Wittgenstein:
Understanding and Meaning
Part II: Exegesis §§1–184

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Second, extensively revised edition
by
P. M. S. Hacker
Other volumes of this Commentary

Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volume 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part I: Essays
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Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
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Part II: Exegesis §§428–693
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Epilogue:
Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytical Philosophy
P. M. S. Hacker

Companion to this volume

Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part I: Essays
G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker
second, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker
For Anne and Sylvia
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Acknowledgements

Dr Erich Ammereller, Dr Hanoch Benyami, Professor Hans-Johann Glock, Professor Oswald Hanfling, Edward Kanterian, Dr Joachim Schulte, Dr Jonathan Witztum and Professor Eike von Savigny read and commented upon one or more chapters of exegesis. They saved me from a multitude of errors and oversights. I am most grateful to them for their generosity and for their constructive criticisms.

I owe thanks to Professor Brian McGuinness, Dr Joachim Schulte and the late Professor Georg Henrik von Wright, who have done so much to clarify the history of Wittgenstein’s masterpiece, for reading and giving me their comments upon the essay entitled ‘The history of the composition of the Philosophical Investigations’ and upon the exegesis of the ‘prelims’ to Wittgenstein’s book.

St John’s College has, as always, been generous in its support of research and scholarship. I am, as I have now so often been, most grateful to Jean van Altena for her admirable copy-editing.

P. M. S. H.
Thoughts reduced to paper are generally nothing more than the footprints of a man walking in the sand. It is true that we see the path he has taken; but to know what he saw on the way, we must use our own eyes.

Schopenhauer
The exegesis of the second edition of Volume 1 is constructed on the same principles as that of the first edition. The text of the *Investigations* §§1–184, as before, is divided into six chapters. There is nothing sacrosanct about the chosen division — other ways of segmenting the text can readily be imagined and justified. The divisions were chosen partly for convenience of exposition, and because we thought, and I still think, that they correspond to fairly evident thematic changes (the exception is chapter 5, §§134–42, which is a bridging sequence of remarks). They enable readers to pause for breath, as it were, and to gain their bearings in the landscape.

Each chapter of exegesis is preceded by an introduction, which surveys the argumentative development of the sequence of Wittgenstein’s numbered *Bemerkungen* (referred to as ‘sections’ to avoid ambiguity) and explains the structure of the argument. This is supplemented by tree diagrams that represent the relationships between the various sections. At the end of each such introduction, there is a table of sources. In the first edition, we were satisfied to correlate the numbered sections of the text with TS 220 (the Early Draft (*Frühfassung* (FF))), and TS 226R, which is Rhees’s 1938/9 translation of it up to §116, although, of course, the exegesis of individual sections made reference to many more texts. Subsequent volumes of the Commentary were more thorough in their attempts to track down sections to their manuscript sources. Now, with the publication of the Bergen edition of the *Nachlass* in electronic form, and the consequent availability of a search engine, I have endeavoured to give all the relevant sources of a given section in the tables of sources annexed to each introduction to a chapter of exegesis. Of course, an element of judgement is involved in thus selecting sources, and no doubt there are some passages that I decided not to be worth registering which another person might, with equal right, think to be relevant.

As it was decided to publish this volume of the Commentary in two parts *ab initio*, rather than, as hitherto, waiting on the publication of the paperback edition, I have followed the practice of the paperback editions and indicated in a text box the appropriate locus, relative to the exegesis, of each essay, and have specified, in the inserted box, the section headings of the relevant essay. This will indicate to anyone using the exegesis for the study of Wittgenstein’s book that corresponding to a particular place in it, there is a comprehensive discussion of Wittgenstein’s treatment of a topic in an essay printed in Part I of this volume of Commentary.
I observed in the Introduction to Part I that my reasons for wishing to write a second edition of this volume included the fact that much new material by way of both primary sources (manuscripts, diaries and letters) and derivative primary sources (students’ lecture notes, dictations) has been published in the last quarter of a century. These materials often shed light on the interpretation of individual sections of Wittgenstein’s text. Furthermore, many debates over the interpretation of individual remarks have been illuminating and have sometimes led me to revise the interpretations we gave in the 1970s. I am especially indebted to Professor Eike von Savigny’s methodical criticisms in his Wittgensteins ‘Philosophische Untersuchungen’: Ein Kommentar für Leser, 2nd edn (Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1994). I do not always agree with his strictures or with the interpretations he advocates, but I always learnt a great deal from his criticisms and discussions. It would be tedious and unbearably lengthy to list all the significant changes I have made throughout the text of the exegesis, for I have rewritten, compressed and revised it extensively. But the ‘chapter’ that has undergone the most transformation and supplementation is the exegesis of §§89–133 on philosophy and philosophical methodology. The interpretations here are importantly different from those offered in the first edition, and are supported with a great deal of new evidence. The upshot is that, despite compression, this chapter of exegesis is almost twice as long as the previous text, and sheds a great deal more light on Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the Tractatus and on his new conception of philosophy, its aims and methods.

