Juha Manninen • Friedrich Stadler
Editors

The Vienna Circle in the Nordic Countries
Networks and Transformations of Logical Empiricism
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Networking was a crucial part of the activities pursued by the community of scholars known as the Vienna Circle. After 1929, the informal discussion group around Moritz Schlick sought to reach increasingly wider audiences through conferences and publications. Even before the Vienna Circle ‘went public’, it had already aroused interest in the northern countries of Europe. Empiricism was the common ground, soon joined by modern logic. A peculiarity of the Nordic countries and their small universities was that professors of philosophy were usually responsible for psychology as well. This only increased these professors’ interest in Vienna; after all Charlotte and Karl Bühler were working there too.

After he had read Hans Reichenbach’s *Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A Priori* in 1923, Eino Kaila was the first to seek contact with the exact philosophy emerging at the time. Reichenbach’s reprints of his papers on probability and induction helped forge a long-lasting tradition around these topics in Finland. In 1926, Kaila coined the name “logical empiricism” to point out the distinguishing features of the new attitude. Correspondence with Schlick and Rudolf Carnap led to Kaila’s being invited to engage in discussions with the Circle – both with and without Schlick – during the days the Circle’s manifesto was being drafted in 1929. In the Vienna of the early 1930s, Kaila did an empirical study on how young children respond to the human face. Together with his students, especially Georg Henrik von Wright, Kaila was able to make Helsinki a northern center of logical empiricism, to be enriched later by von Wright’s own close contact with Wittgenstein in Cambridge.

Danish modernism had been influential all over in the Nordic countries. The radical philosopher Jørgen Jørgensen joined the network of the Circle after publishing a treatise on formal logic in 1931. Important for the philosophy of law was Alf Ross’ visit to Hans Kelsen. A number of Danish psychologists were interested in the Vienna Circle, and one of Jørgensen’s main works was a study on the biological foundations of psychology.

From the perspective of the Vienna Circle, the famous physicist Niels Bohr had made Copenhagen an especially interesting city. Carnap lectured in Copenhagen on the character of philosophical problems in November 1932, presenting his ideas on logical syntax and/or semantics in transition. He went on to speak in Stockholm, Lund and Gothenburg, as well as Oslo. Two years later Carnap’s first publication in English in the new journal *Philosophy of Science* was based on his Scandinavian lecture notes. One central thought was that philosophical “proposals” – inseparable from empirical research – should replace more traditional “theses”. Otto Neurath made similar trips preparing the ground for “The Second International Congress for the Unity of Science” on the problems of causality, with
special consideration of physics and biology, held in Copenhagen in June 1936. This conference was the single most important step in consolidating the new philosophical attitude in the Nordic countries, especially among young philosophers.

Sweden had an antimetaphysical tradition, centered in the main university in Uppsala, but this tradition was neither empirical nor logical in the sense of modern logic. Åke Petzäll visited Vienna in 1932. A small book he published presents the results of his conversations, especially with Friedrich Waismann. In 1935 Petzäll launched a new journal, *Theoria*. It proved to be an important forum for the exchange of ideas and criticism between the networks of Logical Empiricism – or: Unified Science – and philosophers from the Nordic countries. In addition, Ernst Cassirer was a refugee in Sweden, and a friend of Petzäll; thus he was able to continue his unique neo-Kantian career and dialogue with the logical empiricists.

In 1934, Arne Naess, a young Norwegian, joined the discussions of the Circle. Together with Ernest Nagel and A. J. Ayer, he became part of Schlick’s circle very late in the day. At the “The Third International Congress for the Unity of Science” in Paris 1937 Naess joined Neurath’s group for empirical semantics against Carnap’s logical semantics. This would later be a line of research for him and his students, although only one line of the many topics he dealt with.. Naess received the only chair for philosophy in Norway at the age of 27, with the help of evaluations from Kaila and Jørgensen. He led a very active life until his death in January 2009.

Shaped by his experience in the resistance movement, Naess was a man who could not be easily pulled away from his convictions. He was active in his own country – unlike the Vienna Circle refugees in the U.S.A. – and thus largely unaffected by the climate of the Cold War. Naess’ career seems unusual compared with those who had to leave their home countries. But it can also be a test case of what could have happened if it would have been possible for logical empiricism to flourish in the areas of its origin.

One of the least known networks of the Vienna Circle is the “Nordic connection”. This connection had a continuing influence for many of the coming decades, beginning with the earliest phase of the Vienna Circle and continuing with a number of adaptations and innovations well into contemporary times. Some of the individual members of this network are remembered, such as Georg Henrik von Wright. But little attention is now given to the fact that these individual members communicated intensively with each other as well as with the Vienna Circle and its international continuation in the Unity of Science movement.

An attempt to correct the earlier somewhat restricted view of the European perspective of the Circle was made by the Institute Vienna Circle in co-operation with the Helsinki Institute for Advanced Studies, where both of the editors of this volume were able to work together for some time. We also wish to thank the Helsinki Center for Nordic Studies, especially Johan Strang. This co-operation resulted in a symposium entitled “Networks and Transformations of Logical Empiricism: The Vienna Circle in the Nordic Countries”, which took place in Helsinki in
Editorial

September 2007.

The interest aroused by the Helsinki symposium was very encouraging. We are happy to publish in the present volume most of the papers that developed out of presentations in this symposium.

On January 12, 2009 Arne Naess passed away in the age of 96. One of the editors was happy to have met this extraordinary philosopher and man for the last time in Oslo just before the conference took place in Helsinki. After this impressive visit, Arne Naess sent the following message which was read by the organizers at the opening of the conference:

“I was so glad when Friedrich came to see me in Oslo some days ago, more so when he told me about his symposium. My stay in Vienna in the 1930’s was a significant time in my life and to be able to attend some of the seminars there played an important role in my development as a philosopher, even as a person.

