Among those to whom we offer particular thanks and gratitude is Chan Heng Chee, the ambassador of Singapore to the United States. Throughout our project, Ambassador Chan has been extraordinarily helpful, gracious, and generous with her time and knowledge.

We are grateful to the U.S. Institute of Peace and its president, Richard H. Solomon, for helping fund our reporting travel. And special thanks to former USIP executive director G. Eugene Martin, who took great interest in our project. Others in and around Washington whose assistance has made a difference are Ambassador Alphonse F. La Porta, former president of USINDO, the United States-Indonesia Society; W. Keith Luse, senior member of Senator Richard Lugar’s staff; Kate Clemans, director, C & M International Ltd.; former deputy undersecretary of commerce Dr. Paul London; Albert Santoli, president, Asia America Initiative; Ambassador John S. Wolf, president, Eisenhower Fellowships; Australian ambassador Dennis Richardson; Ken Ballen, president, Terror Free Tomorrow; Allen Cissell of the East-West Community College Partnership; and Astari M. Daeuwy, Johns Hopkins University.

U.S. ambassadors Ralph L. “Skip” Boyce and Lynn Pascoe couldn’t have been more helpful in providing their own exceptional insights and making members of their embassy staffs available to us.

To Bond Senate staff members Brent Franzel, Jack Bartling, Mike Dubois, and Louis Tucker, minority staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, our thanks for giving of your own time and for help in preparing research and providing background for the genesis of this book.

Colonel James Linder, an officer and a gentleman, head of the joint task force in Mindanao, gave freely of his time to help us observe and understand what smart power looks like at work on the ground.

In Indonesia, Islamic communications specialist Mohammed Iqbal of Gadjah Mada University guided us across the archipelago and through the gray zones of religious fundamentalism. We are also grateful to Ambassdor Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat; former U.S. Public Affairs counselor Charles N. Silver; Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group; Dr. Alwi Shihab, presidential envoy to the Middle East; Rev. Lidya K. Tandirerung; Faqihudin Abdul Kadir, secretary-general, Fahmina, Cirebon; and presidential spokesperson Dr. Dino Patti Djalal. Particular thanks to Dharmawan Ronodipuro, who unfailingly kept us up to date.

In the Philippines, we owe much to a dear old friend, Abby Tan, and to another journalist, Greg Hutchinson, who made marvelous arrangements for us in Manila and Mindanao. Also, Maria A. Ressa, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., and Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez, president, Benguet Corp. From the University of the Philippines: Aileen S. P. Baviera, dean, Asian Center; Asiri J. Abubakar, professor of Asian Studies; and Dr. Carmen A. Abubakar, dean, Institute of Islamic Studies. Ellen H. Palanca, director of Chinese Studies, Atteneo de Manila University. In addition, General Benjamin Defensor, chief, APEC Counterterrorism Task Force; Major General Dato Pahlawan Soheimi bin Abbas of the Malaysian Army, head, International Monitoring Team, Mindanao. Ray D. Roderos, chief superintendent, Philippines National Police, Directorate for Intelligence. And our special appreciation to attorney Ishak Mastura for his river of information from Bangsamoro.

In Thailand, Busaba Sivasomboon bravely accompanied us through dangerous territory in the South. We are thankful to her and apologize to her husband, who worried about her safety. Monsour Salleh, a journalist who lives in the South and covers his homeland courageously, is due our appreciation for leading us to particularly informative sources. Thanks, too, to author and scholar Jeffrey Race; Colonel Denny Lane of Saint Anthony’s College, Oxford University; Lin Hang Hing of the embassy of Singapore in Bangkok; Abdul Rahman Abdul Samad, chairman of the al-Iman Foundation; Anthony Davis, Asia correspondent, Jane’s Intelligence Review; and Denis Gray of the Associated Press.

In Malaysia, veteran journalist Kuah Guan Oo organized our way throughout the country. Juhaidi Yean Abdullah led us along the northern border. We are also most thankful to Philip Mathews, an old friend and assistant director-general of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur.

