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism
INDIA AND TAIWAN
From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism
Editors
Vij Books India Pvt Ltd
New Delhi (India)
Published by
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Copyright © 2016, Vichar Nyas Foundation
First Published : 2016
ISBN: 978-93-84464-83-7
All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Application for such permission should be addressed to the publisher.
The views expressed in this book are those of the contributors in their personal capacity. These do not have any official endorsement.
Contents
List of Contributors
Acknowledgement
Introduction
1. The Republic of China: How the British were outmanoeuvred in diplomacy over the question of Tibet
B. R. Deepak
2. The Republic of India and the Republic of China: 1947-1949
B. R. Deepak
3. India’s National leaders and the Nationalist China
B. R. Deepak
4. Chiang Kai-shek and the China-Burma-India Theatre of War
Lin Hsiao-chen
5. Paying Last Respects to Mahatma Gandhi
Luo Jialun (Tr. Prashant Kaushik)
6. Testing the Limits of Pragmatic Diplomacy:Taiwan’s Relations with India
Chen Mumin
7. From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism: The Political and Security Issues between Taiwan and India
Parris H. Chang
8. Experiences of Developmental State in India and Taiwan
Kalim Siddiqui
9. Exploring Education Cooperation between Taiwan and India: The Case of Mandarin Chinese Education
Tung Yu-li
10. Taiwan Studies in India
Janardan Sahu
11. India and I
Victor Feng Da-Hsuan
Index
About the Editors
List of Contributors
1. B R Deepak, Professor, Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
2. Lin Hsiao-chen, Ph.D candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
3. Prashant Kaushik, Ph.D candidate, Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
4. Chen Mumin, Associate Professor, the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan.
5. Parris H. Chang, Professor emeritus of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, is the CEO of Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies. He was a member of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (Parliament) for 12 years and Deputy Secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council.
6. Kalim Siddiqui, Senior Lecturer, International Economics at University of Huddersfield, UK.
7. Tung Yu-li, Adjunct Lecturer, Chung Yuan Christian University, Taiwan.
8. Janardan Sahu, Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.
9. Victor Feng Da-Hsuan, Director of the Global Affairs and Special Advisor to the Rector, University of Macau, former Senior Vice President of National Tsing Hua University.
Acknowledgements
This volume is the product of a special issue of the Think India journal brought out in 2013. Given the paucity of scholarship in India and Taiwan on the subject, it was a mammoth task to collect papers for the volume. However, through the good offices of various friends in India and Taiwan, we managed to put in place seven articles that touched on various facets of India-Taiwan relations. In this volume, four more scholars from India and Taiwan contributed papers thus enriching the volume.
We would like to thank all the contributors, as well as the academicians in India and Taiwan who made innumerable insightful comments and helpful suggestions. Our intellectual debt to those academics, China and Taiwan experts who have tremendously contributed to the India-China and India-Taiwan interactions will be obvious to any reader familiar with the literature in this area.
We thank Prashant Kaushik, co-contributor and a Ph.D candidate in the Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi for going through the proofs and submitting the same to the editors in time.
Finally, we would also like to thank our publisher Rohan Vij of the Vij Books who showed great interest in the volume, and meticulously prepared for the publication of the same.
Naturally, as editors, we take responsibility for whatever deficiencies in coverage and oversight that remains. We will value reader’s insights and suggestions at:
bdeepak@mail.jnu.ac.in
dptripathincp@gmail.com
Introduction
After having a period of brisk contacts of trade and cultural exchanges for more than ten centuries since the beginning of our common era the people of India and China, the cultural cousins of the past, suddenly found themselves tied together by British colonial chains and became, ironically, ‘colonial cousins’ during the 19th century. It was the common enemy of India and China, i.e. Pax Britannica, which united the two ancient civilizations again in their common anti-imperialist struggles. Even though the civilizational dialogue was disrupted by the colonial advancement in Asia, the undercurrents of such a dialogue remained alive during the colonial times as well.
Well before the establishment of the Republic in China, Indian nationalists and revolutionaries developed deep and intimate contacts with the father of the Chinese Nation, Sun Yat-sen in Japan during his exile. Not only this, Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Taiyan through the official newspaper of Tongmeng Hui supported the Indian freedom movement. Indian nationalists like Borohan?, Surendermohan Bose, Rash Behari Bose, M.N. Roy, Barakatullah, Lala Lajpat Rai and many other outstanding pioneers of the Indian freedom movement maintained good contacts and friendship with Sun Yat-sen, who wholeheartedly supported the Indian cause and rendered all possible help to them. Through their good offices, the Chinese nationalists introduced Indian nationalists to the leading Japanese personages thus enabling them to carry out anti-British activities in Japan.
