State/Space

A Reader

Edited by

Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon MacLeod
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Blackwell Publishing
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The idea for this book originated in a series of discussions among the editors inspired by two sets of panels on the political economy of scale at geography conferences in 2000. Gordon MacLeod and Jane Pollard co-organized some panels on “Political and economic geographies of scale” at the Joint Annual Meeting of the Royal Geographical Society and Institute for British Geographers, held in January 2000 at the University of Sussex. These panels revealed some of the basic theoretical problems involved in theorizing the changing political economy of scale and its implications for state space. Comments by Jamie Gough and Erik Swyngedouw were especially helpful in this regard. An opportunity for further inspiration and discussion came from a series of panels on “State space in transformation: new approaches to political geography and state theory,” which were co-organized by Neil Brenner and Martin Jones at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, April 2000, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. All four editors presented papers here and we received some very useful feedback from our co-panelists and other participants. Neil Brenner would like to thank the Economic Geography Research Group of the RGS-IBG for providing a Young Researchers Travel Grant that enabled him to attend the Sussex conference. Bob Jessop would like to thank *Antipode* and Blackwell Publishing for supporting his travel to the same meeting. The editors also gratefully acknowledge the comments provided by three anonymous reviewers, which proved extremely helpful as we worked to complete the project.

This book provides no more than a first cut into a large, multidisciplinary, and rapidly growing research field. It makes no claim to provide a comprehensive survey of recent work on state space. Many difficult, even painful, editorial decisions were required in order to meet some very strict length requirements imposed by the publisher. We do hope, however, that this volume will provide readers with a broad overview of this exciting new field of theory and research. We also anticipate, in future work, the further development of our own research agenda on the production and transformation of state space under modern capitalism.

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Introduction: State Space in Question

Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon MacLeod

The contributions to this book explore the spatiality of state power in historical and contemporary capitalist social formations. The observation that states are spatial entities may seem self-evident to many readers. Modern states are demarcated from each other by territorial boundaries that they patrol and regulate for military, police, economic, political, demographic, and many other reasons. Likewise, modern states are internally divided into diverse territorial jurisdictions and administrative subdivisions. The most cursory glance at a contemporary world political map seems to confirm the self-evident character of these spatial properties of the modern state. For such maps depict a plethora of distinct state territories, large and small, separated from one another by a global grid of boundaries, and generally demarcated as color-coded “blocks” of space on a flat surface. Thus each individual state is represented as a kind of container that separates an “inside” of domestic political interactions from an “outside” of international or inter-state relations (Walker 1993). This container metaphor also underpins conventional depictions of intra-national political spaces. Thus each regional or local jurisdiction is viewed as a self-enclosed political territory within a nested hierarchy of geographical arenas contained within each other like so many Russian dolls.

Our introduction identifies and comments on an emergent research agenda that is concerned with the production and transformation of state space. This agenda is particularly focused on the restructuring of territorially demarcated forms of state power and the recent decentering of nationally scaled forms of state activity. It also highlights the differential effects of newly emergent political and state spaces on the structural and strategic capacities of the state, the mobilization of social forces, and the dynamics and effectivity of political struggles. Taken together, as we explore below, these complementary research agendas are systematically challenging the entrenched geographical assumptions of mainstream approaches to state space.

Recent Challenges to the Naturalization of State Space

Images of state spatiality as a pre-given and relatively unchanging feature of modernity are epitomized in Max Weber’s famous definition of the modern state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946: 78). This definition also illustrates the pervasive taken-for-grantedness of territoriality among most twentieth-century social theorists and social scientists. Indeed, while Weber invested much effort in defining the concepts of legitimacy and force, he did not attempt to problematize or analyze territoriality. Instead he simply accepted it as the necessary condition for the definition of the subjects of state power (Staatsvolk) and for the internal exercise of organized violence. Typically, the issue was reduced, in his major theoretical writings, to one point on a definitional checklist that could simply be presupposed in any discussion of modern bureaucratic states. Apart from a few innovative political geographers (e.g., Gottmann 1973), most social scientists have followed Weber’s example in neglecting state territoriality as an object of serious intellectual inquiry.

This naturalization of state space in modern societies is associated with a range of implicit geographical assumptions that political geographer John Agnew has aptly summarized as the “territorial trap” (1994). This “geographical unconscious” has haunted much of postwar state theory, international relations, and political sociology, silently pervading theory construction and empirical research. It comprises three core assumptions. First, the state is said to possess sovereign control over its territorial borders. This implies that mutually exclusive, territorially self-enclosed, and unitary state actors constitute the basic units of the global political system. Second, and consequently, the binary opposition between the “domestic” and the “foreign” is regarded as a fixed feature of the modern interstate system. This establishes the national scale as the ontologically necessary foundation for modern political life. And, third, the state is conceived as a static, timeless territorial “container” that encloses economic and political processes. This conception shapes analyses of the geographies of all other social relations — this is especially evident in the assumption that state, society, and economy are contained by congruent, more or less perfectly overlapping geographical borders.

The inter-state system instituted by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is generally presented as the dominant form of geopolitical organization from its inception until the late twentieth century. This Westphalian system was premised on the “bundling” of sovereignty (the notion that each state commands a monopoly of legitimate power within its own domain and is entitled to exercise it without external interference) and territoriality (the delineation of that domain around self-enclosed, mutually exclusive borders) (see Ruggie 1993; for an alternative interpretation, see Osiander 2001). In this context, the geographical assumptions associated with Agnew’s “territorial trap” appear to have a certain material — but imperfect and partial — foundation as products of state interaction within the Westphalian system. But failure to relativize these assumptions in relation to the history of state formation in a particular period is bound to produce a limited and somewhat static approach to the relations between state power and social space.