In this second edition, I have added a preliminary essay entitled ‘The history of the composition of the Philosophical Investigations’ that summarizes what has been learnt over the past half-century by various scholars working closely on the editing of Wittgenstein’s texts. I have also added an essay, ‘An overview of the structure and argument of the Philosophical Investigations’, in which I have tried to survey the argument of the whole book, from §1 to §693. It is not easy to see how it all hangs together, and why the various discussions are located where they are. So I have tried to remedy this.

The structure of the exegesis of the sections is in essence the same as before. Each section is discussed separately, as are the Randbemerkungen (comments below the line at the bottom of certain pages). Different paragraphs in each section are referred to by lower-case letters (e.g. ‘§27(a)’ refers to the first paragraph of §27). Five different kinds of comments are marked out by marginal numbers: 1, 1.1, 2, 2.1 and 3. The first, i.e. 1, consists of commentary on the section as a whole. 1.1 consists of comments on individual lines, phrases and words, as well as suggestions for rectification of mistranslations. 2 discusses parallel remarks from Wittgenstein’s other writings, which sometimes offer elaborations of the thought expressed concisely in the Investigations, and sometimes contrast with the final text and therefore shed light on the development of his ideas. 2.1 consists of parallel lines or phrases in Wittgenstein’s other works which amplify or illuminate matters of detail. 3, used infrequently, is reserved for any other
business. Lower-case roman numerals are used when an enumeration of points is necessary. Enumeration within enumeration has sometimes forced recourse to arabic numerals or lower-case letters. Since these conventions were chosen for their perspicuity, I have, as before, not hesitated to transgress them where, for some reason, they impeded clarity.

To save space, I have much reduced the quotations in the original German, which, in the first edition, accompanied our translations from the Nachlass. Since the whole of the Nachlass is now available on CD-rom, the translations can readily be checked against Wittgenstein’s original.

P. M. S. Hacker
St John’s College, Oxford
October 2003
Abbreviations

1. Wittgenstein’s published works

The following abbreviations, listed in alphabetical order, are used to refer to Wittgenstein’s published works.

BlB Occasionally used to refer to the Blue Book.
BrB Occasionally used to refer to the Brown Book.


Reference style: all references to *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I, are to sections (e.g. PI §1), except those to Randbemerkungen (notes below the line) on various pages. Reference to these pages is given by two numbers, the first referring to the page of the first and second editions, the second to the third edition. References to Part II are to pages, in a like manner (e.g. PI p. 174/148). References to other printed works are either to numbered remarks (TLP) or to sections signified ‘§’ (Z, RPP, LW); in all other cases references are to pages (e.g. LFM 21 = LFM, page 21) or to numbered letters (CL); references to *The Big Typescript* are to the original pagination of the typescript as given in the Bergen electronic edition of *Wittgenstein’s Nachlass* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).

2. Derivative primary sources


Abbreviations


3. Nachlass

All references to other material cited in the von Wright catalogue (G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), pp. 35ff.) are by MS or TS number followed by page number (‘r’ indicating recto, ‘v’ indicating verso) or section number ‘§’, as it appears in the Bergen electronic edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass.

In the case of the first manuscript draft of the Investigations, MS 142 (the so-called Urfassung), references are to Wittgenstein’s section number (‘§’), save in the case of references to pp. 77ff., which are redrafts of PI §§1–2 and to pp. 78–91, which Wittgenstein crossed out and redrafted on pp. 91ff., subsequently assigning them section numbers in the redrafts alone.