After the establishment of the Republic, Indian revolutionaries also made China as one of their centers to carry out anti-British activities. Barring a few, most of them were the members of Ghadar Party. Much of the activities centered around Hankou, it being the center of Kuomintang (KMT) government and Shanghai and Hong Kong being the places where Indian settlers including policemen and troops numbered maximum. The Ghadar activities during the second phase of Siam-Burma Plan were supported by the KMT and Communist Party of China (CPC) alike. Ghadar support to the Chinese nationalist government and in turn enlisting latter’s support was the direct outcome of the formation of First United Front in China between the KMT and CPC. Many Ghadar revolutionaries had even participated in the campaigns of the Chinese government against the warlords. Their activities came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the United Front in 1927.
Jawaharlal Nehru, who drew inspiration from the ongoing nationalist struggle in China, institutionalized the ties between the Congress Party and the KMT on one hand and drew a roadmap for future India-China ties on the other. This was demonstrated during the Brussels Congress Against Imperialism (February 1927) where Nehru had extensive discussions with the Chinese delegation headed by Liao Huanxing. In order to have a better understanding of either country’s anti-imperialist and anti-militarist movements, and to establish proper contacts and cooperation between the Indian National Congress and the KMT, some points which were negotiated and agreed upon included: China will open an Information Bureau in India in order to organize an efficient and regular service of information between the two countries; a Chinese representative will be stationed in India; mutual visits of the representatives will be arranged, and some may attend the annual session of the Indian National Congress at invitation. The exchange program also included the visits of trade unions from both sides. The Chinese delegates were keen on some Indian students coming to China for studies, and establishing contacts with the Chinese people and their national movement. It was also agreed that India would continue to press the British to withdraw Indian forces from China and not to use them against the Chinese people. Taking these agreements as foundations, the Indian and Chinese delegates issued a joint manifesto and emphasized the resolve of India and China in their anti-imperialist struggle. A note on joint declaration duly signed by the representatives of India and China was passed by the Brussels Congress.
Later, in the spirit of these declarations, the Indian National Congress invited the KMT representatives to visit India. The KMT decided to send Song Qingling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen to India but the British Indian government refused visas to the Chinese representatives and the visit did not materialize. The colonial government did the same thing when the Indian National Congress invited Song Qingling to participate in its Calcutta annual session in 1928. A year before, when the Labor Conference was to be held in China, the Indian representative D. R. Thengdi, Joglekar Ghate and Nimbkar could not participle for the same reason. The British denial of permission was an attempt to subvert the cooperation between the Indian National Congress and KMT and this made it all the more necessary for the nationalist forces in India and China to cooperate for their common good and intensify their anti-imperialist struggle. Indian National Congress passed many resolutions against the use of Indian troops in China.
As the Japanese barbarities made news across the world, India decided to dispatch a medical mission to China in 1938 to help China in its War of Resistance Against Japan. Nehru made the bonds of friendship even stronger when he visited China in 1939. Mahatma Gandhi and Gandhian principles of non-violence were heatedly debated in China. Chinese people showered both encomiums and criticism on Gandhi when he led the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements in India. Sun Yat-sen, however never approved of his weapon of non-violence, for he was of the view that an armed struggle was indispensable for national liberation. Nevertheless, Sun approved of Gandhian pacifist techniques, such as non-cooperation and civil disobedience for inflicting irreparable loss on the British economy. In fact, Sun’s last words were “peace, struggle, save China!”. Gandhi even suggested these techniques and principle of non-violence to the Chinese people, but came round to the Chinese view point that it cannot be applied to China’s national situation, especially when it was engaged in an armed struggle with Japan. He condemned the barbarity of the Japanese aggression and supported the Chinese government and people in their struggle against Japan. Chinese people equally supported the Indian cause of independence, and held that India should not join the Second World War unless it was declared free. Later, however, with the formation of India-China-Burma Theatre of War, China requested Indian people to support the War efforts of the Allies. President Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February 1942 specially to break the ongoing deadlock between the British and the Indian National Congress.
The period from 1905-1947 was the period when both the people of India and China rendered support and sympathy to each other in their common struggle against imperialism. It was Nehru’s vision that in future India and China will necessarily come together to realize the vast and tremendous potential of economic cooperation in a New World after the War. Soon after the end of the War, when China plunged into civil war, India wished for the unity of China and hoped it would resolve her problems peacefully. It appears that the Indian leadership including Nehru underestimated the hold of the CPC over the masses. This could be due to the relationship Nehru and other Congress leaders had established with the leaders of ruling KMT that never controlled more than 27% of China’s entire area. Another factor could be the uniformity of interests and goals established by the Indian National Congress and the KMT, first during the Brussels Congress in 1927 and later during Nehru’s China visit in 1939. Actually, non-resistance to Japan and the extermination campaigns by KMT against the communists had made it extremely unpopular among the masses. The KMT was also considered most corrupt and the corruption within KMT ranks was said to have reached extraordinary propositions. Despite American assistance, the well-equipped army of the KMT was routed and forced to flee to Taiwan.
