ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE

 
The start of 1942 marked the third calendar year of the war in the North African desert. What had begun as border skirmishes between two colonial powers on 11 June 1940, the day after Italy had declared war on Britain, later developed into a full-scale theatre of war which pitted British and Commonwealth forces against the fascist empire of the Axis regimes.
  It had all started so well for General Archibald Wavell’s sparse Western Desert Force. His two divisions pushed the seven divisions of Graziani’s Italian Tenth Army back across Libya to El Agheila at the base of the Gulf of Sirte, capturing great numbers of troops and equipment in the process. Wavell’s force was then plagued by the same problems that were to affect both sides throughout the desert war; how to supply their armies on the front line when their supply trains stretched back hundreds of kilometres in the rear? Everything from ammunition to toilet paper had to be ferried forwards across featureless terrain, along poor roads and through shifting desert. The farther west the British advanced, the longer the supply train grew, sucking in more and more men and transport just to keep those at the front sustained.
 
Operation Crusader: Eighth Army’s advance to El Agheila and retreat back to the Gazala Line

 

Generalfeldmarschall Rommel strikes a defiant pose for the camera on the main coastal road across Libya to Egypt, the Via Balbia, which formed the main axis for the to-and-fro battles that took place in North Africa between 1940 and 1943. (IWM, HU5623)
 
  Wavell paused at El Agheila and tried to build his strength prior to resuming his westward advance. By this time his force had become XIII Corps under the command of Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor and comprised 6th Australian Division and 7th Armoured Division. At this point Axis forces invaded Greece and Prime Minister Churchill instructed Wavell to send part of his strength to help counter enemy forces there. Lieutenant-General O’Connor was ordered to relinquish the Australian Division and part of 7th Armoured Division, which left him with few forces to hold the line. Worse was to follow when Hitler came to the aid of his Italian ally and dispatched Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel to North Africa in a bid to restore some prestige to the Axis cause. With Rommel came the fledgling units that were to form the Afrika Korps – just part of the 5.leichte Division and elements of 15.Panzer Division – but they were enough to bolster the Italians into launching an attack against the British on 24 March 1941.
  With Rommel’s armoured cars leading the assault, Axis forces pushed the British XIII Corps right back to the Egyptian border and, by 14 April, had cleared the whole of Cyrenaica save for a beleaguered garrison of two Australian brigades holed up in the port of Tobruk. The rapid advance now left Rommel with long supply lines to the rear and little extra strength, fuel or ammunition to push farther eastwards into Egypt. His advance halted at the Halfaya Pass. In contrast, Wavell’s forces had short lines of communication and were growing stronger by the day as new formations arrived in Egypt from Britain and the Commonwealth.
  Wavell struck back on 15 May with Operation Brevity in which he tried to repossess the strategically important Halfaya Pass. Initially, the attack was successful, but within 12 days Rommel counterattacked and took it back again. Wavell tried again on 15 June with a more ambitious strike named Operation Battleaxe. The results were the same: Rommel’s defensive tactics had the measure of the attack and the battle was virtually over in just two days with the vital pass remaining in Axis hands. Rommel had the strength to resist the British, but had little extra might with which to force his way into Egypt. Reinforcement seemed unlikely, for seven days later Hitler launched his attack on Russia and the Afrika Korps slipped down the list of German priorities.
 

25 November 1941 and a tired and dispirited Rommel stands in the front of his Horch staff car during the great retreat after his defeat by the British during the Crusader offensive. (US National Archives)
 