Probably to console an old man almost 96 years old, Friedrich mentioned the possibility of my attending this conference. It was a very nice thought and I would have jumped at the offer 10 years ago, or even 5 years ago, insofar as a 90 year old could jump! But no, I can only envy you from afar the chance to inspire one another and to wish you and the conference every success. Arne Naess (Oslo, Norway)”

This volume is dedicated to Arne Naess in commemoration of his unique life and work.

Helsinki and Vienna, June 2009

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Friedrich Stadler
(University of Vienna, and Institute Vienna Circle, Austria)
Arne Naess – A Biographical Sketch

Arne Dekke Eide Naess was born on January 27, 1912 in Oslo. After a long and successful life he passed away on January 12, 2009 in Oslo as the most renowned Norwegian philosopher, where he was honoured with a state funeral. He was one of the most important public figures in Norway and in his later years became known all over the world as a pioneer of the ecological movement.

Given this publicity in recent decades his earlier life was forgotten or obscured in a sense – especially his student years in Paris, Vienna and Oslo before the outbreak of World War II, when he attended the famous Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick during a stay in Vienna 1934–36. Here he wrote his dissertation Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten (Knowledge and Scientific Behaviour) which was published in Oslo by the Norwegian Academy of Science in 1936.\footnote{Arne Naess, Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten. Skrifter Utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo. II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse. 1936. No. 1. Oslo: I Kommissjon Hos Jacob Dybwad 1936 (249 pp.).}

Before the beginning of his unique academic career, he had studied philosophy, psychology, mathematics, and astronomy in Paris and in 1933 he submitted two Master’s theses on the concept of truth and behavioural psychological principles (in Norwegian). From 1938 to 1939 he was in Berkeley, where he conducted empirical behavioural studies together with the psychologists Edward C. Tolman and Clark L. Hull. Before, he actively participated in the “Third International Congress for the Unity of Science – Encyclopedia Conference” in Paris, July 1937, where he discussed in some private meetings his conception of truth intensely with Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and others. As a result of his studies in the context of these discussions Naess published Truth as Conceived by Those Who are not Professional Philosophers (1938).\footnote{Arne Naess, Truth as Conceived by Those Who are not Professional Philosophers. Oslo 1938. I am grateful to Juha Manninen (Helsinki) for indicating to me the context of this publication: cf. his manuscript Developments and Tensions within the Vienna Circle. Helsinki 2009. (forthcoming).}

The Congress is described in my The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Wien–New York: Springer 2001, pp. 377-382. The Proceedings of that Congress were published as volume 6 of the series Einheitswissenschaft/Unified Science/Science Unitaire, ed. by Otto Neurath and Jørgen Jørgensen. (The Hague 1938). This issue includes a discussion of Egon Brunswik’s paper “The Integration of Psychology into the Exact Sciences” by Carnap, Naess and
Circle’s doctrine of empiricism in 1937-1939 in his manuscript *Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Empirismus von Otto Neurath und Rudolph Carnap.* (How Can the Empirical Movement Be Promoted today? A Discussion of the Empiricism of Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap”) which was published in Oslo only in 1956 (Reprinted in Naess 1992 and 2005). In his Vienna times he did additional research with the Viennese psychologist and Vienna Circle member Egon Brunswik (a proponent of the Karl Bühler school), which was to be continued in Berkeley in exile. Before World War II Naess contributed several related articles to the Swedish Journal *Theoria* 1937ff., which was an important forum for the scientific communication between Viennese and Nordic philosophers even during the war-time years.

At the age of 27 Naess was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo in 1939, a chair which he held until his early retirement in 1970. During the War he participated actively in the Norwegian Anti-Nazi resistance movement. After 1945 Naess became head of an UNESCO project on the East-West Conflict (1948–49) and served subsequently as editor of the philosophical journal *Synthese* (1950–1963), while in 1958 he founded and edited the (still existing) interdisciplinary journal of philosophy *Inquiry*.

In this period (1940–1955) Arne Naess became well known as a an activist of the international peace movement and as an adherent of Mahatma Gandhi, before he succeeded as the founder and philosopher of the ecological movement (coining the terms “deep ecology” and “ecosophy”) after 1970.

Following his retirement as a professor he travelled a lot as visiting professor all over the world (to Vienna again in 1984 at the Institute for Advanced Studies) and later on, from 1991 on, continued his highly productive intellectual life at the still existing “Centre for Development and Environment” at the University of Oslo.

His numerous publications include some 30 books and a large number of articles, most of them collected in the 10 volumes of the *Selected Works of Arne Naess*.

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Edgar Rubin. The unpublished manuscripts are located in the Neurath papers (Haarlem, NL): Nr. 196K. 30-33.


4 Cf. the contribution of J. Strang in this volume.


6 *Inquiry* is currently ed. by Wayne Martin (University of Essex) and is published with Routledge. On the role of Naess decisive for introducing modern social science in Norway see Fredrik W. Thue in this volume and his *In Quest of a Democratic Order. The Americanization of a Norwegian Social Scholarship 1918–1970.* Oslo 2006.

7 See the website: www.sum.uio.no.
In March 1936 Naess lectured in the Schlick-Circle on “Logic and Scientific Behavior” (Logik und wissenschaftliches Verhalten), presenting the main claims of his forthcoming book Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten:9

His approach was methodological-psychological, and was an endorsement for basic research fostered by a consistent behaviouristic analysis (language behaviour). It addressed the descriptive and normative perspective and offered a formal calculus of discussion. He also argued for a relativistic and contextual meaning theory, providing rules of discussion. From this followed an anti-foundationalist approach as opposed to classical (propositional) logic principles. It focused on the problem of non-ambiguity, which is not attainable, favoring a sort of sociological behaviourism, e.g., discussing common-sense behaviour. It thus challenged the dualism of an exclusive true-false dichotomy, while maximizing the comparisons of statements according to the principle of intersubjectivity, conceived of as an objective-psychological methodology.

Naess also presented his insight that propositional logic is not applicable to every day life and science, which is based primarily on empirical research on laymen (cf. Naess 1938).10 By the way, the contested notion of a (scientific) fact shows surprising parallels to the claims of Ludwik Fleck’s contemporary sociology of science.11 As a summary of this presentation one can speak of an early psychological and sociological turn in epistemology and philosophy of science rejecting pure formal logic.

