A Companion to the Philosophy of Education

Edited by
Randall Curren
A Companion to the Philosophy of Education
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today's leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike.

Already published in the series:

1. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition
   Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric Tsui-James

2. A Companion to Ethics
   Edited by Peter Singer

3. A Companion to Aesthetics
   Edited by David Cooper

4. A Companion to Epistemology
   Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa

5. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy
   Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit

6. A Companion to Philosophy of Mind
   Edited by Samuel Guttenplan

7. A Companion to Metaphysics
   Edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa

8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
   Edited by Dennis Patterson

9. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion
   Edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro

10. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language
    Edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

11. A Companion to World Philosophies
    Edited by Elliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe

12. A Companion to Continental Philosophy
    Edited by Simon Critchley and William Schroeder

13. A Companion to Feminist Philosophy
    Edited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young

    Edited by William Bechtel and George Graham

15. A Companion to Bioethics
    Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer

16. A Companion to the Philosophers
    Edited by Robert L. Arrington

17. A Companion to Business Ethics
    Edited by Robert E. Frederick

18. A Companion to the Philosophy of Science
    Edited by W. H. Newton-Smith

19. A Companion to Environmental Philosophy
    Edited by Dale Jamieson

20. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy
    Edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa

21. A Companion to Genethics
    Edited by Justine Burley and John Harris

22. A Companion to Philosophical Logic
    Edited by Dale Jacquette

23. A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy
    Edited by Steven Nadler

24. A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages
    Edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone

25. A Companion to African-American Philosophy
    Edited by Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman

26. A Companion to Applied Ethics
    Edited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman

27. A Companion to the Philosophy of Education
    Edited by Randall Curren
A Companion
to the Philosophy
of Education

Edited by
Randall Curren
# Contents

Notes on Contributors ix  
Preface xvi  
Introduction 1  
Randall Curren

## Part I  Historical and Contemporary Movements 5

1  The Socratic Movement 7  
   C. D. C. Reeve

2  Stoicism 25  
   Christopher Gill

3  The Judaic Tradition 33  
   Hanan A. Alexander and Shmuel Glick

4  The Educational Thought of Augustine 50  
   Gareth B. Matthews

5  Humanism 62  
   Craig Kallendorf

6  Enlightenment Liberalism 73  
   Amy M. Schmitter, Nathan Tarcov, and Wendy Donner

7  Rousseau, Dewey, and Democracy 94  
   Patrick Riley and Jennifer Welchman

8  Kant, Hegel, and the Rise of Pedagogical Science 113  
   G. Felicitas Munzel

9  Romanticism 130  
   Frederick C. Beiser
CONTENTS

10 The Past as Future? Hellenism, the Gymnasium, and Altertumswissenschaft
Wolfgang Mann 143

11 Critical Theory
Douglas Kellner 161

12 The Analytical Movement
Randall Curren, Emily Robertson, and Paul Hager 176

13 Feminism
Jane Roland Martin 192

14 Postmodernism
David E. Cooper 206

Part II Teaching and Learning 219

15 The Nature and Purposes of Education
Paul Standish 221

16 Theories of Teaching and Learning
D. C. Phillips 232

17 The Capacity to Learn
Carol Wren and Thomas Wren 246

18 Motivation and Classroom Management
Richard Ryan and Martin Lynch 260

19 The Measurement of Learning
Andrew Davis 272

20 Knowledge, Truth, and Learning
Jonathan E. Adler 285

21 Cultivating Reason
Harvey Siegel 305

22 Moral Education
Graham Haydon 320

23 Religious Education
Gabriel Moran 332

24 Teaching Science
Michael R. Matthews 342

25 Teaching Elementary Arithmetic through Applications
Mark Steiner 354

26 Aesthetics and the Educative Powers of Art
Noël Carroll 365
27 Teaching Literature
   Richard Smith

Part III The Politics and Ethics of Schooling

28 The Authority and Responsibility to Educate
   Amy Gutmann

29 Church, State, and Education
   William Galston

30 Common Schooling and Educational Choice
   Rob Reich

31 Children's Rights
   James G. Dwyer

32 Education and Standards of Living
   Christian Barry

33 Educational Equality and Justice
   Harry Brighouse

34 Multicultural Education
   Robert K. Fullinwider

35 Education and the Politics of Identity
   Yael Tamir

36 The Ethics of Teaching
   Kenneth A. Strike

37 Inclusion and Justice in Special Education
   Robert F. Ladenson

38 Sex Education
   David Archard

Part IV Higher Education

39 Ethics and the Aims of American Higher Education
   Minda Rae Amiran

40 Universities in a Fluid Age
   Ronald Barnett

41 Academic Freedom
   Robert L. Simon

42 The Ethics of Research
   Michael Davis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Affirmative Action in Higher Education</td>
<td>Bernard Boxill</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>The Professor–Student Relationship and the Regulation of Student Life</td>
<td>Peter J. Markie</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>The Role of Ethics in Professional Education</td>
<td>Norman E. Bowie</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index                                                                 | 627
Notes on Contributors

Jonathan E. Adler is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, City University of New York. He is an epistemologist whose areas of research and publication also include ethics, informal logic, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of education. His publications include the book *Belief's Own Ethics* (2002).