Manuscripts

MSS 105–22 are eighteen large manuscript volumes written between 2 February 1929 and 1944. These were numbered by Wittgenstein as Vols I–XVIII. In the first edition of this commentary they were referred to by volume number, followed by page number (e.g. ‘Vol. XII, 271’). Since then it has become customary to refer to them by von Wright number alone. Here they are referred to on their first occurrence in a discussion by their von Wright number, followed by volume number in parentheses, followed by page number in the
Abbreviations

Bergen edition (e.g. ‘MS 116 (Vol. XII), 271’). In the subsequent occurrence of a reference to the same volume in the same discussion, the volume number is dropped.

‘MS 114 (Vol. X) Um.’ refers to Wittgenstein’s pagination of the Umarbeitung (reworking) of the Big Typescript in MS 114. The Umarbeitung begins on folio 31v of MS 114 (Vol. X), and is paginated consecutively 1–228.

Typescripts

B i Bemerkungen I (TS 228), 1945–6, 185 pp. All references are to numbered sections ($§$).

B ii Bemerkungen II (TS 230), 1945–6, 155 pp. All references are to numbered sections ($§$).

All other typescripts are referred to as ‘TS’, followed by the von Wright number and pagination as in the Bergen edition.

The successive drafts of the Investigations are referred to as follows:

TS 220 is the typescript of the Early Draft (Frühfassung (FF)) of the Investigations, referred to in the first edition of this Commentary as ‘PPI’ (Proto-Philosophical Investigations), dictated from MS 142 (the Urfassung (UF)).

TS 226$_r$ is Rhees’s pre-war translation of TS 220, §§1–116, referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI(R).

TS 227a and 227b are the two surviving carbon copy typescripts of the Investigations (the top copy having been lost).

TS 238 is a reworking of TS 220, §§96–116, with renumberings, deletions, corrections and additions in Wittgenstein’s hand, referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI(A).

TS 239 (the Bearbeitete Frühfassung (BFF)) is a reworking of TS 220.

ZF is the reconstructed Intermediate Draft (Zwischenfassung) of the Investigations, previously known as the Intermediate Version, and referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI(I).

In transcriptions from the Nachlass I have followed Wittgenstein’s convention of enclosing alternative draftings within double slashes ‘//’.

4. Reference style to the other volumes of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations

Abbreviations


References to these are of the form ‘Volume’, followed by the volume number, the quoted title of an essay in the designated volume, and the section number of that essay. Occasionally reference to specific pages in an essay is made, in which case it is the paperback edition that is referred to. References to the exegesis are flagged ‘Exg.’, followed by section number prefixed with ‘§’ or page number (in the case of the Randbemerkungen).

References to Part I of this volume of the Commentary are given by essay title and section number or page number.

5. Abbreviations for works by Frege

BLA i  *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, vol. i (1893); references to the preface by roman numeral indicating the original page number, all other references by section number (§).

BLA ii *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, vol. ii (1903); all references by section number (§).


CP  *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984). To refer to individual articles in this volume, the following abbreviations are used:

CO  ‘Concept and Object’
CT  ‘Compound Thoughts’
FC  ‘Function and Concept’
FG  ‘Foundations of Geometry’
N  ‘Negation’
SM  ‘Sense and Meaning’
T  ‘Thought’

All page references to these articles are to the original German pagination, as it occurs in the margins of the English translation, followed by the page number in CP.


6. Abbreviations for works by Russell

The history of the composition of the Philosophical Investigations

As Wittgenstein wrote in the preface to the Investigations that he dated January 1945, and which was used, with minor amendments, in the published version, the thoughts he was presenting were the precipitate of his philosophical investigations over the previous sixteen years, i.e. dating back to 1929. His efforts to compose a book incorporating his new ideas can be divided into different phases.1

1. The Big Typescript. The first phase began in 1929. The first work to emerge was the typescript later published as Philosophische Bemerkungen (1964), compiled primarily to present to the Council of Trinity College in order to obtain a grant that would enable Wittgenstein to continue his work, and subsequently submitted as a Fellowship dissertation. It is doubtful whether this compilation of early 1930 was ever intended as a draft for a book. Concurrently, he was co-operating with Friedrich Waismann in writing the first volume of the Vienna Circle’s series of publications Schriften zur Wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung. This was duly advertised as Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, for which Moritz Schlick wrote a preface. But the project never reached completion, and effectively collapsed with Schlick’s murder in 1936. It was published under Waismann’s name in English translation in 1965 as The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (PLP).2 These years of the early 1930s, however, were mainly dedicated to writing a book dismantling the edifice of the Tractatus, laying the foundations for Wittgenstein’s new philosophical method, and applying it to the philosophy of logic and language, and to the philosophy of mind.