Naess’s dissertation Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten (Knowledge and Scientific Behaviour) – regrettably not included in his Selected Papers – was finished in 1934/35 in Vienna and published in Oslo 1936 by the Norwegian Academy of Science.

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9 Naess, „Logik und wissenschaftliches Verhalten“. Shortened and reworked manuscript. 18 pp. Vienna Circle Archives (VCA) Haarlem (NL), Neurath Papers R 45c. (18 pp.).
In his preface the young philosopher refers to the Vienna Circle members of his generation Rose Rand, Heinrich Neider, and Walter Hollitscher thanking them for their help.\footnote{12} In four chapters the book deals with 1. an objective-psychological description of objects and contents of knowledge, 2. existing investigations into the intersubjective and objective-psychological description of the objects and contents of knowledge, 3. the way of behaviour as unity of scientific behaviour, and 4. on the properties of objective-psychological judgments and the development of scientific behaviour in relation to the judgments of classical logic and to the statements of the natural sciences. An overview and epilogue closes this publication in the spirit of the Viennese empiricism.

According to the author\footnote{13} the aim of his book was a solution of objective-psychological problems by an objective-psychological description of behaviour and an attempt to “objectivate”(objektivieren) the problems of epistemology, psychology of knowledge, and classical logic – similar to Egon Brunswik’s work in psychology. The method was an objective-psychological description, which could replace the description of knowledge and contents of objects (despite of difficulties). The conclusion was that any epistemology, the subjective psychology of knowledge, and the theory of meaning can be replaced completely and practically by an objective-psychological description of scientific behaviour (with references to Ernst Mach). Accordingly, there is no room for foundationalism with a logic of inference, but rather a dynamics of models. It is not surprising that Naess underscores the relativity and time dependence of all models of knowledge, referring to a certain frame and context, which, e.g., seems to anticipate Paul Feyerabend’s “contextual meaning”.

In retrospect Naess wrote on Logical Empiricism in the Vienna Circle as follows:\footnote{14}

My doctoral thesis in philosophy of science was an effort to remind us that in science the content of a theory is not independent of research behaviour – the activities of observing, confirming, disconfirming, and so on, and that these are set within a deep context of place, history, and culture. Later, as a postdoctoral researcher at the UC Berkeley, I studied the behaviour of experimental psychologists doing animal research.

In 1934 and 1935 I studied in Vienna and ... became a member of the famous Schlick seminar, the main discussion group of the Vienna Circle. Their quest for clarity and cordial cooperation in pursuit of knowledge led me to appreciate that ‘What do I mean?’ is an open question. I concluded that we never intend to express anything extremely definite, even in mathematics or symbolic logic. I saw the importance of using empirical methods to find out how we actually use certain expressions and sentences. I developed and applied a wide

\footnote{12} “Ich möchte hervorheben, daß die Verfasser, die mich bei der Ausführung dieser Abhandlung am meisten beeinflusst haben, zum Teil am wenigsten darin erwähnt sind. Dies gilt für die europäischen und amerikanischen Pragmatisten und für die Verfasser des Wiener Kreises ...”, Ibid., p. 6.
\footnote{13} Naess, Erkenntnis, p. 243ff.
\footnote{14} Naess, “Author’s Introduction to the Series”, SWAN I, 2005, p. lxiii f.
variety of such methods, which became part of the core for empirical semantics that runs through my work. I continued to do this type of research into the 1990s …

And continuing on the background of the dissertation he writes:

In one of my earlier studies, I reviewed about 700 articles from philosophers concerning their use of the word truth. For the most part, I found these unconvincing and soon started on empirical studies of the use of truth among ordinary non-professional people and schoolchildren … Many philosophers seemed to assume that ordinary people hold very naive views about these deep matters. I found through research that, on the contrary, the views articulated by these ‘ordinary’ people were every bit as sophisticated as those held by professional philosophers. This reinforced my conviction that, generally, we greatly underestimate ourselves. Much academic philosophy was narrowly focused and abstract. …

As a consequence, Naess arrived at his life-long attitude of a value-laden scepticism:

My empirical and historical research led me to realize that there are no certainties and that there is a great diversity in our spontaneous experience as well as endless ways to describe and appreciate the complexities and values of the world. Thus, I realized that I am one of those lifetime seekers that the ancient Greeks called a zetetic … From my research on scepticism and the foundations of science and logic, it became clear to me that pluralism (every event has many descriptions and possible outcomes), possibilism (anything can happen), and a healthy scepticism (always seeking truth but never claiming it) make up the most consistent approach to respecting the perspectives and experiences of others, human and nonhuman.

From my empirical studies of semantics, and from my knowledge of several languages, I came to appreciate the complexity of communication … One of the most important discoveries coming from this research, leading to my major book, Interpretation and Preciseness … , was the insight, that we cannot avoid values in any field of endeavour or research.\footnote{15}{Ibid.}

In 1934 Naess lectured in the Gomperz-Circle,\footnote{16}{Stadler, The Vienna Circle op.cit, p. 442-452; Martin Seiler/Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper und die österreichische Philosophie. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1994.} a discussion group around the philosopher Heinrich Gomperz at the periphery of the Vienna Circle. He spoke “on dichotomies of propositions, in particular the dichotomy of ‘true’ and ‘false’” (Über Zweiteilung der Sätze, insbesondere die Zweiteilung in „wahre“ und „falsche“).\footnote{17}{Naess, „Über Zweiteilung des Sätze, insbesondere die Zweiteilung in „wahre“ und „falsche““. (13 pp.). VCA Haarlem, Neurath Papers R 45-46.} After – according to Naess – a theory on an absolutistic notion of reality was skipped, the table of content indicates his approach with an empiricist
and behaviourist theory of science as exemplified by the ways the notions of truth were used and applied:

1. Classical logic, basic research and the notion of truth: theories of truth are constructed and interpreted with a lack of aims. There is an arbitrary and undefined usage; e.g., Hilbert’s propositional calculus, and the need for rules for the application of concepts is obvious.