As if in confirmation of Hegel’s remark that the owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk, social scientists since the mid- to late 1980s have begun to develop new and creative approaches to the study of state space that offer diverse escape routes from the (Westphalian) territorial trap. Initially they questioned how far, under the rapidly changing geopolitical conditions of the late twentieth century, conventional territoralist mappings of the inter-state system still provided an adequate frame-
work for understanding political life. In a rapidly expanding set of literatures, social
scientists have also decentered the hitherto entrenched role of the national scale as
the predominant locus for state activities; in so doing, they have also questioned the
internal coherence of national economies and national civil societies as real and/or
imagined targets for state policies (Radice 1984; Keating 1998; Scott 1998).
Such concerns have prompted many scholars to study the historical origins and
eventual consolidation of the Westphalian geopolitical system, with its apparently
self-enclosed, directly contiguous, mutually exclusive, and sovereign territorial units
(see, e.g., Spruyt 1994; Kratochwil 1986). This in turn has prompted increasing
critical attention to the changing spatialities of state power and political life and to
the development of new methodologies for their study.
This emergent research agenda has been consolidated in recent years through a
number of closely related, albeit analytically distinct, approaches to theorizing and
investigating state space. Together these have generated several distinct research
perspectives, four of which are especially relevant here:

1. **Society and space.** Inspired by Henri Lefebvre (1974) among others, there has been
   a wide-ranging “reassertion of a critical spatial perspective in social theory” (Soja
   1989: 1). As well as human geographers, whose work has long been concerned
   with the spatiality of social life, numerous social theorists and historical sociolo-
gists have explicitly integrated sociospatial considerations into their research (see,
e.g., Harvey 1982, 1989a, 1989b; Castells 1983; Scott and Storper 1986; Greg-
ory and Urry 1985; Giddens 1985; Mann 1986, 1993; Wallerstein 1988). These
   scholars were joined in the 1990s by an emergent school of “critical international
   relations theory” that questions the unreflexive methodological territorialism of
   both realist and liberal approaches to world politics and emphasizes the historical-
   geographical specificity of the territory-sovereignty nexus as a mode of geopolit-
   ical and geoeconomic organization (Macmillan and Linklater 1995; Walker
   1993). At the same time, anthropologists began to develop explicitly spatialized
   conceptual vocabularies to grasp emergent forms of “diasporic” cultural identity
   and political mobilization that appear to escape direct territorialization in
   allegedly self-enclosed geographical arenas (see, e.g., Appadurai 1996; Gupta
   1993). The overall impact of these different bodies of work has been to break the
taken-for-granted link between state territoriality and society and, indeed, for
some, to destabilize, if not completely undermine, the very notion of society
(cf. Anderson 1996; Mann 1986).

2. **The “globalization” debates.** Since the early 1970s, debates have raged over
   the nature, extent, and significance of globalization. These have prompted
   social scientists to rethink issues of space, highlighting its social production
   and historical transformation in and through many emergent, interconnected
   geographical scales. Consequently, space no longer appears as a static platform
   or surface on which social relations are constructed, but rather as one of
   their constitutive dimensions. In particular the state’s role as “power container”
   appears to have been perforated; it seems to be leaking, and thus the
   inherited model of territorially self-enclosed, state-defined societies, economies,
or cultures is becoming highly problematic. In response to this, globalization
researchers have constructed a variety of heterodox, interdisciplinary, and even
postdisciplinary methodologies to challenge the “iron grip of the nation-state on the social imagination” (Taylor 1996: 1923) and its associated, Cartesian image of space as a static, bounded block. Indeed, spatialized approaches to state restructuring have played a key role in facilitating the growing intellectual backlash among globalization researchers against naïve forecasts of the national state’s imminent demise (see, e.g., Cox 1997; Jessop 1999; Brenner 1997).

The crisis of the Keynesian welfare state. The Keynesian welfare states that developed in most advanced capitalist economies during the postwar boom were instituted primarily at the national scale. This involved a socially constructed correspondence between the national economy as the primary object of economic management, the national state as the primary political scale on which economic management was conducted and social welfare was delivered, and the treatment of political subjects as national citizens (Jessop 2002; Peck 2001). This coincidence of couplings at the national scale was disrupted in various ways from the early 1970s onwards by the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism, the increasing internationalization of economic relations, the resurgence of regional and local economies with their own distinctive economic and social problems, the growing rejection of overloaded “big government,” the crisis of US hegemony in the international order, and the increasing mobility of very large numbers of people across national borders. These developments have prompted a decentering of the national scale and the proliferation of new institutions, projects, and struggles at both subnational and supranational scales and this has complicated the articulation of different scales. In response to this “relativization of scale” (Collinge 1996: 1 and passim), recent work has introduced more dynamic and self-reflexive approaches to state spatiality. Moving beyond vertically nested representations of state space, it has explored the tangled, contested, and rapidly changing scalar hierarchies involved in the political regulation of social life under modern capitalism.

New localisms and new regionalisms. Since the late 1980s economic and political geographers have sought to connect the emerging institutions and policies of local/regional economic development with transitions in the territorial governance of contemporary capitalism in response to the crisis of Fordism (MacLeod 2001). This not only involves the emphasis on specific local, urban, and regional problems that require specially tailored solutions rather than a one-size-fits-all national strategy, but has also opened a space for the resurgence of the urban and regional scales in their own right. This (re)discovery of the local and regional is also associated with the development of new forms of governance that give more emphasis to multi-scalar networks and partnerships rather than relying on nationally coordinated bureaucratic hierarchies (Goodwin and Painter 1996; Jessop 1998). Whereas the new localism involves the reassertion of the importance of the local in economic regeneration, political participation, and community building, the new regionalism tends to involve the emergence of broader and strategically more competitive regions than those characteristic of North Atlantic Fordism. Nonetheless both involve the (re-)emergence of new types of regulatory experiments, strategies, and struggles at subnational scales – albeit often promoted by national states or, indeed, supranational state bodies and international inter-governmental or non-governmental bodies (Lovering...
A closely related phenomenon is the increased importance attached to global cities, but this differs from the new localism and new regionalism owing to the horizontally articulated relationships that obtain among global cities in the global city hierarchy. Indeed, studies of world cities have contributed to the turn away from territorialist models of political-economic life by underscoring the key role of transversal inter-urban networks in coordinating socioeconomic relations under global capitalism (on global cities, see Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2001).

A critical theme running through these four sets of emerging issues is the “political economy of scale.” This refers to the ways in which the scalar organization of political-economic life under capitalism is socially produced and periodically transformed (Swyngedouw 1997; Smith 1993; Brenner 1998; McMaster and Sheppard 2002). From this viewpoint, the scalar organization of state space – from the global level of the inter-state system and the national level of state territoriality to subnational tiers of governance such as regional, local, and neighborhood-level institutions – is never fixed forever. Instead, in conjunction with broader socio-economic pressures, constraints, and transformations, it is liable to recurrent redesign, restructuring, and reorientation (see Smith, this volume). The political economy of scale is pivotal to this volume insofar as the contributors (1) call into question the taken-for-grantedness of national state space as the necessary arena of political life; (2) suggest that a relativization of scale is currently unfolding as subnational and supranational levels of state space acquire increasing importance; and (3) analyze ongoing struggles to establish new scales as sites of state regulatory activity under conditions of rapid geoeconomic change.

