

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe



Philipp H. Fluri · Gustav E. Gustenau
Plamen I. Pantev (Editors)

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe

Continuing Democratic Reform
and Adapting to the Needs
of Fighting Terrorism

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Preface by the Editors

As in the rest of Europe, September 11th and its global consequences have triggered an intensive security-political debate in the European Union, the effects of which will become noticeable in the field of the Reform of the Security Sector. Although there was considerable awareness for the dangers of terrorism even before the devastating attacks in the United States, which stem from memories of potential terrorists attacks by extremist political or religious groups, complete awareness of the dangers of terror were limited to few European countries (which experienced separatist movements). After 9/11, the “war on terrorism” was rapidly turned into the central security-political issue and found entrance into all strategic documents and policy and military planning scenarios.

Nearly all over Europe, the increased attention security forces need to pay to preventing and defending against potential terror threats have lead to strains in civil-military relationships. On the one hand, civilians showed an increased need for security, but on the other hand, one fears that through concentration of power with security forces, civil rights could be undermined and democratic control of armed forces and the police weakened.

Within the context of coping with these new security-political tasks, civil-military relations have become a new challenge to the reform countries in South East Europe. Different than in the well-established democracies and market societies in Western and Middle Europe, where the population demonstrates a high level of acceptance versus security institutions, South East European citizens fact their own security apparatuses with massive mistrust. The reasons for this damaged relationship are numerous: they range from negative experiences with security forces in the past authoritarian communist regimes, which dominated the region until 1990/91 to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s, which made it difficult to differentiate between the practices of paramilitaries and “regular” armed forces.

Even following the end of the fighting, “weak states” in the Western Balkans struggle to make their population find confidence in government institutions again. In this context, the European Union and NATO play a central role. The perspective of future membership in these two organisations has become the main propulsive factors for reforms of the security sector. The EU and NATO will have to stand up to the responsibility of

promoting the establishment of democratic mechanisms for regulating and controlling civil-military relationships – in spite of, or even in the face of the danger of global terror.

European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged South East Europe in a comprehensive discourse on the comprehensive reform of state and societal institutions. Structured and well-planned reform programmes aimed at creating integrated European institutions and norms have inevitably created a focus on Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, and Washington D.C., adding extra demands to each national government's domestic, regional and international activities. This is not always to the advantage of the government in office: exceeding compliance with international reform programmes while at the same time under-focusing on the socio-economic needs of voters may lead to a failure to achieve re-election, as in the case of the last Bulgarian government.

The explicit understanding is that all South East European states should be considered eligible for membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Reforms therefore coincide largely with programmes whose ultimate objective is integration. The tacit understanding is that security sector reform cannot ultimately be successful without democratic-institutional reform, and improvement of socio-economic conditions. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has explicitly made this three-pronged approach its own, and added a so-called 'table' for regional programmes to it. Other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations focus on one or the other point.

The invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an improvement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a change of the very 'culture of security'. What is at stake is a shift from the 'culture of state security' to a 'culture of cooperative security', embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative security.

This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro-Atlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of 'un-learning' the past. *Accountability* – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. *Parliamentary and public democratic oversight* of the security sector budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of parliamentary and public control. *Civil-military relations* with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of Defense, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the state. *Civil society organizations* will develop the sufficient competence

and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing the para-state or para-party organizations that previously disseminated ideas to the public (for good or ill, as vested political interests dictated). *Collective cooperative security*, as provided by an alliance of sovereign states, will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expectations of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of *human security* will replace the concept of security for one's nation alone.

Though the whole of South East Europe is engaged in a discourse on security sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civil-military relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media, civil society and academia) have yet led to homogenous or at least symmetrical and sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the global coalition in the 'fight against terrorism' has accelerated development in some departments of the security sector (even Bosnia-Herzegovina is preparing participation in peacekeeping operations). It has, however, at the same time led to a standstill if not a backlash in the evolution of a culture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian law. As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, human rights and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them.

While security sector reform undoubtedly progresses in South East Europe, the same can not be said about global developments in the security sector. As Robin Luckham points out in *Governing Insecurity*¹, the triumphal advance of Western liberal democracy in some parts of the world is paralleled by international inequalities and a new form of military politics. Whereas coups and military governance have been on rapid decline, new forms of civilian autocracies are emerging, based on coalitions of the ruling elites with security services other than the traditional military. Whereas many countries are 'in transition', it remains doubtful what this transition will lead to. The image of one 'happy Transatlantic security family' as cherished by securocrats on both sides of the Atlantic is thus put seriously into question when we decide to apply finer instruments of heuristic concepts such as assessing 'countries genuinely in transit', those that are 'challenged democracies', 'democracies managed by elites', and those that are regressing toward authoritarianism behind a smoke-screen of democracy. In most 'transition' democracies there remains a struggle over who

¹ Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books, 2003).

defines 'national security' and national security policy. The revival of international *realpolitik* in the last two years could also raise a demand for strategically placed military regimes (in places such as in Pakistan and Colombia).

