

S E C O N D E D I T I O N

PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
Case Studies

Harold Kerzner, Ph.D.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

CASE STUDIES, SECOND EDITION

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Preface

Other than on-the-job training, case studies and situations are perhaps the best way to learn project management. Case studies allow the students to apply the knowledge learned in lectures. Case studies require that the students investigate what went right in the case, what went wrong, and what recommendations should be made to prevent these problems from reoccurring in the future. The use of cases studies is applicable both to undergraduate and graduate level project management courses, as well as to training programs in preparation to pass the exam to become a Certified Project Management Professional (PMP®) administered by the Project Management Institute.

Situations are smaller case studies and usually focus on one or two specific points that need to be addressed, whereas case studies focus on a multitude of problems. The table of contents identifies several broad categories for the cases and situations, but keep in mind that the larger case studies, such as Corwin Corporation and The Blue Spider Project, could have been listed under several topics. Several of the cases and situations have “seed” questions provided to assist the reader in the analysis of the case. An instructor’s manual is available from John Wiley & Sons, Inc., to faculty members who adopt the book for classroom use.

Almost all of the case studies are factual. In most circumstances, the cases and situations have been taken from the author’s consulting practice. Some educators prefer not to use case studies dated back to the 1970s and 1980s. It would

be easy just to change the dates but inappropriate in the eyes of the author. The circumstances surrounding these cases and situations are the same today as they were twenty years ago. Unfortunately we seem to be repeating several of the mistakes made previously.

Recommendations for enhancements and changes to future editions of the text are always appreciated. The author can be contacted at

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
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Part 1

PROJECT MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES

As companies approach some degree of maturity in project management, it becomes readily apparent to all that some sort of standardization approach is necessary for the way that projects are managed. The ideal solution might be to have a singular methodology for all projects, whether they are for new product development, information systems, or client services. Some organizations may find it necessary to maintain more than one methodology, however, such as one methodology for information systems and a second methodology for new product development.

The implementation and acceptance of a project management methodology can be difficult if the organization's culture provides a great deal of resistance toward the change. Strong executive leadership may be necessary such that the barriers to change can be overcome quickly. These barriers can exist at all levels of management as well as at the worker level. The changes may require that workers give up their comfort zones and seek out new social groups.



Lakes Automotive


Lakes Automotive is a Detroit-based tier-one supplier to the auto industry. Between 1995 and 1999, Lakes Automotive installed a project management methodology based on nine life-cycle phases. All 60,000 employees worldwide accepted the methodology and used it. Management was pleased with the results. Also, Lakes Automotive's customer base was pleased with the methodology and provided Lakes Automotive with quality award recognition that everyone believed was attributed to how well the project management methodology was executed.

In February 2000, Lakes Automotive decided to offer additional products to its customers. Lakes Automotive bought out another tier-one supplier, Pelex Automotive Products (PAP). PAP also had a good project management reputation and also provided quality products. Many of its products were similar to those provided by Lakes Automotive.

Because the employees from both companies would be working together closely, a singular project management methodology would be required that would be acceptable to both companies. PAP had a good methodology based on five life-cycle phases. Both methodologies had advantages and disadvantages, and both were well liked by their customers.

QUESTIONS

1. How do companies combine methodologies?
2. How do you get employees to change work habits that have proven to be successful?
3. What influence should a customer have in redesigning a methodology that has proven to be successful?
4. What if the customers want the existing methodologies left intact?
5. What if the customers are unhappy with the new combined methodology?



Ferris HealthCare, Inc.

In July of 1999, senior management at Ferris recognized that its future growth could very well be determined by how quickly and how well it implemented project management. For the past several years, line managers had been functioning as project managers while still managing their line groups. The projects came out with the short end of the stick, most often late and over budget, because managers focused on line activities rather than project work. Everyone recognized that project management needed to be an established career path position and that some structured process had to be implemented for project management.

A consultant was brought into Ferris to provide initial project management training for 50 out of the 300 employees targeted for eventual project management training. Several of the employees thus trained were then placed on a committee with senior management to design a project management stage-gate model for Ferris.

After two months of meetings, the committee identified the need for three different stage-gate models: one for information systems, one for new products/services provided, and one for bringing on board new corporate clients. There were several similarities among the three models. However, personal interests dictated the need for three methodologies, all based upon rigid policies and procedures.


After a year of using three models, the company recognized it had a problem deciding how to assign the right project manager to the right project. Project managers had to be familiar with all three methodologies. The alternative, considered

impractical, was to assign only those project managers familiar with that specific methodology.

After six months of meetings, the company consolidated the three methodologies into a single methodology, focusing more upon guidelines than on policies and procedures. The entire organization appeared to support the new singular methodology. A consultant was brought in to conduct the first three days of a four-day training program for employees not yet trained in project management. The fourth day was taught by internal personnel with a focus on how to use the new methodology. The success to failure ratio on projects increased dramatically.