The articles included in this anthology have been chosen on several grounds. First, we have sought to include chapters that challenge the entrenched assumptions associated with the “territorial trap,” as outlined above, and which, on this basis, open up useful methodological perspectives for the investigation of currently unfolding transformations of state space. Second, and relatedly, we have looked for articles that implicitly or explicitly adopt a broadly postdisciplinary perspective rather than operating within only one disciplinary paradigm (on post-disciplinarity, see Jessop and Sum 2001). Third, we have sought to include contributions that represent cutting-edge contributions from one or more of the major theoretical traditions concerned with state space (including, among others, historical sociology, Marxism, world systems theory, the new institutionalism, critical international political economy, feminist state theory, the regulation approach, and contemporary urban and regional political economy).

The organization of this volume reflects three key thematic questions, which we consider important in the study of state space:

1 What are the appropriate theoretical categories and methods through which to explore the geographies of state space? Thus part I contains contributions that elaborate some of the theoretical foundations for the investigation of state space under modern capitalism.

2 In what ways are inherited formations of state territoriality being transformed under contemporary conditions? Thus part II examines the remaking of state
territoriality since the early 1970s, focusing on the apparent demise of the Westphalian geopolitical order and the ensuing "relativization of scales."

3 How have the geographies of sociopolitical struggle and conflict been transformed under contemporary conditions? Thus part III explores the reshaping of political space more generally in the current period, focusing in particular on the crystallization of new forms of sociopolitical mobilization at a variety of scales and their reciprocal implications for the character of state activity.

Theoretical Foundations: Dimensions and Dynamics of State Space

The contributions to this anthology indicate convincingly the need to move beyond the prevalent notion of state space as a pre-given, static container within which social relations happen to occur. In so doing, they explore one or more of three crucial dimensions of what we term “state space” (see box I):

1 They examine changes in the state’s distinctive form of spatiality, namely, the territorialization of political power. This dimension includes, among other issues, the changing meaning and organization of state territoriality; the evolving role of borders, boundaries, and frontiers; and the changing intra-national geographies of state territorial organization and administrative differentiation. We refer to this aspect as state space in the “narrow” sense.

2 They also systematically explore the geographies of the territorial state’s changing forms of intervention into social and economic processes at various spatial scales, whether territorially defined or not. For, as several authors

| State space in the narrow sense | Refers to the state's distinctive form of spatiality. This comprises the changing organization of state territoriality in the modern inter-state system; the evolving role of borders, boundaries, and frontiers; and the changing intra-national geographies of state territorial organization and internal administrative differentiation. |
| State space in the integral sense | Refers to the territory-, place-, and scale-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized strategically to regulate and reorganize social and economic relations and, more generally, to the changing geographies of state intervention into social and economic processes. This includes non-territorial as well as territorial modes of state intervention. |
| State space in the representational sense | Refers to competing spatial imaginaries that represent state and political spaces in different ways as a basis for demarcating states from each other, demarcating the state from the wider political system, and demarcating the wider political system from the rest of society. These spatial imaginaries also provide an important basis for the politics of representation, for the mobilization of territory-, scale-, and place-specific forms of state intervention and for territorial politics within (and against) the state. |

Note: most of the chapters consider each of the three dimensions.
indicate, the geographies of state space are not limited to the state’s territorially bounded configuration as a self-contained “apparatus” but also encompass the territory-, place-, and scale-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized to reorganize and regulate (albeit temporarily) the social and economic relations of capitalist society. In short, state spatiality must be viewed as a complex expression of ongoing processes and practices of sociospatial regulation at various scales. We refer to this latter, and more general, aspect as state space in the “integral” sense. As such it extends beyond the territorial and the juridico-political features of state institutions to include their contested imprints and effects upon the geographies of socioeconomic relations within and beyond state boundaries.

Finally, several contributions explore the role of different forms of discourse and representational practices in constituting state space as an “imagined” (rather than natural or pre-given) geopolitical entity. Precisely because there are no “natural” political territories, the spatial zones successfully claimed by and/or allotted to any given state are always delineated through historically specific social practices that constitute, impose, and naturalize particular forms of knowledge – and, therefore, power – over space, scale, and territory (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Agnew 1999; Coleman 2002; O Tuathail 1999). These practices operate “through the active simplification of the complex reality of places [and territories] in favour of controllable geopolitical abstractions” (Agnew and Corbridge 1995: 48-9). This is also reflected in changes in popular geographical assumptions about politics, political community, and political struggles. By including essays that explore these relatively neglected, “representational” practices, we hope to create a theoretical space for inquiry into the ways in which state space is represented and imagined, both in geopolitical struggles and in everyday life.

State space in the narrow sense

In its narrow sense state space refers to the spatialities of the state itself, regarded as an ensemble of juridico-political institutions and regulatory capacities grounded in the territorialization of political power. This involves, in the first instance, the coupling of authoritative, collectively binding political power to a specific territory. It is crucial to recognize that political power has frequently been exercised without resort to territorialization, for instance, among nomadic and other stateless peoples where the boundaries of political power are defined in terms of mobile subjects rather than fixed territories. Yet, even when political power has been effectively territorialized, it does not always assume the form of the modern sovereign state and its associated inter-state system. Earlier forms of territorialization include city-states, empires, the medieval state system, and absolutism (Braudel 1984; Dodgshon 1987, 1998). Thus, the modern territorial state must be viewed as a very late – and by no means final – development in the history of state formation.

In the modern inter-state system, territoriality operates not merely as a principle of internal geographical enclosure, but also as the foundational organizational principle of the entire system of geopolitical interaction on a global scale.
Accordingly, as the contributors to part I elaborate, it is the territorial organization (territorialization) of political power that appears to give a common form to all states within the inter-state system in the modern period. This territorialization process involves the systematic parcellizing of a potentially global political system into a series of mutually exclusive spaces controlled by separate and formally sovereign states. It thereby also establishes the material basis for the distinction between “domestic” politics (supposedly a realm of internal peace and the rule of law) and “foreign” relations (generally construed as a realm of anarchy, war, and violence), which has long underpinned mainstream approaches to international relations theory (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Murphy 1996).