The dissenting and disaffected in South East Europe, those who believe that things were better for everyone before, because in nostalgic retrospect they were better for *them*, will be hard to please. Their voices are hardly ever heard at meetings at the governmental level, for governmental policies foresee compliance with (or at least the need not to challenge) the stipulations of security sector reform. They are, however, most unlikely at this point in time to try to voice their grievances by means other than the democratically permitted ones: demonstrations; votes for opposition parties; and lengthy declarations read out at meetings (often made possible by well-meaning non-governmental organizations funded by the same governments which propose security sector reform as a transfer of norms).

It would thus be insincere to claim that all citizens of South East European states (1) understand and (2) willingly accept security sector reform, or in fact, the trinity of democratic-, economic- and security sector- reform, as it would be insincere to claim that most citizens of the Euro-Atlantic community member states (1) understand and would (2) gladly accept far-reaching interferences with their customary lifestyles, even though their ultimate goal may be substantial improvement of people's welfare and security. Security sector reform because of its strong impact on society is a negotiated process. The incentive of ultimately being able to join the very institutions which propose security sector reform may, however, itself be as strong a motivation as added human security is.

The present study, supported by many enthusiastic experts, provides an excellent outline to the status of civil-military relations in South East Europe – from Slovenia to Turkey – and reflects on the progress, problems and challenges to the Reform of the Security Sector. Additional value can be found that its authors seek to view these topics in the light of the current global security-political issues, above all in the war against terrorism. It is to be hoped that the effort to independently monitor South East European reforms in the security sector will be continued.

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Introduction

Plamen I. Pantev

The study of evolving civil-military relations in South East Europe and the special accent on the continuation of democratic reforms while adapting to the needs of fighting terrorism is both a logical follow-up inquiry into the subject, and a reflection on the new challenges life posed to the peoples and states in the region after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Studies published by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)¹, by the Groningen Centre of European Security Studies² and by the UK-run Civil-Military Relations Network Newsletter³ among others have showed the subject has attracted the interest of an increasing number of respected experts in the last five years.

The present study was carried out by the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia as part of a collaborative effort with two long-standing partners – first, the Austrian Directorate General for Security Policy, the Bureau for Security Policy and the Austrian National Defense Academy, Vienna, and, second, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the combined context of the Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group and the Security Sector Reform Study Group of the PfP Consortium of the Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

The research effort, undertaken by ISIS with the support of the project co-partners was taking place when issues of civil-military relations and

¹ Ph. Fluri and Vel. Shalamanov (eds.), *Security Sector Reform: Does It Work? Problems of Civil-Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Security Sector* (Sofia: Corecta 2003), 77–185; Jan Trapans and Ph. Fluri (eds.), *Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. A Self-Assessment Study, Vol. I and II* (Geneva/Belgrade: Dragan Srnic, Sabac 2003); Ph. Fluri and David Law (eds.), *Security Sector Expert Formation – Achievements and Needs in South East Europe* (Vienna: NDA, IPSCM May 2003).

² David Greenwood and Peter Volten, *Security and Defense in South East Europe: The ESCADA Report* (Groningen: CESS 2003).

³ Andrew Cottey, 'Civil-Military Relations and Defense Diplomacy After 11 September: New Dynamics', *CMR Network Newsletter*, <http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk>, Issue Five 2002; Tim Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform in Southeastern Europe', *CMR Network Newsletter*, <http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk>, Issue Six, 2002.

democratic control of the security institutions in the post-Cold War world were evolving and gaining support South East Europe or the Balkans as a valid theoretic assessment tool. We considered enough time has passed since the study of 2001 to come back to the topic, re-evaluate previous assumptions and try to understand better new processes and facts. The pressing needs of the security sector to reform and fight terrorism in a more efficient way were also calling for assessing the impact that this change will have on civil-military relations and democratic control over security and defense organizations in South East Europe. The need for having more homogeneous criteria, essential to assess recent developments was obvious during our first study. It was persistently stemming from the general trend of the emergence of a security community of nations in the Balkans – part of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic civic and security space. Both the theoretic progress and the practical needs to cope with a new threat – terrorism – intensified the need for greater homogeneity of standards for the evaluation of civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces and the other security agencies in the region.

Another important reason to come back to the issue is the invariably high worth of the commodity called “regional stability”. As observed in the previous study, the maturity of civil-military relations and democratic control of the security institutions is reflected significantly in the general security situation of the region. A democratically- and legally-established system of transparency and accountability of security and defense institutions is a confidence-building measure with a broad positive effect on stability in bilateral, multilateral and regional relations in the Balkans.