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1 For the historical data in the following discussion I am indebted to the bibliographical research of Georg Henrik von Wright, Joachim Schulte, Alois Pichler and Brian McGuinness, to the research of Stephen Hilmy and Anthony Kenny on The Big Typescript, and to the biographical research of Brian McGuinness and Ray Monk.

of mathematics. The fruits of this endeavour are evident in *The Big Typescript* (TS 213), a 768-page untitled typescript, with an eight-page annotated table of contents, made in 1933. It is divided into 19 chapters and 140 numbered sections. The typescript was based on MSS 105–114 (Vols I–X), which had been sifted into preliminary typescripts TSS 208–11, on which *The Big Typescript* is based. He immediately began reworking *The Big Typescript*, initially by making extensive handwritten modifications and additions, on both recto and verso, as well as inserting handwritten pages. He then reverted to fresh manuscript composition based on the modified typescript and on the pocket notebooks MS 156(a) and (b), and wrote the *Umarbeitung* (‘Revision’) in the second part of MS 114 (Vol. X) beginning on 31v, and paginated 1–228, and continuing in MS 115 (Vol. XI), 1–117, written in late 1933 and early 1934. This too was unsatisfactory, and in 1934 he tried a second reworking (the *Zweite Umarbeitung* (‘Second Revision’)) in MS 140 (the *Grosses Format* (‘Large Format’)) — a 42-page attempt to mould the material afresh. This too was abandoned, although *The Big Typescript* was to be quarried again later.

2. **Revision of the Brown Book (EPB).** The next attempt at the composition of a book was in Norway in autumn 1936. Wittgenstein had dictated the Brown Book to Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose in Cambridge 1934/5. In August 1936 he travelled to Norway with the intention of continuing his philosophical work in solitude. The first effort was directed at the text of the Brown Book, which, at the end of August, Wittgenstein began translating into German and reworking (up to BrB, p. 154) under the title ‘Philosophische Untersuchungen, Versuch einer Umarbeitung’ (‘Philosophical Investigations: attempted revision’) in MS 115 (Vol. XI), 118–292. In early November, he abandoned the attempt, writing ‘Dieser ganze “Versuch einer Umarbeitung” von Seite 118 bis hierher ist NICHTS WERT’ (‘This whole “attempted revision” from page 118 to here is COMPLETELY WORTHLESS’ (MS 115 (Vol. XI), 292)). As he wrote to Moore, ‘I found it all, or nearly all, boring and artificial. For having the English version before me had cramped my thinking.’ So, he continued, ‘I therefore decided to start all over again and not to let my thoughts be guided by anything but themselves’ (CL 169 (20 Nov. 1936)).

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3 Underlying these large MS volumes were first draft writings in small pocket notebooks. Only four of these survive from this period: MS 153a, which is a source for MSS 110–12 (Vols. VI–VIII); MS 153b, a source for MSS 112–13 (Vols VIII–IX); MS 154, a source for MS 113 (Vol. IX); and MS 155, a source for MS 112 (Vol. VIII).

4 The published volume *Philosophical Grammar* (PG), ed. R. Rhees, is an editorial compilation from *The Big Typescript* and its various revisions. PG §§1–13, 23–40, and the final two paragraphs of 42 are derived from the second revision of BT, i.e. MS 140 (the *Grosses Format*). §§14–22, 41–2, 43–141 are derived from the first revision, i.e. MSS 114–15 (Vol X–XI). Most of the rest is derived from BT, but appendices 1–3 are from TS 214, and appendix 4b is from MS 116 (Vol. XII). For detailed information, see A. J. P. Kenny, ‘From the Big Typescript to the *Philosophical Grammar*’, repr. in his *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), pp. 24–37.

