



Glynn Cochrane

# MAX WEBER'S VISION FOR BUREAUCRACY

A CASUALTY OF WORLD WAR I



# Max Weber's Vision for Bureaucracy

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A Casualty of World War I

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# CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Von Moltke's Staff Bureaucracy</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Risk and Scientific Expertise</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Weber's Post-Versailles Bureaucracy</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>German Attitudes Toward Public Service</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Prussian Lessons in Public Health</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Bureaucracy and Society</b>	<b>117</b>
	<b>Appendix A</b>	<b>139</b>
	<b>Appendix B</b>	<b>143</b>
	<b>Appendix C</b>	<b>151</b>

<b>Appendix D</b>	163
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<b>Bibliography</b>	165
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<b>Index</b>	187
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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

After working with the British Overseas Civil Service in the South Pacific, Glynn Cochrane studied social anthropology at Oxford, completed a D.Phil. and became a full professor of Public Administration and Anthropology at the Maxwell Graduate School Syracuse. He was the first Director of a Cooperative Agreement between the Maxwell School and the US Agency for International Development on Local Revenue Administration, and managed research in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He has been an External Examiner in public administration to the University of Dar-es-Salaam and the University of the West Indies and is an adjunct professor at the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland.

In 1973 he was invited by the World Bank to submit a report on the use of anthropology in project operations of the World Bank Group. Recommendations in *The Use of Anthropology in Project Operations of the World Bank Group* (co-authored with Raymond Noronha) were accepted by the World Bank. In 1975 he wrote *Social Soundness Analysis* for USAID, an appraisal system that has been used in agency poverty-related projects work for over 40 years; he helped to design and deliver USAID's *Development Studies* Course.

His publications include, *Big Men and Cargo Cults*, *Development Anthropology*, *The Cultural Appraisal of Development Projects*, an edited volume, *What We Can do For Each Other*. World Bank publications include *Reforming National Institutions for Economic Development*, *Policies for Strengthening Third World Local Government*, and *The Organisation and Management of Tropical Diseases*, co-authored with Bernard Liese and

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Beginning in 1983 he was involved with the implementation of public sector reform, first, as World Bank Advisor on public administration to Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare in Papua New Guinea where, over four years, working with senior civil servants, he helped to draft and to successfully steer through parliament, amendments to the constitution on the role of the Public Services Commission as well as supporting finance and personnel management legislation. He then became UNDP Advisor on Civil Service Reform to the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, Sir Geoffrey Henry, and later worked as a USAID Chief-of-Party on private sector development in Sri Lanka.

As Chief UN Advisor for Civil Service Reform in Tanzania, he successfully argued for the inclusion of local government in a donor-funded reform package that had been primarily designed to reduce the size and cost of the civil service. In 1995 he was invited by Sir Robert Wilson, CEO of Rio Tinto plc, to help develop community policies and local engagement for that company's mining operations around the world. He then spent 15 years in the mining industry.

## Introduction

Weber is the starting point for most modern thinking about bureaucracy. His vision was that bureaucracy would be adopted by all industrialized countries:

No machinery in the world works as precisely as this human machine (bureaucracy).<sup>1</sup> From a technical and material point of view it is unsurpassable. But here are other than technical yardsticks...however much people may complain about the evils of bureaucracy; it would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried out in any field except by means of officials working in offices .... For bureaucratic administration is, other things being equal, always, from a formal point of view, the most rational type. For the needs of mass administration today, it is completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration.<sup>2</sup>

The scale of Weber's ambition for bureaucracy can be seen in the fact that he thought bureaucracy might defeat capitalism:

<sup>1</sup>Weber tended to use 'machine' to refer to army efficiency: 'The result of Weber's military training was a great admiration for the 'machine' as well as a martial and patriotic mentality that made him long for an opportunity someday to take to the field at the head of his company.' Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988, pp. 70–72.

<sup>2</sup>J.P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics*, London, Faber & Faber, Appendix 1, 1955, pp. 125–131.