2. A comparison of the notions for statements in different types of text shows that ‘true’ has no exceptional status: there are many variants of opinions, most of them diffuse and tentative, but with a similar function like “it is true, that …”. Empirical semantics documents this communication in every day life and science.

3. The “true/false”-dualism does contribute nothing to linguistics and the practice of science because of an arbitrary and undefined usage that asks for rules of application.

4. Rather, the “true/false”-dualism contributes to ontology, especially to absolutistic conceptions of reality. Why then theories of truth and logics in history of philosophy? Which type of logic should be chosen? (Is there any temporal or modal logic?). Without doubt, the notions of truth and reality were important in the history of philosophy (classical logic) for ontological reasons, but leading to generalisations and absolutist interpretations. As a consequence the codification of the dualism with ontological commitments followed.

In his summary Naess argued that in science and every day life the dualism of true and false generated a sort of pseudo-science “logic” comprising the whole set of judgments and disregarding all other possible and applied related notions. There exist many types of concepts and opinions, most of them diffuse and tentative, but with a similar function. An axiomatization of all these usages is impossible and a choice has to be made between them – which converged strongly with the empiricist and common sense position held by Neurath and Richard von Mises. Here the question is whether we are accepting a “pragmatic turn” in logic or succumbing an ideological-metaphysical tendency.

The German manuscript Wie fördert man die empirische Bewegung? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Empirismus von Otto Neurath, und Rudolph Carnap was written by Naess in 1937–1939 and published only in 1956. The reason for this delay in publication was according to Naess the lack of knowledge about Logical Empiricism in Norway before World War II. It deals critically with the writings of Neurath and Carnap in the 1930s, but also with some of their later developments. Naess formulated its general aim as an empiricism “without dogma” and with “research”, but not with “science” (as scientism). The reworked and expanded English edition of this manuscript appeared as “How Can the Empirical Movement be Promoted Today?” in From an Empirical Point of View and was reprinted in

his *Selected Works* (with appendices on references and remarks on the empirical movement).

In this study, Naess made a strong case for empiricism inspired by Neurath’s and Carnap’s positions regarding physicalism and Logical Empiricism. The chapters will be described as follows:

1. There are no universally valid demarcation criteria.
2. Carnap’s and Neurath’s demarcation criteria: physicalism
3. Carnap’s term *Language*
4. What are the Terms of Science?
5. Carnap’s Term *Physical Language*
6. Carnap’s Term *Reducible*
7. Concluding Remarks on the Formulation of Physicalism
8. Is it at All Possible to Determine the Meaning of a Statement?
9. Specification of Space and Time Does Not Protect Us from Anti-empiricism
10. Research Programs Instead of Theses. Models Instead of Systems
11. On the Reification (“Vergötzung”) of Theoretical Constructs in Psychology
12. Physicalism and Some Proposals Concerning the Technique of Discussing
13. The *Encyclopedia* Project - Its Significance for the Empirical Movement
14. Summary

Appendix I. 1956: Notes and comments on the paper written between 1937 and 1939

Appendix II. Remarks on the empirical movement

The main arguments of Naess are as follows:

– There are no universally valid (demarcation) criteria for decision: Naess is in accordance with Carnap, Neurath, Frank, but raises objections against some of their formulations. Like Neurath he prefers a “behavioristics of scholars” (*Gelehrtenbehavioristik*), versus “pseudo-rationalism” and rejects an “operational view” (P.W. Bridgman).

– Carnap’s and Neurath’s decision (demarcation) criteria – physicalism: Naess finds the formulations of physicalism as rather speculative. What is the meaning of “language” and “language of science”: it is rather a system of (implicit?) rules for scientific terms. What are the concepts of science? Also reducibility is not useful as criterion for decision making. Therefore, physicalism is not unambiguous, especially without contents (a similar critique like Edgar Zilsel’s). Instead, there is a need for proposals, for presentation and discussion, thereby avoiding the “theses-style”.

– Can one determine the meaning of a proposition at all? The case of psychology shows a pluralism of psychologists and theories, questioning the equation of physicalism = empiricism. Regarding statements on “the meaning of a proposition” the Duhem-Poincaré thesis is applicable (cf. Quine)

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20 SWAN VIII, pp. 163-216.
and provides a valuable tool against “absolutism” (as “pseudo-rationalism” does according to Neurath), which is therefore indispensable for empiricism.

- Space-time references do not protect us from anti-empiricism because they are not a sufficient requirement for empiricism. This postulate is informed by references to Descartes and Rudolf Steiner.

- Research programs instead of theses. Models instead of systems: The success of physics can be explained by sociology of science, as an argument against too much “systematisation”.

- On the idolatry (“Vergötzung”) of auxiliary constructions in psychology (on the reification of theoretical constructs in psychology): In agreement with Philipp Frank’s reference to Ernst Mach, Naess supports his fight against the “idolatry of auxiliary terms” (Vergötzung der Hilfsbegriffe). Naess prefers thought-models in psychology and psychoanalysis (which he underwent in Vienna) instead of a “universal science” of biology, sociology and psychology.

- Physicalism and some proposals for the technique of discussing: Physicalism may serve as a tool for discussion techniques. Empiricism is the ideal tool and instead of anti-metaphysics rather the notion of a-metaphysics is proposed by Naess.

- The Encyclopedia project; its significance for the empirical movement: Naess is in favor of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, as a further development of an a-metaphysical and empirical movement: “model” instead of “system” is the recommended program as a collective enterprise with a more general approach. Whereas the old French encyclopaedists were an ideological group, the new encyclopaedists are fighting against an “autistic way of thinking” (E. Bleuler). Because there are no universal solutions, only empiricism is the clue for any further progress.

- In his summary, Naess explained how this empiricism was to be promoted (again with the preference for “research” instead of “science”) by:
  a) promotion of collective work, also in isolated fields
  b) work on questions related to the unification as a collective enterprise with establishing bridges (Querverbindungen)
  c) proposals in order to sharpen the tools of language of certain collectives
  d) fight against “autistic thinking”, and promotion of studies in scientific behavior as a type of “complex behavior”
  e) fight against a tendency of insufficient expanding systems, instead of models.

