Introduction
Chronology
Design and Development
Technical Specifications
The Combatants
The Strategic Situation
Combat: Duel at Stonne
Statistics and Analysis
Further Reading
The Battle of France in May–June 1940 was the first military campaign to see large-scale tank-vs.-tank fighting. Only a handful of tank-vs.-tank clashes had occurred in World War I, and they were rare during both the Spanish Civil War and the Poland campaign of 1939 as well. The Battle of France was also the first campaign to see the use of armored divisions by both sides. This book examines the clashes between two of the best tanks of the 1940 French campaign, the French Char B1 bis and the German PzKpfw IV.
Tanks had emerged from World War I as an important, but flawed, innovation. Advances in firepower such as the machine gun and long-range artillery were better used as defensive weapons and led to the stagnation and horrors of trench warfare in 1914–18. The early tanks were a reincarnation of medieval siege engines, fragile but powerful weapons capable of cracking open a fortified trench line. The big question in the interwar years was whether tanks could help restore the battlefield balance by challenging the murderous firepower of the defense with enough mobility and armored protection to sustain offensive missions. The answer was by no means clear because early tanks were not durable enough to conduct operations for much more than a day or two before breaking down, becoming trapped in trenches, or exhausting their fuel supply. Tank technology improved in the 1920s and early 1930s, but the French Army remained saddled with its rusting Great War tanks. Their dismal automotive performance poisoned the attitudes of many French commanders to the potential of tanks beyond their limited role as infantry support weapons.
In Germany, the Kaiser’s army had been unenthusiastic about tanks in World War I and had the smallest armored force of the Great Powers. The Versailles treaty banned tanks from the postwar Reichswehr but the ban had perverse consequences. Germany was not burdened with archaic tanks that might discourage army interest in mechanization. By explicitly banning tanks, the Allies merely convinced the Germans that the forbidden must be very desirable. Even relatively conservative German officers saw a necessity to acquire tanks as soon as possible to assuage this affront to the German Army’s honor. Between the end of the war in 1918 and Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the German attitude towards tanks completely reversed, and the German Army began to emerge as an enthusiastic proponent of armored warfare.
Some far-sighted German officers saw the tank as more than a mere technical innovation, but as the seed for a revolution in warfare, shifting the balance back to the offensive in place of the defensive stagnation of World War I. The panzers were the steel core of a more elaborate effort at combined-arms mechanization and the panzer divisions included a balanced mix of tanks, mechanized infantry, and motorized artillery. The panzer divisions saw their vindication in Poland in September 1939, but it was one thing to defeat the outnumbered Poles and another thing to take on the vaunted French Army.
The French Army regarded the tank as a vital element in its doctrine of methodical battle. French doctrine was preoccupied with the lessons of World War I, convinced that the infantry needed a steel backbone of tank support to survive against the deadly firepower of the modern battlefield. The majority of French tanks were committed to the mission of infantry accompaniment. At the same time, the French recognized the need for mobile forces to carry out other missions. The tank offered a mechanized alternative to the horse for the traditional cavalry missions of reconnaissance and exploitation. As a result, the French devoted about a quarter of their tank force to this mission. These light mechanized divisions (DLM) were the closest French equivalent to the German panzer divisions, but they were far fewer in number in 1940: only three divisions compared to ten German panzer divisions. The French also saw the need for a heavily armored shock force to support the advance of the infantry, but there was no consensus until the German demonstration of panzer divisions in Poland in 1939. In early 1940, the French Army began consolidating their new Char B1 bis tank battalions into their own embryonic armored divisions (DCr). The French armored divisions were much smaller than their German counterparts and were not a well-balanced combined arms force. They were especially weak in motorized infantry. However, their main flaw was not organizational but chronological. They were created too late to undergo proper training; only two were fully organized by May 1940, and they lacked the practical experience of their German opponents.
