INTRODUCTION
THE DIVISIONS: 6. SS-GEBIRGS-DIVISION NORD
7. SS-FREIWILLIGEN GEBIRGS DIVISION PRINZ EUGEN
8. SS-KAVALLERIE DIVISION FLORIAN GEYER
9. SS-PANZER DIVISION HOHENSTAUFEN
10. SS-PANZER DIVISION FRUNDSBERG
THE PLATES
THERE IS NO SPACE in these pages to attempt a summary of the complex early history of the German NSDAP (National Socialist) movement in the 1920s and 1930s; nor of the emergence from the Nazi Party’s mass uniformed organisation, the SA (Sturmabteilungen or ‘Brownshirts’) of the SS political security organisation (Schutz Staffeln or ‘protection squads’) headed by Heinrich Himmler.1 The first title in this sequence, MAA 401, The Waffen-SS (1): 1. to 5. Divisions, gives brief introductory notes up to 1939, by which time the original few battalions of armed gendarmerie which had carried out Hitler’s 1934 purge of the SA were poised to play a role on the battlefield. The armed units of what were then termed the SS-Verfügungstruppe were still few and militarily insignificant, and regarded by the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) with some suspicion, even disdain. Early combat experience in the West, and particularly in the first year of the Russian campaign, changed that perception, leading to a number of different cycles of expansion of what was now the Waffen-SS.
By 1943 the battle-proven premier divisions, converted to the armoured and mechanized role, would have earned the Waffen-SS priority for the best quality manpower and equipment; but initially Himmler was not allowed to compete openly with the Wehrmacht for conscripted recruits. For the first expansion of 1939–42 he was obliged to create new units by conversion of other sources of SS manpower, some of them of poor quality (see notes on the SS-Totenkopfstandarten in MAA 401). This was soon followed by the first admissions of foreign volunteers of suitably ‘Aryan’ racial background, and by experiments with recruitment from among ‘Volksdeutsche’ – ethnic Germans living outside Germany. Himmler’s mystical obsession with imagined racial purity would soon give way in the face of the ever increasing demand for manpower to replace the mounting casualties on the Eastern Front.
By 1943 Hitler’s relationship with the traditional leadership of the Wehrmacht had deteriorated sharply, and the unquestioningly loyal SS was in the ascendant. The previous limitations on recruitment were abandoned, and between early 1943 and spring 1945 the ostensible order of battle of the Waffen-SS grew from eight to no fewer than 38 divisions ‘on paper’ – although many of the higher numbered (mostly foreign) formations fell far below the standards set by the early divisions. A number of corps-level formations, and even one or two nominal ‘SS armies’ containing both SS and Army units, would see action in 1944–45. The divisions covered in this present title span the period from the 1941–42 conversions and experiments, to the formation of the ‘second generation’ of élite armoured divisions in early 1943.
The Waffen-SS as a whole earned a dual reputation: for remarkable aggression and stamina in combat, and for murderous atrocity against civilians and prisoners. This series of Men-at-Arms titles will concern itself solely with brief, factual organisation and campaign histories of the separate divisions, and the evolving uniforms, insignia and personal equipment of their officers and men.
General explanations of Waffen-SS rank structure and titles, and of universal uniform and insignia practice, are given in MAA 401, and are not repeated here.
1 See MAA 220, The SA 1921–45; and MAA 266, The Allgemeine-SS.
February 1941 | SS-Kampfgruppe Nord |
September 1941 | SS-Division Nord (mot.) |
May 1942 | SS-Gebirgs-Division Nord |
October 1943 | 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division Nord |
Feb–May 1941 SS-Brigadeführer Richard Herrmann; May 41–Apr 1942 SS-Brigadeführer Karl-Maria Demelhuber; Apr 1942, & June 1942–Oct 1943 SS-Brigadeführer Matthias Kleinheisterkamp; Apr–Jun 1942 SS-Oberführer Hans Scheider; Oct 1943 SS-Gruppenführer Lothar Debes; Oct 1943–Aug 1944 SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Kruger; Aug 1944 SS-Brigadeführer Gustav Lombard; Sept 1944–Apr 1945 SS-Gruppenführer Karl Brenner; Apr–May 1945 SS-Standarten-führer Franz Schreiber
SS-Gebirgsjäger Regiment 11 Reinhard Heydrich; SS-Gebirgsjäger Regiment 12 Michael Gaissmair; SS-Schutzen Abteilung (mot) 6; SS-Gebirgs Panzerjäger Abteilung 6; SS-Sturmgeschütz Batterie 6; SS-Gebirgs-Artillerie Regiment 6; SS-Flak Abteilung 6; SS-Gebirgs Aufklärungs Abteilung (mot) 6; SS-Gebirgs Pionier Abteilung 6. Also attached SS-Polizei Gebirgsjäger Regiment 18; SS-Schijäger Bataillon 502 Norge; SS- og Politikompani (Norwegian Police Companies – Nr 2 in 1943, Nr 3 in 1944 – served alongside SchiJr Btl)
This division had its origins in February 1941, when a number of SS-Totenkopf regiments were transferred to Norway for garrison duty. These were mostly Allgemeine-SS reservists of military service age. Subsequently, SS-Kampfgruppe Nord (mot.) was formed, from SS-Totenkopfstandarten (redesignated as SS-Totenkopf Infanterie Regimenter) 6 and 7 and a number of other units. This new battle group was attached to XXXVI Korps of Heeresgruppe Nord, to participate in Unternehmen ‘Silberfuchs’ (Operation ‘Silver Fox’), intended to secure the liberation of Karelia – a region of Finland occupied by Soviet forces – and subsequently to take part in the invasion of the northern USSR. However, the ‘battlegroup’ had woefully inadequate training and preparation for combat, and would consequently suffer heavy casualties. Many of its gunners had had no opportunity to practise live firing; there had been no combined training of the infantry and artillery units; the strength and quality of the transport was low, and there were insufficient infantry support weapons. The brigade was not a cohesive force but rather a collection of disparate and inadequately equipped units, many of its officers and men hardly trained even in basic military skills.