Despite the defeat of the nationalists in the Civil War (1946-49), India kept its faith with China. Nehru also accepted the failure of Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt army. He was convinced that public opinion in India was against the KMT and to support a corrupt government in China would be condemned in India. Therefore, he adopted a ‘wait and watch’ approach and remarked “We can’t possibly ally ourselves with Kuomintang merely because of the past. We cannot ignore facts.” Nevertheless, respecting the ground realities in China and the victory of CPC over KMT, in barely eight months time, India recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China on April 1, 1950.
Even though most of the countries in the West did not recognise China and kept it out of the United Nations General Assembly, India consistently adhered to “one China” policy and supported restoration of the PRC in the United Nations. It almost became the spokesperson of “one China” policy to the displeasure of many western countries. However, with the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, especially after the breakdown of official talks on boundary question in 1960, and more importantly after the border war of 1962, there was an obvious rapprochement with Taiwan. According to Zhao Weiwen (2000: 196-198), between October 1961 and October 1970, India nearly stopped its friendly exchanges with the PRC. On the contrary, it established frequent contacts with Taiwan. Zhao gives a long list of India-Taiwan contacts of this period, which according to her were aimed at opening a “second front” in southeast China and making “two Chinas.” “India did not stop ogling despite of Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal.” The first contact Zhao cites is the presence of Mr. Chopra, the Indian ambassador to Philippine, on the occasion of Taiwan’s “National Day” celebrations on 10 October 1961. In August 1963, Mr. Bohra, Secretary General of the Indian Military Committee, visited Taiwan. In the same year between 19 and 29 October, Masani, the General Secretary of the Swatantrata Party and a Member of Parliament visited Taiwan. In 1964, between 18 and 24 June, a bigger delegation consisting of 10 parliamentarians visited Taiwan and spoke of establishing formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The delegation was accorded warm welcome by Chiang. In July, Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi was in Taiwan. In May 1966, three Southeast Asia special correspondents of Hindustan Times, Indian Express etc. newspapers were in Taiwan at the invitation of “News Bureau” of Chiang Kai-shek clique. In June, Raghunath Singh, Secretary General of the Congress Parliamentary Group paid a visit to Taiwan. In September, Acharya Kriplani, a member of the Indian Parliament was in the island at the invitation of Taiwanese “Foreign Minister” and was received by Chiang Kaishek. In October, Bhatia, Editor General of the Hindustan Times and Tiwari, a correspondent of the Indian Express were in Taiwan. During their meeting with Jiang Jingguo, Jiang urged India to snap diplomatic ties with Beijing and join hands with Taiwan in order to deal with the mainland “threat,” however, the modus operandi of this alliance was to be discussed at an opportune time, according to Zhao. In April 1968, Morarji Desai, Deputy Prime Minister of India, paid a visit to Taiwan. During his next leg of journey in Japan, he spoke of “two Chinas” and expressed that his visit to Taiwan was a tacit acknowledgement of the existence of “two Chinas.” In July parliamentarian C. C. Desai was in Taiwan and pledged to “endeavour for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the KMT China and India.” In February 1969, G. B. Pant, yet another parliamentarian visited Taiwan and was received by Yan Jiagan, head of the “Executive Yuan.”
According to Zhao, scores of Taiwanese “non-official” personnel frequently visited India and colluded with the Indian government against China. In February 1962, Shen Jianhong, the “Chairman of the Executive Yuan’s News Bureau” participated in an “International News Conference” in India. In July 1963, a “Buddhist delegation” from Taiwan visited India. The delegation was officially received by S. Radhakrishnan, the President of India and Jawaharlal Nehru. In August 1965, Si Qi from Taiwan’s “National Education Department of the Ministry of Education” was accorded warm welcome by the Indian President and other ministers. Same year in September, Du Guangxun, from Taiwan’s “Legislature Commission” visited India. In March 1966, India allowed Li Guoding, the “Commerce Minister” and Shen Qi, the “Deputy Foreign Minister” of Taiwan to participate in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East Conference. Peking Review (8 April 1966: 14) accused India of plotting the creation of “two-Chinas.” As regards Li Guoding’s India visit, the CCP mouthpiece reported that the Chiang clique “delegation” was warmly received by the Indian authorities, who took this opportunity to carry out rabid anti-Chinese activities. It further reported that India’s political, business and financial bigwigs were busy contacting the Chiang Kai-shek elements. Both sides advocated increased “understanding” and “cooperation” in joint opposition to China. In August 1968, when a Taiwanese delegation came to participate in the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Asia, China protested to this “new crime” of India creating “two Chinas.” China took note of Minister of State for Education, Bhagwat Jha Azad’s remarks of 9 August in Parliament on the question of participation by Taiwan in UN conference. China accused India of “openly using the reactionary, shop-worn US imperialist term calling the People’s Republic of China ‘Communist China,’ while calling the Chiang Kaishek gang, the sworn enemy of the Chinese people, the ‘Republic of China.’” This according to China was a ‘new crime’ committed by the ‘reactionary’ Indian government (Peking Review, August 30, 1968: 30-31). Similarly, In October, when Taiwan sent a delegation headed by Tao Rong, the “Chairman of the Diplomatic Commission” of Taiwan to participate in the birth centenary of Mahatma Gandhi, China labelled it as “collaboration” against China and a “grave crime” by the “reactionary Indian government.” According to Zhao (2000), on 10 October when