The study aims at outlining the theoretic preconditions of fighting terrorism and at reviewing the persisting old and the new security risks and instability in the Balkans. It aims at analysing continuity and change in civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces and the security sector reform during the fight against terrorism and at finding specific reflections of these developments on the Balkan countries and the region. Specific humanitarian law requirements for democratic control of the armed forces are analysed with the intention that this normative perspective will be realised and internalised by the security sector players from the region. There is a worrisome tendency of exaggerating protection of society and state at the expense of the individual’s freedoms and liberties – a tendency we consider should be temporary and proportional to the battle on terrorism. The study aims also to acquaint the reader with the specific national perceptions, wording, terminology, and expressions brought by the individual authors, to record the level of discussion in each of the countries of the region. Finally, the study aims at comparing the national

perspectives of the discussed topics – a comparison – made according to a relevant methodology.

The core of this methodology is the understanding that civil-military relations (CMR), democratic control (DEMCON) and security sector reform (SSR) are at different stages of their evolution in the different Balkan countries, as concluded in the first study on these issues in 2001. Being a significant component of the regional security and stability they need to be continuously monitored, studied and improved in each individual case. The need to adapt to the requirements of fighting terrorism has an impact on CMR, DEMCON, and SSR. The consequence of this adaptation on the individual nations deserves a special theoretic inquiry and may lead to adequate recommendations for the future. The harmonisation of activity of the South East European countries on CMR, DEMCON and SSR, considering the variety of levels of evolution in these areas of the individual national cases is more than a theoretic challenge – it is a practical need in the efforts of homogenising security and defense fields essential to the process of shaping a common Euro-Atlantic strategic culture.

Another core element of the methodology is the tailoring of specific questions about the individual nations' evolution of CMR, DEMCON and SSR. After the initial screening of the CMR in South East Europe in the study of 2000/01, the targeted state of these relations led us deductively to a definition of problem areas in each country. The 'targeted state of affairs' included the standard NATO/PfP requirements on CMR, DEMCON and SSR as well as developed and tangible normative expectations in the evolving security situation. The South East European experience is also expected to contribute to improvements in that field.

There are three exceptions in the applied methodology, intentionally made in the study for the purposes of the geographic widening of the research. First, the inclusion of the Greek and the Turkish cases required some background information to cover the developing situation in the two old NATO states. Second, the Hungarian model case of scrutinising only one aspect of the SSR – the transformation of the intelligence system and what changes are required for the DEMCON of that particular sector. Third, the Romanian case, which concentrates on the priority security threat and interest – the fight on terrorism, and on the particular measures of responding to the requirements of having adequate DEMCON over the security sector while this fight continues.

The most ambitious methodological novelty of the study was to try to outline the general regional picture of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the period of fighting terrorism, basing the analysis, assessments and conclusions on *all* South East European countries' experience without exception and in one and the same theoretic framework of study. We consider this approach

both theoretically and politically correct. The process of homogenising the security attitudes, culture and standards of the ‘security community’ of South East Europe, which is in the process of progressively shaping itself, requires all national cases to be included. This is also politically correct since most Balkan countries are getting closer and closer to NATO and the EU: they are either NATO and EU members or aiming to be NATO, PfP and EU members. In a NATO and EU organisational setting, South East European countries need to speak the same language on security and defense issues, they need to share a common vision, regulative and behavioural culture on CMR, DEMCON and SSR. The very agreement of *all* national-case writers to be part of the same team under a single methodology, known by *all* in advance is a conceptual and intellectual breakthrough in the security studies of and in the Balkans. This is a strong reflection of the expectations by the South East Europeans of our common Euro-Atlantic future, which encourages various changes in specific ways in each of the countries towards common values, standards, norms and attitudes on CMR, DEMCON and the security sector relationships in general. The participation in the study of our Greek friends is especially valuable since Greece was until 2004 the only EU and NATO member country of the region and bears an incomparable experience. The participation of our Turkish colleagues is invaluable: Turkey is the most powerful state in South East Europe, a staunch NATO member and the enlargement of EU to the East would be incomplete without this country since we all need to get closer together on key strategic issues. The participation of our Slovenian colleagues gives another promise for the developments in the fields of CMR, DEMCON and SSR: Slovenia is a post-Communist and post-Yugoslav country, which proved that both legacies can be overcome and that membership in NATO and EU is possible for all the other countries of South East Europe with similar historical, social, economic, political and cultural experience. The participation of an expert writer from Bosnia and Herzegovina proves that even the hardest of all national cases bears both critical self-assessment and optimism potential of being an equal partner in the family of Balkan and European nations. The closure of the gaps in the fields of CMR, DEMCON and SSR bears a special meaning for the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole region towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

The theoretic developments which influenced this study deserve mention, as they are different from the previous one in 1999–2001.