David Archard is Reader in the Department of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, UK. He has published *Children: Rights and Childhood* (1993), and numerous articles and chapters in social, political, moral, and applied legal philosophy. His most recent book is *Sexual Consent* (1998).

Hanan A. Alexander is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education and head of the Center for Jewish Education and the Ethics and Education Project at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a former Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Fingerhut School of Education at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles. He was Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Religious Education* from 1991 to 2000, and is the author of *Reclaiming Goodness: Education and the Spiritual Quest* (2001).

Minda Rae Amlran is Emerita Professor of English at the State University of New York, Fredonia. She chaired the English departments there and at Tel Aviv University, Israel, served nine years as an academic dean, was a consultant to the Department of Research and Evaluation of the Chicago Board of Education, served on college accreditation teams for two regional accrediting associations, and has presented and published widely on the assessment of general education.

Ronald Barnett is Professor of Higher Education and Dean of Professional Development at the Institute of Education, University of London, UK. He has published extensively in the theory and conceptual analysis of the university and higher education, his latest book being *Realizing the University in an Age of Supercomplexity* (1999).

Christian Barry is the commissioning editor of *Ethics and International Affairs*, and a consultant for the United Nations Development Program. He was a co-author of *Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development*. His work focuses on the theory and measurement of human rights.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Frederick C. Beiser is Professor of Philosophy at Syracuse University and has taught previously at Yale, Indiana University, and the Universities of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Colorado. His publications include *Fate of Reason* (1987), *Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism* (1992), and *Early Political Writings of the German Romantics* (1996).

Norman E. Bowie is the Elmer L. Andersen Chair in Corporate Responsibility at the University of Minnesota, where he holds a joint appointment in the Department of Philosophy and the Carlson School of Management. His most recent book is *Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective* (1999).

Bernard Boxill is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of *Blacks and Social Justice* (1984, 1991) and the editor of *Race and Racism* (1991). His article “The Morality of Reparations” appeared in 1972 and has been widely reprinted.

Harry Brighouse is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and was for two years Professor of Philosophy of Education at the London Institute of Education. He is the author of *School Choice and Social Justice* (2000) and other works in political philosophy and philosophy of education, and is co-editor of the journal *Theory and Research in Education*.

Noël Carroll is Monroe C. Beardsley Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. His special research areas include aesthetics and the philosophy of history. His most recent books are *Philosophy of Mass Art* (1998) and *Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction* (1999).


Randall Curren is Associate Professor, jointly appointed in the Department of Philosophy and the Margaret Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development, at the University of Rochester. He is the author of *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* (2000) and other works in moral, political, legal, and educational philosophy, and is co-editor of the journal *Theory and Research in Education*.

Andrew Davis is Senior Lecturer in Education at Durham University, UK, where he directs the Primary Mathematics provision and the PGCE Primary Course. For many years he taught children aged from four to eleven. His contributions to the theory of educational assessment include *The Limits of Educational Assessment* (1998) and *Educational Assessment: A Critique of Current Policy* (1999).

Michael Davis is Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions and Professor of Philosophy at the Illinois Institute of Technology. He is the author of over 120 articles and four books, including *Thinking Like an Engineer* (1998) and *Ethics and the University* (1999), and co-editor of three books, including *Conflict of Interest in the Professions* (2001).
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Wendy Donner is Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario. She is the author of *The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy* (1991) and other works on Mill’s utilitarianism, feminism, and political philosophy.


Robert K. Fullinwider is Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and during 1996–8 was research director for the National Commission on Civic Renewal, whose report, *A Nation of Spectators*, appeared in 1998. He is the author of *The Reverse Discrimination Controversy* (1980) and other works in moral, social, and educational philosophy, editor of *Public Education in a Multicultural Society* (1995) and *Civil Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal* (1999), and is presently co-authoring a book on college admissions.

William Galston is Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland at College Park. He is the author of *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State* (1991), *Justice and the Human Good* (1980), and many other works in political and social philosophy, American politics, and public policy. He served as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy (1993–5) and is Executive Director for the National Commission on Civic Renewal (USA).

Christopher Gill is Professor of Ancient Thought at the University of Exeter, UK. His books include *Greek Thought* (1995) and *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy* (1996). He has edited several collections of essays, including *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (1990), and *Form and Argument in Late Plato* (1996). He is completing a book on Hellenistic and Roman psychology and ethics.

Shmuel Glick is Director of the Schocken Institute of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and teaches Education and Rabbinic Literature at the Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies. He is author of *Education in Light of Israeli Law and Halakhic Literature*, two volumes (1999, 2000), and editor of Simcha Assafs’ *Mekorot le-toldot ha-Hinukh be-Yisrael* (A Source-Book for the History of Jewish Education from the Beginning of the Middle Ages to the Period of the Haskalah [nineteenth century]), two volumes (2001).