Finally, he argues against all formulations of empiricism, which are definitive or closed: "This is an expression of the position that the relative persistent manifestation of empiricism is a general attitude, but not a habit of language (Sprachgewohnheit)."  

Naess continued his critical assessment of Carnap in the Festschrift dedicated to the latter with a contribution on “Typology of Questionnaires Adopted to the

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21 Naess, Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung, op. cit., p. 29.
Study of Expressions with Closely Related Meanings”.\(^{22}\) It is a survey of questionnaires used by Naess in his studies on synonymity, as a contribution to empirical semantics and its terminology. For the adaptation of the semantic concepts of extension and intension to pragmatics (with Carnap and others) a detailed analysis of concrete empirical procedures is desirable. And Naess voiced objections to intensional concepts in agreement with Carnap.\(^{23}\)

A remarkable transcending of the program of Logical Empiricism can be found in Naess’s book on *Four Modern Philosophers. Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre.* (1968),\(^{24}\) which irritated Carnap, but did not lead to a break in their lifelong friendship – as is also apparent in Naess’s obituary of Rudolf Carnap in his journal *Inquiry:*\(^{25}\) On this amusing episode Naess writes retrospectively with reference to the richness of amateur philosophies:\(^{26}\)

What about the richness and equivalidity of professional philosophies? Provoked by mutual distrust between existentialists and the analytically minded, I published *Four Modern Philosophers …*, taking not care to reveal any differences in my estimation of Carnap, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Heidegger. Carnap complained mildly that I had compared him to a schoolboy.

This is not really surprising given Carnap’s critique of Heidegger since the 1920s\(^ {27}\) and his refusal to appear in a volume in P.A. Schilpp’s renowned “Library of Living Philosophers” if a volume were to be dedicated also to Heidegger in same series.

In this context, the unpublished correspondence between Naess and Neurath (from 1934 to 1945, comprising some 85 letters),\(^{28}\) as well as between Naess and Carnap (in the 1960s)\(^{29}\) illustrates the ongoing interaction and communication between agreement and divergence in the context of a scholarly family resemblance.

In 1934, after Neurath was forced into his first exile in the Netherlands because of the Civil War in Austria, Naess wrote to the former from Vienna that he very

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\(^{26}\) Naess, “How My Philosophy Seemed to Develop”, in: SWAN IX (Philosophical evelopment, Environment, and Education).


\(^{28}\) Correspondence Neurath-Naess, Vienna Circle Archives (VCA), Haarlem (NL).

\(^{29}\) Correspondence Carnap-Naess, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University and of Pittsburgh, and Philosophical Archives, University of Konstanz. Thanks for the permission of quoting from these collections.
much deplores Neurath’s absence and expressed some deep agreements between
Neurath’s and his own philosophical positions. This scholarly and personal ex-
change, enriched during meetings in Copenhagen 1936 and Paris 1937, lasted up
to 1945 reflecting the whole terrible war period. It ends with an elucidating and
moving correspondence focusing on the life and work of both proponents:

On June 25, 1945, Neurath wrote to Naess from Oxford:

Now the flood is over. We hope you are in good health. Please write by return. Short infor-
mation to you: 14th May 40, jumped into a motor life boat; picked up by British destroyer,
interned, released, lecturing two terms at Oxford University “Logical Empiricism and the
Social Science”. Married. New institute founded together with Susan Stebbing … Going
on very well.

Encyclopedia going on well, your half of the paper you are writing together with Br.(unswik)
urgently needed. We are now continuing Journal, Library etc. and we hope you will help
us, as usual.

This is only the dove looking out for you, with best wishes, greetings and kind regards
(what can I do for you here?), Ever yours

Naess replied with a long and last letter to Neurath, dated August 16, 1945, from his
home Holmenkollen in Oslo: he mentions that he had delivered his part of the pa-
er on psychology to Charles Morris already before the war waiting for Brunswik’s
contribution, but – he continued regarding the Encyclopedia project:

now, my part is to old, and (I) am very happy that it is not published. I am not sure that
I can bring the work up to date here in Norway. I will have to discuss that question with
Br.(unswik). We will get all books we want from England an(d) America, but when people
from those countries ask which books we want, we cannot but answer “those we ought to
have”…

With reference to his own war experiences Naess writes impressively:

I am still somewhat groggy and disheartened because of lost friends and collaborateurs,
but I hope soon to recover. The very brilliant young philosopher Ludvig Lövestad died
this year. He was my close friend in all kinds of work, also the ‘illegal’. He was tortured
to death, remaining silent about my hiding-place. Another close friend and collaborateur in
philosophy, Wickström-Nielsen, was killed when jumping from parachute. He came from
England and jumped with documents and Russell’s new book on Truth etc. and Lundbergs
new book on the methods of sociology. Also other young people who wished to go on with
philosophy and mathematics are missing. This field got an exceptionally hard blow …

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30 Naess – Neurath, March 30, 1934; Neurath – Naess, 1934. Vienna Circle Archives
(VCA) Haarlem (NL).
31 Here Neurath signed in his typical manner as in most of his letters to friends with an
elephant sketched by himself individually according to his mood.
Regarding his philosophical work Naess expressed his dissatisfaction with his previous publications:

As an exception I published a book “Filosofiske problemer, deres inndeling og egenart”. You certainly understand the title. It has the function to show Norwegian amateur philosophers of the elder or more speculative kind, that their professor is not a “real” philosopher and that they ought not to send me their MS’s.

He further on mentions his mimeographed volumes on symbolic logic employing the matrix method for the functional calculus:

Most of my mimeographed works deals with interpretation, precision, and how to detect misunderstandings, the different kinds of misunderstandings and the fraudulent use of ambiguity. I try to work out a scientific description of these things. Logical empiricism and allied tendencies presupposes a moderately precise and sound description of precision.

