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Intercultural Discourse and Communication

The Essential Readings

Edited by
Scott F. Kiesling
and
Christina Bratt Paulston
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This reader is offered as a resource for students and instructors for courses in “cross-cultural communication,” or “intercultural discourse and communication,” as the field is also called. It contains introductory readings for courses that involve the study of how language use varies from culture to culture, and how knowledge of these differences can be put to work to help understand differences and dominance relations between cultures.

The book is organized so that foundational and new theoretical readings are provided in the first part, case studies applying these perspectives in the second, views of cultural contact and identity in the third, and applications to “real world” problems in the fourth. The theoretical approaches are meant to give the student an idea of the ways in which language and discourse is universal across cultures, and how differences among cultures might be usefully compared. The case studies are exemplary of these approaches. They are not necessarily simple applications of the theoretical approaches, but rather in some way enhance or problematize them. Finally, the readings in parts three and four somehow apply a knowledge of intercultural communication to solving problems of society, including problems arising from intercultural contact, and power imbalances between dominant and subordinate cultures in a single society. The chapters can thus be read in order, or a reading in a theoretical approach could be paired with the case study and/or applied reading which it matches.

The reader is, of course, only a sampling of many crucial articles in intercultural discourse, and the title of “essential readings” should be looked upon with some skepticism; the “complete” list of essential readings would fill an entire, ever-expanding bookcase. The readings are designed to be used with an introductory text, such as Bonvillain (2003), Duranti (1997), Foley (1997), or Scollon and Scollon (2001). Asante and Gudykunst (1989) could also provide support for these readings. The readings could also be used on their own, with an instructor providing background discussion and leading discussions about the significance of each reading. Students may also want to search for further readings in journals like Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, Journal of Pragmatics, Language in Society, Language and Intercultural Communication, Multilingua, and Pragmatics.

In the case studies and applied parts, we have tried to include a wide range of cultures, large and small, from around the globe. There were always multiple candidates
for each “slot,” and once or twice decisions were made to include a reading because it increased the cultural diversity of the readings. This is not to say that all of the world’s cultures are present, or even a majority. Because of the places in which the field has grown, there is still no doubt an Anglo-American bias.

There are also some topics related to the study of intercultural discourse that readers will note are not present. We do not have a reading discussing the contentious problem of the nature of culture itself. We have also made no attempt to include readings on linguistic relativity, either in its “classic” sense, or in the newer work being done by Levinson, Lucy, Silverstein, and others. There are excellent discussions of culture in both Duranti’s and Foley’s texts; the question of universality vs. relativity is the main focus of Foley’s text. Bonvillain also has an extensive discussion of linguistic relativity. There is also no reading on language ideology per se, although in general language ideology is central to many of the theoretical and practical readings here, and is central to the articles with an applied focus.

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References


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7. Scott Fabius Kiesling, “Norms of sociocultural meaning in language: Indexicality, stance, and cultural models.” This is an adapted version of his essay “Prestige, cultural models, and other ways of talking about underlying norms and gender” which appeared in The Handbook of Language and Gender, edited by Janet Holmes and
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Part I

Approaches to Intercultural Discourse

Introduction

While studies which compare cultures have been undertaken informally for as long as there have been travelers, it is not until the 1960s that systematic ways of undertaking comparisons of language use, with a view to understanding how language and culture works more generally, appear. We have identified four main ways of viewing these differences and similarities, beginning with Hymes’s groundbreaking Ethnography of Speaking, then Interactional Sociolinguistics, Linguistic Etiquette (also known as Politeness), and finally theories of indexicality and syntheses of these approaches.