On 6 June 1941 it was ordered to the Rovaniemi area of Finland. The Kampfgruppe had only recently concentrated near Kirkenes, and had to march the length of the Arctic Ocean Highway from Kirkenes on the Arctic Ocean to Rovaniemi not far from the Baltic coast. By 10 June its forward elements had reached their destination, but other units straggled in over a period of a week or so. Elements began moving towards the Soviet frontier near Salla on 17 June. On 24 June the order to advance finally arrived, the attack itself being further delayed until 1 July.
Nord was tasked with making a frontal attack on heavily defended enemy positions in front of Salla, as part of an attempt to cut a main railway line and isolate Soviet troops in the Kola Peninsula. The brigade would be supported by an assault by 169. Infanterie Division on the northern flank, while Finnish infantry drove deep behind enemy lines towards Allakurtti from Nord’s southern flank. The SS troops were reinforced by the addition of the Army tank battalion Panzer Abteilung 40, and both Army artillery units and Stuka dive-bombers provided suppressive bombardment of Soviet positions prior to the assault. This softening-up barrage had only limited success; it did cause some damage to the enemy, but also started forest fires which severely hampered visibility and thus the subsequent artillery and air attacks. The advancing SS infantry were met by stubborn resistance and extremely heavy defensive fire; they were unable to advance far, and on 2 July the attack was called off. Nord had become badly scattered (although it should be mentioned that Army units on their northern flank fared little better).
Nord spent the next two days regrouping in preparation for a resumption of the attack; but in the early hours of 4 July the Red Army launched a counter-attack with armoured support. Although this was eventually beaten off by the Army and Finnish units on Nord’s flanks, reports that enemy tanks had broken through caused several companies of SS infantry to flee their positions. About a kilometre behind the line they met the Kradschutzen platoon on its way forward to check out the reports of enemy tanks. The motorcyclists were infected by the panic and, without checking further, reported that enemy armour had indeed broken through; as a result an entire regiment abandoned their positions, only being rallied when they reached the corps headquarters at Kelloselka.
It was intended to put the badly shaken troops into defensive positions while renewing the attack with other elements of both the SS-Totenkopf infantry regiments. Many of the latter simply got lost and failed to rendezvous; and the attack soon ran into heavy fire from enemy bunkers in the forest edge. The SS troops returned fire and eventually the enemy positions fell silent; but patrols sent out to confirm that they had been eliminated were unable to locate the concealed bunkers. Mistakenly assuming that they had been destroyed, the SS troops continued their advance, only to be brought under heavy fire while crossing open ground in front of the treeline. They were pinned down for several hours before being given authority to pull back. Over a period of nine days the battlegroup had lost 261 dead and 307 wounded (though they had taken over 250 enemy prisoners).
The lamentable performance of Kampfgruppe Nord was a direct result of their lack of training and inadequate leadership; the brigade had been thrown into battle to learn its craft the hard way, under fire, and against an extremely tough enemy. It was subsequently broken up into smaller sub-units which were subordinated to Finnish forces attacking Soviet positions at Kestenga. The battle-hardened Finns were aware of Nord’s inexperience at all levels, and took direct control of the SS regiments. This was to be the first and only time that Waffen-SS troops were placed under command of an allied army. By 20 August the units of Kampfgruppe Nord had lost a total of 1,085 men to a combination of enemy action and dysentery.
After retraining under the tutelage of Finnish infantry, the brigade was rebuilt with younger, fitter soldiers from the Waffen-SS replacement system, and SS-Totenkopf Infantry Regiment 9 was added. In September 1941 the Kampfgruppe was upgraded to divisional status, and all its fragmented sub-units were brought back under German command. While the original units remained in the line in Finland, January 1942 saw the formation of new elements at Wildflecken, which were trained as mountain infantry; they joined the former battlegroup – redesignated on 15 May as a mountain division – in Finland in August 1942.