In Singapore, for sharing their insights into their own country and the surrounding region, our thanks to Benny Lim, the cracker-jack permanent secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs; Amitav Acharya, head of research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University; Chua Siew San, deputy secretary of the Ministry of Defense; and Stanley Loh, director, Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And in Hong Kong, we owe particular thanks to Harvey Stockwin and Isabel Escoda, two Old Asia Hands who have forgotten more than we will ever know.

Finally, we offer our sincere appreciation to our editor, Hana Lane, who got it, right off the bat.

More than three decades later, Americans are no longer very concerned about Southeast Asia. This is a serious mistake. The region is home to one of the greatest concentrations of Muslims on Earth. They are spread among Vietnam’s neighbors—Indonesia and Malaysia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, and Singapore. At 250 million, they outnumber the entire Muslim Middle East. The world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation is Indonesia, 220 million, three times the largest Arab country, Egypt. But the Muslims of Southeast Asia do not register in our mind’s eye. We turned our backs on them and their homelands when we abandoned the quagmire of Vietnam. We can no longer afford this complacency and the ignorance it breeds.

While Southeast Asia’s Muslims have for centuries stood apart from their Arab coreligionists, the differences are beginning to shrink. And that is cause for concern and action, from Southeast Asians as well as Americans. Thirty years ago, while we were fully engaged fighting Vietnam’s Communists, the Muslims of Southeast Asia were almost universally what we would have termed “moderate,” had we been paying attention. But because they were God-fearing Muslims, and therefore anti-Communist, we paid them little heed. We took them for granted. They might have prayed the required five times a day or they might not have prayed at all. Many felt comfortable dining in restaurants with non-Muslim friends, as long as pork wasn’t served. Men seldom grew beards, even those sufficiently hirsute to do so. Some women covered their hair; almost none masked their faces. People greeted each other in the vernacular salamat pagi, never the Arabic salaam aleikum. They thought of themselves first as ethnic Malays and only then as Muslims.

All of that, and much more, is shifting dramatically as the Muslims of Southeast Asia turn increasingly to the Middle East to reaffirm their identity. Moderation is losing the moral high ground, looked down upon as a tool of Western manipulation. And still we are paying scant attention.

The flame of puritanical religious practice, which more and more Muslims perceive as the Islam that Mohammed transmitted from God, was reignited by two events in the Middle East during the latter decades of the twentieth century. Only in retrospect have they been recognized as Earth-shattering. First, the mullahs’ revolution of 1979 in Iran demonstrated to Muslims everywhere that Islam was not merely a litany of rites to be performed in the mosque, but a way of life meant to control their every move as well as the legal system and governance of the state. The second was Saudi Arabia’s pouring of vast amounts from its staggering oil earnings into building and running ultraconservative Wahhabi mosques and religious schools throughout Southeast Asia. Saudi-trained imams and teachers spread the word that their intense practice alone was the true Islam of Mohammed and that the watered-dawn versions of the region were haram (forbidden).

At about the same time, Osama bin Laden began agitating for stricter implementation of the faith within the Saudi kingdom. He preached that the influence of Christian-Jewish “Crusaders” was eroding the purity of Islam and that the presence of U.S. troops was sullying the very land of its birth. This culminated in the 9/11 attacks. In direct reprisal, on October 7, 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan in what the Pentagon called Operation Enduring Freedom. Seventeen months afterward, beginning on March 20, 2003, U.S. forces unleashed the Shock and Awe bombing campaign of Baghdad, laying the groundwork for a swift, cross-country armored assault. The basis of the argument President George W. Bush and Britain’s prime minister, Tony Blair, employed was “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.” It quickly became evident that Saddam did not possess any weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. credibility suffered its greatest blow since we abandoned our friends in the Indochinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Throughout the Muslim world and beyond, America became not a defender of freedom, but an aggressor.

Many of the Muslims with whom we spoke during our research travels through Southeast Asia said they had been horrified by 9/11. Many others admitted readily that they were pleased. They acknowledged exhaling a collective, long-held sigh of relief and vindication for a score settled. Still, they bit their tongues and swallowed their instinctive resentment when the Bush administration ordered the invasion of Afghanistan. They had little empathy for the Taliban and they understood, even if they did not condone, Americans’ need to settle their own score with bin Laden and his hosts.