In the opening chapter, historical geographer Marcelo Escolar usefully highlights the crucial role of representational practices in the original territorialization of political power involved in the formation of the modern (inter-)state system during the long sixteenth century. Thus Escolar explores the radical reorganization of inherited medieval institutional landscapes, in which borders had served as relatively fluid zones of transition between overlapping, interpenetrating realms of political, religious, military, and other forms of authority. As Escolar’s account clearly shows, the modern inter-state system was not constructed on a terrestrial tabula rasa but crystallized out of a complex, polymorphic medieval landscape that was itself inherited from earlier rounds of state building. As Escolar demonstrates, the degree of political centralization and state modernization crucially affected the nature of territorial demarcations and their associated representational practices in different zones of modern state building. Indeed, given the multiplicity of historical (and geographical) starting points for modern state formation during the early Renaissance period, it is hardly surprising that modern states continue to exhibit such divergent institutional and spatial forms, rather than converging around a generic model of the modern bureaucratic-democratic state.

Although the Treaty of Westphalia formally instituted the principle of state sovereignty, territorial borders have never been static features of state power. Rather, their forms and functions within the geopolitical system have been modified continually – sometimes quite dramatically – through political struggles on various spatial scales (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Paasi 1996; Newman and Paasi 1998). Nonetheless, as historical sociologist and social theorist Michael Mann notes in chapter 2, it is precisely the state’s centralized territorial form that underpins its unrivaled usefulness to diverse social forces – including both capital and labor – in promoting particular projects to restructure socioeconomic relations. Accordingly, as political geographer Peter Taylor notes in chapter 5, since the origins of the modern inter-state system during the long sixteenth century, the state’s role as a territorial “power container” has expanded in several directions. These include: (1) war-making and military defense; (2) the containment and development of national economic wealth; (3) the promotion of nationalized politico cultural identities; (4) the institutionalization of democratic forms of political legitimation; and (5) the provision of various forms of social welfare. Thus, from the war machines of early modern Europe and the wealth containers of the mercantile era to the national developmental/imperialist states of the second industrial revolution and the national welfare states of the Fordist-Keynesian period, states have deployed a great variety of politico-regulatory strategies, and have attempted to use the principle
of territoriality to “contain” very different types of socio economic activities within their borders. In short, even though the modern state has indeed “acted like a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality” (p. 102), the territorialization of politics was never accomplished “once and for all” but has remained a precarious, deeply contentious outcome of historically specific “state projects” (Jessop 1990). Thus territorial borders are best viewed as a medium and outcome of historically specific strategies and ceaselessly renewed attempts to shape the geographies of political-economic activities both within and between states (Newman and Paasi 1998).

As political geographers have long emphasized (e.g., Gottmann 1973; Taylor 1993), national states assume a variety of forms depending on their internal administrative hierarchies and inter-governmental arrangements. All modern national states, with the possible exception of small city-states, subdivide their territories into jurisdictional units and distribute administrative and/or political power among them according to certain legal-bureaucratic principles. In addition to the conventional distinction between unitary and federal states, there are further significant differences that shape the “spatial selectivity” (Jones 1997) of state forms. These are liable to change over time through measures to reduce or increase the number, scale, and scope of administrative and political units and/or to redesign and reallocate their tasks and responsibilities. Indeed, as several contributors to parts II and III of this book indicate, the present period is one in which the internal geographical differentiation of state space is being thoroughly reworked, as inherited forms, functions, and divisions of state space are called into question and redefined throughout western Europe, North America, and East Asia. For present purposes, the essential point is that these internal geographies of subnational administration and regulation represent fundamental elements of state space in its “narrow” sense.

Crucially, however, as our contributors demonstrate, territoriality represents only one dimension within the complex geographical architectures of modern state spatiality. For there are many other, equally important dimensions of state spatiality that may also be interpreted as products, arenas, objects, and stakes of ongoing sociopolitical struggles. Within the global politicogeographical system established by the (Westphalian) practices of state territoriality, states have mobilized a variety of historically specific strategies for parcelizing, regulating, monitoring, and representing social space. The analysis of such state spatial strategies leads us to the second dimension of state space mentioned above, namely, state space in its integral sense.

State space in the integral sense

The mobilization of state spatial strategies involves attempts to influence the geographies of socioeconomic activities such as industrial agglomeration, infrastructure investment, and demographic movements within a state’s territory (Lefebvre 1978; Prescott 1987). On the one hand, as the Marxist theoretician Henri Lefebvre argues, “each state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished – a space, even, where something is brought to perfection: namely, a unified and hence homogeneous society” (1991: 281; cf. chapter 4, this volume). In their
chapters, Lefebvre and Mann both detail the ways in which state institutions under modern capitalism tend to encage socioeconomic relations within an encompassing territorial grid. Likewise, in chapter 3, the Marxist state theorist Nicos Poulantzas suggests that state territoriality imposes a specifically capitalist "spatial power matrix" in which antagonistic class relations are (1) partitioned among distinct national frontiers and borders, and (2) homogenized within those borders according to the principle of national unification. For Poulantzas, this spatial power matrix has two main effects. First, it "nationalizes" the conditions for economic and social development, for class struggles and class alliances, and for other forms of social mobilization so that these processes and practices tend to operate within national rather than international and/or local horizons. Second, it establishes the basis for national (democratic) politics to define the general (public) interest and attempts to mobilize the 'people-nation' behind the national interest (whether to defend national security or to promote international competitiveness).

On the other hand, as other contributors to this volume emphasize, even in the midst of these tendencies toward the territorialization and homogenization of social relations within the framework of the national state, established grids of state spatial regulation are frequently unsettled, particularly under conditions of deep socioeconomic instability or systemic crisis (see also Harvey 1989b, 1982). When such crises erupt, entrenched patterns of state spatial regulation may be thoroughly reworked, in part as a means to reconfigure established geographies of capital accumulation and uneven spatial development (Smith 1984; Lefebvre 1977, 1978). In this sense, state spatial strategies must be viewed as historically specific practices through which state institutions attempt to adjust to the constantly changing geoeconomic and geopolitical conditions in which they operate: their modalities, targets, and effects evolve qualitatively during the history of capitalist development.