Tao held a press conference, mayor of New Delhi was also present. Taiwan’s “National Anthem” was played besides the Indian National Anthem. China reacted strongly and lodged a protest and regarded it as a “grave crime” by the “Indian reactionaries” to step up the creation of two Chinas “under the instigation of US imperialism (Xinhua, 12 October 1968).” In December 1969, Tao once again visited India and met India’s top political leaders including the President, V. V. Giri, and the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Irrespective of India’s hobnobbing with Taiwan, India never accepted Taiwan’s independence, albeit China viewed all these developments, necessarily hostile to China and detrimental to its sovereignty. Indian diplomatic support to Taiwan like China’s support for Naxalbari constituted nothing more than psychological pressure on China, and must be viewed in the light of Cold War rhetoric between India and China when both supported the forces opposite to the respective countries. The kind of language China used at this point in time, shows how desperate and isolated it was in the international community; the domestic turbulences such as the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ and the inherent power struggle within the CPC could have brought such a behavioral change in China.
With the ‘politics in command’ paving way to ‘economics in command’ in China under Deng Xiaoping and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cold War mentality has definitely eroded if not disappeared totally. Taiwan’s economic integration with mainland China on one hand and Taiwanese leader’s advocacy of a ‘flexible foreign policy’ on the other has made China confident, and has allowed Taiwan to carry out economic and cultural relations with countries in the world. In a video conference with the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 12, 2011, President Ma Ying-jeou outlined three important strategies for Taiwan: one, institutionalizing cross-strait rapprochement with mainland China; two, enhancing Taiwan’s contributions to international development; and three, aligning Taiwan’s defense and diplomacy. These could be termed as the three pillars or the ‘defense lines’ as Ma calls them of Taiwanese new foreign policy ever since he took office in 2008. Under ‘flexible diplomacy’ Taiwan sought diplomatic truce and opportunities to participate in international organizations and events. The truce called for consolidation of ties with its 23 diplomatic allies across Pacific, Europe and Africa, while the latter offered it opportunities to participate in rehabilitation work in Ache and Haidi earthquakes; it also secured the observer’s status in World Health Assembly (WHA) of the WHO since 2009. In fact the “three-no’s” policy toward cross-strait relations: “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” could be regarded as an important ingredient of the ‘diplomatic truce’ under ‘flexible diplomacy.’
The so-called ‘cheque diplomacy’ of yesteryears paved way for a foreign aid policy that is in line with the international standards. With an aim to promote partnership, Taiwan has committed to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community by supporting humanitarian causes and safeguarding human security. It has contributed to disaster relief efforts around the world and is the largest donor so far to Japan’s Tohoku earthquake relief effort. Taiwan has also diversified the modes of aid and cooperation in to the GIS, hospital management, environmental protection, as well as renewable energy fields. Another policy is that of people-to-people exchanges and cultural diplomacy. The policy has provided Taiwanese citizens and NGOs various opportunities to participate in international affairs and exchange ideas with foreign civil societies. Under the aegis of this policy, Taiwan has initiated various programs such as national development seminars for youths, international youth ambassador program, Taiwan scholarships and fellowships, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Huayu Enrichment Program and Taiwan Study Camps, International Cooperation and Development Fund’s (ICDF) Mandarin Scholarship programs. All these initiatives have helped Taiwan to boost its image internationally and enabled international community to have a better understanding of Taiwan, its culture, customs and values.
It is under the ambit of ‘flexible diplomacy’ from the Taiwanese side and the ‘Look East Policy’ of India that has been renamed as ‘Act East Policy’ by Modi Government that Taiwan and India are expanding their ties in economic, cultural, educational and to some extent security domains, especially from 1995 when trade representative offices of both sides were set up in Delhi and Taipei, known as Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) and India-Taipei Association (ITA) respectively. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, India’s trade and investment with Taiwan is too small. In 2011 it was merely $7.7 billion, accounting just 1.2% of Taiwan’s total foreign trade. It is expected that the volume would reach $10 billion in 2015. India being a developing country with huge labor force, offers tremendous opportunities for Taiwan in various sectors including IT, retail, infrastructure and agriculture, especially the food processing sector where Taiwan is a leading player. When Taiwan can invest over $200 billion in mainland China, India certainly can attract much more investment from Taiwan, which holds around $400 billion in foreign exchange reserves. Indian government has been sensitive to investment from mainland China in some sectors owing to security concerns, these concerns are not as acute as with Taiwan. Indian manufacturing could immensely benefit from the Taiwanese experience, especially the contract manufacturing where a product is manufactured at different assembly lines in different places. They have replicated this model in mainland China successfully and turned it into the factory of the world. The model has created employment opportunities for millions of people on one hand and optimized costs on the other. Feasibility study as regards the Free Trade Agreement has been concluded, even though there are hurdles in it, it is hoped that both sides would reach some agreement so as to give a push to the bilateral trade and investment.