We begin with a reading by Dell Hymes, who began to develop this field as a response to the Chomskyan notion that what linguists should focus on is the linguistic competence of a speaker of a language. Hymes noted that Chomsky thought of this competence in a fairly restricted way (all and only the grammatical sentences of a language), and that were a man to stand on a street corner and utter all and only the grammatical sentences of English he would likely be institutionalized. Rather, speakers need a whole range of competencies that go with language, specifying not just the sentences of a language, but information about the appropriateness of the form of those sentences, the speakers, and other aspects of context which speakers understand as part of being competent in language. Hymes thus sought to develop a descriptive, etic model that could describe speech events across cultures, and compare them. Hymes’s chapter describes the motivations and outlines of this model. The goal is to understand what knowledge a speaker must have in a speech community in order to be a competent speaker of the language of that community. Alessandro Duranti’s chapter further outlines the ethnography of speaking and compares this approach to some others, especially Conversation Analysis, as a path to understanding the ways culture and language are intertwined. Although ethnography of speaking was not developed to analyze intercultural encounters, it could be used to do so. Its outlining of specific parts of a speech event are extremely useful for beginning to analyze what might go wrong when two cultures meet, by comparing components of similar speech events across two cultures.
The next two readings focus explicitly on intercultural encounters. John Gumperz’s work is often the first mentioned when intercultural communication is taught; his *Discourse Strategies* was pioneering in its analysis of the sources of misunderstanding in intercultural encounters, by focusing on forms of language that are not often explicitly studied, such as intonation. Teachers and students may want to use this chapter in conjunction with a short film made by Gumperz called *Crosstalk*. Gumperz’s essential insight is that there are language forms like intonation that tell us how talk is meant to be received by the listener – a cue for the context in which it should be taken. This context can refer to aspects of interpersonal context such as “I am being friendly,” as well as aspects of speech event context such as “This is a joke.” Gumperz tells us that we are not just following pre-existing rules for situations (as we might expect from the ethnography of speaking), but that we use language to actively signal what our understanding of our stance is – our relationship to our talk and to our interlocutors. Gumperz used this paradigm to show how cultural misunderstandings occur, and suggests that if more people understand these differences in contextualization cues, then discrimination will be lessened.

Rajendra Singh, Jayant Lele, and Gita Martohardjono, however, point out that finding and learning the differences on these levels is only the beginning. They suggest that there are other pre-existing relationships that must be considered when trying to understand intercultural encounters and how discrimination works within them. Most importantly, they point out that people from different cultures rarely meet as equals, and much of this inequality is not personal, but due to power differences in the cultures they come from. So in England, South Asian migrants have less power than native Anglos, and they are expected to accommodate to the dominant culture. This kind of power asymmetry is almost universal in immigrant situations, but also in colonial and post-colonial situations. While Singh et al. are quite critical of Gumperz, they add to rather than subtract from his perspective, by showing that there are other important considerations in intercultural encounters in addition to the concerns outlined by Gumperz.

The reading by Gabriele Kasper on linguistic etiquette clearly summarizes and criticizes the work that usually comes under the rubric of “politeness theory,” which has been dominated since 1978 by the theoretical perspective of Brown and Levinson. Their theory focuses on universality rather than relativity, and outlines a way of accounting for cross-cultural differences through a small number of universal constructs. As Kasper explains, it is the universality of these constructs that has been criticized. But the idea that something like politeness – linguistic etiquette – is present in all cultures is unquestioned. Kasper presents several ways this etiquette may be thought of, including Brown and Levinson’s, and outlines a number of important issues facing politeness theory. Students often find the abstractness of this theory quite difficult, and it is recommended to include a textbook reading in this area (see Bonvillain 2003, Foley 1997, and Holmes 1992, for discussions of politeness theory).

The set of articles in the theoretical approaches is rounded out by two articles that discuss the ways that language encodes and communicates sociocultural information, and the kinds of social information it encodes. Both Ochs and Kiesling view social meaning in language as *indexicality*, which is the meaning process in which linguistic form is related to context. A linguistic form becomes associated with an aspect of the social world, so that the same linguistic form indexes, or “brings to mind” that social
aspect whenever used. This view is related to that of Gumperz, but investigates in more
depth the relationship between linguistic form and social meaning, noting that people
do other things with indexicality in addition to indicating “what is going on”: they can
call up social identities such as male or female, and even specific cultural models, as
suggested by Kiesling. Of course, these indexes must be shared, and significant inter-
cultural misunderstanding can occur if they are not shared.

The four parts thus present four different but compatible perspectives on how lan-
guage and culture are related. We can consider politeness and contextualization cues to
be kinds of indexicality, and these ideas can be used in describing speech events in the
ethnography of speaking. Students will profit by comparing the approaches and their
use in different situations; such a comparison will help illuminate the ways in which
discourse differs across cultures.

References

1

Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life: Toward a Descriptive Theory

Dell Hymes

[...]

1.1 Introduction

The primary concern now must be with descriptive analyses from a variety of communities. Only in relation to actual analysis will it be possible to conduct arguments analogous to those now possible in the study of grammar as to the adequacy, necessity, generality, etc., of concepts and terms. Yet some initial heuristic schema are needed if the descriptive task is to proceed. What is presented here is quite preliminary – if English and its grammarians permitted, one might call it “toward toward a theory.” Some of it may survive the empirical and analytical work of the decade ahead.