In the beginning of 2002 Anthony Forster outlined three major challenges of CMR which dramatically redefined our understanding of how the armed services interact with civilian authorities and more generally with civil society: epistemological, ontological and practitioner- and policy

maker-led challenges, moving scholars towards a new research agenda⁴. Dr. Forster argues that there are increased possibilities of applying new knowledge to CMR issues; enhanced opportunities for interdisciplinary research, and, to root the study of CMR in approaches which have stronger theoretic foundations⁵.

In late 2002 Gerhard Kümmel proposed to distinguish six interdependent and interpenetrated dimensions in an attempt to cover the full scope of CMR: economy, finance, technology, culture, society, and politics⁶. He adds an important aspect of the issue: CMR may look differently depending on the moment in time that they are observed. CMR should be differentiated, according to Kümmel in peacetime, crisis situations, traditional military operations (defense, deterrence, attack), and non-traditional military operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, etc.)⁷. Kümmel highlights another key perspective on the issue of CMR: different dimensions have both a national/domestic and an international context⁸.

Theodor Winkler⁹, Dylan Hendrickson, Andrzej Karkoszka¹⁰, and Heiko Borchert¹¹ develop the concept of the security sector reform – a far broader concept than the traditional CMR, for addressing security problems. According to Th. Winkler the security sector reform is composed of five elements:

- (1) The reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to democratic principles and the needs of state and society,
- (2) The starting point is a broad view of the term ‘security’, including military, societal, economic and environmental security risks,

⁴ Anthony Forster, ‘New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agenda’, *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 1:2 (April 2002), 71.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Gerhard Kümmel, ‘The Military and its Civilian Environment: Reflections on a Theory of Civil-Military Relations’, *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 1:4 (December 2002), 67.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Theodor H. Winkler, *Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order*, Occasional Paper – No. 1 (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, October 2002) 40.

¹⁰ Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, ‘The challenges of security sector reform’, in: *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 175–201.

¹¹ Heiko Borchert, *Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI): How to Advance Security Sector Reforms with the Help of a New Assessment and Development Framework*, Paper of the WG on SSR (Berlin: PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 6th Annual Conference, 15–17 June 2003) 23.

- (3) The reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organisations, and border guards,
- (4) Security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens,
- (5) The reforms concern both the organisation of the security sector (legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labour) and the human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating services staffed with professionals¹².

Heiko Borchert, borrowing from Timothy Edmonds' ideas of the first and second generations of reforms in the sector of CMR and DEMCON¹³, outlines the parameters of a third generation of SSR: provision of adequate capabilities and improvement of co-operability among Security sector actors¹⁴.

All these and other contributions to the theory of CMR, DEMCON and SSR allowed the authors of this region-encompassing study to upgrade the applied theoretic framework. There are *five specific features* of the research framework that comprise the five main theoretical accents:

First, the issues of CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to be key problems of the *transition* of most of the societies and states in South East Europe from totalitarianism to democracy, from wars to post-war rehabilitation and from post-war reconstruction to normalcy. Without reforming the security sector the security institutions of the old regimes may continue to have a 'say' in the life of the new, democratic societies. The fight against organised criminality becomes more difficult or even impossible without the SSR as the example of Serbia and Montenegro showed most vividly, but examples of that kind could be noticed in all post-totalitarian societies and states with no exception. Lack of stability, dependence on criminal structures keeps foreign investors away from South East Europe and without substantial investments, the economic and infrastructure retardation of the region cannot be overcome.

Second, CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to experience the influence of ethnic pressures of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and of ethnic clashes of 2000/01 in Southern Serbia and FYROM/Macedonia.

¹² Theodor H. Winkler, *Managing Change...* 10–11.

¹³ Timothy Edmonds, *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*, Report for the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva: DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-packages/ws_criteria221101/DCAFSSRReport1.pdf, 2001).

¹⁴ Heiko Borchert, *Security Sector Reform Initiative...* 4.

Notwithstanding, CMR, DEMCON and SSR in South East Europe in general become more characteristic of the '*regional security community*' that is emerging in the Balkans. Thanks to domestic stabilising effects, the growing transparency in the security sector of each country is perceived by neighbours as a *de facto* confidence and security-building measure. The general security situation in the Balkans is improving and efforts to prevent conflicts become more effective. The region becomes more predictable from a security point of view and the chances of diverting public attention and energy on economic and other constructive areas increase for the good of the people of South East Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic zone.

Third, on the conditionality of sound CMR, DEMCON and SSR policies, which are to be followed by NATO and EU accession, produces multiple effects. It improves the domestic and the broader regional security situation of the Balkans and increases the likelihood that current non-NATO and non-EU members will be *integrated in the Alliance and the Union*. PfP, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and OSCE also play driving roles in the evolution of the security sector towards integration in both major European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Without covering the requirements in the area of CMR, DEMCON and SSR, integration in NATO and EU becomes virtually impossible and this has been well understood by the leading elites of the Balkan countries.