QUESTIONS

1. Why was it so difficult to develop a singular methodology from the start?
2. Why were all three initial methodologies based on policies and procedures?
3. Why do you believe the organization later was willing to accept a singular methodology?
4. Why was the singular methodology based on guidelines rather than policies and procedures?
5. Did it make sense to have the fourth day of the training program devoted to the methodology and immediately attached to the end of the three-day program?
6. Why was the consultant not allowed to teach the methodology?



Clark Faucet Company

BACKGROUND

By 1999, Clark Faucet Company had grown into the third largest supplier of faucets for both commercial and home use. Competition was fierce. Consumers would evaluate faucets on artistic design and quality. Each faucet had to be available in at least twenty-five different colors. Commercial buyers seemed more interested in the cost than the average consumer, who viewed the faucet as an object of art, irrespective of price.

Clark Faucet Company did not spend a great deal of money advertising on the radio or on television. Some money was allocated for ads in professional journals. Most of Clark's advertising and marketing funds were allocated to the two semiannual home and garden trade shows and the annual builders trade show. One large builder could purchase more than 5,000 components for the furnishing of one newly constructed hotel or one apartment complex. Missing an opportunity to display the new products at these trade shows could easily result in a six- to twelve-month window of lost revenue.

CULTURE

Clark Faucet had a noncooperative culture. Marketing and engineering would never talk to one another. Engineering wanted the freedom to design new products,

whereas marketing wanted final approval to make sure that what was designed could be sold.

The conflict between marketing and engineering became so fierce that early attempts to implement project management failed. Nobody wanted to be the project manager. Functional team members refused to attend team meetings and spent most of their time working on their own “pet” projects rather than the required work. Their line managers also showed little interest in supporting project management.

Project management became so disliked that the procurement manager refused to assign any of his employees to project teams. Instead, he mandated that all project work come through him. He eventually built up a large brick wall around his employees. He claimed that this would protect them from the continuous conflicts between engineering and marketing.

THE EXECUTIVE DECISION

The executive council mandated that another attempt to implement good project management practices must occur quickly. Project management would be needed not only for new product development but also for specialty products and enhancements. The vice presidents for marketing and engineering reluctantly agreed to try and patch up their differences, but did not appear confident that any changes would take place.

Strange as it may seem, nobody could identify the initial cause of the conflicts or how the trouble actually began. Senior management hired an external consultant to identify the problems, provide recommendations and alternatives, and act as a mediator. The consultant’s process would have to begin with interviews.

ENGINEERING INTERVIEWS

The following comments were made during engineering interviews:

- “We are loaded down with work. If marketing would stay out of engineering, we could get our job done.”
- “Marketing doesn’t understand that there’s more work for us to do other than just new product development.”
- “Marketing personnel should spend their time at the country club and in bar rooms. This will allow us in engineering to finish our work uninterrupted!”

- “Marketing expects everyone in engineering to stop what they are doing in order to put out marketing fires. I believe that most of the time the problem is that marketing doesn’t know what they want up front. This leads to change after change. Why can’t we get a good definition at the beginning of each project?”

MARKETING INTERVIEWS

- “Our livelihood rests on income generated from trade shows. Since new product development is four to six months in duration, we have to beat up on engineering to make sure that our marketing schedules are met. Why can’t engineering understand the importance of these trade shows?”
- “Because of the time required to develop new products [4–6 months], we sometimes have to rush into projects without having a good definition of what is required. When a customer at a trade show gives us an idea for a new product, we rush to get the project underway for introduction at the next trade show. We then go back to the customer and ask for more clarification and/or specifications. Sometimes we must work with the customer for months to get the information we need. I know that this is a problem for engineering, but it cannot be helped.”

The consultant wrestled with the comments but was still somewhat perplexed. “Why doesn’t engineering understand marketing’s problems?” pondered the consultant. In a follow-up interview with an engineering manager, the following comment was made:

“We are currently working on 375 different projects in engineering, and that includes those which marketing requested. Why can’t marketing understand our problems?”

QUESTIONS

1. What is the critical issue?
2. What can be done about it?
3. Can excellence in project management still be achieved and, if so, how? What steps would you recommend?
4. Given the current noncooperative culture, how long will it take to achieve a good cooperative project management culture, and even excellence?


5. What obstacles exist in getting marketing and engineering to agree to a singular methodology for project management?
6. What might happen if benchmarking studies indicate that either marketing or engineering are at fault?
7. Should a singular methodology for project management have a process for the prioritization of projects or should some committee external to the methodology accomplish this?

Part 2

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT

The first step in the implementation of project management is to recognize the true benefits that can be achieved from using project management. These benefits can be recognized at all levels of the organization. However, each part of the organization can focus on a different benefit and want the project management methodology to be designed for their particular benefit.

