The River Rhine has long been an important symbol of German history and of national strength – a defensive moat that was often seen as a psychological barrier and vital military objective separating the heartland of the country from its enemies in the west. After the Allied invasion and the fall of France and Belgium in the autumn of 1944, Hitler’s generals urged him to withdraw all German forces behind the river where they might be used more effectively. The Führer refused and insisted that his troops fight to defend every metre of soil, a policy which eventually resulted in the bulk of German strength being destroyed west of the Rhine.
The Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in north-west Europe, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, had implemented a ‘broad front’ policy for the advance of his forces from France into Germany. He had insisted that his Canadian, British, American and French armies would attack all along the line from the North Sea to Switzerland in order to engage German forces everywhere they could. Attacks across the Rhine would only be launched when all of his forces were lined up along its west bank.
A paratrooper from 6th Airborne Division ready for action on the eastern side of the River Rhine during Operation Varsity. (BU 2561, IWM)
Troops of the 9th Durham Light Infantry from 131st Infantry Brigade in a Kangaroo armoured personnel carrier. The brigade was the infantry arm of the 7th Armoured Division, the Desert Rats. (BU 2847, IWM)
By March 1945 Eisenhower’s armies were at the River Rhine, ready for the assault. In the north was FM Bernard Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group, with Gen Harry Crerar’s Canadian First Army holding the left of the line from the North Sea to its junction with Gen Miles Dempsey’s British Second Army near Xanten. Next to Dempsey’s formation, just south of Wesel, was Gen Bill Simpson’s US Ninth Army. South of Montgomery’s army group was Gen Omar Bradley’s US Twelfth Army Group with Gen Hodges’ US First Army on the left between Cologne and Koblenz and Gen George Patton’s US Third Army on the right holding the river up to Mannheim. All of these formations had advanced to the Rhine from the beaches of Normandy. Farther south, the line was held by Gen Jacob Dever’s US Sixth Army Group which had come north from the landings on the French Riviera. Gen Patch’s US Seventh Army was taking up position along the Rhine south of Mannheim to Strasbourg, with Gen de Lattre’s French First Army holding the remainder of the river up to the Swiss border.
Gen Eisenhower had stuck to his broad-front strategy in spite of often quite virulent criticism from the commander of British Twenty- First Army Group. FM Montgomery favoured the policy of the maximum use of force on a narrow front aimed at the industrial heartland of the Third Reich, which was situated in the north-western part of Germany. This northern front was also the most obvious direction to take into the heart of the country towards its capital Berlin. Whilst there was much military logic to commend Montgomery’s proposal of applying the overwhelming use of power against a relatively small area of enemy resistance along the most favourable route, political considerations made it unacceptable.
British medium guns join in the pre-assault artillery bombardment of the German side of the Rhine, part of the covering fire put down by almost 3,500 Allied guns. (BU 2143, IWM)
Eisenhower had to consider the pride and sensibilities of all the fighting nations, most especially those of the USA who were providing the bulk of men and matériel to the campaign. All had to be fully involved in the drive for victory and Montgomery’s plan would have geographical constraints which would make the drive into Germany mainly a British campaign. This would leave the cream of American forces to play a subsidiary role in the final downfall of Germany. Public opinion in the US, and military commanders on the ground, would not stand for this. Eisenhower chose to employ all of his strength in concert, pushing the Nazi forces back as they advanced. History has vindicated this policy, for it resulted in ultimate victory. Historians will, however, continue to argue whether or not the war could have been ended sooner, or indeed whether or not it might have taken longer, if a policy other than Eisenhower’s had been adopted.