Amy Gutmann is Provost and Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and was the founding Director of the Princeton University Center for Human Values. She is author, most recently, of a new edition of *Democratic Education* (1999), (with Dennis Thompson) *Democracy and Disagreement* (1998), and (with Anthony Appiah) *Color Conscious* (1996), and editor of *Freedom of Association* (1998).

Paul Hager is Professor of Education at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. His research interests include philosophy of education, critical thinking,

**Graham Haydon** is Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, and Course Leader of the MA in Values in Education, at the Institute of Education, University of London, and a former Lecturer in Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. He is author of *Teaching about Values* (1997) and *Values, Virtues and Violence: Education and the Public Understanding of Morality* (2000).

**Craig Kallendorf** is Professor of English and Classics at Texas A&M University. His most recent books are *Virgil and the Myth of Venice: Books and Readers in the Italian Renaissance* (1999), and an edition and translation of the works of four Italian Renaissance humanists for I Tatti Studies.


**Robert F. Ladenson** is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Humanities, and Faculty Associate in the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, at the Illinois Institute of Technology. He specializes in practical and professional ethics, the philosophy of law, and political and moral philosophy. He is also a special education hearing officer for the State of Illinois.

**Wolfgang Mann** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He works principally on Greek philosophy, and is the author of *Aristotle's Categories and Their Context* (2000) and other works in the history of philosophy.

**Peter J. Markie** is Professor of Philosophy and Vice Provost for Undergraduate Studies at the University of Missouri at Columbia. He is the author of *Descartes's Gambit* (1986), *A Professor's Duties* (1995), and articles in the history of modern philosophy, ethics, and logic. He is the editor with Steven M. Cahn of the anthology *Ethics* (1999).

**Jane Roland Martin** is Professor of Philosophy Emerita at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and a past president of the Philosophy of Education Society. Her most recent book, *Coming of Age in Academe*, was published in 2000. Her earlier works include *Reclaiming a Conversation* (1985), *The Schoolhome* (1992), and *Changing the Educational Landscape* (1993).

**Gareth B. Matthews** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of *Socratic Perplexity and the Nature of Philosophy* (1999), *The Philosophy of Childhood* (1996), and *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes* (1992), and the editor of *The Augustinian Tradition* (1998).
Michael R. Matthews is Associate Professor of Education at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He has degrees in geology, psychology, philosophy, philosophy of education, and the history and philosophy of science. He is the author of four books, editor of four books, and editor of the journal *Science and Education*. His most recent book is *Time for Science Education* (2000).

Gabriel Moran is Professor in the Philosophy of Education Program at New York University, and for the past twenty years has been an active member in the International Seminar on Religious Education and Values. He is the author of more than a dozen books on religious education, most recently *Reshaping Religious Education* (1998) and *Both Sides: The Story of Revelation* (2001).

G. Felicitas Munzel is Associate Professor in the Program of Liberal Studies at the University of Notre Dame. She is the author of *Kant’s Conception of Moral Character* (1999), articles on Kant, moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics, and translator of Kant’s 1775/6 Friedlaender Lectures on anthropology. With a grant from the Earhart Foundation she is currently working on *Immanuel Kant: Philosopher-Educator*, on the relation of Kant’s critical philosophy to the eighteenth-century education reform debates.

D. C. Phillips is Professor of Education and, by courtesy, Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, where he has also served as Interim Dean of the School of Education. A Past-President of the Philosophy of Education Society, he is author, co-author, or editor of ten books and has published more than a hundred essays in philosophy of education and philosophy of social science. His most recent work is on constructivism and philosophical issues in educational research.

C. D. C. Reeve is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of *Philosopher-Kings* (1988), *Socrates in the Apology* (1989), *Practices of Reason* (1992), and *Substantial Knowledge* (2000). He has translated Plato’s *Republic* and *Cratylus* and Aristotle’s *Politics*.

Rob Reich is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ethics in Society, and, by courtesy, Education, at Stanford University, where he also directs the Stanford University Summer Philosophy Discovery Institute for high school students. His publications include *Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education* (2002) and other works in political and educational theory.

Patrick Riley is Oakeshott Professor of Political and Moral Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His books include *The General Will Before Rousseau* (1986), *Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence* (1996), and *Kant’s Political Philosophy* (2002/3). He is the editor of the *Cambridge Companion To Rousseau* (2001), and translator of the works of Bossuet, Fenélon, Malebranche, and Leibniz.

Emily Robertson is dual Associate Professor of Cultural Foundations of Education and Philosophy at Syracuse University, and a past president of the Philosophy of Education Society. Her published scholarship includes works on rationality and education, moral education, the ethics of teaching, and social philosophy.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Richard M. Ryan is Professor of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Rochester. He has published over 150 scholarly pieces, including, with Edward Deci, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-determination in Human Behavior (1985), and developed with Deci a widely tested theory of motivation, development, and education, known as Self-determination Theory. He has been a visiting scientist at the Max Planck Institute, a Cattell Fellow, and has won awards for both his teaching and his contributions to educational research. He is joined in his chapter in this volume by Martin Lynch, a collaborator in the Human Motivation Research Group at the University of Rochester.

Amy M. Schmitter is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. Her main areas of research are the history of early modern philosophy and the philosophy of art. She has published articles on several aspects of Descartes’s philosophy and is working on a book on his notion of representation.