Taiwan is upbeat about its investments in India with the inauguration of Narendra Modi as prime minister. Modi is widely seen as a pro-investment prime minister who also visited Taiwan when serving as the chief minister of Gujarat. No wonder Taiwan is building an industrial city in Gujarat, the land for which has already been allocated. Early in June 2015, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs unveiled its new exports-transformation strategy by choosing Gujarat as Taiwan’s new investment base. The ministry plans to take a new original brand manufacturing (OBM) model to cooperate with India’s domestic brands. The OBM model, unlike Taiwan’s previous model of contract manufacturing, is not aimed at utilizing cheap labor in India, but rather will use the concept of industrial parks. It will integrate Taiwan’s advantages in production, research and technology with India’s sales channels and brands, so as to deepen bilateral cooperation and introduce Taiwanese products into India, the Middle East and North Africa (Lu 2015). With India’s ‘Make in India’ campaign Taiwanese panel display maker Innolux Corp is also exploring opportunities for making an investment in India, and many more Taiwanese companies may follow suit.
On the cultural front if only 100,000 people are going to Taiwan every year, the figure is almost 30 times higher for the people coming from Taiwan, albeit most of these are tourists. There is a huge scope for this sector, especially the Buddhist and traditional Indian culture including the Yoga. Education sector is another area where India and Taiwan can join hands. Thousands of Indian students have found their ways to the western universities with huge human capital investments. Taiwanese universities that are in sync with the western education standards and state of the art infrastructure could be another destination for such students with reasonable tuition fee and lodging expenses. Furthermore, Taiwan has been offering 25 scholarships to Indian students every year, indeed many Indian students have chosen Taiwanese universities for higher studies. Another area where India could benefit from Taiwan is the teaching and learning of the Chinese language. With the rise of China, China’s ever increasing economic and political clout has impelled people across the globe to learn Chinese language, in India too there is a ‘rush’ to study Chinese. There are political as well economic reasons to study Chinese in India. The announcement made by the then Human Resources Development Minister Mr. Kapil Sibal in 2010 that India will introduce Chinese language in all Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) schools from 6th standard was a welcome step. However, the announcement has hardly seen any implementation. When China offered to train Indian teachers and dispatch their own for the cause, the Indian side showed reluctance and apprehension in moving forward. It was only in 2014 that China dispatched 22 Chinese teachers who are mostly concentrated in and around Delhi, and it is believed that they have found the task of teaching students extremely difficult as only one class has been offered to them per week. In the face of such a scenario, Taiwan Education Centers (TEC) seems to have filled the gap. Today there are four TECs in India, located in Delhi, Noida, Sonipat and IIT Madras. There is a possibility that the TEC may see expansion in India owing to above reasons.
As far as security ties are concerned these are not even at nascent level. There is lot of reluctance and caution from the Indian side lest these affect India’s bilateral ties with Beijing, and also Taiwan’s ties with the US to some extent. It has been reported that US once stopped Taiwan from approaching India for a joint project on satellite launching. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan has been more aggressive in developing relations with India as they have adopted quite anti-mainland policies, and even stands for declaring independence. DPP also established intelligence exchange and track-two dialogues with India, like ‘Taiwan-India Security Dialogue’ between the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in India and the Institute of International Relations (IIR), National Chengchi University (NCCU) of Taiwan, and ‘Taiwan-India-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.’ However, such initiatives gradually ceased after Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. It appears that the task of establishing strategic cooperation in the security field will continue to remain an uphill one. If the KMT is trounced in general election this year, the DPP may wish to restore some of the initiatives and diversify into some other areas.
It was in the light of these issues that Think India brought out a special issue on India and Taiwan Relations in 2013. Now the issue with a few modifications has been brought out in a book form. The volume carries eleven essays by eminent Indian and Taiwanese experts, political personalities, retired diplomats and budding scholars who have looked into the various facets of India-Taiwan relationship covering various domains such as history, trade and investment, educational exchanges, experiences of development, and security issues.
The first two papers by Professor B. R. Deepak stimulate reflection, open a debate and provide the readers with some much overlooked perspectives, perceptions and approaches from the Republic of China (ROC), the British India and Tibet as regards the Tibet issue. Different approaches from the nascent ROC under Yuan Shikai during Simla Conference (1913-14), and later under Chiang Kai-shek, and how they tried to hedge the British supremacy in Tibet and claim Tibet have been discussed and analysed. It was these approaches that have prolonged the Tibet question for so long and sowed the seeds of Sino-Indian rivalry in the times to come.