And remembering the pre-war Encyclopedia movement, Naess renewed his former offer as follows:

We were very sad that the Congr. of unif.(ied) sc.(ience) could not be realized here in Oslo, and feel morally justified in claiming the next congress to be here. How about that? … Conclusion: Encycl.(opedia) paper must wait till literature arrived, if haste and you have others who can write, I resign. (Gladly).

But Naess ended optimistically with regard to a possible future cooperation:

Write more about you and your plans. … I subscribe herewith for the journal and other periodicals of central interest. Are there young philosophers or clever philosophical students who could think of a stay at our university? We think to send some to England and America. There are institutions willing to arrange the economic side of the question. With the very best wishes etc., ever yours Arne Ness”

As is well known, these plans could not be realized because of the unexpected early death of Otto Neurath, who died after a heart attack in Oxford in December 1945.

In 1963 Naess questioned Carnap about his long version of his autobiography, and asking him specifically whether he had met Martin Heidegger in his student years and what prevented Carnap from endorsing nationalism, on Friedrich Waismann’s lost manuscript “Logik, Sprache, Philosophie”, the role of Hans Driesch for Carnap’s Aufbau, also on Wittgenstein’s influence on the Vienna Circle 34. In his answer (November 19, 1963), Carnap mentioned the impossibility of sending the extended version of his autobiography, that he certainly did not meet Heidegger

33 After his hand-writing signature “Arne Ness” he adds: “e, if you prefer”.
34 Naess to Carnap, September 28, 1963.
in his student years\(^35\) and that probably his own war experiences saved him from adhering to any nationalism. Furthermore, Carnap doubted that Driesch himself thought the *Aufbau* was a similar book project to his philosophy. Some years later, in 1967 Naess announced to Carnap the proofs of his *Four Modern Philosophers* and told him about his visit to Los Angeles. In addition, the correspondence documents the efforts of Naess awarding Carnap the honorary doctorate of the University of Oslo and his own visit of Carnap in Los Angeles in 1968.

The participation of Naess in the Unity of Science movement reveals his sympathy with the *Encyclopedia* project but also the divergences from some of its basic commitments: At the 2nd International Congress for the Unity of Science in Copenhagen, June 21-26, 1936 he commented on E. Tolman’s Lecture “An Operational Analysis of ‘Demands’”\(^36\). Afterwards he was invited by the editors Carnap, Neurath and Morris to contribute to the first 2 volumes of the *Encyclopedia* on psychology together with Egon Brunswik but because of theoretical differences regarding a broader frame of reference only Naess withdrew and Egon Brunswik later delivered his *Conceptual Framework of Psychology* (1952).\(^37\)

During the 3rd International Congress for the Unity of Science – Encyclopedia Conference in Paris, Sorbonne July 29-31, 1937, Naess had discussed Brunwik’s “The Integration of Psychology into the Exact Sciences”, together with Carnap and the Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin. Inofficially, he participated in the discussion with Carnap and Neurath, which was not published.\(^38\)


At the end of the conference he announced an “Invitation to Oslo” for a forthcoming meeting in 1940, which could not be realized because of the outbreak of World War II. The 5th Congress took place in Cambridge, Mass. in 1939 just at he beginning of the War and the 6th and last Congress was held at the University of Chicago, September 2-6, 1941.\(^40\)

\(^35\) This is a surprising note given the fact that in 1929 Carnap attended lectures of Heidegger and Cassirer in Davos and participated in the subsequent discussions. Cf. Friedman, loc.cit.

\(^36\) *Erkenntnis* VI, 1936, p.397


\(^38\) See also Fn. 2 and below in the subsequent section.


In parallel Naess contributed to the journal *Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, edited by Ake Petzäll, Gunnar Aspelin, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Torgny T. Segerstedt. (Gothenburg and Copenhagen). This journal was an important print medium for the “Nordic Connection” between Vienna Circle and the Nordic philosophers before and during World War II. In the 3rd volume we find a review of his own *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten* to which he replied critically (“Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten. Entgegnung von Arne Ness auf die Bemerkungen von H.J. Pos”) with “Common-sense and Truth” he summarized his claims in the previous aforementioned publications in which he endorsed common sense philosophy. After the War he was again reviewed and he continued contributing with “Toward a Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness” and “Husserl on the Apodictic Evidence of Ideal Laws.”

**ARNE NAESS: LATE REMEMBRANCES OF THE VIENNA CIRCLE**

In his first recollection on “Logical Empiricism and the Uniqueness of the Schlick Seminar: A Personal Experience with Consequences” Naess praised the pluralism and style of discussions in the Vienna Circle:

The central members and visitors of the seminar – about 10 people – were seriously engaged in one and the same great undertaking. There was an atmosphere of eager cooperation. Something very great was built and any cooperation, however modest, was appreciated. There was room for all. Opinions differed, but then it was essential to ask: Is the difference serious? Exactly how serious? Perhaps minor, perhaps all to the good: there ought to be no Gleichschaltung (streamlining of opinions).

And he continued to reflect on the relation between philosophy and ideology:

A participant puts forward an opinion, using a sentence T. A second participant, probably thinking the opinion is not tenable, interferes, saying “Würden Sie (würdest du) die Formulierung U akzeptieren?” (Would you accept the formulation U?) … What struck me as müstergültig (worthy of being a model) about this procedure was the effort not to declare lack of agreement before careful verbal investigation so that undesirable effects of termino-

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328-393.
42 Vol I/1938, pp. 62-68.
48 Ibid., p. 12.
logical idiosyncracies were eliminated, and the choice of conciliatory, building up the other way of clarification.

And finally Naess turned to the culture of communication which he characterizes as a unique “Gandhian non-violent approach”, which was lost after 1938. 49

Looking back I feel sorry that the combined analytical and social initiative of the logical empiricists petered out. It constituted in the 30’s a cultural force … When Quine and others took over the analytical leadership, the movement was largely robbed of its social and political aspects.