Only a specific, explicit mode of description can guarantee the maintenance and success of the current interest in sociolinguistics. Such interest is prompted more by practical and theoretical needs, perhaps, than by accomplishment. It was the development of a specific mode of description that ensured the success of linguistics as an autonomous discipline in the United States in the twentieth century, and the lack of it (for motif and tale types are a form of indexing, distributional inference a procedure common to the human sciences) that led to the until recently peripheral status of folklore, although both had started from a similar base, the converging interest of anthropologists, and English scholars, in language and in verbal tradition.

The goal of sociolinguistic description can be put in terms of the disciplines whose interests converge in sociolinguistics. Whatever his questions about language, it is clear to a linguist that there is an enterprise, description of languages, which is central and known. Whatever his questions about society and culture, it is clear to a sociologist or an anthropologist that there is a form of inquiry (survey or ethnography) on which the...
answers depend. In both cases, one understands what it means to describe a language, the social relations, or culture of a community. We need to be able to say the same thing about the sociolinguistic system of a community.

Such a goal is of concern to practical work as well as to scientific theory. In a study of bilingual education, e.g., certain components of speaking will be taken into account, and the choice will presuppose a model, implicit if not explicit, of the interaction of language with social life. The significance attached to what is found will depend on understanding what is possible, what universal, what rare, what linked, in comparative perspective. What survey researchers need to know linguistically about a community, in selecting a language variety, and in conducting interviews, is in effect an application of the community’s sociolinguistic description (see Hymes 1969). In turn, practical work, if undertaken with its relevance to theory in mind, can make a contribution, for it must deal directly with the interaction of language and social life, and so provides a testing ground and source of new insight.

Sociolinguistic systems may be treated at the level of national states, and indeed, of an emerging world society. My concern here is with the level of individual communities and groups. The interaction of language with social life is viewed as first of all a matter of human action, based on a knowledge, sometimes conscious, often unconscious, that enables persons to use language. Speech events and larger systems indeed have properties not reducible to those of the speaking competence of persons. Such competence, however, underlies communicative conduct, not only within communities but also in encounters between them. The speaking competence of persons may be seen as entering into a series of systems of encounter at levels of different scope.

An adequate descriptive theory would provide for the analysis of individual communities by specifying technical concepts required for such analysis, and by characterizing the forms that analysis should take. Those forms would, as much as possible, be formal, i.e., explicit, general (in the sense of observing general constraints and conventions as to content, order, interrelationship, etc.), economical, and congruent with linguistic modes of statement. Only a good deal of empirical work and experimentation will show what forms of description are required, and of those, which preferable. As with grammar, approximation to a theory for the explicit, standard analysis of individual systems will also be an approximation to part of a theory of explanation.

Among the notions with which such a theory must deal are those of speech community, speech situation, speech event, speech act, fluent speaker, components of speech events, functions of speech, etc.

1.2 Social Units

One must first consider the social unit of analysis. For this I adopt the common expression *speech community*.

1.2.1 Speech community

Speech is here taken as a surrogate for all forms of language, including writing, song and speech-derived whistling, drumming, horn calling, and the like. Speech community
is a necessary, primary term in that it postulates the basis of description as a social, rather than a linguistic, entity. One starts with a social group and considers all the linguistic varieties present in it, rather than starting with any one variety.

Bloomfield (1933) and some others have in the past reduced the notion of speech community to the notion of language (or linguistic variety). Those speaking the same language (or same first language, or standard language) were defined as members of the same speech community. This confusion still persists, associated with a quantitative measure of frequency of interaction as a way of describing (in principle) internal variation and change, as speculatively postulated by Bloomfield. The present approach requires a definition that is qualitative and expressed in terms of norms for the use of language. It is clear from the work of Gumperz, Labov, Barth, and others that not frequency of interaction but rather definition of situations in which interaction occurs is decisive, particularly identification (or lack of it) with others. [Sociolinguistics here makes contact with the shift in rhetorical theory from expression and persuasion to identification as key concept (see Burke 1950:19–37, 55–9).]

Tentatively, a speech community is defined as a community sharing rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech, and rules for the interpretation of at least one linguistic variety. Both conditions are necessary.