The third paper, again by Prof. B.R. Deepak discusses that owing to the commonalities in thoughts and actions of the Indian and Chinese nationalists, they forged close ties not only at the individual, but also at the organizational levels. It posits that while the early Indian nationalists sought to charter the course of armed struggle to dislodge the British from India, in the second phase the Indian leaders representing the Indian National Congress (INC) sought to establish links with the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party in China. Indian leadership especially Nehru was of the view that there was much in common in the struggle carried out in different colonial countries, including the unification drive in China in the 1920s, therefore, there was a need to forge close ties and alliances, so that mutual support could be extended amidst each other’s freedom struggle. The paper holds that it was this thinking of Nehru and other national leaders in India including Mahatma Gandhi that culminated into Nehru’s China visit in 1939 and Chiang Kai-shek’s India visit in 1942, albeit Chiang’s prime objective was to muster India’s support for war efforts. The quest for alliance with China did not die out even after liberation of China, however, things that unfolded thereafter took a different shape altogether.
Lin Hsiao-chen analyses the events unfolding in the China-Burma-India Theatre of War during the Second World War and argues that unless and until one’s national interests are not harmed; there is no question of countries supporting each other. The formation of the CBI Theatre of War is no different. The UK continued to appease the Japanese as long as its colonial interests were intact in Southeast Asia and Asia. The US too was on a similar footing, even though it has denounced the Japanese aggression but had maintained neutrality too. It was only when the Japanese threatened Burma, and later bombarded the Pearl Harbor that the British and the Americans were forced to take China seriously. Chiang’s India visit should also be seen in the same context.
Prashant Kaushik, digs out an interesting piece from the special issue of the Eastern Miscellany dedicated to Mahatma Gandhi upon his assassination in 1948 and renders it into English. The piece was written by Luo Jialun, the first ambassador of the Republic of China to India, who provided a vivid first-hand account of attending Gandhi’s funeral to the Chinese readers.
Prof. Chen Mumin’s paper explores Taiwan’s quest for a strategic ally in the face of an increasingly powerful and assertive China. He posits that India that also harbors a deep suspicion of China’s growing power projection, appears to be an ideal choice, for it is a nuclear power, a rising economic giant on the world stage, and powerful enough to be a stalwart ally in the event of Beijing’s threats and responses. He poses the question whether Taipei and Delhi are interested in forming such an alliance at all? He analyses the state of Taiwan- India relationship, and says that both have shown interests in upgrading the relationship to a strategic level in recent years. He however, subscribes this phenomenon, to a large extent, in response to China’s rising influence in the region, and ‘trust deficit’ between Beijing and New Delhi.
Prof. Parris H. Chang takes a historical perspective of the India-China relations, especially since the establishment of the PRC, and the circumstances under which relations between India and the PRC deteriorated. His paper maintains that Delhi did not see the usefulness of the ties with Taiwan, contrary to China courting Pakistan in the light of “enemy’s friend is my friend” paradigm. It was only after the close of the Cold War, and particularly after India initiated the ‘Look East Policy’ that India started to pay attention to Taiwan, not from a security point of view, but in terms of trade and investment as it saw Taiwan as a potential partner. He concludes that India needs to deepen and strengthen relations with Taiwan in all areas including information sharing as both are facing similar challenges. China factor has been clearly attributed as a rider and a factor in adopting caution in developing the relations between India and Taiwan.
Prof. Kalim Siddiqui analyses the economic policies adopted by India and Taiwan since late 1940s. He draws interesting analogy between the two by arguing that both were ruled by colonial governments, i.e. India was under British rule, while Taiwan was under Japanese rule; and both, on the eve of their independence, had similar levels of per capita incomes, widespread poverty and colonial economy albeit there have been differences as regards size, population, culture and history. However, presently while Taiwan has catapulted itself to the level of developed economies, Indian economy is still struggling in terms of low productivity, existence of immense poverty and unemployment. The volume of trade between Indian and Taiwan is very small standing at US$ 6 billion in 2014. He concludes that there is a huge potential for cooperation between the two.
Tung Yu-li takes stock of the educational and cultural ties between India and Taiwan. She sees complementarity between the growing demand for Chinese language in India and Taiwan’s interest in exporting the education of Chinese language abroad. According to her, despite of strong complementarities, there was hardly any attempt to harness this potential until 2011. It was in 2011 that Taiwan set up its first ever Taiwan Education Centre (TEC) in India. The author posits that cooperation in Chinese language education will become the pillar to uphold India-Taiwan relations in future.