Let us imagine that coal, iron, all mining and metallurgic products, in addition to alcoholic products, sugar, tobacco, matches, in short all mass products, today already produced by cartels, taken over by the State or State-owned enterprises, moreover, the State-run controlled big estates multiplied...workshops and cooperatives for the needs of army and State officials also administered by the State, in land and foreign shipping controlled by the State, also all railways etc...and all these enterprises held in bureaucratic order... With regard to our society it is highly probable that bureaucratisation will master capitalism—some time, as it happened in antiquity.<sup>3</sup>

Weber also said that: ‘From a technical and material point of view, [bureaucracy] is unsurpassable’ and he said that his bureaucratic model worked ‘exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production.’<sup>4</sup> He added that, ‘Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personnel costs—these are raised to the maximum in bureaucratic organizations. Where charismatic rule is incalculable and transitory, and patrimonial rule personal and unpredictable, bureaucratic rule is both calculating and calculable, systematic, a coherent assemblage of parts manned by specialized personnel, ideally adapted to the domination and administration of men and the pursuit of ends through rules applied without regard to persons.’<sup>5</sup>

Weber’s theory of bureaucracy failed to deliver what he had promised. Robert Merton described the performance deficit of the Ideal-Type in a 1949 assessment that is still relevant today,

The very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances...[and] also lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism. Stress on ‘depersonalisation of relationships’ leads to conflict in relationships with bureaucratic personnel. Specific behavioural orientations

<sup>3</sup>Weber, quoted in J.P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics*, London, Faber & Faber, 1955, p. 158.

<sup>4</sup>Max Weber, *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 333–339.

<sup>5</sup>Max Weber, *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 973, 1111 and 1112; Arnold Eisen, ‘The Meanings and Confusions of Weberian Rationality,’ *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 1, March, 1978, pp. 67–69.

often mentioned are 'buck passing', 'red tape', rigidity and inflexibility, excessive impersonality, oversecretiveness, unwillingness to delegate and reluctance to exercise discretion.<sup>6</sup>

### THE PRUSSIAN ANTECEDENTS TO WEBER'S VISION

Up till a few years before his death in 1920 Max Weber's thinking about bureaucracy was heavily influenced by the highly successful experience of the Prussian General Staff in response to challenges posed by the Industrial Revolution. In the nineteenth century armies were the largest organizations in Europe and America and the Prussian General Staff was recognized as the most efficient and effective organization in Europe and as an organization which had the best scientific expertise. It possessed all the attributes associated with modern bureaucracy namely, hierarchy, specialization, and action taken on the basis of written rules.<sup>7</sup> Von Moltke's military bureaucracy had worked very well; the speed and ease with which victory was achieved in the wars of German unification in the 1860s established the Prussian military bureaucracy as the most efficient and effective organization in Europe and its methods were adopted by all the major European powers.<sup>8</sup>

Helmuth von Moltke's General Staff had developed the first modern bureaucracy, one that was capable of providing a more comprehensive, more realistic, and more predictably precise administrative performance, and at a much lower human cost than the Ideal-Type. The General Staff was a small, discrete, and highly unusual part of the Prussian army of fewer than 500 officers. For Robert Merton, the military characteristics of reliability of behavior, high conformity of personnel, and prescribed patterns of action are all functions of the bureaucratic discipline at the heart of the military institution. 'The military serves as the coercive arm of the state, the "users of force" implied in Weber's definition. Of course, the modern military is itself structured as a bureaucracy, its organizational characteristics of hierarchy, discipline, and conformity rationally designed to increase the effectiveness with which it can defend the state.'<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Robert Merton, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York, Free Press, 1949, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup> C.J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government*, New York, 1963, pp. 468–470.

<sup>8</sup> A. Bucholz, *Moltke and the German Wars*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Merton, 1971, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personality' in A. Etzioni (ed.), *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations*, 2nd edition, London, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, pp. 47–59.

Supporting the idea of Weber's enthusiasm for von Moltke's Staff, Weber's wife Marianne said that the most memorable time in his life was 1870, the year of the Franco-Prussian War when the armies of Helmuth von Moltke, orchestrated by the Prussian General Staff, destroyed the military forces of France.<sup>10</sup> The Prussians shared with Weber a belief in the game-changing ability of an administrative Staff to provide a new way of coordinating and directing the complex administrative arrangements made necessary by the Industrial Revolution. Although Napoleon and Gustavus Adolphus had to be personally present to command their troops, Staff, the new administrative technology developed by the Prussians, enabled its creator and commander von Moltke to destroy his Austrian opponent while he was 200 miles from the front.<sup>11</sup> Weber and the Prussians also shared a belief about the importance of scientific expertise, historical analysis, discipline, and the means of compulsion, as well as office holders having a sense of calling.

Max Weber grew up in a country whose citizens enthusiastically supported the army and a growing number of patriotic associations celebrated Prussian military prowess. The Prussians, as was the case with the British and other European nations, had great admiration for all things military; ex-servicemen were accustomed to wearing their army uniforms and medals when they attended civic and family events. The victory over France was celebrated each year on Sedan Day. Reserve Officer army commissions of which there were 120,000 in 1914 were hotly sought after and veterans' associations had 2.9 million members on the eve of war.