Fourth, a basic need of implementing the third generation of SSR, though in many individual cases fundamental, first or second-generation reform deficiencies are still to be observed, stems from the *fight against terrorism*. This would be impossible if on a domestic, regional and broader international level the different components of the security sector did not work cooperatively in identifying and neutralising terrorist groups. Of course, SSR should not be identified with anti-terrorism activities, but surely, it is a main motivation for reform of the security sector. The reform is also needed because of the obligation of new democratic societies (and older ones) in South East Europe to preserve the balance between the security interests and the support for democracy and human rights while the fight on terrorism still goes on.

Fifth, the SSR focus of the countries of South East Europe is needed for plain *good governance purposes of the security sector*. People understand how important security is for their everyday life. What they understand in parallel is that the more economic the 'security commodity' is, the better their economy and standard of living is going to be. That is why state budgets and professionalism in the security sector are turning more and more into topics of public discussion and the interest on these topics will grow.

Finally in this introductory part it could be shared that the present study bears features of more maturity in the perception and assessment of CMR, DEMCON and SSR issues in the Balkans, compared to the first one. A generally higher level of education and knowledge of indigenous experts on these topics, a general improvement of the domestic and regional security situation in South East Europe provide the opportunity the critical analysis and assessments of the individual authors to be translated in a logical and principled way into working practical recommendations for policy-making. The ‘spill-over effect’ of the intensified theoretic research in the field of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the last years is paying back in a very practical way in South East Europe. The participation of scholars from Austria, Canada and Switzerland alongside with their colleagues from South East Europe in carrying out this study confirms this assessment.

Part 1:
Old and New Security Risks and
Instability in the Balkans

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism: The View from South East Europe

Plamen I. Pantev

1 Introduction

Intellectual investment in the fight against terrorism comprises the widest spectrum of perspectives, issues, methods, approaches, instruments, etc. Definitely the new evil of the 21st century will induce reactions and pre-emptive acts by the developed world that may make more likely dealing away with terrorism or at least – strongly limit its potential.

If we do not downgrade our level of analysis and responsibilities as students and doers of security, we shall avoid two mistakes: first, start believing that everything about terrorism is learned or written and that we should just implement what we know, and, second, ignore the possibility that terrorists may manipulate or influence structural trends of the international system to improve their chances of reaching ‘their ends’.

There are “bodies of knowledge” that need to be constantly treated and developed – no matter how far we have come in our understanding of terrorism with the purpose of reaching success against it in the very, very long struggle ahead of us. One such ‘body of knowledge’ is about the *deep philosophy and logic of the motivational model of terrorism*. What makes terrorists prone to suicide acts? Which social systems and situations trigger the psychological mechanisms that create the phenomenon of terrorism with its specific motivations, aims, targets, instruments and methods? The answer to these questions may help go deeper into the motivational nature of terrorism.

Another important ‘body of knowledge’ that needs to be further studied and improved is about the *roots of terrorism as one form of psychological warfare*. Modern, religious-motivated and large-scale deadly terrorism seeks particular effects on a target public so that its ends are reached more easily: “Re-establish the Muslim state throughout the world; overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’; remove Westerners from Muslim countries;

kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere; Jihad".¹ Fear, insecurity, panic, irrational reactions are just instrumental in influencing the people who can agree with the final ends of the terrorists.

Many other such 'bodies of knowledge' need to be continuously studied and developed to enable us to fully grasp the phenomenon. In this study the possibility of terrorists influencing and/or manipulating international relations and individual countries' foreign political behaviour is of special interest. Creating chaos in the most powerful country of the world is a priority of terrorists. Their dream, however, is the re-ordering of international development, and of individual countries, thus creating a more effective and instrumental environment to reach the goal of re-establishing the Muslim state throughout the world. Interest is further driven by the character and level of perception of terrorism in the individual Balkan countries and in the region in general. The differences in perceiving and reacting to the threat, the insufficient predictive power of evolving tendencies in global and regional international relations and of the potential utilization of these tendencies by terrorists may lead to negative consequences for South East Europe and for the broader international system. This is a development that should be prevented.

There is another pressing reason to deal with these questions: the quest by some states for short-term financial, economic or geopolitical advantages because of the global character of terrorism and the mounted pressure on the United States to be the leader in reacting to the threat. We must be clear on this issue: the fight against terrorism does not mean utilizing the side-effects of the struggle of the active anti-terrorist states by some other countries. The fight against terrorism rather means a comprehensive national investment by all states into this struggle, since terrorists attack and aim at disrupting the very core of statehood and the trust of people in their elected governments.

The aim of this chapter is to outline the scope and magnitude of the impact of terrorism on the present system of international relations and how this is reflected in the regional development of South East Europe. A critical assessment of the present anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities in the Balkans is made on this basis and some improvements of the strategic thinking to better cope with the challenge.

¹ Ronald G. Bowdish, 'Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces', in Sam J. Tangredi (ed.), *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington, D. C.: INSS, ND University, 2002) 84.