State space in the representational sense

In considering the representation of state space, our contributors address three key themes that pervade the more innovative recent literature, namely: (1) the power/knowledge relations involved in the construction of state territorial divisions, the parcellizing of territory as landed property, the demarcation of distinct political jurisdictions, and so forth; (2) the ways in which state spatial practices continually shape and reshape subjectivities and spatial horizons in everyday life; and (3) the ways in which social alliances are formed and mobilized on a territorial basis, leading to a variety of scale- and place-specific political strategies intended to defend and/or promote particular interests grounded within already established, emerging, or potential state spaces.

To varying degrees, the contributions of Escolar, Poulantzas, and Lefebvre (as well as the essays in parts II and III by Cameron and Palan, Sum, and Yuval-Davis) all discuss the essential role of power–knowledge relations in the construction, mapping, and continual restructuring of state space. The question of state hegemony, everyday life, and subjectivity is posed most prominently in part I by Lefebvre and Poulantzas, both of whom are deeply concerned to understand the manifold ways in which the modern state's power over territories and places becomes a taken-for-granted and
mystified feature of everyday life under capitalism. For Lefebvre, the state’s capacity to hide its own shaping effects upon social relations is absolutely essential to its operations of sociospatial regulation, control, and domination (see also Abrams 1988). Poulantzas in turn stresses the role of class struggle (especially between the bourgeoisie and the working class) in producing such naturalized, everyday epistemologies of state space, above all those associated with modern nationalism. Lefebvre is more interested in the politics of everyday resistance, the rise of new social movements, and the growth of new, potentially transformative uses of space.

The chapters in part I thus provide an initial set of conceptual tools and categories through which to decode the geographies of state space under modern capitalism and hence to denaturalize the geographical assumptions associated with traditional analyses of the national territorial state. They explore the contingent character of its historical constitution, the extraordinarily diverse political geographies associated with its historical evolution, the extensive cross-national variations in its spatial form, the often hidden structural and strategic biases associated with such variations, and the articulation of state space to contextually specific forms of spatial imaginary, discourse, and representation. The contributions thereby illuminate many key aspects of the three dimensions of state space alluded to above. Overall, they emphasize that states are not simply located “upon” or “within” a space. Rather, they are dynamically evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very social relations they aspire to regulate, control, and/or restructure. This continual production and transformation of state space occurs not only through material-institutional practices of state spatial regulation but also through a range of representational and discursive strategies through which the terrain of sociopolitical struggle is mapped and remapped by actors who are directly involved in such struggles.

Remaking State Territoriality: Beyond the Westphalian Model?

The contributions to parts II and III turn from foundational theoretical issues to the more immediate question of how inherited geographies of state space are being reworked in a period of rapid geoeconomic and geopolitical change. These chapters also denaturalize established assumptions regarding state space in powerful ways. But they do so by analyzing the ways in which (1) state territoriality is being reforged as a principle of geographical enclosure; (2) the primacy of nationally scaled forms of state regulation is being destabilized in the face of newly emergent supranational and subnational forms of political-economic activity; and (3) new forms of political mobilization, conflict, and struggle are crystallizing that cross cut, bypass, or transcend inherited geographies of the national state.

Crucially, the contributions to parts II and III reject the narratives of state “decline,” “decay,” or “erosion” that pervade popular approaches to contemporary global change. While they diverge in their theoretical, empirical, and political starting points and in their interpretations of contemporary political-economic trends, they share a concern with two core issues: the transformation of inherited geographies of state space, and the ongoing production of new state spaces at various geographical scales and territorial sites around the world. The contributors
to part II explore, in particular, various ways in which the inherited Westphalian system of state territoriality is being reorganized under contemporary capitalism (see also, among other authors, Anderson 1996; Kobrin 1998; Hettne 2000). Inter alia, the authors suggest that the primacy of the national territorial state is best interpreted as a parenthesis in the long history of state formation rather than as a necessary feature of political life. However, while the contributors to this part all question whether the Westphalian model of state territoriality still survives, they offer markedly contrasting visions of newly emergent geographies of state power, socioeconomic governance and political struggle.

Despite otherwise deeply rooted methodological and empirical differences, chapter 6 by international relations theorist Martin Shaw and chapter 7 by world systems theorist Giovanni Arrighi both contend quite explicitly that the Westphalian model of state territoriality is today being systematically dismantled. Shaw develops this argument primarily through a reinterpretation of the history of state forms in the West. On this basis he elaborates the daring claim that a new, internationalized western state form is currently emerging. Building upon and expanding Mann’s fourfold characterization of the features of the modern territorial state (see chapter 2), Shaw argues specifically that state boundaries (especially in their military and geopolitical crystallizations) are being powerfully redrawn to produce a hemispheric, if not fully global, state (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000). Shaw does not regard this as an entirely novel arrangement. On the contrary, he argues that the dominant state form from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century was not the nation-state but a world or regional European empire centered on the western European heartlands of world capitalism. Nonetheless, Shaw suggests that the new western state is novel because it is dominated by a single core state rather than being structured through the coexistence of several European empires (late nineteenth century until World War II) or two postwar superpowers (World War II until the late 1980s). For Shaw, the Westphalian model overprivileges the national and the global scales and thereby neglects the continentally configured geopolitical “blocks” that, in his view, now constitute the most important units of state power. Despite criticisms (e.g., Panitch 2001), Shaw’s seminal discussion of the “global western state conglomerate” illuminates the highly important role of supranational state alliances and institutions in what are increasingly multi-scalar and multi-centric political geographies.

Arrighi likewise critiques the Westphalian model by exploring the historical lineages of the Sinocentric state system and thereby reinterpreting the conventional history of state development in the capitalist world system (see also Arrighi 1994). In particular, he argues that both the capitalist world economy and the modern inter-state system contain pre-modern and modern characteristics. For Arrighi, the leading agencies in the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system have either been something less (city-states and quasi-states), something more (quasi-empires), or something different (business diasporas and other trans-territorial capitalist organizations) compared to the stereotypical nation-states that dominated the Westphalian geopolitical imagination. Nonetheless, as Arrighi suggests, at a decisive moment of its evolution, the Eurocentric capitalist world system did indeed become embodied in a worldwide system of nation-states that has continued to develop unevenly across time and space. Focusing on East Asia after 1945, Arrighi
argues that many East Asian states were little more than “quasi-states” that functioned largely as “military protectorates” under US hegemony rather than as genuinely sovereign states. However, the linchpin of Arrighi’s critique is his suggestion that the collapse of Communism, the deepening crisis of US global hegemony, and the incipient shift of capitalism’s center of gravity (back) toward East Asia together have entailed a major threat to established global and national political geographies. Arrighi’s work offers a sophisticated challenge to “neo-medievalist” claims that we are witnessing a return to pre-modern political geographies (see, e.g., Ruggie 1993; Kobrin 1998) and an insightful counterpoint to Shaw’s suggestion that an integrated western or world-scale state is being forged. Yet Arrighi’s chapter also converges with such analyses in claiming to discern a significant remaking of inherited formations of (national) state territoriality.