Some years later, in 1997, Naess reported on his cooperation with the psychologist and philosopher Egon Brunswik (1903–1955) in his short “Philosophical Note on Brunswik’s Work”. 50 Brunswik had published in Vienna Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt. Grundlegung einer Psychologie vom Gegenstand her (1934), influenced by Brentano, Bühler, as well as neo-behaviorism and Logical Empiricism, which converged in an “ecological psychology” of humans and their natural environment. He can be seen as a pioneer of “probabilist revolution” in psychology (having invented key notions such as “vicarious functioning” and “lense model” of perception, “representative design”). 51 Naess mentioned him because of “the psychological actuality of my close friend Egon’s work”, who “showed us a new way of transcending Cartesian subject/object dualisms, and contributed to a new form both of behaviourism and gestalt thinking”. 52 And he concluded, that Brunswik’s “psychology from the point of view of the object may be interpreted as a psychology conceived of as a subject/object neutral field.” 53 From 1934 on Naess and Brunswik had planned a joint contribution on psychology to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, which – in the end – failed as a consequence of differences on the significance of empiricism. The monograph appeared only in 1952 authored by Brunswik solely under the title The Conceptual Framework of Psychology. 54 In 1998, in a published lecture delivered in Frankfurt, Naess again re-evaluated “The Spirit of the Vienna Circle Devoted to Questions of Lebens- and Weltauffassung”, alluding to Spinoza and philosophical scepticism. 55

49 Ibid., p. 13
50 Naess 1997. This contribution is not mentioned and included in SWAN.
51 Kurt Fischer / Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt, loc. cit.
52 Ibid., p. 177.
53 Ibid.
54 Egon Brunswik, The Conceptual Framework of Psychology, loc. cit. Naess reports nicely and moving on the “typical European” Brunswik in his late Berkeley times with a typical anecdote: “In the big department of psychology at Berkeley Brunswik felt eminently European and he certainly was more sophisticated than most. He would suddenly rise from the sofa in his office, open the door, and shout to an unfortunate student ‘Must you whistle Bach!’” (Ibid.).
Regarding the attitude towards research and cooperation within the Vienna Circle he contrasted *Wissenschaftliche Weltsaufassung* vs. *Lebens-und Weltsaufassung*: “In my work within the realm of what I call total views, comprising the classical questions of *Lebens-und Weltsaufassung*, I have been heavily influenced by what I personally experienced in the Schlick-Seminar in 1934 and 1935.”\(^{56}\) A necessary total view is normative and descriptive, compatible with being a sceptic questioning absolute certainty or dogmas. Therefore, analytic clarity and research attitude are applicable to general orientations, too. Basic views on life and world have been put forward in academic and non-academic philosophy, and the increasing interest in them is rooted in the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies), leading up to the Club of Rome’s *Limits of Growth* (1972) and *Beyond the Limits* (1992): sustainability has become the crucial concept of all these human enterprises. Naess observed a development from “*Weltauffassung*” to “*Lebensanschauung*” culminating in his concept of “ecosophy”. The focus of the Vienna Circle was more on language than on life, society and world (à la Wittgenstein), and although Spinoza was certainly venerated by members of the Vienna Circle, he was not taken seriously enough. Naess himself undertook a detailed “reconstruction” of Spinoza’s ethics employing modern symbolic logic with the application of “Occam’s razor”, because “it is my contention that the way I work shows the influence of the spirit of the Vienna Circle”\(^{57}\): the aim being to show “equivalences” among centrally important terms, logical clarity and empirical work within the framework of creative metaphysics. In this regard Naess appreciated Tarski’s and Carnap’s work on truth as logical analysis on “truth”, but the so called *Mach-Poincaré-Duhem* theorem is preferably warranted: “Consequently, in my life a reconstruction, including the symbols, is significant in my practical life”.\(^{58}\)

In his last account on the Vienna Circle Naess dealt with the “Pluralism of Tenable World Views” (2003) from a combined logical and empirical point of view, a development from *Wissenschaftliche Weltsaufassung* to a manifoldness of tenable world views. A “scientific” attitude was seen as compatible with science, humanities and historiography including values and norms. Again, Naess made a plea for “research” instead of “science”, promoting a research attitude instead of a “logic of science” (logical syntax of language). This was an implicit critique of his friend Carnap, with whom he discussed these issues of Spinozan vintage in Los Angeles. In this case he sided with the naturalist and empiricist Neurath, who had also warned against an excessive respect for mathematics and logic.

From that perspective it is not surprising that Chinese and Indian philosophy could be interpreted also as relevant to questions of scientific compatibility.

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56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 364.
– which, by the way, had already been addressed by Heinrich Gomperz, who had commemorated Ernst Mach as modern “Buddha of Science”.  

Even if it was difficult in terms of the choice of terminology, Naess argued for an “acceptance of the existence of a variety of different world views, all compatible with science”, because he saw globalization as being inevitable, maybe leading to Gleichschaltung, whereas in the 1930s there existed the antagonisms of communism vs. anticommunism, Nazism vs. Anti-Nazism, etc.

As contemporary movements comparable to Logical Empiricism one could cite, for instance, ecological movements with comparative studies of life quality (similar to Neurath’s contributions on the standard of living). Naess closed with the following mission statement in the spirit of the Vienna Circle:

… it is important for many of us to try to influence movements we wish well to reach the high level of creative dialogue and sober mutual respect in spite of differences of opinion which characterized the logical empirical movement.

**Summary**

Although the main focus of his work after World War II turned away from Logical Empiricism and towards the ecological movement by way of the peace movement, Naess once again focused on the Vienna Circle increasingly in the 1990s – marking a sort of emotional and intellectual return to his Viennese roots (comprising the Schlick Circle, Freud’s psychoanalysis, Brunswik’s Gestalt psychology). Evidence of this can be found in his correspondence with Neurath (up to 1945) and Carnap (up to 1969) as well as in his book publications till the end of the 1960s, but also in his articles on A.J. Ayer, G. Mannoury, P. Feyerabend, as well as in his contributions to *Theoria* from 1938 on.