2 Modern Terrorism: Specific Challenges for the Structure and Functioning of the International System and for the Individual States

2.1 Main Features of Modern Terrorism

There is no formally recognized international legal definition of terrorism². The US National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003) defines terrorism as: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”³. Magnus Norell, a Swedish expert on counter-terrorism, provides the following working definition:

the “systemic use of illegitimate violence by non-state or sub-state actors, specifically aimed at non-combatants and/or civilians to achieve specific objectives. These objectives could be political, social or religious depending on the group in question. Terrorism becomes international when it is carried out beyond the borders that define a specific group’s country of origin, or when it is targeting foreign nationals within a specific group’s country of origin”⁴.

In addition it could be said that terrorism today is really global: terrorists are organised in networks and can operate from every corner of the world. The neutralisation of one segment of the organisation would not mean the end of the whole network. Next, we face terrorists who have religious motivation to strike, making them fanatical and ready to act in an indiscriminate manner. ‘Burning’ all infidels, including by nuclear and/or other WMD is a very significant part of the thinking of the new terrorists. The deep satisfaction of the leaders of Al Qaeda from the large casualties in the

² At the Berne, Switzerland meeting of the PfPC ESSG on 22 April 2002 Col. Nick Pratt, USMC (Ret.) said there are 109 academic definitions of ‘terrorism’. On 2 April 2002 Islamic nations failed to come up with a common definition of ‘terrorism’ at a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Malaysia. The obstacle was the diverging views on the nature of the Palestinian struggle against Israel – ‘freedom-fighting’ or ‘terrorism’ (FT, 3 April 2002, 2). Prof. Dr. Kemal Beyoghlou, a US counter-intelligence expert underlined on 16 September 2002 at a lecture to the Atlantic Club in Sofia that the best short definition of terrorism is ‘a politically motivated attack on civilian non-combatants’. Chris Donnelly of NATO focuses on terrorism as a ‘tactic’ (Donnelly/CND/2002/090/Spain/26.04.2002, 5).

³ ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ (Sofia: Wireless Files, US Embassy, 18 February 2003) 2.

⁴ Magnus Norrel, ‘The Role of the Military and Intelligence in Combating Terrorism’, *Romanian Journal of International Affairs*, VIII:4 (2002) 42.

WTC in New York was recorded and distributed over the globe by the terrorists themselves.

For the working purposes of this study it will draw arguments from the following key features and perspectives to the phenomenon of terrorism:

- a) It causes death to innocents and people removed from the conflict,
- b) It is an instrument/tactic of waging military activity,
- c) It has an unclear territorial and legal subject identification,
- d) It is becoming more lethal,
- e) It demonstrates a large-scale 'suicide power', compromising the traditional rational approaches in applying military violence,
- f) It is global in magnitude,
- g) It is fanatical and religiously motivated,
- h) It is becoming more indiscriminate towards its victims,
- i) The use of WMD is an irrational and yet direct purpose of terrorists.

2.2 The System of International Relations Under the Pressure of Terrorism

First, the main features of modern terrorism underline the increased role of non-state actors in global affairs, causing definite changes in the very morphology of the system of international relations. Non-state actors, even if they are just small groups, even if possessing powerful technological instruments, can cause damage that traditionally only national armed forces could inflict. Such small non-state actors operate in one third of the countries of the world (or maybe more). Even state actors may submit to the powerful network of terrorist non-governmental groups.

Second, terrorism interacts also with the socio-economic environment of the system of international relations. Underlying conditions of poverty, economic backwardness, low level of health care and education create resentment for terrorists to exploit. This has been registered by the G-7/8 summits in the last two years and for sure will remain their major focus in the years to come. Ellen Laipson correctly highlights the inadequate explanatory power of poverty and humiliation as sources of terrorism⁵. Futile or failed attempts to interact with and adapt to the West are even stronger causes of becoming susceptible to recruiting as a terrorist. The interaction of terrorism with the socio-economic environment of the interna-

⁵ Ellen Laipson, 'While America Slept: Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, 82:1, January/February (2003) 143–144.

tional system has another aspect too: billions of dollars and millions of jobs were lost only in the United States after the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. Many financial relationships had to be rebuilt and many manufacture and trade activities reorganized. This is a serious reminder of the consequences of terrorism on the international system and individual state actors.