But the invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the protracted and violent occupation appalled them. They condemned the war, not because they admired Saddam but because they viewed it as unprovoked and a clear demonstration of Americans’ universal disregard for Muslims. They found in the killing, the Abu Ghraib torturing, and what they perceived as the blatant hypocrisy of the Guantánamo Bay imprisonments all the proof they needed that Americans cared little, if at all, about the human rights of Muslims and about bringing the blessings of democracy to Iraqis.

In their reality, the United States wanted Iraq’s oil, its strategic location as a permanent base for U.S. military forces, and a spring-board from which to better defend Israel—the quintessential symbol of Islam’s humiliation. After years of theoretical teachings, Iraq provided them with incontrovertible evidence of America’s anti-Islamic bias.

Resentment of Western influence, never very far beneath the surface after centuries of colonial domination in Southeast Asia, percolated up to ground level. Muslims we had considered moderate—or “mainstream”—began to take on the fundamentalist trappings of Arabs, though not necessarily their intellectual comprehension. Small percentages of Southeast Asian Muslims, mainly undereducated, unemployable young men, heard the siren call of terrorism and bought into it as the best weapon available to them to fight against their own disadvantaged status and what they believed was the evil of the West. In Indonesia, officials estimate that 2 percent of Muslims fit within the “radical” rubric. While initially that seems reassuring, in a nation of 238 million, 90 percent of them Muslim, 2 percent works out to well over 4 million.

After some of these young men traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to undergo martial training with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization, they returned home and began launching suicide-bombing attacks on Westerners and their supporters in their midst. Yet most Southeast Asian Muslims continue to fit Western standards of moderation. Most value democracy and want to live in democratic societies. Most admire much of what Americans believe in and want the United States to remain an active participant in their region’s economic and diplomatic lives. But they will no longer accept the big brother-small brother relationship that we have long demanded of them and that their own governments have accepted as unavoidable.

Because we lacked insight the last time we bumbled into the jungles of Southeast Asia, we left with 58,000 of our own and perhaps 6 million Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians dead. Our greatest failure in the 1960s and 1970s was in not realizing that Ho Chi Minh could be, indeed was, both a Communist and a Vietnamese nationalist. Instead, we convinced ourselves that if Ho came to power over the South, a reunited Communist Vietnam would align with China, its millennial enemy, and the Soviet Union. This melded giant would then overrun the rest of Southeast Asia—the “dominoes”—and stain the East indelibly red.

Today, by continuing to lump religious fundamentalists together with radical extremists and assuming that they all hate Americans, we are compounding the same kind of simplistic mistakes. First among these is the widespread and insulting tendency to think of all Muslims as Arabs and as terrorists. In fact, numerous variables exist within Islam, and they readily can be traced geographically. The Muslims of Southeast Asia are at the far end of a religious feeding chain that originates in the Arabian desert. There, the Arab Muslims of the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia at their core, comprise the beating heart, the wellspring of Islamic orthodoxy. The religion teaches that it was there that God, Allah, speaking through the Archangel Gabriel, dictated the Koran to an illiterate trader in a desert cave fifteen hundred years ago. And it is there today that many feel most powerfully the renewed summons of that man, anointed the Prophet Mohammed, the Messenger of God, to once again eliminate the governments and laws of men and reestablish the pure form of Islam that he delivered.

To the east of the Arabian heartland, in South Asia, are the Muslims of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. With notable exceptions (the Taliban, for one), they are less intense in their practice than the direct descendants of the Arab legions that forced them at scimitarpoint to convert more than a thousand years ago. Former adherents of Hinduism and Buddhism, both faiths much older than Islam, they retain measures of their previous cultural identities, which leaven fundamentalist tendencies.

Finally, the Muslims of Southeast Asia, from southern Thailand to peninsular Malaysia and the far-flung archipelagoes of Indonesia and the southern Philippines, accepted Islam of their own free will. The faith was brought to them peacefully, beginning in the thirteenth century, first by Sufi mystics who wandered down from India, and later, to a much greater extent, by Arab traders, whose objective was accumulating spices and other Oriental riches rather than souls. Many of those Arabs remained behind in what must have seemed a tropical paradise, seduced by soft ocean breezes, the joys of the monsoon rains, the succulent fruits, and the women in graceful sarongs. They enjoyed other benefits as well. The darker-skinned ethnic Malays of the islands treated the fairer Arabs with deference. To this day, indigenous people honor the descendants of the early Arabs as being closer to the progenitors of the faith than they, latter-day converts.