  Churchill now lost patience with Wavell and replaced him with General Sir Claude Auchinleck. During that summer the Western Desert Force was enlarged by the addition of XXX Corps and became Eighth Army with Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham, recent victor against the Italians in Abyssinia, in command. A new, much larger offensive, Operation Crusader, was planned to begin on 18 November. This time Auchinleck and Cunningham would begin by trying to outflank Rommel’s positions at the Halfaya Pass and drive through to Tobruk. At the same time, the Tobruk garrison would break out of its encirclement to join up with Eighth Army. While this offensive was being planned, Rommel himself was organizing his own attack aimed against Tobruk, convinced that the British posed no serious threat to him.
  Cunningham struck first and succeeded in launching XXX Corps behind the enemy at Halfaya Pass and swung out into the desert. Rommel met this attack at Sidi Rezegh and caused great damage to the inferior British armour, destroying the bulk of XXX Corps’ tanks. The German commander now had an opportunity to annihilate XXX Corps, but chose to attempt a greater victory by attacking eastwards in an effort to get behind the rear of Eighth Army and cut its line of retreat in order to destroy it completely.
  The move unnerved Cunningham who then urged Auchinleck to sanction a general retreat. Auchinleck was made of sterner stuff and refused to give way, reasoning that Rommel’s forces must now be tired and in as bad a way as the British. He ordered every unit to attack the enemy and to pursue him relentlessly and then replaced Cunningham with his own Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie. Rommel’s attempt to disorganize the British partially succeeded, but it also caused some confusion within his own army. He failed to achieve his plans on two counts: he was not strong enough to break the British positions, nor did he have sufficient forces opposite Tobruk to hold the British down in his rear.
  Although Ritchie was titular head of Eighth Army, it was Auchinleck who now directed the course of the battle with orders for a resumption of the attack on Sidi Rezegh. The move unbalanced the Axis command for Rommel was still well to the east and out of touch with his main headquarters. Days of intense and confused fighting followed as Rommel tried to take back the initiative. Great damage was suffered by both sides fighting furiously to gain control of the battlefield. Ritchie’s troops pushed on to Tobruk and managed to lift the siege. Gradually the superior strength of the British began to overcome Rommel’s command and the Afrika Korps was in danger of being surrounded. Rommel tried one last attack to break through into Tobruk on 5 December but it failed. The next day he ordered a general retreat.
 

Italian troops man a Breda 20/65 model 35 cannon. This 20mm gun was designed in 1934 as an anti-aircraft weapon, but had a dual role in the desert where it served as an anti-tank gun, albeit with a poor reputation and inferior performance when compared with most other weapons. (IWM, MH5867)
 
  The British chased Rommel back across Cyrenaica, past Benghazi right back to El Agheila where his advance had started the previous March. Each time the pursuing Eighth Army got too close, the Afrika Korps would turn round and deliver a sharp rebuff. By the start of January 1942 most of Rommel’s forces were ensconced in the old Axis positions along the El Agheila–Marada strongpoint facing eastwards ready to fight a defensive battle against Lt. Gen. Ritchie’s army. Here, with much shorter supply lines to their bases in Tripolitania, Axis forces quickly began to replenish their losses and rebuild their strength.
  Although Operation Crusader was costly to Eighth Army in men and equipment, its effort was rewarded with a decisive victory over the seemingly invincible Rommel and his Afrika Korps. Both sides were equal in strength at the start of the battle on 18 November, with the British and Commonwealth forces numbering 118,000 men and the Axis forces 119,000. When the fighting was over, British losses amounted to 17,700 and the enemy losses 24,500, of which 14,600 were German. Rommel was not, however, defeated. His command was intact and, although his force was exhausted, it still had plenty of fight left in it. The victory had been a great boost for Eighth Army’s morale, for Ritchie’s troops had thrown the enemy out of Cyrenaica and relieved Tobruk. His officers and their men now felt that they had the capability of beating Rommel and evicting Axis forces from North Africa. In this they were quite wrong, for Rommel had no intention of letting Eighth Army rest on its laurels and build up strength for another offensive.
  On 5 January 1942 a convoy arrived in North Africa, which landed 54 German tanks and 20 armoured cars as well as a sizeable number of anti-aircraft and artillery guns. Also being shipped in to Rommel were large quantities of fuel and ammunition. With these reinforcements he began thinking of going back on the offensive. Intelligence led the German commander to believe that the British outposts were thinly held and widely dispersed. By the middle of January Rommel decided he was strong enough to mount an attack.
 