Third, terrorism provoked the stability of the fluid configuration of centres-of-power relationships. Al Qaeda took the risk of polarizing further the natural differences of interests of the major power centres in the beginning of the new century. The expectations of the terrorist network are of sharpening those differences and portraying the role of the organization as an influential global political player. The instinctive reaction of the great powers to the terrorist provocation was taking anti- and counter-terrorism positions. This is a valid assessment almost three years after the tragic events of 11 September. As the crisis around Iraq proved, however, anti-Americanism is continuously exploited by global terrorism, and various international actors go on using hatred towards the USA as a political expedient. Neither the great and big, nor the small and less powerful states should be blind to the fact that the United States is openly targeted by terrorism as the world's hegemonic and lone superpower. Any opportunistic exploitation of this targeting for balance of power (multi-polar vs. unipolar) purposes is counter-productive for the civilized progress of globalization and serves petty, short-term and narrow purposes. This is not a call for the launch of a global pro-US 'PR-campaign' by all anti-terrorist forces, but a reminder how blind anti-Americanism is pragmatically exploited for the ends of terrorism. The centres of power of the 21st century world bear a special responsibility to find a more stable and lasting state of interrelationships for the sake of depriving global terrorist networks from global destabilization potential.

Fourth, the terrorist acts of 11 September had regional ripple effects. They polarized the Middle East, Chechen and other conflicts in Asia and Africa further. Another structural level of the system of international relations – the regional and local conflicting knots – also experienced the pressure of the new terrorist activity. South East Europe was no exception. However, the region was already on the way to its stabilisation and the negative effects of this pressure were rather limited. The regional destabilisation by global terrorism is neither cancelled, nor slowed down. Hence, South East Europe will continue to be susceptible to terrorist pressures and activity as long as it is not firmly anchored to the EU and NATO.

Fifth, terrorism after 11 September caused re-conceptualisation and reformation of one of the priority sub-systems of international relations – security. The traditional 'containment' and 'deterrence' conceptual

frameworks could no longer provide explanation and adequate response to such acts. The high probability of terrorists getting hold of WMD already puts global strategic stability under great risk. Because of the changed focus of terrorism, states neglect other grave global security threats: environmental, socio-economic, humanitarian, etc. Understanding and internalizing these effects is an indicator of the maturity of SEE countries, and their readiness to be effective partners in building-up cooperative security in the 21st century.

Sixth, mass-scale terrorism had an impact on the regulatory system of international relations. Regulatory measures of coercion assumed new and sharper forms. The civilized existence of human society was jeopardized. A very drastic effort has been made in eliminating negotiation as a means of solving problems and reaching non-violent ends. The role of military force and, if needed – violence – have regained preeminence as a means of social stability and orderly existence. This is considered a legitimate reaction to the application of indiscriminate violence by terrorists.

2.3 *The Risks and Challenges for the Democratic Society and State*

The democratic and freedom-loving part of the world can hardly accept the situation described in the preceding paragraph but as a temporary one. No country with a democratic or democratizing society should stay aside of the effort of depriving terrorism from its blackmail and society-degradation capacity. People expect that the fight against terrorism will end with a victory and they will resume their way of democratic and free life as it was before 11 September 2001.

However, this is only one of the concepts on how democracies must react to terrorism. Other- also quite sober- views reflect another thinking, which seek to to have society adjust to the phenomenon of terrorism rather than attempt at rooting it out, being part of social life as it is nowadays. The core of that thinking is that democratic countries with their open societies, freedoms and civil liberties are always going to be vulnerable to terrorism. These societies will never be able to protect *all* targets, *all* the time, against *all* possible attacks, which means that terrorism will always be attractive to foes of democracy. Though public and individual vigilance is constantly mobilized by the democratic state, fighting against terrorism, and the expectations from that fight should remain realistic while seeking to diminish the vulnerabilities of democratic open societies.

Both concepts have legitimate arguments and a possible resolution of the dilemma seems to be in following two parallel tracks of behaviour:

First, despite the necessary limitations of certain rights and liberties inherent to democratic society during its fight on terrorism, protecting the foundations of democracy and keeping all measures against terrorism within the confines of established- though more sophisticated democratic procedures- is mandatory for any democratic state. Balancing principles with interests is not an easy job, but it is the only way to overcome tensions or crisis of a democratic society in fight with itself while targeting and struggling against terrorism. US Secretary of State Colin Powell warned on 1 August 2002 in Brunei against “using the campaign against terrorism as a way to suppress legitimate dissent or as a way to suppress people presenting their views to government”⁶. Then he added that “if we are going to prevail over terrorism, really going to prevail over this plague on the face of mankind, then we have to do it in a way that respects human dignity and the rights of men and women”⁷. An area in which democratic governments and societies risk failing is an eventual excessive accumulation of power in any one too centralized institution. Ellen Laipson asks a very legitimate question, concerning US democracy: “Should terrorism push the United States to revise its core belief in checks and balances?”⁸

Second, efforts should be exerted to democratize Islam and prevent Islamic clerics from hindering the process. A bottom-line of discussing the issue is that Muslims are not the problem – radical Muslims are. Radwan Masmoudi, President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a US-based think-tank, was quoted by the ‘Christian Science Monitor’ saying that “the key to a viable future is a coalition of moderate Islamists and non-Islamists committed to representative government”⁹. Nadcem Kazmi of the Al-Khoei Foundation in London supports this claim by saying that there is a “need for a diplomatic process to develop a ‘cohesive authoritative fatwa’ for delegitimizing terrorism”¹⁰.