Harvey Siegel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. He is the author of Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism (1987), Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education (1988), Rationality Redeemed? Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal (1997), and many papers in epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of education. He also edited Reason and Education: Essays in Honor of Israel Scheffler (1997).


Richard Smith is Professor of Education and Director of Combined Social Sciences at the University of Durham, UK. He was for ten years editor of the Journal of Philosophy of Education. He is (with Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, and Paul Standish) author of Thinking Again: Education after Postmodernism (1998) and Education in an Age of Nihilism (2000), and editor of the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education (2002).

Paul Standish is Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Dundee, UK, and Editor of the Journal of Philosophy of Education. His recent books include (with Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, and Richard Smith) Education in an Age of Nihilism (2000), (edited with Nigel Blake) Education at the Interface: Philosophical Questions Concerning Education Online (2000), (edited with Pradeep Dhillon) Lyotard: Just Education (2000), and (edited with Francis Crawley and Paul Smeyers) Universities Remembering Europe (2000).

Mark Steiner is Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is author of Mathematical Knowledge (1975) and The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (1998).

Kenneth A. Strike is Professor and Chair of Educational Policy and Leadership at the University of Maryland, and Professor Emeritus at Cornell. He is a past president of the

**Yael Tamir** is Professor of Philosophy and Education at Tel Aviv University, Israel. Her books include *Liberal Nationalism* (1993), *Democratic Education in a Multicultural State* (editor) (1995), and, with Stephen Macedo, *Nomos XLIII: Moral and Political Education* (editor) (2002).

**Nathan Tarcov** is Professor in the Committee on Social Thought, the Department of Political Science, and the College, and Director of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Locke's Education for Liberty* (1984, 1997) and articles on European and American political thought and American foreign policy. He is editor and translator with Harvey C. Mansfield of *Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy* (1996), editor with Ruth Grant of *Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding* (1996), and editor with Clifford Orwin of *The Legacy of Rousseau* (1997).

**Jennifer Welchman** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. She is the author of *Dewey's Ethical Thought* (1996) and works in the fields of ethics, applied ethics, and the history of philosophy.

**Carol T. Wren** is Associate Professor in the Department of Reading and Learning Disabilities of the School of Education at DePaul University in Chicago. Her publications include *Hanging by a Twig: Understanding and Counseling Adults with Learning Disabilities and ADD* (2000), *Learning Disabilities: Diagnosis and Remediation* (1983), and various chapters and articles on education and learning disabilities.

**Thomas E. Wren** is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. His publications include *Caring about Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology* (1991), *Philosophy of Development* (1997), *Moral Sensibilities and Education*, two volumes (1999, 2000), and numerous articles and book chapters. In addition to a doctorate in philosophy he holds masters degrees in education and English.
Preface

This Companion would not have existed without the initiative and assistance of Jeff Dean, and the encouragement and advice of Steve Cahn and Eamonn Callan. Their recognition of the need for a volume of this kind was essential to getting the project off the ground. As the plan for the volume took shape in the spring of 2000, Jeff, Eamonn, David Cooper, Harry Brighouse, and Ken Westphal all provided helpful suggestions. Others who offered valuable formative advice in the months that followed include Ronald Barnett, Steve Cahn, Jane Roland Martin, Michael Matthews, Emily Robertson, Amélie Rorty, Francis Schrag, Harvey Siegel, Paul Standish, Patricia White, and an anonymous referee for the press.

Like earlier volumes in the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, this Companion aims to provide in one volume a comprehensive and authoritative overview of its field. Every effort has been made to produce a work of the highest philosophical quality, and one that is accessible to undergraduates and the interested lay public; one that guides readers through the terrain in a way that is not only informative and accurate, but also philosophically fresh and engaging; one that brings together in a coherent manner work of philosophical significance spanning several disciplines, several continents, and several intellectual styles; and one that brings readers face-to-face, as much as possible, with the very thinkers who have shaped the debates and literature of their topics. In an enterprise of this complexity, not every dream can be fulfilled – more than one chapter that was planned did not materialize – but a format that makes space for genuinely creative contributions yields more than enough compensation in the form of unexpected gifts. The 53 contributors to this volume not only provide an unparalleled guide to the philosophy of education as it is, they move the field forward. In accomplishing this, they persevered through more than the normal distractions of academic life, and I am grateful to them for their excellent work, their fortitude, and their patience with my countless queries and requests.

Many others provided suggestions, corrections, bibliographical assistance, and other forms of help. I have probably forgotten as many of them as I can now remember, but they certainly include Julia Annas, Myles Burnyeat, Ann Cudd, Walter Feinberg, Thomas Groome, Paul Hirst, Steve Macedo, Wolfgang Mann, Kathleen McGowan, Ralf Meerbote, Martha Nussbaum, Shirley Ricker, Amartya Sen, Ken Strike, Harold Wechsler, Ed Wierenga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Tom Wren. Gabriel
Uzquiano read and provided comments on a draft of chapter 12, and Paul Collins and Margie Shaw read and commented on drafts of several chapters. In her capacity as my research assistant, Margie also provided welcome assistance with proofreading, word processing, and other aspects of production. The Spencer Foundation made it immeasurably easier for me to keep the project on schedule by providing assistance in the form of a generous grant, which provided funds for a research assistant, release from teaching responsibilities, and other expenses.