The sharing of grammatical (variety) rules is not sufficient. There may be persons whose English I can grammatically identify but whose messages escape me. I may be ignorant of what counts as a coherent sequence, request, statement requiring an answer, requisite or forbidden topic, marking of emphasis or irony, normal duration of silence, normal level of voice, etc., and have no metacommunitative means or opportunity for discovering such things. The difference between knowledge of a variety and knowledge of speaking does not usually become apparent within a single community, where the two are normally acquired together. Communities indeed often mingle what a linguist would distinguish as grammatically and as socially or culturally acceptable. Among the Cochiti of New Mexico J. R. Fox was unable to elicit the first person singular possessive form of “wings,” on the grounds that the speaker, not being a bird, could not say “my wings” – only to become the only person in Cochiti able to say it on the grounds that “your name is Robin.”

The nonidentity of the two kinds of rules (or norms) is more likely to be noticed when a shared variety is a second language for one or both parties. Sentences that translate each other grammatically may be mistakenly taken as having the same functions in speech, just as words that translate each other may be taken as having the same semantic function. There may be substratum influence or interference (Weinreich 1953) in the one as in the other. The Czech linguist J. Neustupny has coined the term Sprechbund “speech area” (parallel to Sprachbund “language area”) for the phenomenon of speaking rules being shared among contiguous languages. Thus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and southern Germany may be found to share norms as to greetings, acceptable topics, what is said next in a conversation, etc.

Sharing of speaking rules is not sufficient. A Czech who knows no German may belong to the same Sprechbund, but not the same speech community, as an Austrian.

The language field and speech field (akin to the notion of social field) can be defined as the total range of communities within which a person’s knowledge of varieties and speaking rules potentially enables him to move communicatively. Within the speech field
must be distinguished the speech network, the specific linkages of persons through shared varieties and speaking rules across communities. Thus in northern Queensland, Australia, different speakers of the same language (e.g., Yir Yoront) may have quite different networks along geographically different circuits, based on clan membership, and involving different repertoires of multilingualism. In Vitiaz Strait, New Guinea, the Bilibili islanders (a group of about 200–250 traders and potmakers in Astrolabe Bay) have collectively a knowledge of the languages of all the communities with which they have had economic relations, a few men knowing the language of each particular community in which they have had trading partners.

In sum, one’s speech community may be, effectively, a single locality or portion of it; one’s language field will be delimited by one’s repertoire of varieties; one’s speech field by one’s repertoire of patterns of speaking. One’s speech network is the effective union of these last two.

Part of the work of definition obviously is done here by the notion of community, whose difficulties are bypassed, as are the difficulties of defining boundaries between varieties and between patterns of speaking. Native conceptions of boundaries are but one factor in defining them, essential but sometimes partly misleading (a point stressed by Gumperz on the basis of his work in central India). Self-conceptions, values, role structures, contiguity, purposes of interaction, political history, all may be factors. Clearly, the same degree of linguistic difference may be associated with a boundary in one case and not in another, depending on social factors. The essential thing is that the object of description be an integral social unit. Probably, it will prove most useful to reserve the notion of speech community for the local unit most specifically characterized for a person by common locality and primary interaction (Gumperz 1962:30–2). Here I have drawn distinctions of scale and of kind of linkage within what Gumperz has termed the linguistic community (any distinguishable intercommunicating group). Descriptions will make it possible to develop a useful typology and to discover the causes and consequences of the various types.

1.2.2 Speech situation

Within a community one readily detects many situations associated with (or marked by the absence of) speech. Such contexts of situation will often be naturally described as ceremonies, fights, hunts, meals, lovemaking, and the like. It would not be profitable to convert such situations en masse into parts of a sociolinguistic description by the simple expedient of relabeling them in terms of speech. (Notice that the distinctions made with regard to speech community are not identical with the concepts of a general communicative approach, which must note the differential range of communication by speech, film, art object, music.) Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules, or one set of such rules throughout. A hunt, e.g., may comprise both verbal and nonverbal events, and the verbal events may be of more than one type.

In a sociolinguistic description, then, it is necessary to deal with activities which are in some recognizable way bounded or integral. From the standpoint of general social description they may be registered as ceremonies, fishing trips, and the like; from
particular standpoints they may be regarded as political, esthetic, etc., situations, which serve as contexts for the manifestation of political, esthetic, etc., activity. From the sociolinguistic standpoint they may be regarded as speech situations.