Gen Eisenhower did nonetheless agree that the main effort across the River Rhine would be made in the north, with Montgomery continuing to have the assistance of US Ninth Army under his command for the operation. The main reason for this was the proximity of the great industrial area of the Ruhr 40km to the south-east of Twenty-First Army Group’s intended crossing places. This vast complex, 80km wide and 90km deep, was the only remaining powerhouse of Hitler’s Third Reich – the industrial zones of Silesia and the Saar had already been overrun by the Russians and the Americans. It was essential that the Ruhr zone be captured to cut off Germany’s last source of production. With US Ninth Army crossing under Montgomery in the north, and Gen Hodges’ US First Army crossing farther south between Düsseldorf and Cologne, the Ruhr could be eliminated in a giant pincer movement by these two armies and might well precipitate a complete German collapse.
The problem of crossing the River Rhine had been carefully studied by Allied planners for a considerable time. Back in September of the previous year, Montgomery had unsuccessfully tried to get troops across the lower stretches of the river at Arnhem in Holland with an elaborate airborne operation. After this had failed serious thought had to be given to organizing another large-scale set-piece attack across the Rhine in northern Germany. By November 1944, an outline plan for the assault had been evolved. This was to be put into operation immediately after the area west of the river, the Rhineland, had been cleared. (See Campaign 74: Rhineland 1944)
The remains of the 19th-century Fort Blücher which guarded the western end of the road bridge at Wesel. Evidence of the battle which took place when US troops tried to evict the last of the enemy from inside, can be seen along its walls. (Ken Ford)
These moves were delayed in late December 1944 when Hitler launched a counteroffensive through the Ardennes. All of Eisenhower’s plans for any further advance into Germany were put on hold whilst Montgomery and Bradley’s army groups dealt with the attack. The enemy threat was finally eliminated at the end of January 1945 and the front stabilized enough for the advance to continue. Montgomery then resumed his plans to clear the Rhineland prior to an assault across the river by British Second Army.
He launched an attack through the Reichswald Forest, Operation Veritable, on 8 February with Canadian First Army. After much bitter fighting, the Rhine was reached at Wesel on 10 March. Montgomery also cleared the area to the south of the Canadians with US Ninth Army in Operation Grenade to complete Twenty-First Army Group’s move up to the Rhine. Enemy resistance to these moves was fierce, but the continued pressure being applied all along the line was irresistible and the subsequent fighting inflicted a costly defeat on the enemy. Gen der Fallschirmtruppen Alfred Schlemm’s German First Parachute Army and Gen der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen’s German Fifteenth Army were forced to retreat in some disorder back across the Rhine.
Gen Bradley continued his advance to the river in Operation Lumberjack. US First and Third Armies pushed their way through the German Fifth Panzer Army of Gen der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel and the German Seventh Army, commanded by Gen der Infanterie Hans Felber, in front of the Rhine. Calls to Hitler by these generals and their superiors to be allowed to retire back across the river in front of the Allied onslaught were denied, forcing C-in-C West, GenFM von Rundstedt, to waste his dwindling resources in a futile attempt to preserve a rapidly disintegrating front line.
Farther to the south, Gen Dever’s US Sixth Army Group was pitting itself against Gen der Infanterie Hermann Foertsch’s German First Army and Gen der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck’s German Nineteenth Army. Outflanked by progress in the north and unable to halt the inexorable advance of US Seventh and French First Armies, these, too, were forced back across the upper Rhine.
American troops move through a small German town during Operation Grenade, US Ninth Army’s drive through the Rhineland to the River Rhine itself. (KY 54468, IWM)
One by one the enemy blew his bridges across the river as the Allies approached. He then tried to regroup his forces to resist the inevitable assault crossings. All the bridges were destroyed as planned bar one. By a stroke of good fortune the rail bridge at Remagen was captured intact, but damaged, by Hodges’ US First Army. Gen Bradley sought permission from Eisenhower to put troops across and establish a bridgehead. The enemy side of the river was not the best type of terrain on which to conduct a powerful advance, but the psychological nature of the achievement was a great boost to the Allies. Eisenhower gave the go-ahead and the Rhine barrier was breached. Other crossings were soon to follow.