While Shaw and Arrighi focus on the global level from both geohistorical and contemporary viewpoints, the other contributors to part II examine the various reterritorializations and rescalings of state power that have ensued since the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism in the 1970s. For example, political sociologist and international political economist Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (chapter 8) addresses the development of European state space as a (geo)economic crystallization of state power and class domination following the dissolution of the Fordist-Keynesian class compromise during the early 1970s. He explores the significance of cultural and representational factors in state formation by drawing on the neo-Gramscian school of transnational historical materialism (on which see Gill 1993). One of the key contributions of his chapter is to distinguish between the institutional form and the socioeconomic content of European integration; the former involves what we have called state power in its narrow sense, the latter can be said to involve state power in its integral sense (p. 148). Van Apeldoorn also underscores the essential role of classes and rival class fractions — including both their material interests and their associated ideologies — in this remaking of political space. On this basis, in an elegant and concise case study, he traces the recent emergence of a new “comprehensive concept of control” (combining an accumulation strategy, state project, and hegemonic vision) for the European Union. Van Apeldoorn labels this state-mediated class strategy “embedded neoliberalism” and suggests that it has been promoted by the dominant “globalist” fraction of transnational capital. This implies that new state spaces are contingent, politically charged, and often highly unstable institutional creations rather than necessary and automatic responses to globally induced pressures or emergent governance problems. Nor are state spaces merely an arena in which political-economic struggles occur; they also constitute a key weapon in such struggles (see also chapter 3, this volume).

In their contribution to part II, international relations theorists Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan (chapter 9) highlight two additional emerging sites of economic and political restructuring that have in turn generated new representations and imaginations of economic life. These are the off-shore economy (the realm of international financial transactions and speculative investment activities) and the anti-economy (the realm of policies oriented toward excluded, marginalized, and decommodified populations and individuals). Although the off-shore economy is often described as if it were somehow extra-territorial and beyond the control of the national state (e.g., Castells 1996; O’Brien 1993; cf. Yeung 1998), Cameron and
Palan argue that its apparent “extra-territoriality” is actually a reified ideological reflection of new state projects and accumulation strategies. For Cameron and Palan, states are actively involved in constructing, reproducing, and exploiting the very distinction between “off-shore” and “on-shore” (private) economies. Indeed, they argue that national states are active “drivers” of the off-shore economy and the neo-liberal private economy rather than their helpless victims. As Cameron and Palan suggest, in redrawing territorial and institutional boundaries in these ways and thereby contributing to the development of a post-Westphalian geopolitical order, national states are deeply complicit in the establishment of putatively “deter-ritorialized” or “borderless” flows in the emerging, neo-liberal global economy.

If the new forms of statehood identified by Shaw, van Apeldoorn, and Cameron and Palan seem to be emerging primarily in a top-down manner, other authors have examined the emergence of new state and political spaces from the bottom up, through the initiatives of local and regional territorial coalitions and diverse, civil society-based social forces. Particularly noteworthy here is political scientist Joachim Blatter’s chapter on cross-border regions in western Europe and North America (chapter 10; see also the chapters in part III by Keating, Keil, and Lipietz). Blatter argues that studies of border regions offer useful insights into contemporary processes of state spatial restructuring and the changing operations of borders, boundaries, and territories in global capitalism (see also Nevins 2002). Accordingly he develops a fourfold classification of the various political institutions associated with cross-border cooperation, namely, commissions, connections, coalitions, and consociations. He then shows how these institutions contribute in turn to the governance of four distinct border regions in Europe and North America. As Blatter argues, major differences in cross-border institution-building exist between the two continents. While the European path to debordering is described appropriately as a “multi-level system,” Blatter suggests that the US–Mexican and US–Canadian cases are developing non-territorial political institutions on a bottom-up basis; consequently, in the latter context, the nation-state continues to serve as the key institutional agent of territorial governance. This analysis resonates closely with Escolar’s emphasis on the divergent paths along which early modern processes of state territorialization unfolded. Blatter’s insights also suggest that there is still ample scope for multiple and divergent post-Westphalian regulatory settlements and inter-scalar “fixes” to develop in different zones of the world economy.

Finally, in contrast to these top-down and bottom-up approaches, several novel accounts have emerged in recent years that emphasize the tangled, transversal properties of newly emergent state spaces. In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical conception of political space as a scaffolding of scales stretching vertically from the global and the national downward to the regional and the local, such approaches explore the proliferation of new, horizontally articulated, “rhizomatic” linkages among state (and non-state) institutions at diverse spatial scales. Chapter 11, by critical international political economist Ngai-Ling Sum, provides a particularly fascinating analysis of such “networked” and “rhizomatic” political spaces in contemporary East Asia. She coins the concept of “geo-governance” to analyze the strategic networks of trans-border actors (both public and private) involved in the self-reflexive coordination and stabilization of diverse trans-border modes of growth. These networks typically seek to promote territorial competitiveness by
linking together economic activities at divergent scales (in particular, the global, the regional, and the local) and by shaping, disciplining, and controlling the time-space dimensions of production and exchange at each of these geographical scales. Sum develops this approach by examining four key “moments” of capitalist restructuring: finance, industry, commerce, and culture. In exploring the emergence of the “Greater China” region as a distinctive, networked geo-governance regime, Sum identifies another important escape route from the Westphalian territorial trap. This involves neither a simple reordering of entrenched scalar hierarchies nor a straightforward process of de- and re-territorialization through the reworking of the forms and functions of borders. Instead it involves processes of inter-scalar/inter-territorial rearticulation to establish new modes of interdependence, coordination, and governance across previously unconnected positions within inherited regimes of state territorial regulation.