1.2.3 Speech event

The term *speech event* will be restricted to activities, or aspects of activities, that are directly governed by rules or norms for the use of speech. An event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several. Just as an occurrence of a noun may at the same time be the whole of a noun phrase and the whole of a sentence (e.g., “Fire!”), so a speech act may be the whole of a speech event, and of a speech situation (say, a rite consisting of a single prayer, itself a single invocation). More often, however, one will find a difference in magnitude: a party (speech situation), a conversation during the party (speech event), a joke within the conversation (speech act). It is of speech events and speech acts that one writes formal rules for their occurrence and characteristics. Notice that the same type of speech act may recur in different types of speech event, and the same type of speech event in different contexts of situation. Thus, a joke (speech act) may be embedded in a private conversation, a lecture, a formal introduction. A private conversation may occur in the context of a party, a memorial service, a pause in changing sides in a tennis match.

1.2.4 Speech act

The *speech act* is the minimal term of the set just discussed, as the remarks on speech events have indicated. It represents a level distinct from the sentence, and not identifiable with any single portion of other levels of grammar, nor with segments of any particular size defined in terms of other levels of grammar. That an utterance has the status of a command may depend upon a conventional formula (“I hereby order you to leave this building”), intonation (“Go!” vs. “Go?”), position in a conversational exchange [“Hello” as initiating greeting or as response (perhaps used when answering the telephone)], or the social relationship obtaining between the two parties (as when an utterance that is in the form of a polite question is in effect a command when made by a superior to a subordinate). The level of speech acts mediates immediately between the usual levels of grammar and the rest of a speech event or situation in that it implicates both linguistic form and social norms.

To some extent speech acts may be analyzable by extensions of syntactic and semantic structure. It seems certain, however, that much, if not most, of the knowledge that speakers share as to the status of utterances as acts is immediate and abstract, depending upon an autonomous system of signals from both the various levels of grammar and social settings. To attempt to depict speech acts entirely by postulating an additional segment of underlying grammatical structure (e.g., “I hereby X you to . . .”) is cumbersome and counterintuitive. (Consider the case in which “Do you think I might have that last bit of tea?” is to be taken as a command.)

An autonomous level of speech acts is in fact implicated by that logic of linguistic levels according to which the ambiguity of “the shooting of the blacks was terrible” and the commonality of “topping Erv is almost impossible” and “it’s almost impossible to top Erv” together requires a further level of structure at which the former has two
different structures, the latter one. The relation between sentence forms and their status as speech acts is of the same kind. A sentence interrogative in form may be now a request, now a command, now a statement; a request may be manifested by a sentence that is now interrogative, now declarative, now imperative in form.

Discourse may be viewed in terms of acts both syntagmatically and paradigmatically; i.e., both as a sequence of speech acts and in terms of classes of speech acts among which choice has been made at given points.

1.2.5 Speech styles

Style has often been approached as a matter of statistical frequency of elements already given in linguistic description, or as deviation from some norm given by such description. Statistics and deviations matter, but do not suffice. Styles also depend upon qualitative judgments of appropriateness, and must often be described in terms of selections that apply globally to a discourse, as in the case of honorific usage in Japanese (McCawley 1968:136), i.e., there are consistent patternings of speaking that cut across the components of grammar (phonology, syntax, semantics), or that operate within one independently of the selectional restrictions normally described for it. Whorf adumbrated as much in his conception of “fashions of speaking”; Joos has made and illustrated the point with regard to English; Pike (1967) has considered a wide variety of contextual styles as conditions on the manifestation of phonological and morphological units. Besides the existence of qualitatively defined styles, there are two other points essential to socio-linguistic description. One is that speech styles involve elements and relations that conventionally serve “expressive” or, better, stylistic, as well as referential function (e.g., the contrast in force of aspiration that conventionally signals emphasis in English). The second point is that speech styles are to be considered not only in terms of cooccurrence within each but also in terms of contrastive choice among them. Like speech acts, they have both syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions. [...]

The coherence, or cohesion, of discourse depends upon the syntagmatic relation of speech acts, and speech styles, as well as of semantic and syntactic features.

1.2.6 Ways of speaking

Ways of speaking is used as the most general, indeed, as a primitive, term. The point of it is the regulative idea that the communicative behavior within a community is analyzable in terms of determinate ways of speaking, that the communicative competence of persons comprises in part a knowledge of determinate ways of speaking. Little more can be said until a certain number of ethnographic descriptions of communities in terms of ways of speaking are available. It is likely that communities differ widely in the features in terms of which their ways of speaking are primarily organized.