In stark contrast to Montgomery’s intended set-piece and overwhelmingly strong plans to cross in the north, the Americans chose to improvise their crossings as chance allowed and to exploit any tactical situation on the far side of the river as it occurred. They had columns of engineers and bridging material just behind their front and troops ready to carry out an immediate assault. When US Third Army’s commander, Gen George Patton, heard that his XII Corps was close to the river just south of Mainz, he ordered its commander, Gen Manton Eddy, to try to take the Rhine on the run. Gen S. Leroy Irwin’s US 5th Division rose to the occasion and carried out a successful assault crossing on the same night as its 23rd Infantry Regiment arrived on the river. Now both US First and Third Armies had crossings over the Rhine before Montgomery was able to launch his long-awaited attack on the night of 23 March. It was with great glee that the anglophobic Gen George Patton was able to announce just before Montgomery’s massive set-piece assault: ‘Without the benefit of aerial bombardment, ground smoke, artillery preparations or airborne assistance, US Third Army at 2200hrs, Thursday evening 22nd March, crossed the Rhine.’
Prime Minister Winston Churchill watches the airborne fly-in from a vantage point near the Rhine. With the premier, from left to right: Gen Crerar (Commander Canadian First Army), FM Alanbrooke (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Lt Gen Simmonds (Commander Canadian II Corps) and FM Montgomery (Commander Twenty-First Army Group). (Barney J. Gloster/Dept. National Defence/National Archives of Canada, PA-143952).
CHRONOLOGY
1944
17 September
- FM Montgomery launches Operation Market Garden in an attempt to cross the Lower Rhine at Arnhem.
25 September
- Operation Market Garden is abandoned when paratroopers are unable to hold on to their airborne bridgehead over the Rhine at Arnhem. The remnants of British 1st Airborne Division are withdrawn across the lower Rhine that night.
November
- Detailed planning begins for new crossings over the Rhine between Emerich and Rheinberg, timed to take place once the Rhineland to the west of the river is cleared of the enemy.
16 December
- Hitler launches a major offensive through the Ardennes which catches US First Army by surprise and drives deep into American territory. Planning for the Rhine crossing is delayed for a month while this bulge in the Allied line is removed.
20 December
- US Ninth Army placed under operational control of British Twenty-First Army Group to deal with the northern flank of Hitler’s Ardennes offensive.
1945
February
- Ninth Army remains under the command of British Twenty-First Army Group for the Rhineland battle.
8 February
- Canadian First Army launches Operation Veritable to clear the Reichswald area of the Rhineland.
23 February
- US Ninth Army launches Operation Grenade to cross the River Roer and clear the Rhineland on the right flank of Canadian First Army.
7 March
- US III Corps captures the bridge over the River Rhine at Remagen and US First Army establishes a bridgehead across the river.
8 March
- The capture of a bridge over the Rhine is too much for Hitler and he decides to relieve GenFM von Rundstedt of his command and appoint GenFM Albert Kesselring as Commander-in-Chief (West).
9 March
- Montgomery issues the final directive for the operation to cross the River Rhine, code name Plunder.
10 March
- The road and rail bridges at Wesel are blown by the retreating Germans as Montgomery’s troops reach the Rhine.
21 March
- A month-long programme of heavy bombing by Allied air forces against German bridges, viaducts and road and rail traffic feeding the Rhine is completed.
- US Eighth Air Force and the RAF now concentrate their heavy bombers on enemy airfields and barracks to the east of the river.
22 March
- Gen Patton’s US Third Army crosses the Rhine near Nierstein at 2200hrs.
1800hrs
- The normal harassing fire along the Rhine begins to build in intensity as Allied artillery concentrate on Twenty-First Army Group’s sector east of the river prior to the crossings.
2100hrs
- British Second Army begin Operation Plunder with XXX Corps’ attacks across the Rhine opposite Rees with 51st (Highland) Division. Heavy opposition from German paratroopers is met once the assaulting battalions move inland.