Thus, the Islam that evolved among Southeast Asians is an amalgam, adapted, distilled and modulated first by distance and then by blending over time with their own cultural and religious precursors. The result is not only less doctrinaire but also in some ways almost unrecognizable to modern Arab travelers. They angrily dismiss indigenous medicine men and mystics who commune with spirits of volcanoes as haram. Traditional female court dancers from the island of Java, the heartland of Indonesian culture, performing with arms bared in elaborate, jeweled costumes, are an affront to Arab sensibilities.

Superficially, Indonesian Muslims have more in common with the relaxed attitudes of Thai Buddhists and South Indian Hindus than with the austerity of Middle Easterners. The application of Islamic law, Sharia, is comparatively limited. Most women cover their hair with scarves and many, though not nearly all, wear some type of loose, form-concealing overgarment. Still, far fewer women on the streets of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur shroud themselves in the black abaya or mask their faces behind a niqab than do in London and Paris, leave aside Jiddah and Tehran, though the practice is spreading. In Indonesia and Malaysia, it is common for Muslims to live, work, and study alongside Christians and Buddhists (mostly ethnic Chinese), Hindus, and animists—though not without periodic bloody outbursts. (There is reason that the only Malay/ Indonesian word used commonly in English is “amok.”) Also common in Southeast Asia is elected, secular government. Although the degree of liberal democracy and the brightness of the line between religion and state differ, the basic precepts are common to the people of the region and of the United States.

We focus our attention in this book on five Southeast Asian states: Indonesia and Malaysia, which have Muslim majorities; the Philippines and Thailand, with violent Islamic minorities in their southern districts; and Singapore, overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese but bracketed by Islamic neighbors and newly uncertain of the loyalty of its own Muslim minority. As we will make clear, the stability of these governments, their levels of corruption, and their commitment to the well-being of their citizens vary widely, as do the challenges and opportunities they offer Americans.

Indonesia is unarguably the centerpiece. Astonishingly, after breaking free in 1998 from half a century of “guided democracy” under President Sukarno and the authoritarian “new order” of Suharto, it has become the most genuinely democratic country in the region.

At the opposite end of the scale is Singapore. Tiny, bourgeois, essentially a one-party town, it enforces rigid strictures on democracy. It has the most secular government in the region and is, along with Japan and Australia, America’s most supportive friend in Asia.

It would be tempting—understandable, even—for Americans to quickly size up these and most of the other Muslims of Southeast Asia as “our kind.” We could assure ourselves that they are, for the most part, as President George W. Bush famously put it at the outset of the war on terror, “with us.” But that would be presumptuous and mistaken. We could assuage our consciences with the belief, doubtless held by many Americans, that the United States already has done more than enough to help Muslims, to no avail. The real issue, however, is that what we have done until now has been simply wrong. Not only do we need to continue helping, our help must be effective. Although the Muslims of Southeast Asia begin from a very different theological place than the Arabs, they increasingly are heading toward a religious junction with them. “Compared with the Middle East, Islam in Southeast Asia is still tolerant and respectful of other faiths,” Tommy Koh, Singapore’s former longtime ambassador to the United Nations and one of Asia’s most astute world affairs analysts, told us. “But there’s a movement afoot for ‘pure’ Islam; not backward-looking like the Taliban but, nevertheless, far more conservative than has traditionally been the case. There is no denying it: there is a ‘green tide’ and it is rising.”

Members of Singapore’s ethnic Chinese majority, like Koh, nervously glancing over their shoulders at Indonesia and Malaysia, are fixated on the tide analogy. Unspoken is the alarming prospect that should it rise much higher, it could surge across the entire region, leaving behind devastation. The tide—green being the symbolic color of Islam because the Prophet is believed to have dressed in a green cloak and turban—has risen to such a level of anger and frustration over the past seven or eight years that secular political leaders are increasingly fearful of attempting to resist it.