1.2.7 Components of speech

A descriptive theory requires some schema of the components of speech acts. At present such a schema can be only an etic, heuristic input to descriptions. Later it may assume the status of a theory of universal features and dimensions.
Long traditional in our culture is the threefold division between speaker, hearer, and something spoken about. It has been elaborated in information theory, linguistics, semiotics, literary criticism, and sociology in various ways. In the hands of some investigators various of these models have proven productive, but their productivity has depended upon not taking them literally, let alone using them precisely. All such schemes, e.g., appear to agree either in taking the standpoint of an individual speaker or in postulating a dyad, speaker–hearer (or source–destination, sender–receiver, addressor–addressee). Even if such a scheme is intended to be a model, for descriptive work it cannot be. Some rules of speaking require specification of three participants [addressor, addressee, hearer (audience), source, spokesman, addressees; etc.]; some of but one, indifferent as to role in the speech event; some of two, but of speaker and audience (e.g., a child); and so on. In short, serious ethnographic work shows that there is one general, or universal, dimension to be postulated, that of participant. The common dyadic model of speaker–hearer specifies sometimes too many, sometimes too few, sometimes the wrong participants. Further ethnographic work will enable us to state the range of actual types of participant relations and to see in differential occurrence something to be explained.

Ethnographic material so far investigated indicates that some sixteen or seventeen components have sometimes to be distinguished. No rule has been found that requires specification of all simultaneously. There are always redundancies, and sometimes a rule requires explicit mention of a relation between only two, message form and some other. (It is a general principle that all rules involve message form, if not by affecting its shape, then by governing its interpretation.) Since each of the components may sometimes be a factor, however, each has to be recognized in the general grid.

Psycholinguistic work has indicated that human memory works best with classifications of the magnitude of seven, plus or minus two (Miller 1956). To make the set of components mnemonically convenient, at least in English, the letters of the term SPEAKING can be used. The components can be grouped together in relation to the eight letters without great difficulty. Clearly, the use of SPEAKING as a mnemonic code word has nothing to do with the form of an eventual model and theory.

1. **Message form.** The form of the message is fundamental, as has just been indicated. The most common, and most serious, defect in most reports of speaking probably is that the message form, and, hence, the rules governing it, cannot be recaptured. A concern for the details of actual form strikes some as picayune, as removed from humanistic or scientific importance. Such a view betrays an impatience that is a disservice to both humanistic and scientific purposes. It is precisely the failure to unite form and content in the scope of a single focus of study that has retarded understanding of the human ability to speak, and that vitiates many attempts to analyze the significance of behavior. Content categories, interpretive categories, alone do not suffice. It is a truism, but one frequently ignored in research, that how something is said is part of what is said. Nor can one prescribe in advance the gross size of the signal that will be crucial to content and skill. The more a way of speaking has become shared and meaningful within a group, the more likely that crucial cues will be efficient, i.e., slight in scale. If one balks at such detail, perhaps because it requires technical skills in linguistics, musicology, or the like that are hard to command, one should face the fact that the human meaning of one’s object of study, and the scientific claims of one’s field of inquiry, are not being taken seriously.
Especially when competence, the ability of persons, is of concern, one must recognize that shared ways of speaking acquire a partial autonomy, developing in part in terms of an inner logic of their means of expression. The means of expression condition and sometimes control content. For members of the community, then, “freedom is the recognition of necessity”; mastery of the way of speaking is prerequisite to personal expression. Serious concern for both scientific analysis and human meaning requires one to go beyond content to the explicit statement of rules and features of form.

While such an approach may seem to apply first of all to genres conventionally recognized as esthetic, it also applies to conversation in daily life. Only painstaking analysis of message form – how things are said – of a sort that indeed parallels and can learn from the intensity of literary criticism can disclose the depth and adequacy of the elliptical art that is talk.

2. **Message content.** One context for distinguishing message form from message content would be: “He prayed, saying ‘. . . ’” (quoting message form) vs. “He prayed that he would get well” (reporting content only).

Content enters analysis first of all perhaps as a question of topic and of change of topic. Members of a group know what is being talked about and when what is talked about has changed, and manage maintenance and change of topic. These abilities are parts of their communicative competence of particular importance to study of the coherence of discourse.

Message form and message content are central to the speech act and the focus of its “syntactic structure”; they are also tightly interdependent. Thus they can be dubbed jointly as components of “act sequence” (mnemonically, A).