Like young men in many industrialized countries Weber did his national service in the army. In the autumn of 1883, when he was 19 years of age, Weber moved to Strasbourg in order to serve his year in the army. When his time as a recruit was over, he was used to military service, and he displayed more endurance than most one-year men even though he was a failure in the gymnasium. The result of Weber's military training was admiration for its martial and patriotic mentality and he wanted to lead his own company in the field. Later in his year-long national service Weber became a *Korporal-schaftsführer* (squad leader). The new responsibility took more

<sup>10</sup> Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988, pp. 70–72.

<sup>11</sup> J.P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics*, London, Faber & Faber, 1955, p. 79; Henry Spenser-Wilkinson, *The Brain of an Army*, Westminster, Archibald Constable, 1895, pp. 66, 67.

time and energy. However, a year later, in the Spring of 1885, he returned to Strasbourg for his first officer's exercise. He began to enjoy military life: 'My position really is different now from what it used to be, and if, as I confidently hope, I am promoted in two or three weeks, I shall experience the pleasant as well as the useful side of the military establishment.'<sup>12</sup>

During World War I, when Weber was unfit for active service, he became the director of an army hospital in Heidelberg. 'Despite its hideousness this war is great and wonderful and worth experiencing. It would be even more worthwhile to participate in it, but unfortunately, they cannot use me in the field as they would have used me if it had been waged in time, twenty-five years ago. My brothers are all serving in the field or in garrisons; my brother-in-law Hermann Schaefer fell at Tannenberg.'<sup>13</sup> Weber, who normally was isolated at his desk, now navigated in the middle of a stream of the most intensive communal labor. He controlled an expanding network, and under his administration nine new hospitals came into being in the town. In the last years of the war Weber served as a Captain in the reserves and was in charge of a number of military hospitals in and around Heidelberg. As a reserve, medically disabled officer, Weber was in charge of discipline. Dealing with relations with the civilian population Weber says, 'it is highly desirable that for the duration of the war and for the assumption of executive power by the military it should be clearly established by law that the military authorities have the right to prohibit innkeepers and, what is equally important, private persons on pain of punishment from dispensing alcohol or other stimulants to soldiers.'<sup>14</sup>

The Prussian General Staff, which became the backbone of the German Army in the 1914–18 War, was in the ascendant from the establishment of Imperial Germany in 1871 until the end of World War I. In her biography of Weber his wife, Marianne explained at some length how Weber 'did not have a one-sided liberal orientation, for a firmly established national power state appealed to him as the necessary basis of everything else.' At the outset of World War I, Marianne Weber quotes Weber as writing, 'For no matter what the outcome, this war is great and wonderful,' and notes

<sup>12</sup> Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988, pp. 75–77.

<sup>13</sup> Tannenburg was the town in East Prussia where the German Eighth Army under General Paul von Hindenburg defeated the Russian Second Army under General Alexander Samsonov between August 26 and 30, 1914.

<sup>14</sup> Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988, p. 548.

how Weber never did express regrets about the fact of the war. From the biography, it is possible to understand why one of Weber's major concerns in post-war Germany involved the establishment of a strong and responsible leadership.<sup>15</sup>

A.J.P. Taylor said:

Prussian Staff officers brought to nineteenth-century war accuracy, precision, system. German unification was the result of military action led by the Prussian officer class who were completely opposed to the idea of nationalism. Nor was it true to say that the victory rested on material or men. The struggle was mainly staffed by the Prussian army which did not have the manpower of the French. In terms of equipment the Prussians had a better rifle than the Austrians but their artillery was not so good. But the French chassepot rifle was better than the Prussian needle gun, and their artillery was better. Prussia's triumph was a triumph of will, not of material superiority, a triumph of planning, of forethought, of conscious direction. The Prussian Generals were commonplace enough. Not only Bismarck, but Prince Frederick Charles, himself a distinguished General, spoke contemptuously of them. What was not commonplace was the Prussian General Staff, applying business-wise methods to the conduct of an army.<sup>16</sup>

During World War I, Ludendorff, Chief of the Great German General Staff, ran factories, the army and the German state, making decisions on industrial production, foreign relations, rationing, wages, and so on. Indeed, he was a virtual dictator even though he had no political training and possessed poor political instincts.<sup>17</sup> In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles which brought World War I to a conclusion, outlawed the Prussian General Staff. After the Treaty of Versailles had been signed, Weber said he would concentrate all his intellectual strength on 'how to get once more for Germany a Great General Staff.'<sup>18</sup> Marianne Weber, who became Max Weber's literary executrix after his death in 1919, had to remove any references to military thinking from the Ideal-Type model of bureaucracy, which was published in *Economy and Society* in 1922. This redaction was

<sup>15</sup> Allan N. Sharlin, 'Retrospective: Max Weber,' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 49, No. 1, March, 1977, pp. 110–115.