A gun from the ‘Bush Artillery’ in action during the long siege of Tobruk. The ‘unit’ was made up of engineers and infantry who used captured Italian field guns to supplement the work of the regular artillery during the nine months that Tobruk was cut off from Eighth Army. The gunners here are firing a captured Italian 75mm gun to good effect. (IWM, E4788)
 
  Auchinleck was oblivious to this quick turnaround in Axis fortunes, for both he and his commanders believed that it would be almost impossible for Rommel to take the offensive for some considerable time. Their intelligence had shown them that his losses, his lack of reinforcements and his supply difficulties would make further aggressive moves difficult for him. When Rommel struck early on the morning of 21 January, just 16 days after the last of his rearguard had retired behind the El Agheila defences, British Eighth Army was taken completely by surprise.
  There had been some changes made to Eighth Army formations since the end of the Crusader battle, with the veteran 7th Armoured Division being withdrawn to be replaced by the untried and understrength 1st Armoured Division. Its 2nd Armoured Brigade had no desert experience and had had little training since arriving in Egypt the previous month, but was sent forwards to hold the front line. Fuel shortages meant that Ritchie could also maintain just one infantry brigade in a forward position, so that when Rommel launched his attack there was little to stop him making quick gains.
 

A Matilda infantry tank of the type used by the British Army tank brigades during the Gazala battle. The Matilda was the heaviest and bestprotected tank on the battlefield having 78mm armour at its thickest point, a level of protection not matched by any of the Axis tanks. Its main weapon, however, was the 2-pdr gun that proved to be woefully inadequate when facing German armour. (IWM, E9560)
 
  A speedy withdrawal saved the British advance forces from complete destruction, but allowed Rommel to motor northwards at speed. In eight days Axis forces had retaken Benghazi and Rommel had swung his troops eastwards, pushing Ritchie’s army back towards Tobruk. Lack of fuel slowed down the strength of the Axis advance, which in turn allowed the British XIII Corps to withdraw into the safety of the partially prepared Gazala– Bir Hacheim defence line, just 64km to the west of Tobruk. Rommel had engineered an impressive advance and a great tactical victory. In just over two weeks, and with almost negligible losses, the Axis commander had driven Eighth Army back over 560km and had retaken much of the ground lost during the British Crusader offensive.
  There now followed a period during which both sides rested, trained their forces and prepared to launch a new offensive. Rommel and Auchinleck both knew that the other would attack when he was ready and each hoped that he would be the one who was ready first. On 26 May, Rommel won the race and attacked.
 
 

CHRONOLOGY

1941

18 November
- Under command of Lt. Gen. Alan Cunningham, British Eighth Army launches Operation Crusader against Axis forces led by Gen. Erwin Rommel to join up with the besieged garrison in Tobruk
26 November
- After protracted and confused fighting during which time the British fail to press the offensive hard enough to achieve a result, the C-in-C Middle East, Gen. Claude Auchinleck, decides to replace Cunningham at the head of Eighth Army with Lt. Gen. Neil Ritchie.
10 December
- Further prolonged fighting results in Rommel beginning to withdraw eastwards and Tobruk is relieved after a siege that had lasted eight months.
 