The format for this work does not give contributors space within their chapters to thank those who have provided them with assistance, so it is fitting that acknowledgment of such assistance be made here. For bibliographical assistance, Amy Schmitter would like to thank Patricia Easton (chapter 6). For their personal recollections of the early years of analytical philosophy of education, the authors of chapter 12 owe thanks to Tom Green and Mike Oliker. For comments on drafts, Jonathan Adler would like to thank Catherine Z. Elgin and Randall Curren (chapter 20). Mark Steiner would like to thank Carl Posy for pointing out errors, Stanley Ocken for corrections and help with the section on “logical applications,” and Shmuel Weinberger for help with applications of topology (chapter 25). Amy Gutmann thanks Robert Fullinwider, who suggested the trilogy of aims possessed by educational authorities invoked at the opening of chapter 28. Christian Barry would like to thank Randall Curren, Joanna Piciotto, and Kate Raworth for comments on drafts, and Sidney Morgenbesser, Thomas Pogge, and Amartya Sen for instructive conversations on the themes of chapter 32. Jeff Spiner-Halev deserves thanks for supplying references and material on multiculturalism in recent political philosophy, for chapter 34. Robert Ladenson would like to thank, for their “generous and valuable” comments on drafts, Randall Curren, Michael Davis, Richard Eldridge, Bernard Gert, Roger Gilman, Owen Goldin, Austin Lewis, Martin Malin, Stephen Nathanson, Fay Sawier, Francis Schrag, and Ujjval Vyas. He also wishes to thank the Illinois Institute of Technology for a sabbatical leave in the fall of 2000, when his work leading to chapter 37 began, and the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University, which provided a stimulating and warmly collegial setting for the work. Minda Rae Amiran and I owe thanks to Amélie Rorty for formative advice and comments on the plan for chapter 39. Finally, Michael Davis would like to thank Louis Lombardi, Warren Schmaus, and Vivian Weil, as well as the audiences which responded to presentations of earlier versions of chapter 42.

Randall Curren
Rochester, New York
The philosophy of education has enjoyed a notable resurgence in recent years, a resurgence fueled in part by developments in related branches of practical philosophy, or philosophy that is concerned with the conduct and guidance of human affairs. Philosophy of education is a field that is nourished by and largely ancillary to political philosophy and ethics, and much of what is most admirable in philosophy of education pertains to the politics and ethics of education. This is only part of the truth, however. Public debates have been an important stimulus to philosophical examination of educational issues, other philosophical sub-disciplines provide vital foundations for philosophy of education, and the wealth of recent work on the history of philosophy – work that is both philosophically significant and seriously historical – has been salutary in documenting the wealth of attention to educational questions through much of the history of philosophy, and in retrieving forgotten but valuable ways of thinking about education. From the time of Socrates onward, philosophy’s claim to be a worthwhile enterprise has rested largely on its educative functions, and to flesh out this defense of philosophy (as Plato does in his dialogue the Gorgias, for instance) is inter alia to engage in philosophy of education.

Like other forms of normative inquiry concerned with distinct domains of practice, philosophy of education is shaped not only by the philosophical problems and resources it brings to its domain, but by the practical problems and perplexities intrinsic to that domain. Issues of authority, liberty, responsibility, justice, equality, and professional ethics are common to the various branches of practical philosophy, but philosophy of education must grapple with normatively significant features of and developments in the world of education, just as bioethics must grapple with normatively significant features of and developments in the world of medicine and biomedical research. The shortcomings and strengths of educational practices, policies, proposals, and theories are grist for the philosopher of education’s mill. So while it is true that philosophy of education has benefited from the fact that political philosophy has recently begun to address questions about children that had been long neglected, philosophy of education has also benefited from the fact that some of the prominent public debates about education in recent years, including debates about parental choice in education, public support for religious schools, and the accommodation of students with disabilities, have been good candidates for philosophical inquiry.
Philosophy of education is also like other branches of practical philosophy in requiring serious engagement with the facts about its domain. Progress depends, as it does in any field of practical philosophy, on getting the facts right and developing conceptual frameworks adequate to the specific phenomena and institutional contexts in question. As it happens, the facts about education are dauntingly complex and elusive, and are also in some respects the concern of other philosophical sub-disciplines. Hence, although philosophy of education was integral to moral and political philosophy through much of the history of philosophy (the point of ethics being, in the view of Aristotle and others, not just to know what virtue is, but to possess and exercise it), it has also been associated with epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. This should not be surprising. Knowledge is a goal of education and the primary object of epistemological inquiry. Learning, understanding, remembering, thinking, and reasoning are mental phenomena that epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of psychology have been concerned with. Teaching is, among other things, a form of communication that relies upon language and shapes the language acquisition and language patterns of learners. It is thus not far removed from phenomena that philosophy of language and cognitive science are legitimately concerned with.