Dr. Janardan Sahu presents a brief general overview of the status of Taiwan Studies in India. He looks into the evolution and different phases of Taiwan studies in India. He also flags some of the obstacles, and argues that there is an urgent need on the part of the Indian scholars on Taiwan and Taiwanese scholars on India to reciprocally strengthen cooperation and have a meaningful academic engagement.
The last paper in this volume by Professor Victor Feng DaHsuan, former Senior Vice President of National Tsing Hua University (NTHU), Taiwan, is in fact his keynote address at NTHU International Conference on Globalization of India-Taiwan Relations and Strategy delivered on 28 April 2013. It deals with Prof. Feng’s association with India, as he was born in New Delhi while his father Paul Feng was serving as bureau chief of the Central News Agency of the ROC in New Delhi in 1946. While speaking to Paul Feng on 20 January 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru said that “If China and India hold together, the future of Asia is assured.” Prof. Feng observes that it is indeed unfortunate that history has not been kind to their mutual relationship in the 20th Century; however, he concludes that for the tranquility of Asia and for the world in the 21st century, India and the PRC should and need to have the best of relations.
Finally, it is pertinent to note that there are indeed very few scholars in India and Taiwan who are working on various facets of India-Taiwan relations. Nonetheless, in 2013 Think India journal explored the idea and brought out a special issue on India-Taiwan relations. Now that the volume has taken the form of a book, we take this opportunity to extend heartfelt thanks to all the contributors, since it would not have seen the light of day without their support. We hope that this endeavor will further strengthen the understanding between India and Taiwan, and pave a way for an all-round development of the cultural and economic relations between the two.
References:
Lu Hsue-hui (2015), “Taiwan Eyes India, Indonesia for Investment” Want China Times, June 13, 2015 http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150613000114&cid=1102. Accessed on July 17, 2015.
“Plot to Create ‘Two Chinas’: India’s Provocation”. Peking Review, 15 (8), April 8, 1966.
S Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol.12, p.408-9, New Delhi. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
“Strong Protest Against Indian Government’s New Crime in Creating ‘Two Chinas’”. Peking Review, 11 (35), August 30, 1968.
Zhao Weiwen (2000), : 1949-1999 (Yinzhong guanxi fengyunlu: 1949-1999≫ Records of Turbulences in Sino-Indian Relations: 1949-1999). Current Affairs Press (Shishi Chubanshe), Beijing.
The Republic of China: How the British were outmanoeuvred in diplomacy over the question of Tibet
B. R. Deepak
Tibet, from the very beginning of 20th century was a bone of contention between China and the British. In order to open Tibet for trade, and more so to check the Russian advance, Britain invaded Tibet in 1904, and forced Lhasa Convention on Tibet. Xinhai Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchus in an armed rebellion.1 The Chinese garrison at Lhasa had revolted and deposed the last Manchu Amban2 in Tibet. The killing of Zhao Erfeng, a Han Chinese bannerman Amban, and brain behind the Chinese expansion in eastern Tibet in December 1911 proved to be a signal for widespread revolt. According to Liu (1921: 540), the Tibetans under the influence of Kalon (the commander of the Tibetan forces in east) declared independence and in March, Tibetan forces at Kelunbu were first to raise the banner of revolt. Following this the entire Tibetan region was engulfed in revolt. The Chinese forces stationed in Outer and Inner Tibet were either subdued or forced to surrender their weapons and leave Tibet. Liu also goes on to say that in late June, Tibetan forces invaded Sichuan and occupied Batang, Litang and Daqianlu. In Chamdo, the Chinese garrison under Peng Rishi destroyed the Chamdo monastery.3
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and subsequent expulsion of the Chinese military and other civil officials from Lhasa, the Tibetans under the Dalai Lama exercised de facto independence for the next 39 years. China under the Republicans however, declined to accept this status of Tibet and tried to exert its control on Tibet in one way or another from time to time. The British on their part worked closely with the Tibetan government but were outmanoeuvred by the Chinese in diplomacy.
The Republican government under Yuan Shikai was reluctant to discontinue the Manchu policy of establishing Ambans in Tibet, albeit under a new name, the Administrator of Tibet. In September 1913, it sent orders to Zhong Ying to replace Lian Yu as Amban (Lamb 1966: 381). The presence of Zhong Ying, who was the commander of the Chinese expeditionary forces to Lhasa in 1910, infuriated the Tibetans and fighting broke out yet again. A truce agreement was signed in the presence of the Nepalese resident on December 14, 1913, and Zhong Ying finally retreated from Lhasa to the Indian borders. While still in Chumbi Valley, he received orders from China to stay back in Tibet. Finally, Lu Xingzhi, who the British considered a Chinese spy (Lamb 1966: 398-400), was appointed as Administrator of Tibet but was never permitted to enter Lhasa. Meanwhile, Lian Yu had reached Peking and incited the rulers of Peking against Zhong Ying, blaming him for the Chinese disaster in Tibet. Zhong Ying was finally executed in 1915 by Yuan Shikai government for his crimes in Tibet.