<sup>16</sup> A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1944, p. 114.

<sup>17</sup> A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1945, pp. 172–175.

<sup>18</sup> J.P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics*, London, Faber & Faber, 1955, pp. 107–110.

necessary in order to avoid giving the victorious allies the impression that, despite proscription, Germany intended to rebuild the General Staff.

### WEBER'S MILITARY EXPERIENCE HAS NOT BEEN STUDIED

Talcott Parsons, who was a graduate student at Heidelberg (as well as a student of Malinowski in London) before World War II, and who was largely responsible for introducing and interpreting Weber to American and British audiences, passed over Weber's military experience in his 1864–1964 evaluation of Weber's role as a founder of modern sociology.<sup>19</sup> Nor did he dwell on Marianne Weber's warts-and-all biography of Weber, which did have extensive and interesting detail about his political and military involvements. Parsons was not alone among sociologists in not attaching much importance to Weber's military views and experience.<sup>20</sup> Nor did Radkau's recent biography, which was the most comprehensive look at Weber's life since Marianne Weber's book, highlight any military interest or involvement.<sup>21</sup>

My sense is that the enduring stereotype of the Prussian military, one of intrinsically and unchangeably unimaginative rigid automata with a reputation for brutality, has contributed to the lack of interest in the Prussian military among students of bureaucracy. The Prussians' reputation

<sup>19</sup>Talcott Parsons, 'Max Weber 1864–1964,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2, April, 1965, pp. 171–175; Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988.

<sup>20</sup>On sociological studies of bureaucracy see, David Beetham, *Bureaucracy*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1996; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*, New York, Doubleday, 1960; Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955; Randall Collins, *Max Weber*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1986; Mary Fullbrook, 'Max Weber's Interpretative Sociology: A Comparison of Conception and Practice,' *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 1, March, 1978; H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Editors, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London, Routledge, 1967; Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Democracy*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1954; S.M. Miller, *Max Weber: Selections from His Work*, New York, Crowell, 1963; Frank Parkin, *Max Weber*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1982; Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2004; Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Editors, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1949; Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, (Edited and translated), *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Sam Whimster, *The Essential Weber: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 2004.

<sup>21</sup>J. Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, translated by Patrick Camiller, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009.

as soulless machine-like brutes of the sort conveyed by the opera ‘Wozzeck’ was reinforced by the experience of Wilhelmine and, later Nazi, Germany which popular opinion tends to retroject into the past.

For ‘two generations the German General Staff has stood as an object of hatred, fear and revulsion. In two World Wars, an American military establishment, hastily raised and trained, came face-to-face with the well-drilled and highly organized counterpart...The revulsion came as a civilian afterthought when the need for a scapegoat was felt.’<sup>22</sup>

Stewart Clegg tells us in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology* that:

Weber realized that the modern German state’s success had been possible only because of the development of a disciplined bureaucracy and standing army—inventions that became the envy of Europe. In the military, nothing exhibited bureaucratic discipline better than goose-stepping, which the Prussians invented in the seventeenth century. The body language of goose-stepping transmitted a clear set of messages. For the generals, it demonstrated the absolute obedience of their recruits to orders, no matter how painful or ludicrous these might be. For civilians, the message was that men drilled as a collective machine would ruthlessly crush insubordination and eliminate individualism.<sup>23</sup>

The historian Christopher Clark’s magisterial study of Prussia, *The Iron Kingdom*, pointed out that Prussian militarism was not that much different from other European countries’ militarism.<sup>24</sup> When Max Weber did his national service in the army he obviously regarded the goose-stepping drill as having no great significance; his wife Marianne says that he pleased even higher superior officers with the ‘impeccable elegance’ of his goose-step.<sup>25</sup> The goose-step is still used today by the armed forces of over 50 nations who do not necessarily see the drill as being emblematic of Prussian mili-

<sup>22</sup>Dale O. Smith, ‘Observations of the German General Staff,’ *Military Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring, 1963, pp. 28–34; Walter Goerlitz, *The German General Staff*, New York, Praeger, 1953, p. v.