The present situation is admittedly quite different from that faced by Plato, Aristotle, Locke, or Rousseau, however. Philosophical accounts of human nature and the mind have been significantly displaced by scientific inquiry – displaced enough that one cannot pretend to have a serious philosophical account of such things without thoroughly mastering and in some way accommodating, contributing to, or cogently critiquing the relevant science. The demands inherent in this, especially in the decades since the displacement of behaviorist psychology by cognitive science, no doubt explain the decline in recent years of philosophy of education that is directly engaged with learning theory and topics associated with it. Nevertheless, some legitimate philosophical tasks remain even here. Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary enterprise to which philosophers have made substantial contributions, and it is certainly possible that they might do so in a way that sheds light on learning and instruction. Quite apart from this, however, there are conceptual and synthetic aspects of educational theory that fall within the purview of philosophy. Educational theory aspires to provide a systematic body of principles generated, tested, and justified by practical success as much as through research in the disciplines, and philosophy can play several roles in this enterprise.

Because educational theories are necessarily transdisciplinary, any approximation to a systematic theory of education will outstrip the resources of any one discipline. However, philosophy seems to be better equipped than other disciplines to undertake the conceptual and synthetic work necessary to the construction of a transdisciplinary practical theory. Philosophy is unlike other disciplines in engaging in rigorous normative inquiry, and in concerning itself with the nature and structure of theories as such. Inasmuch as a theory of education is a practical theory, aiming to guide educational practice, it has essential normative components: what are the educational aims to which the lessons of empirical investigation and educational experience will be harnessed, and what are the normative constraints on the manner, content, circumstances, and distribution of education? Philosophy is uniquely equipped to secure these normative components of educational theory, and it is important that
INTRODUCTION

it do so. It is also well suited to theoretical synthesis and critique. The role of philosophical synthesis is illustrated by constructivism, the currently reigning example of a unified theory of education, which grew out of psychological theories of learning and instruction, but is rich in philosophical content and inferences. The examination of the philosophical content and inferences in such theories is a more manageable task than the construction of better theories, but these critical and constructive tasks are both feasible and desirable philosophical enterprises. Educational theory is no more empirical than normative – no more the province of science than philosophy – and a well trained philosopher is at least as well attuned to the architecture and adequacy of action-guiding theories as a well trained scientist is. On a smaller scale, there are more specific aspects of educational practice that are only marginally informed by the sciences and can be usefully informed by philosophical analysis. For instance, there are aspects of educational measurement, such as the testing of critical thinking, to which philosophers are making substantial contributions.

A final vital task for philosophy of education in evidence in this volume is to bring a philosophical grasp of the disciplines and arts to bear on the teaching of those disciplines and arts. The philosophies of science, mathematics, and other disciplines are concerned with the nature and structure of science, mathematics, and other disciplines as forms of inquiry and bodies of knowledge. In order to teach a subject with sensitivity to its epistemic structure, teachers must grasp and be guided by the same kind of understanding that philosophers seek – a secure, if nontechnical, sense of the methods of discovery and investigation, of the methods and logic of confirmation, and of the forms of explanation and theory that define their subject as a mode of inquiry. Moreover, they must attend to these aspects of their subjects both in teaching and in evaluating their students. Teachers of the arts would benefit similarly from a philosophical grasp of the communicative and educative capacities of the arts.

This volume is organized into four parts: Historical and Contemporary Movements, Teaching and Learning, The Politics and Ethics of Schooling, and Higher Education. The intent of the first of these parts is not to provide an exhaustive survey of philosophers of education and philosophical treatments of educational questions, which would be impossible in a single volume of this size. The aim, rather, is to provide a historically accurate and philosophically engaging introduction to the major movements and traditions that have most shaped and continue to shape educational thought. The remaining parts aim to provide a similarly accurate and engaging introduction to the major topics in educational theory, policy, and practice that are amenable to philosophical investigation. They divide the field in the way that seems most natural, given the foregoing observations and the distinctness of many issues pertaining to higher education. Other organizational structures might have served equally well, however, and there are many points of contact between topics in different parts. It should be noted in particular that the chapters on teaching and learning are not exclusively concerned with primary and secondary education; the topics addressed in them generally cut across all levels of education.

The resurgence of work in philosophy of education in recent years has not been confined to philosophers working in departments of philosophy and schools and departments of education. It has also been the product of philosophers and other scholars working in political science departments, law schools, humanities programs,
and elsewhere. This volume is the first of its kind in attempting to bring together the best of all of this work, and in doing so it should serve to make the field of philosophy of education more transparent to its disparate and scattered practitioners, and thereby more easy to teach, to learn, and to advance. It also brings this work together in a way that is both retrospective and forward looking. Some of the topics addressed here have been widely discussed for years, but others, though ripe for philosophical investigation, have received relatively little attention. A synthesis of this kind will have fulfilled its function if it not only provides a serviceable resource and handbook of its field, but also serves as a stimulus to further work.
Part I

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS
Slave or free? Citizen or foreign? Rich or poor? Male or female? These questions largely determined the course of one's education (paideia) — as of one's life — in ancient Athens. Slaves, whether the children of slaves or war captives, were excluded from the gymnasia and wrestling schools (palaistrai) which prepared young males for future citizenship. The only training they received was in their domestic duties, which might include attending something like a cooking school, or in the art or craft (techne) of their master or someone else, or in what we now refer to as the sex industry — prostitution was legal in Athens. Unless their art or craft required it or they were paidagogoi, who accompanied their master's sons to school and sat with them through the lessons, slaves did not learn to read or write.