With this philosophical and personal return to some of the Vienna Circle issues in the 1990s there emerges a re-assessment of Logical Empiricism “from an empirical point of view”. The anticipation of Quine’s “Two Dogmas” is striking, but while endorsing a sort of radical empiricism (a variation of “psychologism”) and naturalized epistemology he continued to employ modern symbolic logic for his studies in empirical semantics. Moreover, he favored Spinoza, Mach, James, and Russell over Quines’s “From a Logical point of View”, and the late Neurath of the *Encyclopedia* movement over Carnap or even Wittgenstein.

His message “models instead of theories” is embedded in the context of his continuous monistic world view. Naess’s involvement and engagement in the Unity of Science movement was only interrupted by World War II. The planned conference in Oslo 1940 (probably on “Science of Science” or “Theory and Re-

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60 Naess 2003, p. 6.
search”) could have led to a different development towards pragmatism, empiricism and research-oriented philosophy/psychology (with a consideration of values and ethics). His “ecosophy” seems to be compatible with these commitments and in some sense further developments, which makes Naess a pioneer of contemporary “experimental philosophy”.\(^62\)

Naess continued to admire the mode and style of thinking and discussing in the Schlick-Circle as rendered in his image of the “Gandhian way of communication”. There also seems to be a striking similarity with the aforementioned Ludwik Fleck’s sociology of science, his thought style and thought collective in context of Gestalt theory.

These observations are confirmed in Naess’s book *The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise* (1972) that deals with science as a social project. The author appears as a cosmopolitan intellectual and scholar bridging the gap between the sciences and humanities, as well as different cultures and societies, as for example, the philosophy in China, where he had met again his friend and colleague from the Vienna years, Schlick’s student Tscha Hung (Hong Qian) in Beijing after the Cultural Revolution.\(^63\)

As a tentative conclusion of this short account I would like to emphasise the remarkable continuity and commitment to the Vienna Circle in the life and work of Arne Naess. In my view this is compatible with his multi-tasking way of life and intellectual complexity, and does not so much indicate a clear turn from “scientism to life wisdom” as the editor of his works suggests.\(^64\) This conclusion can be drawn from his late writings on Logical Empiricism with his intellectual return to the legacy of the Vienna Circle.

In his autobiographical “How my Philosophy seemed to Develop” (1983/2005) we read about Naess’s lifelong reworking and revising of his writings, inspired by principles drawn from his psychoanalysis (“Lehranalyse”) he underwent with


In August 9-15, 2007 I had the pleasure to organize an affiliated meeting at the 13\(^{th}\) conference of the IUHPS/DLMPS in Beijing: “East meets West in the Philosophy of Science: Moritz Schlick and Hong Qian (Tscha Hung)”, together with Arne Naess’s good friend Bob Cohen. In this regard I am agreeing to Don Nilson (Akita University, Japan), who delivered a paper on Naess in Beijing entitled “Arne Naess on Pluralism in the Scientific Enterprise”, summarizing that Naess “can be seen as having developed a view of science which in certain ways illuminated or anticipated aspects of philosophical positions of Quine, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Kuhn, proponents of the sociology of scientific knowledge approach, and others” (Conference Abstracts, p. 269).

\(^{64}\) Harold Glasser, “Arne Naess – A Wandering Wonderer: Bringing the Search for Wisdom Back to Life”, in: SWAN I, 2005, p. xvii-lxii. See also the review essay by Elisabeth Nemeth in this volume.
Eduard Hitschmann also in Vienna. – by the way, like F.P. Ramsey in the 1920s and R. Carnap later on in the U.S.:

Early in 1934, at the age of twenty-two, I found myself in Austria eager to climb mountains and study. Psychoanalysis was at that time very close to the center of cultural attention in Vienna. It was therefore inevitable that I should ask myself, if I am to be an honest philosopher of science, would it be not prudent to go through psychoanalysis? Was it not suspicious that in the first draft of my doctoral thesis I had introduced the notion of “achievement” (Leistung) rather than the “meaning” of a sentence as a basic dynamic concept? Might it have to do with my own, perhaps unwise, achievement-mindedness?

Soon I was in a deadly serious fourteen-month analysis, 8-9 A.M. every morning except Sundays, with the old collaborator of Freud, Edward Hit(s)chmann. We were both somewhat astonished to find that I had suffered from a pronounced childhood neurosis. It had obvious consequences for later life, and the analysis turned into a combined character analysis and analysis of my philosophical inclinations. Some of our findings may be of interest in tracing the genesis of philosophical inclinations in general.

I think, only against the backdrop of these early experiences one can fully understand Naess’s reconstruction of his intellectual journey from psychoanalysis, history of life, naturalist epistemology, amateur philosophies, Vienna Circle and empirical semantics, diversity and nonviolence, which leads up to the open concept of his late “ecosophy”.

Personal concluding remark: I met Arne Naess several times since the 1990s in Vienna, Frankfurt, and the last time at the end of August 2007 in Oslo. I was always impressed by his sophisticated personality, combined with a sense of humour, (self-)irony, intellectual power, and moral commitment. Arne Naess was a humanist with a non-violent world view rejecting any form of totalitarian attitudes and dogmatic approaches. He struck me as the Spinoza of our globalised age – certainly with some attitudes and methods reflecting the spirit of the Vienna Circle.
ADDENDUM

Arne Naess, Selected Published Autobiographical Sources related to the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:


Arne Naess (2002), *Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World*. (First publication 1998 in Norwegian, also Danish, Swedish, Latvian).


Main Books by Arne Naess related to Philosophy of Science:

— *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten*. Oslo 1936.
— *Notes on the Foundation of Psychology as a Science*. Oslo 1948
— *Scepticism (1968)*

*The Selected Works of Arne Naess* (SWAN). Harold Glasser, Series Editor. Alan Drengson, Associate Editor. 10 Volumes. Springer: Dordrecht 2005:


Vol. II: *Scepticism. Wonder and Joy of a Wandering Seeker*.

Vol. III: *Which World is the Real One? Inquiry into Comprehensive Systems, Cultures, and Philosophies*.


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