The tendency toward Islamic fundamentalism and its potential degeneration into terrorism could become a huge and dangerous reversal for Southeast Asia as well as for the United States. For sixty years, beginning with the stunning post-World War II independence upheaval that shut down European colonialism in Asia, American-style democracy was the model many in the region dreamed of.

When Malaysia’s first prime minister, the courtly Tunku Abdul Rahman, first saw the new and evocative Iwo Jima Memorial in Washington, he immediately commissioned artist Felix de Weldon to craft a similar heroic bronze monument in Kuala Lumpur, honoring Malaysia’s independence fighters. The red, white, gold, and blue flag of Malaysia bears a remarkable likeness to the Stars and Stripes. At one time or another, all ten countries of Southeast Asia, Muslim and non-Muslim—Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—shared the great hope that they would incorporate some pieces of the American way in their nationhood.

For those who have gained at least a tenuous footing on the economic ladder, part of the dream has come true. But for millions of Muslims, it was shattered, first and still foremost, by the realization in 1948 that the United States would stand aligned with Israelis against Palestinians. This bitter pill has lodged ever deeper in their throats as successive U.S. presidents have embraced Israel, enshrining it as America’s closest ally in the Middle East and the largest recipient of its military aid. America’s quiet acquiescence to Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear weapons program, contrasted with its volatile rejection of Iran’s presumed effort to develop its own, has further infuriated most Muslims, the Iranian Shia themselves as well as the majority Sunni. Likewise, they interpreted America’s rejection of the Hamas election victory in the Palestinian territories in January 2006 and its dragged-out inaction before demanding a halt to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon the following July as further affirmation of an American double standard. The hesitant U.S. response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza in January 2009 refueled the fires of resentment. Now the eyes of the world’s Muslims are focused intently on President Barack Hussein Obama, watching and waiting for change.

Although Israel-Palestine remains the baseline, the invasion and occupation of Iraq elevated anti-American bitterness to unprecedented heights. We are now commonly seen as bullies. As we press Southeast Asian governments for assistance in routing out the terrorists in their midst—and they are providing that help—what is on their minds is: the only time the Americans show up is when they’re in trouble; and then they don’t ask, they demand. Certainly, there are some marked exceptions to the pattern. The enormous, life-saving U.S. military relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was hugely appreciated and went a long way toward offsetting the underlying animus, though just temporarily. Otherwise, from Southeast Asia’s viewpoint, it’s all terrorism (formerly all communism) all the time. While they consider fighting terrorists important, they’re far more worried about reducing the poverty that cripples them.

If we are to begin reversing our relationships, we’ll need to accept that with our awesome position at the pinnacle of power must come a new sense of responsible behavior. The United States, at least for the moment, is something the world has never known, not simply a greater power among lesser ones but a behemoth utterly without peer. Yet, such isolated splendor means we are more dependent, not less, on others. No longer can we continually put our self-interest first.

In a 2007 PBS television special titled “The Case for War,” Richard Perle, a neoconservative Reagan administration official and a chief architect of the Iraq war, complained, “There’s got to be some advantage to being a superpower.” We suggest that the advantage is, we get to try to convince developing countries that democracy may hold the answer to their problems and we have the wherewithal to help them become democratic—if that is what they want. No longer can we toss the raw bone of “with us or against us” at other nations and expect them to snatch it up with gratitude. We have seen how such self-centered policies redound to hurt us.

So long is the shadow we cast and so deep the footprint we leave that no other country seriously challenges us, at least not in the sense that the Axis challenged us in World War II or the Soviets in the Cold War. But, in warfare so absurdly asymmetric as that we’re fighting today, seemingly petty foes such as Iraqi and Afghan insurgents and other nongovernmental groups, such as al-Qaeda, which previously we might have expected to swat aside as mere annoyances, can cause us extreme pain.

While the George W. Bush administration viewed itself as democracy’s singular champion, Muslims (and many non-Muslims) in Southeast Asia considered it no less evil and brutal than we do al-Qaeda. In facing this judgment we need to set aside our own self-indulgence, our instinctive defensiveness. For hundreds of millions of people, America as Satan is an obvious truth. To comprehend why, we must walk in Vietnamese or Iraqi or Palestinian shoes: How would we respond if foreigners invaded the United States? How did we respond when they flew airplanes into our buildings? How would we react if that foreign army occupied the United States year after year; its armored vehicles rumbling day and night through the streets of our cities; its soldiers demanding that we identify ourselves to them, entering our homes at will at any hour, shooting us because we look suspicious to them, and those soldiers didn’t understand our language or know the first thing about our way of life?