Of course, embarking, working on and fulfilling these ambitious goals would require the creation of civil societies with due respect to pluralism in Muslim countries. Muslims who study the integration of democracy into Muslim societies underline the key role of Muslim intelligentsia in

⁶ Colin Powell, ‘Rights Must Be Protected in Anti-Terrorism Fight’ (Sofia: Wireless Files, US Embassy, August 5, 2002) 10.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ellen Laipson, ‘While America...’ 146.

⁹ Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 2003, ‘Easing into Islamic Democracy (Convinced by their experience in the US, American Muslims are helping form democratic coalitions in the Muslim world and are building their case on Islamic principles)’, by Jane Lampman, staff writer to the CSM.

¹⁰ Ibid.

changing public attitudes and in logically discarding medieval models preached by some Islamic clerics. It would be in the interest of Islam and all other faiths if it improves its internal religion's organization by establishing and strengthening supra-national leadership and control structures.

A fundamental strategic goal, however, of both Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals should be de-politicising the difficulties of the adaptation of Islamic fundamentalism to the requirements of globalisation. In the last decade adapting to the needs of the global international environment became the main focus of policy of the majority of states. Other states and non-state actors, however, perceived the new developments towards a global world as a danger for their existence. Hiding behind the existing differences of the religion and culture of the Middle East, which is also predominantly poor while the Western developed world is mostly rich, the proponents of radical Islam decided to attack. The terrorist acts of 11 September aimed at defining politically the format of the clash of radical Islamic religion and the approaching economic, political and cultural globalization. The advantageous form of the clash was 'suffering Islam' against the 'Americanization of the world'. The 'clash of civilization' mentality, poverty in the Muslim world, failed states – especially Muslim ones are trends that terrorism tries to exploit. A major frustration of radical Islam is the readiness of individual Muslims all over the world to embrace globalisation as an opportunity to improve their living standards and to have a better life – with more and better chances to have a choice. This readiness of Muslims to embrace globalisation and to discard conservative Islamic fundamentalist habits and relations very probably unbalances all who profit from manipulating the souls of the believers.

The success of globalization and democracy is the result of the victory of the struggle for democratic rights in the non-Western world and of the fact that state boundaries and sovereignty cannot save those who oppose social, political and technological progress. Another reason is the creation of more and more effective forms and institutions of global governance. Attacks against proponents of these tendencies and on global centres governing these processes is seen as the right way to save Islamic fundamentalism in its extremist and aggressive interpretation. Killing anything that is 'global' remains the only option for the 'ultimate guardians' of the fundamentalist traditions – a very radical interpretation of social and religious life indeed.

3 Threat Perception of Terrorism in South East Europe: Lessons Learned and Lessons Yet to Be Learned

Contradictory tendencies and processes characterize the real magnitude of the terrorist threat and its perception in South East Europe. *On the one hand*, terrorism has interests in the Balkans. SFOR and KFOR, NATO member countries and candidates for membership in the Alliance being allies of the United States are targets of terrorists. South East Europe bears the geopolitical potential to be a barrier to Islamic extremism and terrorism. Bulgaria's ethno-religious model is an obstacle to the expansion of radical Islam of another type – cultural. The 'clash-of-civilization' philosophy of Al Qaeda simply evaporates on Bulgarian territory. This is due both to the specific interpretation of Islam by Bulgarian Muslims and to the well-developed political model of inter-ethnic relationships.

The Balkans' links with terrorism stem from the general criminological situation in a region torn of conflicts for more than 12 years. Mafia-like structures in the Western Balkans particularly could be motivated for more instrumental (political) purposes. Fighting organised crime, cutting the links of criminals with nationalist parties and separatist movements is a major step forward in preventing activation of terrorist cells.

Balkan countries are involved in the global coalition against terrorism. Even Bosnia and Herzegovina is preparing to participate in peacekeeping operations as part of the counter-terrorist struggle and post-conflict reconstruction efforts – a development hard to imagine in the middle of the 1990s. Managing domestic affairs through the Western Balkan countries' own institutions will be an important contribution by the region of South East Europe to the anti-terror campaign.

External support in limiting Balkan terrorist activities came in the form of the US Administration's designation on 3 December 2001 of two groups in the region – the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands (KKCMTSH) as extremist, thus permitting the US Treasury Department to block their US assets and stop them from conducting financial transactions with people in the USA. This measure was important, because the two groups' violent tactics aimed at undermining democracy and threatened efforts to secure peace and stability in FYROM/Macedonia, Kosovo, southern Serbia and the region. The meaning of 'extremist violence' in the US Administration's terminology includes inciting ethnic conflict or other obstructionist acts to promote irredentist or criminal agendas that threaten peace, stability and security. It is interesting to note that counter-terrorist forces in Afghanistan found Kosovo Albanian participation on the side of