Like the Tiger tank later in the war, in 1940 the Char B1 bis was largely invulnerable to most enemy anti-tank weapons of the time. “Jeanne d’Arc” (no. 425) of the 1/47e BCC attacked a German bridgehead at Doudelainville, southwest of Abbeville, in the late afternoon of May 28, 1940. Under the command of Capt. Dirand, the tank destroyed two German 37mm anti-tank guns with its 75mm gun, but had that gun put out of action when a round struck inside the 75mm barrel. It continued its attack using its machine guns. Near Croisettes, it came under intense fire from numerous weapons of various calibers but the rounds bounced off its thick armor. It crushed several German guns under its tracks. It was finally hit on the left side by a heavy caliber gun, probably an 88mm, and put out of action. It received over 90 hits in two hours of fighting and destroyed about a dozen guns and two armored cars. (Patton Museum)
The PzKpfw IV was weakly armored and its firepower was inadequate against contemporary French tanks. However, it had a reliable and robust design that would become the workhorse of the Wehrmacht later in the war after being modernized and improved. This is a PzKpfw IV Ausf. D of Pz.Rgt.9, 10.Panzer Division on exercise in April 1940 at the Baumholder training grounds. (NARA)
The German Army in 1940 enjoyed significant tactical and organizational advantages over their French opponents, particularly in the areas of training and experience. However, the French Army held a slight edge in the number of tanks, and in many cases had better tanks. The Char B1 bis tank was the most powerful of its era. Not only was it armed with an impressive combination of both a 75mm gun and an excellent 47mm gun, but its thick armor was nearly impervious to German tank and anti-tank guns. The Char B1 bis’ main weakness was an awkward design that can be traced back to its premature genesis in 1920. The PzKpfw IV was a robust and sound design, but like most German tanks of the era, it was weakly armored since the Wehrmacht favored speed and surprise over firepower and defense. It was designed to support the PzKpfw III main battle tank with high-explosive firepower, so its short 75mm gun was not effective in tank fighting. In spite of the technological imbalance in favor of the French, the German panzer units prevailed in most of the major tank engagements of the campaign.
The focus of this book is the combat duel at Stonne which pitted the PzKpfw IV tanks of Pz.Rgt.8, 10.Panzer Division against the two Char B1 bis battalions of the 3e DCr. The battle of Stonne was compared by one German officer to Stalingrad and Monte Cassino in its ferocity; it was grimly called the “Verdun of 1940” by German and French veterans alike.
January 1920 | Development of Char B battle tank begins. |
May 1924 | Delivery of prototypes of Char B. |
March 1929 | Delivery of Renault prototype for Char B1. |
1930 | Begleitwagen prototypes completed by Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krupp. |
April 1934 | Production contract for Char B1. |
1935 | Development contract for engineering development of Begleitwagen awarded to Krupp. |
Summer 1935 | First panzer division begins formation at Munster. |
December 1935 | First Char B1 series-production tank delivered. |
October 1936 | Production contract for Char B1 bis. |
February 1937 | First Char B1 bis series-production tank delivered. |
Autumn 1937 | Production of Panzerkampfwagen IV begins. |
1938 |
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January | First three PzKpfw IV Ausf. issued to troops. |
January 20 | First Char B1 battalion declared operational. |
April | Production of PzKpfw IV Ausf. B begins. |
May | Production contract for 35 PzKpfw IV Ausf. A completed. |
September | Production contract for 42 PzKpfw IV Ausf. B completed; production of PzKpfw IV Ausf. C begins. |
September 30 | First Char B1 bis battalion declared operational. |
1939 |
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August | Production contract for 134 PzKpfw IV Ausf. C completed. |
September 1 | Germany invades Poland starting World War II in Europe. |
September | French Army begins forming first Demi-brigade Lourde with Char B1 bis tanks. |
October | Production of PzKpfw IV Ausf. D begins. |
1940 |
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January | French Army begins formation of first two Division Cuirasée. |
May 10 | Wehrmacht initiates Fall Gelb, the plan for the invasion of France. |
May 13 | Panzergruppe Kliest reaches the Meuse river and begins crossings. |
May 14 | French Army’s first counterattack of Meuse bridgehead near Sedan by the 55e DI fails. |
May 15 | 10.Panzer Division and the French XXI Corps begin battle A for Stonne. |
May 17 | After two days of intense tank fighting around Stonne, both sides pull away their tank units for other missions and substitute infantry divisions. |
June 21 | Armistice signed ending the French campaign. |
Although the Char B1 bis was the most powerful tank on the 1940 battlefield, in some respects it was among the more archaic. The awkward design of the Char B1 bis was due to the rapid evolution of tank technology and tank tactics during its two decades of gestation. In January 1920, the French war ministry set up a commission, under Gén. Buat, to determine the need for future tanks. The father of the French tank force in World War I, Gén. Jean-Baptiste Estienne, sought a new 15-ton tank design that would bridge the gap between the Renault FT light tank and the monstrous FCM 2C breakthrough tank. The tactical imperative for the char de bataille, or “battle tank,” was that it would have enough armor to resist enemy field guns of the type encountered in the 1918 fighting; have the firepower to destroy typical defensive field works; have the mobility to surmount trenches and battlefield obstructions; and have the speed to penetrate enemy defenses. Estienne turned to a group of five French manufacturers for their concepts, and prototypes were delivered in May 1924. After trials lasting through March 1925, Estienne isolated the best features from each design, but strongly favored features of the Renault and FCM (Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée). It was at this stage that the Char B received its most dubious feature, a hull-mounted 75mm gun. It is unclear why the design called for this awkward addition considering that the Renault FT of 1917 had already proved the value of a turreted gun, and that FCM had already designed two tanks, the Char 1A and Char 2C, with large-caliber guns in their turrets.