3. **Setting.** Setting refers to the time and place of a speech act and, in general, to the physical circumstances.

4. **Scene.** Scene, which is distinct from setting, designates the “psychological setting,” or the cultural definition of an occasion as a certain type of scene. Within a play on the same stage with the same stage set the dramatic time may shift: “ten years later.” In daily life the same persons in the same setting may redefine their interaction as a changed type of scene, say, from formal to informal, serious to festive, or the like. [ . . . ] Speech acts frequently are used to define scenes, and also frequently judged as appropriate or inappropriate in relation to scenes. Settings and scenes themselves, of course, may be judged as appropriate and inappropriate, happy or unhappy, in relation to each other, from the level of complaint about the weather to that of dramatic irony.

Setting and scene may be linked as components of act situation (mnemonically, S). Since scene implies always an analysis of cultural definitions, setting probably is to be preferred as the informal, unmarked term for the two.

5. **Speaker, or sender.**

6. **Addressor.**

7. **Hearer, or receiver, or audience.**

8. **Addressee.**

These four components were discussed in introducing the subject of components of speech. Here are a few illustrations. Among the Abipon of Argentina –in is added to the end of each word if any participant (whatever his role) is a member of the Hocheri (warrior class). Among the Wishram Chinook, formal scenes are defined by the relationship between a source (e.g., a chief, or sponsor of a ceremony), a spokesman who repeats the
source’s words, and others who constitute an audience or public. The source whose words are repeated sometimes is not present; the addressees sometimes are spirits of the surrounding environment. In the presence of a child, adults in Germany often use the term of address which would be appropriate for the child. Sometimes rules for participants are internal to a genre and independent of the participants in the embedding event. Thus male and female actors in Yana myths use the appropriate men’s and women’s forms of speech, respectively, irrespective of the sex of the narrator. Use of men’s speech itself is required when both addressee and addressee are both adult and male, “women’s” speech otherwise. Groups differ in their definitions of the participants in speech events in revealing ways, particularly in defining absence (e.g., children, maids) and presence (e.g., supernaturals) of participation. Much of religious conduct can be interpreted as part of a native theory of communication. The various components may be grouped together as participants (mnemonically, P).

9. Purposes – outcomes. Conventionally recognized and expected outcomes often enter into the definition of speech events, as among the Waiwai of Venezuela, where the central speech event of the society, the oho-chant, has several varieties, according to whether the purpose to be accomplished is a marriage contract, a trade, a communal work task, an invitation to a feast, or a composing of social peace after a death. The rules for participants and settings vary accordingly (Fock 1965). A taxonomy of speech events among the Yakan of the Philippines [ . . . ] is differentiated into levels according jointly to topic (any topic, an issue, a disagreement, a dispute) and outcome (no particular outcome, a decision, a settlement, a legal ruling).

10. Purposes – goals. The purpose of an event from a community standpoint, of course, need not be identical to the purposes of those engaged in it. Presumably, both sides to a Yakan litigation wish to win. In a negotiation the purpose of some may be to obtain a favorable settlement, of others simply that there be a settlement. Among the Waiwai the prospective father-in-law and son-in-law have opposing goals in arriving at a marriage contract. The strategies of participants are an essential determinant of the form of speech events, indeed, to their being performed at all [ . . . ].

With respect both to outcomes and goals, the conventionally expected or ascribed must be distinguished from the purely situational or personal, and from the latent and unintended. The interactions of a particular speech event may determine its particular quality and whether or not the expected outcome is reached. The actual motives, or some portion of them, of participants may be quite varied. In the first instance, descriptions of speech events seek to describe customary or culturally appropriate behavior. Such description is essential and prerequisite to understanding events in all their individual richness; but the two kinds of account should not be confused (see Sapir 1949:534, 543).

Many approaches to communication and the analysis of speech have not provided a place for either kind of purpose, perhaps because of a conscious or unconsciously lingering behaviorism. [Kenneth Burke’s (1945) approach is a notable exception.] Yet communication itself must be differentiated from interaction as a whole in terms of purposiveness (see Hymes 1964). The two aspects of purpose can be grouped together by exploiting an English homonymy, ends in view (goals) and ends as outcomes (mnemonically, E).

11. Key. Key is introduced to provide for the tone, manner, or spirit in which an act is done. It corresponds roughly to modality among grammatical categories. Acts