The contributions included in part II of this volume raise a number of fundamental questions about emergent forms of state spatial organization. Taken together, these works suggest that, while national territorial states continue to play key roles in the regulation of global, national, regional, and local capitalisms, they are now no longer the exclusive locus of political authority in the contemporary world. In this sense, Ruggie’s (1993) suggestion that the nexus between (national) territoriality and state sovereignty is today being “unbundled” is very germane. However, rather than viewing this unbundling process as the expression of a broader erosion of state power or as evidence that new “postmodern” political formations are being consolidated, most contributors to part II are more tentative in their interpretations. With the exception of Shaw, whose forecast of an emergent global-western state conglomerate represents a particularly bold argument regarding the future of state space, the other analyses in part II represent initial attempts to decode some basic contours of an emergent geopolitical reality that is still being forged through ongoing sociopolitical strategies, struggles, and conflicts at a range of scales and in diverse institutional sites around the world. Clearly, as these analyses indicate, the Westphalian model is being systematically destabilized, if not thoroughly dismantled, under contemporary conditions. But the question of what form(s) of state spatiality will emerge to address the regulatory deficits that have emerged in the wake of this major political-geographic rupture remains undecided. One of Antonio Gramsci’s famous aphorisms therefore provides an appropriate epigraph to this section: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (1971: 276).

Reshaping Political Spaces: New Sites and Scales of Engagement

The contributions in part III attempt in various ways to connect the reterritorializations and rescalings of state power outlined in part II to the emergence of new forms of sociopolitical mobilization, contestation, and politico-cultural identity. They do so by linking many of the major themes surveyed in part II to the rise of new political spaces. This research agenda examines how new social forces are getting constituted as political actors and engaging in new forms of struggle to reconfigure inherited forms of state power or, more generally, to pursue new socioeconomic objectives.
This agenda is part of the growing interest in the “politics of scale” (Smith 1993) in which inherited scalar arrangements are rearticulated upward and downward to establish rehierarchized social, economic, and political geographies. These contributions thus concretize Swyngedouw’s (1997: 140) provocative contention that scale is “the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where sociospatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated.” These chapters also show that, because scales do not exist in mutual isolation, but are always interconnected in a broader, often-changing inter-scalar ensemble (cf. Cox and Mair 1991; Lefebvre 1991; Brenner 2001), a serious and critical engagement with state space must always relate even the most dominant scale(s) to the broader inter-scalar processes through which political geographies are continually constituted and reconstituted. Against this background, part III explores different aspects of contemporary struggles to transform state space, to directly influence the exercise of state power on one or more scales, to escape or bypass the exercise of such power by opening up new political spaces, or to influence it through struggles that are conducted at a distance from the state and in the name of new politicocultural identities.

In chapter 12, for example, urban geographer Neil Smith suggests that geographical scale is best conceptualized as the always-contested and fragile spatial condensation of contradictory social forces as they seek to contain or enable particular forms of social interaction. He also emphasizes the role of cultural factors in ongoing rescaling processes in western Europe. In particular, Smith identifies two intertwined scalar trends in Europe that have major implications for the geographies of sociopolitical contestation. The first is the emergence of a post-national European space as capitalist enterprises seek to “jump scales” to the supranational level of the European Union in order to escape inherited national constraints on accumulation. However, in contrast to authors who believe that a new level of state power is currently being consolidated at a European scale (e.g., Majone 1997; Sbragia 2000), Smith emphasizes that European integration is a highly contested and politically charged political-economic project in which the key protagonists remain nation-states (cf. the chapters by Blatter, Lipietz, and Keating, this volume). The second and closely related trend emphasized by Smith is a resurgence of new types of regional movements, which likewise open up new scales for the articulation of sociopolitical claims, both by capital and by diverse subnational sociopolitical forces. For Smith, both of these developments underscore the deeply contested ways in which inherited scales of political-economic activity and sociocultural life are now being rearticulated in contemporary Europe. Even though state scalar structures are being massively transformed, Smith suggests that national states remain key institutional actors both in promoting rescaling processes and in managing inter-scalar relations within a multi-level institutional hierarchy.

Regulation theorist Alain Lipietz and political scientist Michael Keating also explore aspects of regionalization processes in their chapters. Lipietz (chapter 13) analyzes the dynamics of regional territorial alliance formation – or, in his neo-Hegelian terms, the transformation of regions “in themselves” into regions “for themselves” in contemporary capitalism. His chapter suggests that, following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism in the early 1970s, the national scale of state territoriality is no longer the primary arena for political alliance formation and
sociopolitical contestation. Instead, subnational scales such as regions and localities are becoming increasingly important sites for a variety of (neo-liberal and social democratic) regulatory experiments that attempt to rejuvenate capitalist growth. Emphasizing the complex and uneven character of political-economic development on various scales from the global to the local, Lipietz examines the conditions under which regionally based dominant classes can mobilize state institutions to promote territorial development within a subnational territorial economy such as a city or city-region. In this context he introduces the concept of “regional armature” to describe newly emergent regional power blocs that are anchored in specific regional state apparatuses and armored with relatively autonomous political capacities to pursue regional development projects – even in the face of opposition from the central state. On this basis, Lipietz emphasizes that the rise of such regional blocs requires the concerted mobilization of diverse sociopolitical forces oriented toward specific regional identities and political projects. Compared with other contributions in part III, Lipietz’s key insights are (1) his emphasis on the extraordinary diversity of political-ideological projects (conservative, modernizing, and reactionary) that are crystallizing in and around contemporary regionalization movements; and (2) his recognition that, even as regional rescaling projects transform entrenched national hierarchies of state power, they are still conditioned in essential ways by the inherited institutional landscapes in which they emerge.