5 Now published as *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung* (EPB).
3. The Proto-Draft and Early Draft (UF and FF). The new attempt was MS 142, the manuscript of the first, pre-war, version of the Investigations that corresponds roughly to §§1–189(a) of the published book. This is a 167-page manuscript, written as consecutive paragraphed prose, with the title Philosophische Untersuchungen. It was compiled during two separate periods. Pages 1–76 were composed between early November and early December 1936. Pages 77–167 were written sometime between February and May 1937. Wittgenstein presented the unfinished manuscript volume to his sister Margarete for Christmas 1936, with the inscription ‘Gretl von Ludwig zu Weihnachten 1936 ein schlechtes Geschenk’ (‘Gretl from Ludwig for Christmas 1936 a poor gift’), but he obviously took the volume back with him to Norway in the new year. Pages 77–8 are a revision of the opening two pages, and pages 78 (bottom)–91 are crossed out and reworked on pp. 91ff. Though the manuscript is much amended, it was (initially) a ‘clean copy’ manuscript. This has now been published as the Urfassung (the Proto-Draft (UF)). Its surviving immediate sources are the pocket notebooks MSS 152, 157(a), 157(b), the reworked version of the Brown Book in MS 115 (Vol. XI), and MS 140 (the Grosses Format). It was, it seems, typed in two stages: pages 1–76, and pages 91 to the end. The typing was completed by either May or December 1937. The result was the 137-page typescript TS 220.

Wittgenstein returned to Norway in mid-August 1937, and began working on the sequel to TS 220. TS 220 had ended with the remark corresponding to Philosophical Investigations §189(a). On 11 of September, he began MS 117 (a ‘clean copy’ manuscript) by copying out the last sentence from TS 220. The next 97 pages are the basis of the first 67 pages of the subsequent dictation of TS 221 (for further detail, see below pp. 36–9). He continued working on themes in philosophy of mathematics until mid-October, after which he switched to other topics, and also mined The Big Typescript for usable remarks which he transcribed into MS 116 (Vol. XII). He left Skjolden in mid-December to return to Vienna. The first 117 pages (out of 134) of TS 221 were dictated in Cambridge sometime in mid-1938, the final 17 pages apparently in winter 1938/9. The first-level materials for this second part of the early version include MSS 118, 119 (for pp. 1–119), MS 115 (for pp. 120–30), MS 121 and MS 162(a) (for pp. 130–5). Wittgenstein had the ‘Preface’ to this early version of the Investigations typed (and dated) in August in Cambridge.

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6 In Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Kritisch-genetische Edition, ed. J. Schulte (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2001), but without the deleted pp. 78–91 that were redrafted on pp. 91ff.


8 See exegesis of the Preface, p. 38, n. 15.

9 Numbered as a sequel to TS 220, so the first page is numbered 138.
History of the composition of PI

TSS 220–1 are published as the Frühfassung (Early Draft (FF)). It was with this typescript that Wittgenstein approached Cambridge University Press in August or early September 1938 with a view to publication in German with a parallel English translation, under the title ‘Philosophical Remarks’. The Syndics agreed to this proposal on 30 September. On Moore’s recommendation, Wittgenstein asked Rush Rhees to essay the translation. In consultation with Wittgenstein, Rhees worked on it throughout Michaelmas Term 1938 (TS 226\textsubscript{R}). By January 1939 he had reached §116 (corresponding to PI §107),\textsuperscript{10} at which point he had to leave Cambridge for the USA on account of his father’s death. Wittgenstein, together with Yorick Smythies, revised Rhees’s translation by hand.\textsuperscript{11} Dissatisfied with it and with TS 221, he shelved the publication project for the time being.\textsuperscript{12}

4. The Revised Early Draft (TS 239, BFF). The next attempt consisted in a revision of the two typescripts. One of the copies of TS 220 was extensively revised by hand (TS 239) prior to late 1942 or early 1943. It has been printed as the Bearbeitete Frühfassung (the Revised Early Draft (BFF)). Sometime between 1939 and 1943, TS 221 was extensively reworked, cut up and rearranged. The result, TS 222, has been printed as Part I of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. It was with the former of these texts, or with both texts, in mind that Wittgenstein approached the Press again in September 1943 with the suggestion of publishing a book entitled Philosophical Investigations, to be printed together with a reprint of the Tractatus. This idea, as he explained in the final Preface, had occurred to him in the course of rereading the Tractatus with Nicholas Bachtin. The Syndics agreed on 14 January 1944, but Wittgenstein again moved on to something else.