2200hrs
- British 1st Commando Brigade cross the Rhine and move to capture the important communications town of Wesel.
2215hrs
- RAF Bomber Command carry out a heavy bombing raid on Wesel just before 1st Commando Brigade attack the town. The tactical use of these large bombers so close to the attacking troops ensures the success of the operation.
0200hrs
- British XII Corps attack across the Rhine opposite Xanten with its 15th (Scottish) Division. Enemy resistance is light at first but becomes heavier as the Scottish battalions try to capture the villages inland from the river.
0200hrs
- US Ninth Army starts its crossing with the 30th Division of XVI Corps attacking over the river south of Wesel. German 180th Division give little opposition to the crossings and swift gains are made.
0300 hours
- XVI Corps puts its 79th Division across a stretch of the river near Rheinberg, also against negligible opposition.
Daylight
- Montgomery’s forces have established four complete divisions in a bridgehead over the Rhine stretching from Rees to Dinslaken. Enemy opposition starts to increase as more German troops move into the area. German Army
Group H Commander, Gen Blaskowitz, releases part of his reserve from XLVII Panzer Corps; 15th Panzergrenadier Division comes south from the Dutch border to counter British XXX Corps’ crossings around Rees.
0950hrs
- The first paratroopers of US XVIII Corps begin their drop in an area to the east of the Diersfordter Forest, north of Wesel. The low-flying transport aircraft and the gliders bringing in the airborne troops, suffer heavy losses from
concentrated German anti-aircraft fire. The Diersfordter Forest and the bridges over the River Issel are captured. Contact is later made between the airborne troops and British XII Corps.
2400hrs
- Montgomery’s bridgehead over the Rhine is secure, with only the situation around Rees and the left flank causing any real concern.
25 March
- More divisions are moving over the Rhine and bridging operations are in progress in all sectors. Enemy artillery fire on the river begins to die down as more and more German batteries are overrun or moved back. Blaskowitz commits more of his reserve and sends 116th Panzer Division against US XVI Corps to the south of the River Lippe. British 15th Division send an armoured column through the airborne landings to engage the enemy on the far side of the bridgehead. American Bailey bridge across the Rhine is opened.
26 March
- Each of the three infantry corps in the lodgement enlarge their forces with more divisions. As the enemy is pushed back, the extra ground taken is quickly filled by more and more troops.
27 March
- The German line around the lodgement is starting to break, although resistance is still very strong to the north of Rees on XXX Corps’ sector.
28 March
- Great gains are made as the three infantry corps reach full strength.
29 March
- The breakout is well under way, with movement out of the bridgehead on all parts of the line. The battle for the Rhine crossings has been won.
American paratroopers from US XVIII Airborne Corps hitch a ride on the back of a British Churchill tank from 6th Guards Brigade. (FOX 60432, IWM)
The last planning stage before the Rhine airborne operation: from left to right, Grp Capt R.C. Sutcliffe, A Mshl Sir Arthur Coningham (Commander RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force), Lt Gen Lewis Brereton (Commander Allied First Airborne Army) and AVM V.E. Groom. Gen Brereton’s US XVIII Airborne Corps was to carry out the airborne crossing of the river; Coningham’s 2nd Tactical Air Force provided the overhead cover to the operation. (CL 2223, IWM)
The landing site of the 1st Cheshire Regiment located just downstream of Wesel. The viaduct leading to the old railway bridge which once crossed the Rhine is in the right background. The Cheshires crossed over the river to help 1st Commando Brigade clear Wesel during the first morning after the night assault. (Ken Ford)
Naval LCVPs were shipped over to Germany for Operation Plunder. The craft went by canal from Antwerp and were then loaded onto tank transporters at Neerharen, before being transferred by road to the Rhine. (BU 2006, IWM)
Bridging operations on the River Rhine were the most complex of the war. Great stockpiles of Bailey bridging material were assembled prior to the attack. (B 15755, IWM)