<sup>23</sup>Stewart Clegg, ‘Bureaucracy,’ in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*, edited by Bryan S. Turner, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 47–48.

<sup>24</sup>Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of Prussia 1600–1947*, London, Allen Lane (Penguin), 2006.

<sup>25</sup>Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, translated by N. Zohn, New Brunswick, NJ, Transition Books, 1988, pp. 70–72.

tarism.<sup>26</sup> Clark said that after 1871 the army became a central institution in Prussia and it emerged from the wars of unification in 'a nimbus of glory.'<sup>27</sup> Both sides in World War I invested in negative propaganda. One fact does seem worth mentioning: during World War I over 360 soldiers were shot at dawn by the British forces and fewer than 50 by the Germans.<sup>28</sup>

Clausewitz, the great warfare strategist, was also affected by the negative Prussian stereotype. He has been portrayed as the intellectual progenitor of Prussian aggression. In his work, *On War*, Clausewitz had stated<sup>29</sup>:

war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means ... war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different ... war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense ... if war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief [i.e. the Chief of the General Staff in the German system] a member of the Cabinet, so that the Cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.<sup>30</sup>

The Prussians had not always been so vigorously detested. In 1815 England was grateful to Field Marshall Blücher and his Prussian forces for the decisive assistance he provided to the Duke of Wellington when fighting Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. However, within 100 years England had gone from being Prussia's friend to being an implacable foe. In a speech delivered at the Mansion House Guildhall, in London, Prime

<sup>26</sup> Originating in Prussian military drill in the mid-eighteenth century, the step was called the *Stechschritt* (literally, 'piercing step') or *Stechmarsch*.

<sup>27</sup> Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of Prussia 1600–1947*, London, Allen Lane (Penguin), 2006, p. 341.

<sup>28</sup> Murray Williamson and Alan Millet, *A War to Be Won*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 396–337 (during World War II the Germans executed over 10,000 soldiers).

<sup>29</sup> Raymond Aron has demonstrated that popular ideas about Clausewitz and his supposed enthusiasm for aggression and total war were mistaken since he was in favor of caution and prudence. Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, London, Routledge, 1983.

<sup>30</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605.

Minister Asquith declared that England would not rest until Prussian militarism was destroyed and eliminated from Europe. In 1947 the victorious allies did away with Prussia and the name of Prussia.<sup>31</sup>

## AND CULTURAL FACTORS HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED

It is unlikely that we can have a highly efficient bureaucracy in a society whose other social institutions place little value on minimizing costs or maximizing output. In the course of the analysis of Prussian bureaucracy it became convinced that cultural factors must have played a more prominent role in the analysis of bureaucratic performance than had been acknowledged.<sup>32</sup> Weber's model was not connected to any particular society or cultural orientation and as a result bureaucratic theory has tended to treat cultural factors as if they were extrinsic variables, something to be added in after all the other factors had been considered.<sup>33</sup> Surely, cultural factors should be seen as an embedded feature of bureaucracy, as intrinsic factors?<sup>34</sup>

My experience in large complex organizations has been that administrative behavior tends to reflect the cultural endowment of the public servant though not always in any obvious ways. For example, although Australians are renowned for their lack of reverence toward authority I cannot think of a people who are more addicted to legalisms, agreements, rules, status, hierarchy, and all the other incidents we associate with bureaucracy. The French '*rationalisation des choix budgétaires*,' (RCB) properly suggests the

<sup>31</sup> Michael V. Leggiere, *Blücher: Scourge of Napoleon*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Weberian bureaucracy has not had a large following among anthropologists. An early study was Alexander Leighton's, *The Governing of Men*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1955. Despite the title, Fallers did not rely greatly on Weber. See Lloyd A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of Political Evolution Among the Basoga of Uganda*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965. Meyer Fortes, complained that Weber did not use ritual. See Fortes's article 'Ritual and Office in Tribal Society,' in *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*, edited by Max Gluckman, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1963. Ronald Cohen and Gerald Britain, 'Toward an Anthropology of Formal Organizations,' an unpublished MS, Northwestern University, June 1978; and later, *Hierarchy and Authority: Anthropological Perspectives on Bureaucracy*, Philadelphia Society for the Study of Social Issues, 1980. There is also material in Louis Dumont. See, *Essays on Individualism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986 and Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*, Paris, Gallimard, 1966.

<sup>33</sup> Glynn Cochrane, 'What Can Anthropology Do for Development?' *Finance and Development*, Vol. 11, No. 2, June, p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Dwight Waldo, 'Organization Theory: Revisiting the Elephant,' *Public Administration Review*, November/December, 1978.