Crafts were not the exclusive prerogatives of slaves, however. Poorer citizens as well as free foreigners worked as craftsmen. And their sons typically received an elementary education in mousike and gymnastike (described below) before being apprenticed in their father's workshop. Though training in a craft was not thought of as education in the strict sense, some knowledge of crafts such as medicine was considered — at least by some theorists — to be part of the repertoire of a well educated citizen.

After the creation of the Athenian polis (city, city-state) in the late seventh century BCE, free women spent their time at home. There they learned to spin, cook, take care of children, and manage the household. No schools were provided for women and, even in the Hellenistic period, illiteracy rates were higher among them than among men. Nonetheless, some women were well educated. Aspasia, the Milesian-born mistress of Pericles, is said to have taught rhetoric and to have had discussions with Socrates, and both Plato and Epicurus, as well as earlier Pythagoreans, are known to have admitted women into their schools.

For the first few years a boy was looked after by his mother or nurse (usually a slave). He played games and listened to stories based on traditional myths. Later he received elementary education, typically at the hands of three different teachers. The paidotribēs taught gymnastics, games, and general physical fitness, usually in the palestra. The kitharistēs taught music, lyric poetry, and song. The grammastēs
taught reading, writing, mathematics, and literature. Here a boy learned Homer and Hesiod by heart, not just for their beauty and cultural importance, but as a way of acquiring Greek moral values. Frequent public competitions in athletics, dance, music, recitation — often coinciding with religious festivals — provided an opportunity for both the exhibition of skill and its evaluation by adults.

By the mid-fourth century BCE, and probably earlier, Athens required the legitimate sons of Athenian citizens of all classes to undergo two years of compulsory, state-sponsored, military training (ephebeia), beginning at age eighteen (see Plato, Republic). This was supervised by a kosmētēs and by ten (later twelve) sōphronistai, one from each Athenian tribe. In the first year, it consisted of physical training and technical weapons instruction conducted in a barracks in Piraeus. In the second year, ephebol served at the frontier posts of Attica. From the third century BCE, with the decreased significance of citizen militia, intellectual training in philosophy, literature, rhetoric, and music came to play an increasing role in the ephebeia.

From puberty (which probably occurred quite late in the ancient world) until he grew a full beard, an adolescent Athenian male was sexually pursued by older males. This paiderastaia, as it was called, was supposed to provide sexual pleasure for the older male (erastēs) and an education in male virtue, but no sexual pleasure, for his "boy" (pais, eromenos). When the boy grew to manhood, he was supposed to become an erastēs in turn and cease to play the role of an erōmenos. The symposium, or drinking party, was a locus both for the transmission of traditional values and for male homosexual bonding. Its political and educational significance — somewhat strange to us — is manifest in the attention paid to it by Plato in his Protagoras and Laws.

By the late fifth century BCE, it was possible for Athenians to acquire further education by attending the lectures, or listening to the conversations, of a group of itinerant "professors," the sophists. Though not organizationally, doctrinally, or methodologically a school of any sort, the sophists tended to be pragmatic, naturalistic, humanistic, agnostic in religious matters, and relativistic (in some sense) in ethical ones. The sophists popularized Ionian natural philosophy (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus), taught history, geography, and anthropology, and pioneered the systematic study of language, including techniques of argument and persuasion, grammar, literary criticism, and semantics. As a consequence, they were seen as potentially subversive of traditional values, especially by more conservative citizens.

Socrates (470/69–399 BCE)

Socrates was the son of Phaenarete, a midwife, and Sophroniscus, a stone-carver. In Plato's Euthyphro (11b), he traces his ancestry to the mythical sculptor Daedalus, so it may be that he too practiced his father's craft early in life. He served as a hoplite (heavily armored infantryman) in the Athenian army during the Peloponnesian War with Sparta, where he gained attention for his courage, his capacity to tolerate hunger, thirst, and cold, and powers of concentration that could keep him rooted to the spot for hours on end. Since hoplites had to own property and provide their own weapons, Socrates cannot have been very poor. Still, he seems to have been
exceptionally frugal in his habits. He often went barefoot, seldom bathed, and wore the same thin cloak winter and summer. In a society that worshipped male beauty, he was noteworthy for his ugliness. He had a snub-nose, bulging eyes, thick lips, and a pot belly. Yet his personal magnetism was such that many of the best looking young men avidly sought out his company. In Plato’s Symposium, indeed, he characterizes himself as a master of the art of erotic attraction (ta erotika), though that characterization no doubt involves some ironic punning, since the verb erotan means to ask questions.