5. The Intermediate Draft (ZF). The next phase is exhibited in the Zwischenfassung (Intermediate Draft). This has been reconstructed by von Wright. It was a 195-page typescript, consisting of 300 numbered remarks, corresponding roughly to PI §§1–421. It is for this version that Wittgenstein, in late 1944, wrote the new drafts of a Preface (in MSS 128 and 129, see ‘Preface’, p. 42) dated January 1945. It consists of the reworked version of TS 220 (i.e. TS 239 (BFF)), roughly corresponding to PI §§1–189, together with eight pages from TS 221 (corresponding to PI §§189–97), followed by new material. The new material consists of 104 numbered remarks derived immediately from TS 241, mediately from MSS 129 and 124, and more remotely from MSS 130, 165, 179 and 180(a). It is possible that with this draft we see

\textsuperscript{10} Curiously, although TS 220 is not typed in the form of Bemerkungen (i.e. spaced remarks), Rhees typed his translation in this form.

\textsuperscript{11} His corrections are often of interest and sometimes of importance, especially when he corrects a translation proposed by Rhees which happens to coincide with Anscombe’s 1953 translation.

\textsuperscript{12} He was already having doubts in October, for the Minutes of the Syndics for 21 Oct. refer to Wittgenstein’s uncertainty about publishing his ‘Philosophical Remarks’.
the abandonment of the idea of including the mathematical materials in the book.\textsuperscript{13} How did this come about?

In February 1944, Wittgenstein left Newcastle, where he had been assisting in research on wound shock with Drs Grant and Reeve (and briefly with their successor, Dr Bywaters). He returned briefly to Cambridge and then went to stay in Swansea, where Rhees lived, from March until September. After some further work on philosophy of mathematics, he abandoned that subject\textsuperscript{14} in favour of reflections on a private language, on thinking, imagining, calculating in the head and consciousness (i.e. themes in the philosophy of psychology that bear directly or indirectly on meaning and understanding). These form the main topics of MS 129 (begun on 17 August 1944), which is a major source of these remarks in the Intermediate Draft. They were dictated, either in Wales or on his return to Cambridge, to form the 33-page TS 241. His new ideas led him to a fundamental change in his conception of the book. The material on following a rule, originally intended to lead into a fundamental investigation into philosophy of mathematics, was now to lead into an equally fundamental examination of the conceivability of a private language and associated themes in the philosophy of psychology that shed light on the nature of language, and on the relation between language and thought.

The fact that Wittgenstein dated the new Preface ‘January 1945’, even though it was written in late 1944, suggests that he was thinking of approaching Cambridge University Press again with a finished typescript early in the new year. He does not appear to have done this, however. Rather, he turned to a massive expansion of the Intermediate Draft.

6. \textit{The Late Draft (SF)}. On 13 June 1945, Wittgenstein wrote to Rhees, ‘I am dictating some stuff, remarks, some of which I want to embody in my first volume (if there’ll ever be one). This business of dictating will take roughly another month, or even six weeks.’\textsuperscript{15} The dictation in question is a typescript Wittgenstein called ‘Bemerkungen I’, consisting of 698 remarks. These are derived from post-war sources (the fourth part of MS 116 (Vol. XII), MSS 129–30)) and pre-war sources (MSS 115–17, 119). He selected 400 remarks from ‘Bemerkungen I’ to be included in his book,\textsuperscript{16} and on this basis dictated the last typescript draft, TS 227, in the course of the academic year 1945/6. The

\textsuperscript{13} This is uncertain, precisely because the 1945 draft of the Preface mentions the foundations of mathematics as one of the topics discussed in the book. It is unclear whether this signals an intention to continue, as before, with materials on mathematics, which would follow the new discussions of a private language and associated psychological concepts, or whether it is an oversight — as it evidently is in the final published version of the Preface.

\textsuperscript{14} He never returned to his work on the philosophy of mathematics, although it is evident (see below, p. 28) that he intended a book, entitled ‘Beginning Mathematics’, as a sequel to the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}.