Keating (chapter 14) likewise explores some of the new forms of regional political mobilization that are currently emerging in western Europe. He notes that regional strategies in the era of North Atlantic Fordism were generally technocratic and sought to overcome the patterns of uneven development that had been produced by earlier projects of national modernization. Since the 1980s, however, regionalism has re-emerged largely through bottom-up social forces in a context of accelerated geoeconomic change. We suggest that there are two aspects to this development. First, in response to the pressures of globalization, new regional spaces are emerging from the search for economic prosperity based on agglomeration economies, institutional thickness, and embedded forms of social capital (cf. Storper 1997; Amin and Thrift 1995; Scott 1998). And, second, in response to the ongoing territorial rescaling of government, new spaces of regionalism are also emerging to (re)assert regional claims to democratic participation. These responses are evident in various countries and contexts where an identity politics based on separatist regional/national movements has often been accompanied by the rise (or reinvention) of regional government and devolved territorial administration (Agnew 1995; Giordano 2000; MacLeod and Jones 2001). Reflecting these changes, Keating’s chapter identifies six empirically grounded ideal types of regional movements and regionalist projects that are oriented toward the creation of new political spaces. For Keating, therefore, regionalist projects and movements are not simply top-down, technocratic creations but emerge on various scales and are premised on the unpredictable combination of various old and new political identities. And, as he indicates, any given instance of regionalism is likely to be based on a more-or-less conflictual, more-or-less negotiated mixture of different strategies and visions configured at a range of local, national, and even supranational scales. Keating’s chapter thus develops a number of methodological strategies for the investigation of newly emergent spaces of regionalism and also introduces a number of analytical
typologies that usefully characterize the broad institutional terrain within which divergent forms of regionalization are unfolding.

Whilst the contributions of Smith, Lipietz, and Keating are concerned primarily with the regional level, urbanist Roger Keil (chapter 15) explores several perspectives on local (state) agency in the age of the global city. In particular, he demonstrates various ways in which processes of globalization are currently transforming state power even as states in turn serve as a key institutional infrastructure in and through which globalization processes unfold. Keil acknowledges that the practical sovereignty of national states is being “hollowed out” and specific state capacities are tendentially disempowered through the assertion of (globalized) market powers and supranational governance institutions. But he also insists, along with other recent commentators (e.g., Weiss 1998; McMichael 1996; Yeung 1998), that national competition states have become major protagonists of globalization projects and that other state capacities are simultaneously being reasserted on many scales both above and below the national state. Nonetheless, Keil identifies some important blind-spots in the vast literature on globalization and state restructuring. These include the neglect of the local state’s role in the making of globalization; the failure to examine the continuing and, indeed, reinvigorated regulatory power of the urban scale under globalized conditions; and the bracketing of the major role played by world cities as sites, stakes, and agents in the formation of post-national state forms. Under these conditions, for Keil, urban politics becomes an important forum in and through which competing scalar strategies are played out. It is also, Keil suggests, in the sphere of urban politics that radically democratic alternatives to contemporary neo-liberal forms of political and economic life may be developed (see also Keil 1998). His chapter thus usefully underscores the ways in which urban movements may generate sociopolitical consequences that transcend the urban scale to affect the institutional geographies of national and even global processes.

In chapter 16, anthropologists James Holston and Arjun Appadurai likewise explore the rearticulation of political space and social struggles in the urban context. Like Keil, they view the city as the arena for new modes of political action and for new forms of political identity. Under conditions of intensified globalization, they argue, cities have become strategic sites in which diverse transnational flows (of labor, commodities, information, and culture) are localized. In this context, the meaning of citizenship is being fundamentally reworked: the traditional liberal concept of national citizenship is decomposed and new forms of political subjectivity emerge that focus specifically on the conditions of everyday life within post-national cities. In contrast to Keil, however, Appadurai and Holston give more weight to the regressive side of contemporary denationalization processes. Noting the growing disjunction between the form and substance of national citizenship, they suggest that the two main responses to this crisis are equally unsatisfactory. Thus, whilst welfare retrenchment has encouraged social exclusion, xenophobia, and other politically induced forms of polarization, projects to broaden citizenship rights have frequently entailed their blunting into merely passive entitlements. On this basis, Holston and Appadurai highlight the dystopian elements of the modern city, especially its increasing division into new zones of intense social conflict and the intensification of everyday violence and generalized social insecurity. This is leading to the establishment of exclusive fortified enclaves,
particularly in elite zones of the city, which undermine established forms of public space and, by implication, territorial democracy. In essence, then, the city is for Appadurai and Holston a strategic political space characterized both by new possibilities for popular-democratic mobilizations and by new, localized forms of domination, disempowerment, and exclusion. In this sense, their work usefully highlights the double-edged character of contemporary struggles to create new political spaces: while they may open up new chances for empowerment, resistance and struggle, they may also systematically delink decision making powers from popular-democratic control under the rubric of a new “glocal” authoritarianism (see also Swyngedouw 2000).

A number of closely related issues are raised in feminist political theorist Nira Yuval-Davis’s chapter on the multi-scalar and multi-layered dynamics of contemporary identity politics in relation to citizenship and political democracy (chapter 17). She stresses the polymorphism of political boundaries and their changing relation to different forms of political imaginary. On this basis, she argues that citizenship practices are configured within politically constructed, and therefore malleable, physical and imagined territories. Because the boundaries of nations and states do not usually overlap with each other, and because the individual boundaries of each nation-state are often contested, Yuval-Davis suggests that people’s membership in communities and polities is dynamic and multiple. Particularly under contemporary conditions, she claims, citizenship is becoming a multi-layered and relational construct rather than serving as the basis for singular, pre-given, or fixed political identities. Thus, just as Keil emphasizes the importance of urban civil society in the making of contemporary political spaces, Yuval-Davis stresses the role of bounded urban spaces as a daily theater for the performance of (struggles over) citizenship (cf. Jenson 1991). This performance of political identity involves the intersection and (re)articulation of ethnic, class, and gender differences. It also involves continuing struggles over the socioinstitutional boundaries delimiting the exercise of citizenship, such as that between the private and public, within particular territories. In this context, Yuval-Davis argues that women are especially important as symbols of collectivities, as symbolic border guards, and as bearers of “the private” domain in and across local, regional, national, and supranational boundaries. This emphasis on gender relations is a fundamentally important contribution to current discussions of state space — not merely for the contemporary period, when gender is openly recognized (if not always accepted) as a major component in the multiple political geographies of identity, but also for earlier periods, when patriarchy in various forms was arguably a key foundational element in the geographies of state formation.

The concluding contribution likewise develops a rather dystopian view of contemporary state spaces. Like Appadurai and Holston, anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom also starts at the interface of the global and the local — this time in Africa, where many states have been devastated by decades of war, extreme poverty, and economic crisis. Drawing upon extensive ethnographic research in sub-Saharan African countries such as Angola and Mozambique, Nordstrom argues that the rise of internationalized, extra-legal “shadow networks” of informal exchange challenges academics to fundamentally rethink established theories of state sovereignty. She emphasizes that different flows of non-legal goods/services (including arms,