1942

1 January 
- Rommel’s forces are chased back cross Cyrenaica into his old positions at El Agheila where he had started his advance ten months before.
21 January 
- To the surprise of many within Eighth Army, Rommel resumes the offensive and pushes back the British, forcing them to withdraw across the very ground they had recently won.
4 February
- The retreat becomes a flight and Eighth Army are compelled to withdraw into prepared positions at Gazala, 64km to the east of Tobruk 
February–May 
- A period of rest and replenishment is taken by both sides as they prepare to go on the offensive once again.
26 May
- Rommel strikes first and launches an attack against the northern section of Eighth Army’s line with his mainly Italian Gruppe Crüwell.
27 May
- Early in the morning Rommel leads a mobile armoured force around the southern flank of the British line. Ritchie tries to counter this move with his armoured brigades.
28 May 
- Rommel’s planned move to get behind the bulk of Eighth Army starts to fail as British tanks and guns slow his forward movement. Rommel regroups his forces ready for another attack.
29 May 
- Rommel decides to bring his armour into an area later to be called the Cauldron, a position that is virtually surrounded by Eighth Army, but one from which he can strike eastwards when the time is right. As he withdraws into this position his rear comes into contact with a defended ‘box’ manned by Brigadier Haydon’s 150th Brigade.
30 May 
- Rommel attempts to eliminate 150th Brigade’s position and open up supply routes to the west through the British minefields. Ritchie now thinks he has Rommel trapped and launches new attacks to crush the Afrika Korps, but they lack strength and are easily repulsed.
31 May
- While Rommel continues to batter away at the 150th Brigade ‘box’, Ritchie plans another attack on the Cauldron.
1 June
- Brigadier Haydon is killed and the survivors of 150th Brigade surrender, Ritchie still does not attack the Cauldron in force. Rommel now has a direct supply route eastwards through the minefields and is no longer surrounded.
3 June
- Rommel holds the British armour in the centre and dispatches forces southwards to overrun the Free French outpost at Bir Hacheim.
5 June 
- Ritchie launches Operation Aberdeen to crush Rommel’s position in the Cauldron. Rommel holds the attack and then launches a counterattack against the British armour, chasing away three armoured brigades and capturing large numbers of infantry. 
10 June 
- The Bir Hacheim position of the Free French is overrun and captured.
11 June 
- Rommel once more concentrates his mobile forces and moves against the centre of the British rear. He is met by Norrie’s XXX Corps and stopped, but again with great loss to the British tank force.
12 June 
- A great clash of armour to the south of Knightsbridge is decisive; British losses force a withdrawal to the north and east, leaving those formations of Eighth Army to the west vulnerable.
13 June 
- The 201st Guards Brigade is forced to retreat from the Knightsbridge defensive position in the centre of the British line.
14 June 
- Rommel’s forces begin to pick off the isolated positions west of Tobruk and the 50th and 1st South African divisions begin to withdraw from the Gazala Line. Eighth Army is in danger of collapse.
17 June
- Rommel’s forces make it to the sea to the east of Tobruk and once more the port is surrounded. All those units of Eighth Army that are able retreat back to the Egyptian border.
20 June 
- Tobruk is attacked from the east by the Afrika Korps. A break-in is soon achieved and Axis forces quickly spread out within the fortress area.
21 June 
- Major-General Klopper surrenders the Tobruk garrison.
22 June 
- German troops cross the frontier into Egypt. Eighth Army continues its withdrawal into the defences south of Mersa Matruh.
26 June 
- Rommel begins his attack on the British positions at Matruh.
28 June
- The Matruh position is given up and Auchinleck orders all units to retire eastwards behind the El Alamein Line.
30 June 
- All units of Eighth Army that have survived the long retreat are now behind the El Alamein Line waiting for Rommel to launch his next attack.
 
 

OPPOSING COMMANDERS

 
The battle of Gazala was Rommel’s greatest triumph in North Africa. His handling of the campaign and the relentless pressure that he applied to British Eighth Army marked him out as a great armoured commander. In contrast, despite the overwhelming force available to Lt. Gen. Ritchie, he was never able to grasp the initiative fully and apply the knock-out blow to Panzerarmee Afrika. The battle was fought as Rommel dictated with the British generals having to react to the German commander’s moves.
 

BRITISH COMMANDERS

Compared with the brilliant exponent of armour warfare at the head of Axis forces, British Eighth Army had few armoured leaders of note. Neither Gen. Auchinleck nor Lt. Gen. Ritchie was fully conversant with the deployment of tank formations, nor had they learned from the armoured disasters of their predecessors in the desert.
  General Sir Claude Auchinleck
 Lieutenant-General Neil RitchieCrusaderCrusader