\textsuperscript{16} Seventeen of the \textit{Randbemerkungen} are also from ‘Bemerkungen I’.
Intermediate Draft had been 195 pages long. TS 227 is 324 pages long. The final typescript contains no remarks the manuscript sources of which post-date June 1945, but Wittgenstein made minor handwritten alterations to the typescript over the next few years.

On Wittgenstein’s death in 1951, his literary executors found themselves responsible for his literary remains. The Philosophical Investigations was edited by Anscombe and Rhees, and published by Blackwell in 1953 in German with a facing English translation by Anscombe. The translation underwent various revisions for the second edition of 1958, and again for the third edition in 2001. There remain some inaccuracies and infelicities, the philosophically significant ones of which are pointed out in this Commentary, in the exegesis of individual remarks, under ‘1.1’.

The publication included what is now Part II of the Investigations, printed from a now lost typescript based on MS 144, a collection of 372 unnumbered remarks, divided into fourteen unnumbered sections, selected from manuscripts written between May 1946 and May 1949. Was Part II intended to be part of the same book? The editors, G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, wrote: ‘Part II was written between 1947 and 1949. If Wittgenstein had published his work himself, he would have suppressed a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or so of Part I and worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its place.’ There are some reasons for doubting this judgement.17 But whatever the truth may be regarding Wittgenstein’s intentions, the fact is that he did not integrate the remarks of what is now printed as ‘Part II’ into his book, and they are not part of the same book. The four volumes of this Commentary are concerned solely with what is now referred to as Philosophical Investigations, Part I.

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An overview of the structure and argument of the *Philosophical Investigations*

In the preface to the *Investigations* Wittgenstein recounts how he made several unsuccessful attempts to weld the results of his philosophical work into a seamless whole, in which the thoughts would proceed from subject to subject in a natural order and without breaks. In the end, he had to rest satisfied with an ‘album of sketches’ — a collection of philosophical remarks on many different subjects, arranged in sequences that occasionally jump abruptly from one topic to another. It is sometimes difficult to see the rhyme and reason for the ordering. But since Wittgenstein worked hard and long on the arrangement of his *Bemerkungen*, there is a presumption that it has a rationale. In this essay I shall try to give a synoptic view of the developing argument of the whole of the *Investigations*. It will, I hope, make clear the degree of unity and integrity of the book.

It was Wittgenstein’s desire that the *Investigations* be published together with the *Tractatus* in a single volume, for it seemed to him that his new thoughts could be seen aright only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of thinking (Preface, p. x). The *Tractatus* belongs to the sublime, metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy. It had, in the view of its author, brought that tradition to its culmination and to a turning point. The *Investigations*, however, breaks even more radically with the great tradition. The sublime conception of philosophy that informs the *Tractatus* is abandoned, and the conception of analysis of logical form that the *Tractatus* prescribed for future philosophy is rejected. The *Investigations* advances a different conception of philosophy, a new way of understanding philosophical problems, and novel methods for tackling them. It is therefore unsurprising that the first quarter of the *Investigations* is contrapuntal. On the one hand, Wittgenstein criticizes, implicitly or explicitly, the fundamental commitments that underlay his first philosophy; on the other hand, he replaces them with a quite different way of tackling the problems. The central theme of the book is the nature of language and linguistic meaning. Here Wittgenstein goes over much the same ground as he had covered in the *Tractatus* account of the nature of the proposition, propositional representation and intentionality, but with very different results. His discussions, however, ramify into philosophical investigations of understanding, meaning something by a word or sentence, interpreting, following a rule,
subjective experience, thinking and imagining, which are barely mentioned in the *Tractatus*, even though it presupposed a particular, misguided conception of them. Conversely, the themes of the nature and status of logic and logical necessity that were so central to the *Tractatus* are only briefly touched on here. Presumably they were to be discussed in his book on the philosophy of mathematics and logic that was never completed.