1. The Simla Conference
After Tibet proclaimed independence, the British did not recognise it as an independent state but changed its policy of “Chinese suzerainty over Tibet” to one of “autonomous Tibet.” The British were probably not in position to recognise Tibetan independence due to the existing treaties with China. Another reason could be the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that had reinforced the Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, which is often cited by the British historians as a reason for their “non-intervention” in Tibet. However, other factors such as the collapse of the Chinese control in Tibet after the Revolution of 1911, the Dalai Lama’s support for the British during his exile in Darjeeling (1910-13), the financial difficulties of Yuan’s government, provincial disorder as well as international recognition for the nascent ROC, and the increased Japanese interest in Tibet might have forced the British policy makers to pressure China into accepting the status of Tibet.
It may be recalled at this moment that the main aim of the British was to create a buffer between China and the British dominions along Himalayan states at first instance, and subsequently establish a protectorate over Tibet. The British policy change was hastened by the Chinese pronouncements of forging the union of five races,4 the preparations of a military expedition from Sichuan to Lhasa, and the Chinese proposal to carve a province (Xikang) out of eastern Tibet (Richardson 1998: 541-2; Richardson 1962: 104-5; Lamb 1966: 427). Moreover, the British were apprehensive about Mongolia and Xinjiang falling into the hands of the Russians, hence their desire for at least establishing their control in Tibet. The Russo-Mongolian Treaty of 1912, which accepted Chinese suzerainty in Mongolia but agreed to preserve Mongolian autonomy, further encouraged the British to design and apply the same scheme of things in Tibet on one hand and make the Russians accept the British position in Tibet in exchange for the British accepting the Russian position in Mongolia on the other. Thus the British strategy in real terms was to redefine the status of Tibet to its own advantage and confirm this by a tripartite agreement between the Chinese, the Tibetans and themselves.
The Chinese on their part wanted to reassert their control on Tibet, which they had lost in the wake of 1911 revolution. The Tibetans obviously wanted to assert independence over the entire Tibetan population, including Kham and Amdo in eastern Tibet, and wanted the Chinese to evacuate these places. In order to realise the British ambitions in Tibet, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, made the first move on 17 August 1912. Jordan presented a five point memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protesting against the Chinese military intervention in eastern Tibet and demanding that:
1. China should not intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet.
2. As a suzerain, China is free to station a resident in Tibet but not forces.
3. The policy of the Chinese government of incorporating Tibet as a province of China should be repudiated.
4. If the Chinese government does not give a written acceptance of points 1-3, Great Britain would not recognise the Republic of China.
5. Great Britain would close all its borders to Chinese until China made a declaration to the effect of above-mentioned demands.5
The Chinese government was baffled. They did not accept these proposals when they replied to Jordan’s proposals on 23 December 1912. China declared that it would not convert Tibet into a province of China but reserved the right to dispatch troops to Lhasa for fulfilling the treaty obligations and maintaining peace; it further asserted that there was no need to conclude a fresh treaty as the old treaties were still in place (Wang 1998: 27; Li 1956: 133; Lamb 1966: 462). Citing article II of the Sino-Indian Convention of 1906 (The government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet) and the indemnity cleared by China on behalf of Tibet in 1908, it stated that China had exerted its control over Tibet (Liu 1921: 541; Li 1956: 131-2).
Moreover, the reply asked why did not the British protest when China sent Zhao Erfeng with expeditionary forces into Tibet in 1910-11? According to the Chinese, the question of Tibet was settled between the British and Chinese by the Convention of 1906. Not only this, in 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention on Tibet also recognised Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. However, due to disturbances in many Chinese provinces and other weaknesses, the Chinese government repudiated its initial policy of sending expeditionary forces to Lhasa and reluctantly agreed to participate in a conference in London. The British on their part insisted on Tibetan participation and the venue was fixed at Darjeeling (Liu 1921: 542). The Chinese chose Wen Zongyao as its plenipotentiary but Wen refused to go to India. Wen opined that the Chinese would be better off if the negotiations were held in London not in India. Yuan Shikai then named Zhang Yintang, but the British had not forgotten his participation in the negotiations for the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. Therefore, Zhang was not acceptable to the British. Yuan chose yet another person, Chen Yifan (Ivan Chen), who had been Counsellor at the Chinese Legation in London and was acceptable to the British (Lamb 1966: 470; Li 1956: 135). The British appointed Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, to be assisted by Charles Bell. The Tibetans selected Lonchen Shatra, a senior minister in the Dalai Lama government. The Chinese were reluctant to accept Shatra’s status as a plenipotentiary and suggested he be “an adjoint to the Chinese representative” [as was the case during 1908 Trade Regulations negotiations], but the British insisted for equal status. With British insistence the venue was also shifted from Darjeeling to Simla.