Another critical issue is that the entire organization may not end up providing the same level of support for project management. This could delay the final implementation of project management. In addition, there may be some pockets within the organization that are primarily project-driven and will give immediate support to project management, whereas other pockets, which are primarily non-project-driven, may be slow in their acceptance.



Kombs Engineering

In June 1993, Kombs Engineering had grown to a company with \$25 million in sales. The business base consisted of two contracts with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), one for \$15 million and one for \$8 million. The remaining \$2 million consisted of a variety of smaller jobs for \$15,000 to \$50,000 each.

The larger contract with DOE was a five-year contract for \$15 million per year. The contract was awarded in 1988 and was up for renewal in 1993. DOE had made it clear that, although they were very pleased with the technical performance of Kombs, the follow-on contract must go through competitive bidding by law. Marketing intelligence indicated that DOE intended to spend \$10 million per year for five years on the follow-on contract with a tentative award date of October 1993.

On June 21, 1993, the solicitation for proposal was received at Kombs. The technical requirements of the proposal request were not considered to be a problem for Kombs. There was no question in anyone's mind that on technical merit alone, Kombs would win the contract. The more serious problem was that DOE required a separate section in the proposal on how Kombs would manage the \$10 million/year project as well as a complete description of how the project management system at Kombs functioned.


When Kombs won the original bid in 1988, there was no project management requirement. All projects at Kombs were accomplished through the traditional organizational structure. Line managers acted as project leaders.

In July 1993, Kombs hired a consultant to train the entire organization in project management. The consultant also worked closely with the proposal team in responding to the DOE project management requirements. The proposal was submitted to DOE during the second week of August. In September 1993, DOE provided Kombs with a list of questions concerning its proposal. More than 95 percent of the questions involved project management. Kombs responded to all questions.

In October 1993, Kombs received notification that it would not be granted the contract. During a post-award conference, DOE stated that they had no “faith” in the Kombs project management system. Kombs Engineering is no longer in business.

QUESTIONS

1. What was the reason for the loss of the contract?
2. Could it have been averted?
3. Does it seem realistic that proposal evaluation committees could consider project management expertise to be as important as technical ability?



Williams Machine Tool Company

For seventy-five years, the Williams Machine Tool Company had provided quality products to its clients, becoming the third largest U.S.-based machine tool company by 1980. The company was highly profitable and had an extremely low employee turnover rate. Pay and benefits were excellent.

Between 1970 and 1980, the company's profits soared to record levels. The company's success was due to one product line of standard manufacturing machine tools. Williams spent most of its time and effort looking for ways to improve its bread-and-butter product line rather than to develop new products. The product line was so successful that companies were willing to modify their production lines around these machine tools rather than asking Williams for major modifications to the machine tools.

By 1980, Williams Company was extremely complacent, expecting this phenomenal success with one product line to continue for twenty to twenty-five more years. The recession of 1979–1983 forced management to realign their thinking. Cutbacks in production had decreased the demand for the standard machine tools. More and more customers were asking for either major modifications to the standard machine tools or a completely new product design.

The marketplace was changing and senior management recognized that a new strategic focus was necessary. However, lower-level management and the work force, especially engineering, were strongly resisting a change. The employees, many of them with over twenty years of employment at Williams Company, refused to recognize the need for this change in the belief that the glory days of yore would return at the end of the recession.

By 1985, the recession had been over for at least two years, yet Williams Company had no new product lines. Revenue was down, sales for the standard product (with and without modifications) were decreasing, and the employees were still resisting change. Layoffs were imminent.

In 1986, the company was sold to Crock Engineering. Crock had an experienced machine tool division of its own and understood the machine tool business. Williams Company was allowed to operate as a separate entity from 1985 to 1986. By 1986, red ink had appeared on the Williams Company balance sheet. Crock replaced all of the Williams senior managers with its own personnel. Crock then announced to all employees that Williams would become a specialty machine tool manufacturer and that the “good old days” would never return. Customer demand for specialty products had increased threefold in just the last twelve months alone. Crock made it clear that employees who would not support this new direction would be replaced.

The new senior management at Williams Company recognized that eighty-five years of traditional management had come to an end for a company now committed to specialty products. The company culture was about to change, spearheaded by project management, concurrent engineering, and total quality management.

Senior management’s commitment to product management was apparent by the time and money spent in educating the employees. Unfortunately, the seasoned twenty-year-plus veterans still would not support the new culture. Recognizing the problems, management provided continuous and visible support for project management, in addition to hiring a project management consultant to work with the people. The consultant worked with Williams from 1986 to 1991.

From 1986 to 1991, the Williams Division of Crock Engineering experienced losses in twenty-four consecutive quarters. The quarter ending March 31, 1992, was the first profitable quarter in over six years. Much of the credit was given to the performance and maturity of the project management system. In May 1992, the Williams Division was sold. More than 80 percent of the employees lost their jobs when the company was relocated over 1,500 miles away.