In 406 BCE, Socrates served on the steering committee (prytaneis) of the Athenian Assembly, where he alone voted against an illegal motion to try as a group the generals who had failed to pick up the bodies of the dead after the sea battle at Arginusae. Later, at the risk of his own life, he disobeyed the unjust order of the Thirty Tyrants to bring in Leon of Salamis for execution.

In 423 BCE, he was made the subject of Aristophanes’ comedy, Clouds, as he was of other non-extant comedies by other authors, including Amphisias and Eupolis. In Clouds, he appears: first, as the head of the phrontisterion, a school where, for a small fee, one can learn the just logic, which represents traditional aristocratic values, and also the unjust logic, which represents the new values of the sophists; second, as the ascetic high priest of a mystery religion, who teaches a variety of sciences, including a mechanistic theory of the cosmos, on the basis of which he denies the existence of Zeus and the other gods of tradition, worshipping in their place the various forms of Air, including the eponymous Clouds. It is not much of a reach to conclude that Socrates must have looked enough like other sophists to lend popular credibility to Aristophanes’ portrait.

In any case, he was brought to trial in 399 BCE on a charge of corrupting the youth by teaching them not to believe in the gods, found guilty (in large part, he claims, because of the prejudice against him fanned by Aristophanes), and condemned by a close vote to death by hemlock poisoning. Central, it seems, to the prosecution’s case was one of the most puzzling aspects of Socrates: his daimonion or spiritual voice, which held him back whenever he was about to do something wrong. Though this may, in fact, have been no different from other acceptable forms of religious practice, in someone already suspected of being an atheistic sophist, it no doubt seemed – or could be made to seem – much more sinister and subversive.

Socrates’ personal characteristics played, and continue to play, a very significant role in attracting devotees to him. He demonstrates – what every teacher knows – that charisma can be as important as content. If Socrates hadn’t been erotikos, if he hadn’t had that certain compelling something, who would have listened to what he had to say? As it is, however, many listened. And since Socrates himself wrote nothing, it is to those who did that we must turn for information. The problem is that some of the writings of those who knew him – Antisthenes, Phaedo of Elis, Eucleides of Megara, Aristippus of Cyrene, Aeschines of Sphettos – have disappeared or exist only in very fragmentary form, while others that we do possess – those of Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon – present us with very different portraits. Moreover, Plato’s own portrait is a double one, at least: the Socrates of his early dialogues (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus) is thought to be based to some extent on the historical figure (they are often called “Socratic”
dialogues for this reason). The Socrates who appears in his transitional (Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras), middle (Cratylus, Parmenides, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium, Theaetetus), and some of his late (Critias, Philebus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Laws, Seventh Letter) dialogues, however, seems to be increasingly a mouth-piece for his own developing doctrines. When we look at Socrates, therefore, we are perforce looking at many potentially different figures. For some were influenced by the historical Socrates, some by portrayals of him only some of which we know, some more by the man and his character, and some more by his specific doctrines.

Nonetheless, a few significant ideas come close to being the common property of these different figures: (1) knowledge or theory (logos) is important for virtue; (2) virtue is important for happiness; (3) the sort of self-mastery (enkrateia), self-sufficiency (autarkia), and moral toughness (karteria) exhibited by Socrates with regard to pleasures and pains is important for happiness; (4) the use of questioning based on epagōgē (induction, arguing from parallel cases) is important with regard to the possession of knowledge, and so of virtue; (5) erōs and friendship have important roles to play in philosophy, and philosophy in life; (6) the traditional teachers of virtue (the poets), as well as the alleged embodiments of wisdom (the politicians), are deficient in various ways that questioning reveals.

These ideas are vague, of course, and so can be understood in various ways. Socrates could hardly have influenced Cynics, Cyrenaics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics had it been otherwise. Important as these developments are, however, they are overshadowed by the decisive role Socrates played in Plato's thought and, via it, in Aristotle's.

Plato (428–347/8 BCE)

While Plato was still a boy, his father, Ariston, died and his mother, Perictione, married a friend of the great Athenian statesman Pericles. Plato was thus familiar with Athenian politics from childhood and was expected to take up a political career himself. Horrified by actual political events, however, especially the execution of Socrates in 399 BCE, he turned instead to philosophy, thinking that only education in it could rescue mankind from civil war and political upheaval, and provide a sound foundation for ethics and politics (Seventh Letter, 324b–326b). It was with Socrates, then, that our Plato began.

As represented in the early dialogues, Socratic philosophy consists almost exclusively in questioning people about the conventionally recognized ethical virtues. “What is justice?” he asks, “Or piety? Or courage? Or wisdom?” Moreover, he takes for granted that there are correct answers to these questions, that each virtue is some definite characteristic or form (eidōs, idea). And though he does not discuss the nature of these forms, or develop any explicit theory of them or our knowledge of them, he does claim that only they can serve as reliable standards for judging whether any given type of action is an instance of a virtue, and that they can be captured in explicit definitions (Euthyphro, 6d–e; Charmides, 158e–159a).

Socrates' interest in definitions of the virtues, Aristotle tells us, resulted from thinking of them as ethical first principles (Metaphysics, 1078b12–32). That is why,