Wittgenstein opens the *Investigations* with a quotation from Augustine’s *Confessions*, in which Augustine sketches how he thinks he learnt language as a child. In this description Wittgenstein detected a picture of the essence of language: namely, that words name objects and that sentences are combinations of names. This primitive picture of naming as the foundation of language displays the seed from which numerous philosophical conceptions of language and linguistic meaning grow. From Augustine’s non-philosophical picture Wittgenstein extracts a particular philosophical conception of linguistic meaning: every word has a meaning, the meaning is correlated with the word, it is the object the word stands for. Sentences are essentially complex, composed of words in appropriate combination. Subsequently he makes it clear that central to this Augustinian conception is also the idea that language is connected with reality, i.e. that words (names) are endowed with meaning by means of word–world connections. So ostensive definition of primitive terms is conceived to be the fundamental form of explanation of word-meaning, and it is taken to be the point at which names are linked to things. Wittgenstein held this philosophical conception of language and its relation to reality to be of great importance. Elements or aspects of it affect and infect much traditional philosophy, including the *Tractatus*. It has had a pervasive influence not only upon philosophy of language and logic, but also upon metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mathematics. Eradicating its influence upon philosophical thought is one of the aims of the *Investigations* and of Wittgenstein’s writings on psychology and mathematics.

§§1–27(a) are a preliminary exploration of the Augustinian conception of language. Its purpose is both to shake the grip of the idea that the essence of words is to name things and the attendant conception of sentences as necessarily complex expressions (e.g. composed of subject and predicate or function-name and argument-expression) the essence of which is to be assertable. We should not think that the distinctions we draw between kinds of words turn on the kinds of things the words stand for. Rather they turn on the different kinds of use the words have. Sentences are not essentially complex. The assertoric form does not enjoy any special priority relative to other forms of sentence. Nor does it conceal in its depth grammar a truth-value-bearing component (a sentence-radical) that is common to assertions, commands and questions. (So the concepts of truth and truth-condition cannot have the pivotal role in a proper account of meaning that is commonly allocated to them.) In this opening ‘chapter’ Wittgenstein introduces some of the pivotal themes of the book: the diversity of uses of words, the analogy between words
and tools, the role of explanations of word-meaning and their diversity, the concept of a sample and the function of samples in explanations of meaning, language-games and the use of the method of language-games in philosophical elucidation.

§§27(b)–64 examine misconceptions concerning names and naming associated with philosophical analyses operating under the aegis of the Augustinian conception of language. Throughout history, philosophers and linguists alike have been tempted to think of naming as the foundation of language. Names, it was thought, are either complex and definable or simple and indefinable. Indefinable names stand for simple objects in reality that are their meanings. They are unambiguously linked to their meanings by ostensive definition. But, Wittgenstein argues, it is not only simple and indefinable names that can be explained ostensively. Ostensive definition does not ‘connect language and reality’ in the requisite sense, for it is not a description at all, and the object pointed at is typically a sample that belongs to the means of representation. Ostensive definition is one rule among others for the use of a word, and it is no less capable of being misunderstood than any other form of explanation. Understanding an ostensive explanation of a word presupposes a degree of linguistic competence, e.g. a grasp of the category of expression that is being explained. So ostensive definition does not lay the foundations of language. In this sense, language has no foundations.

The idea that ‘real names’, logically proper names, are simple and indefinable, that they stand for objects in reality that are simple and indestructible, is a mythology of symbolism. What was held (by Russell) to be the paradigmatic name (i.e. ‘This’) is not a name at all. The destruction of the bearer of a name does not deprive a name of its meaning, for the bearer of a name is not its meaning. The meaning of a word is not an object of any kind, but the use of the word, which is explained by an explanation of meaning — which is a rule for its use. What look as if they have to exist as a condition of significant thought and language are not sempiternal simples but rather samples. The conception of simples, conceived as the ultimate indestructible constituents of reality (Platonic simple elements, Cartesian simple natures, *Tractatus* simple objects, Russellian individuals) is confused, because it takes ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ to be absolute, predicative expressions, whereas they are in fact relative, attributive ones. What counts as simple or complex has to be introduced separately and be defined for each kind of thing. So the conception of analysis that underpinned logical atomism is chimerical. Such analytic paraphrase may, for some purposes, be of elucidatory use, but the idea that it penetrates to the ultimate logical structure of the world is an illusion. The world has no logical structure.

§§65–88 investigate a conception of linguistic meaning and explanation of meaning that is a correlate of the conception of simple names linked to simple objects that are the ultimate constituents of reality. It is the thought that the proper form of explanation for complex concept-words (by contrast with simple names that cannot be defined by analysis) is analytic definition. This is