The original production batch of Char B1 tanks served with the 511e RCC and, as seen here, were a popular spectacle on the Champs Elysées at the Bastille Day parades in Paris in 1938–39. Although the Char B1 tanks were retired prior to the France campaign, many were returned to service in ad-hoc companies in the spring of 1940, often rearmed with the 47mm SA 35 gun. This one, “Dunquerque” (no. 111), was attached to the 347e CACC and was destroyed during the fighting at Neuvy-sur-Loeilly on June 6, 1940. (NARA)
After tests, another round of prototypes were then ordered from Renault, FAMH (Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt/St. Chamond) and FCM in March 1927. The first was delivered by Renault in March 1929 and early tests led to a decision to change the specifications on the remaining two pilots. These differed by requiring a 47mm gun in the turret instead of machine guns, and the armor basis was increased from 25mm to 40mm. What had started as a 13 metric ton tank had evolved into a 22-ton design with much more powerful armament.
One of the primary impediments in the development of the Char B was a lack of consensus over the tactical role of this tank. Although the Army retained a tank inspectorate after the 1918 armistice, it was subordinated to the infantry branch instead of the artillery branch which had been responsible for the “artillerie speciale” during the Great War. The infantry had a clear understanding of its requirements for an infantry accompanying tank, but the mission and technical characteristics for a battle tank remained unsettled. About the only area of design where there was a clear consensus was in the realm of armor protection. In contrast to the German preference for mobility at the expense of armor, the French Army clearly sought the best protection possible on its battle tank at the expense of mobility.
The Char B bore a certain resemblance to British Landships of the Great War with flat plate tracks running around the entire length and height of the hull. The main gun in the hull was a short 75mm weapon developed by Ateliers de Bourges (ABS) from the Mle. 31 fortress gun. It was primarily intended for attacking field works, bunkers and other targets because tank-vs.-tank fighting in World War I had been so rare; indeed there were no known instances of French tanks encountering German tanks in 1917–18. The 75mm gun was poorly suited to tank fighting due to its location and peculiar traverse system. Instead of using a dedicated gunner, the gun was traversed in azimuth using the sophisticated Naeder hydrostatic driving controls and aimed using a stereoscopic sight by the driver. While technically clever, this overly complicated configuration proved most unfortunate in actual service use.
The initial production was awarded for the Char B1 on April 6, 1934, and aside from the three prototypes, a total of 32 series-production tanks were built by Renault and FCM through April 1935, some 15 years after the design had begun. This differed from the German Pzkpfw IV where the archaic Großtraktor was abandoned for the more modern PzKpfw IV. However, the French Army had invested so much time and money in the Char B that it remained the focus of its battle tank program in spite of its many antiquated features. The archaic design was not rejected for a more modern configuration because of the lack of any strong doctrinal influence from the Army. In the German case, the advent of the panzer divisions provided a clearer direction for the technical features needed for a modern battle tank, while in the French case, the continuing lack of consensus about the need for armored divisions created a doctrinal vacuum that provided no clear directions to the tank industry.