People are enraged, not pacified, when they perceive that power, certainly foreign power, is being used unjustly against them. They don’t roll over; they lash out. If anyone doubts that, think again about Vietnam, where ninety-pound, malnourished soldiers, who humped artillery pieces over mountain trails on bicycles, outlasted first France and then the United States. Consider Afghanistan, where illiterate, untrained peasants on foot and horseback drove out the British Empire a century ago and their great-grandchildren crushed the Soviet Union eighty years later. Today, that generation’s children are fighting U.S. and NATO troops. And think again of Iraq, where the most powerful and sophisticated armed force the world has ever known could not halt furious young men who planted crude explosives in the roads. That grisly chapter began to wind down only after Americans on the ground finally learned to listen to Iraqis, specifically to local leaders, and then empower them to provide their own security and meet their own pressing human needs.

If one lesson is to be drawn from this bloody history it is this: people will do almost anything, for as long as necessary, to defend their country and their way of life against foreigners. Invaders simply cannot match their passion. This is a painful admission for Americans, whatever our politics and biases. As a nation we think of ourselves as good. We are sure that the rest of the world hungers for our way of life and understands our helpful intentions, our optimism and spontaneity. And we believe that we can change anything we set out to do. There are times when the people of other nations do admire these upbeat qualities. But there are other times when they regard our soaring self-confidence as arrogance. In Southeast Asia, we are teetering between those times right now.

Yet it is in Southeast Asia where we have the best opportunity to regain our balance and begin moving toward global peace with Islam. The first step requires that we simply listen. The two of us have spent careers doing that, listening to the people of this part of the world, among them presidents and prime ministers, radical clerics and terrorists, businessmen, students, peasant farmers, legislators, soldiers, police officers, and intellectuals. In the following pages we give some of them the opportunity to speak for themselves and their societies. Some speak in favor of the United States; others are hostile. Rising anti-Americanism and terrorism are on all of their minds.

A common thread running through our conversations was that poverty and inadequate education lead to the recruitment of religious foot soldiers, the so-called jihadi warriors, to plant homemade bombs along roads and to drive explosives-laden vehicles into targets selected by their better-educated and wealthier superiors. Whether in Iraq or Indonesia, these young men (and occasionally women) step forward—knowing almost certainly that they will die, either by suicide or in combat—with one ambition: to kill Americans before they are killed.

It is a straightforward matter to trace the path of violence eastward, from Iraq to Afghanistan, through the sievelike frontier into Pakistan, and—since the November 2008 assault on Mumbai—onward into India. To the east, Bangladesh has long been fragile and dangerous. Then come the vulnerable states of Southeast Asia. This is a much more realistic and worrisome queue of dominoes than existed during the Vietnam War. With Islamic resentment and pride swelling, it is predictable that more will volunteer and continue waging what they rationalize as jihad.

Yet, Americans can find encouragement in this bleak picture, not in the poisonous Middle East but among the Muslims of Southeast Asia. To them, Barack Hussein Obama is a heroic figure. Like them, he is a person of color. Though a Christian, he has a recognizably Muslim name. Indeed, his father was a Kenyan Muslim. He is an American who as a child lived for a time among them with his mother and Indonesian stepfather. And now he is president of the United States.

As far as the people of the region are concerned, the new administration began work with a clean slate. They want to open a mutually beneficial level of exchange, one that would help provide them with sorely needed help, especially in education, small-scale business, manufacturing, and job training. In return, they offer Americans much-improved relations with a vast number of the world’s Muslims. Surely such an outcome, at a small fraction of the cost of a war, would be a win-win. If the Obama administration wants to reduce the threat of radical Islam in Southeast Asia, it will do so by creating and fine-tuning proactive policies that previous administrations failed to develop.

The fact that Islam in Southeast Asia, although under rising fundamentalist pressure, is not yet in crisis, should be all the encouragement the United States needs to step up to the challenge by putting what foreign-policy experts know as “smart power” to work in the region. The very prospect of avoiding open-ended warfare such as we face in the Middle East and parts of South Asia gives us all the cause needed for considered, positive proactivity. If we wait for extremism to reach tsunami level in Southeast Asia, the region could indeed fulfill the prophecy of becoming the second bloody front in the war against radical Islamists.

Southeast Asia is and long has been home to a number of deadly terrorist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Recently declassified U.S. intelligence revealed that a post-9/11 follow-up attack on Los Angeles was being led by a prominent terrorist known by the nom de guerre Hambali and his Jemaah Islamiya followers in coordination with al-Qaeda. It was about the time that the Los Angeles plans were discovered that intelligence analysts began speaking of Southeast Asia as “the second front” in the “war on terror.” As we delved into the security situation in Southeast Asia, however, we came to understand that the problem was more one of rising Islamic fundamentalism and less a massive terrorist threat. Most importantly, we recognized that Southeast Asia presented a rare opportunity for us to learn how to deal with Islamic countries that were not torn by war. By helping them establish successful governments that would discourage the development of violent extremists, we would be helping them, and the rest of the Muslims in other countries, including the United States. We chose The Next Front as the title for this book because we believe it is there where we can and must develop and test an entirely new approach applicable to Muslims everywhere.

These are the key questions for Americans to consider at the outset:

We will address each of these questions fully. In sum, though, we believe that Americans cannot afford any longer to ignore the Muslims of Southeast Asia. There is simply too much at stake, and not just the economic and strategic basics, which, to the small community of U.S. specialists who study the region, are historically all that have mattered. More important is the need to penetrate the thinking of the region’s people.

Respect for the United States as a force for good has plummeted dramatically, not only in Southeast Asia but among all people of the worldwide Islamic community, the umma. According to a November 2006 poll by the University of Maryland, Arab dislike of President George W. Bush surpassed that of Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert by nearly two to one. But with the change of U.S. administrations, the extent of anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia certainly is becoming less deeply rooted and less often expressed in acts of violence. Obama has been given an important opportunity. Southeast Asia’s governments are anxious for the United States to step up trade, investment, security, and public diplomacy to cool the extremist rhetoric that threatens them and offset the dexterously managed, low-key, high-speed rise of China throughout the region.

The steps Americans take, if we take them, could have an effect as profound and long-lasting as the missteps we took in the past. Forty years ago, we misread the hopes and intentions of the Vietnamese. Two generations later, we misread Iraqis, presuming that because they had suffered under a dictator, they wanted to become us. As Iraq has proven, there is no way to crush the jihad in the way we crushed Germany and Japan; no thirty-eighth parallel, as there was in Korea, behind which to drive them. Those enemies were governments with armies; defeat the army and the entire structure collapses. Today’s enemies have no government to defend. More often—and this applies to South and Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East—they despise their governments. They’re fighting not for a country but for an ideal.

The ideal is all they have. But it does us no good to tell ourselves that because they have bought into the most extreme interpretation of religion, they are simply evil zealots who despise us. Those who best understand the terrorist movements of Southeast Asia say that most sign on simply because everything else in life has failed them, not because they hate our freedoms. In truth—and they themselves say so—they envy us for our privileges. That is very different, though, from wanting to be us. Most of all, what they want is hope. Having and working toward realistic hope is the essence of what it means to be American, and it is the best of what we can offer. To interpret this sense of the possible for people who have so few possibilities, we must help them break the cycle of poverty, ignorance, and injustice in which they are caught.

To begin, we will need nonmilitary armies of energetic Americans to deliver the information and skills that Americans know and do well. We will have to give this help freely and with no presumption that those who receive it will become our friends or even thank us. Some may end up disliking us more than they do now. It happens. But most will benefit, and so will we. The task will be costly, though far cheaper than war. This likely is the only way for us to help a huge bloc of Muslims draw back from the brink of extremism and build a mutually advantageous relationship with a United States that exercises the responsibility, as well as the prerogatives, of world leader.

As George W. Bush observed more presciently than he could have known, during his first presidential campaign, “If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us.”