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ORIGINS
DEVELOPMENT
USS LANGLEY (CV-1)
THE LEXINGTON CLASS (LEXINGTON (CV-2) AND SARATOGA (CV-3))
USS RANGER (CV-4)
THE YORKTOWN CLASS (YORKTOWN (CV-5), ENTERPRISE (CV-6), AND HORNET (CV-8))
THE WASP (CV-7)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
COLOR PLATE COMMENTARY
In 1910, the US Navy became the first to launch an aircraft from a ship when Eugene Ely piloted a floatplane off a wooden platform built on the cruiser USS Birmingham. In 1911, Ely became the first aviator to recover an aircraft aboard a warship when he landed on the armored cruiser Pennsylvania anchored in San Francisco Bay. Despite the fact that this landing had all the elements of what was to become standard procedure for landings aboard carriers, the US Navy did not follow up this initial lead in carrier technology. Instead, seaplanes were pursued because of their economy and the fact that they did not impede the operations of the launching ship’s guns. Experiments were begun into mounting catapults aboard large warships to support the use of seaplanes, but none were in service when the First World War began.
During the war, work continued on catapults. Successful catapult trials seemed to indicate that a major investment in aircraft carriers was unnecessary. The US entry into the First World War in 1917 caught the US Navy without a single carrier or ship dedicated to operating aircraft. By the end of the war, the Royal Navy had clearly established a lead in naval aviation and the US Navy had yet to begin the construction of a single carrier. Finally, fears of falling further behind the Royal Navy (which was already operating several carriers) and the realization that air supremacy was an essential part of modern naval operations compelled Congress to fund the conversion of a collier into an aircraft carrier in July 1919.
The initial role of US Navy carriers was to support the battle fleet. The battleship was still viewed after the First World War as the arbiter of naval power and the carrier’s role was to provide reconnaissance and spotting for the battle fleet while denying those advantages to the enemy. Use of aircraft to spot at long ranges exposed enemy ships to plunging fire against their weaker deck armor rather than their much stronger vertical armor. Such an advantage was viewed as decisive by the battleship admirals. Carriers were also expected to protect the air space over their own fleet, thus denying the enemy the advantages of long-range spotting and scouting.
The most famous of the prewar carriers was undoubtedly Enterprise. Here she is shown with her air group spotted on deck, en route to Pearl Harbor in October 1939.
The importance of striking the enemy’s carriers first, an essential element in prewar US Navy doctrine, was evidenced during the pivotal battle of Midway. Here Yorktown, with her strike group spotted on deck, prepares to attack the Japanese carrier force on June 4, 1942.
Another important mission for carrier aircraft in the aftermath of the First World War was antisubmarine patrol. Patrolling aircraft from carriers could keep enemy submarines submerged and, against a fast-moving force, a submerged diesel-electric submarine with a top speed of less than 10 knots was effectively neutralized.
Only gradually did the US Navy develop the carrier’s role as an independent offensive platform. The first carrier aircraft were unable to carry torpedoes large enough to cripple or sink a capital ship. Of course, bombs could be carried, but these posed no real threat to ships maneuvering at speed to avoid attack. However, in the 1920s, the offensive capability of carrier aircraft was greatly increased by the development of divebombing, which for the first time allowed maneuvering ships to be struck with some degree of accuracy. Capital ships with heavy deck armor were still immune from attack but carriers, with their unarmored flight decks, had now become very vulnerable.
Reflecting the premise that carriers could not withstand significant damage, US Navy doctrine increasingly separated the carriers from the battle fleet in order that they escape early detection and destruction by the enemy. The primary task of the carrier was now to destroy opposing carriers as soon as possible, thus preventing their own destruction, and to set the stage for intensive attack on the enemy battle fleet. To maximize the carrier’s striking power, standard US Navy doctrine called for the launch of an entire air group at one launch. In order that an entire “deck load” strike be launched quickly, it was necessary to have the entire strike spotted on the flight deck. Once flight operations had begun, it was imperative to keep elevator movements to a minimum, so strike operations were essentially limited to those aircraft spotted on the flight deck.
The continuing requirement to quickly generate maximum offensive power against enemy carriers affected US Navy carrier design. This meant that the developments and techniques necessary to quickly launch a full deck of aircraft were paramount. Open, unarmored hangars and the provision of catapults facilitated the quick launch of large numbers of aircraft. Doctrine called for most of the carrier’s aircraft to be parked on the flight deck with the hangar deck used for aircraft maintenance and storage. This practice and the design of US carriers meant that they operated larger air groups than their foreign contemporaries. The primacy of the needs of the aviators and the restrictions of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty drove all prewar carrier designs.
The US Navy’s prewar fears of the vulnerability of its carriers was largely accurate during at least the first year of the war. This photo shows the effect of a Japanese divebombing attack on Yorktown at Midway. A 550lb bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded inside the stack uptakes with the result being the intense black smoke seen here.
During flight operations, the carrier would turn into the wind and steam at full speed to launch aircraft. Aircraft could be launched either by means of a take-off roll or by catapult. As aircraft became heavier, the use of catapults became more important. Effective use of catapults allowed the quicker launch of a large strike and for heavier loads to be carried, but their widespread use did not occur until late in the Second World War. When a strike was being launched, the heaviest aircraft were spotted aft so that they would have a longer take-off roll. Lighter aircraft were spotted forward, often as far forward as amidships. Prewar doctrine also called for the launching of scout bombers from the hangar deck by use of catapults. This would not require any dislocation of the strike aircraft parked on deck.
When recovering aboard ship, aircraft returned over the stern where they would be caught by one of several arresting wires running across the aft portion of the carrier. Barriers would be rigged between the landing area and the bow of the ship where aircraft were parked after landing. All US prewar carriers had provision for recovering aircraft over the bow in case the aft part of the ship was damaged. For this contingency, there was a back-up set of arresting wires installed in the forward part of the ship.
Japanese torpedo planes proved to be the most potent weapon against US carriers in the early war period. Here a Japanese B5N torpedo plane (still carrying its weapon) breaks through Hornet’s screen in an attempt to torpedo the carrier during the battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942.
In the prewar period, and into the Second World War itself, the standard US carrier air group had four squadrons. One scouting squadron with the primary mission of finding enemy carriers was embarked. Spotting aircraft disappeared from the air group in the late 1920s, this mission being taken over by cruiser and battleship floatplanes. There was a single squadron of fighters. Strike aircraft included a squadron of dive bombers and a squadron of heavy strike aircraft that could be employed as torpedo or level bombers. Evolving tactics and aircraft technology resulted in adjustments to the air group through the 1930s, but the basic structure was little changed going into the Second World War. By 1938, the standard prewar carrier air group had four squadrons of some 18 aircraft each, with another three in reserve. The dive bomber squadron was retained, but the scout squadron was now equipped with scout bombers instead of the earlier spotting aircraft types. When more modern aircraft entered service, like the Douglas SBD Dauntless, both the dive bomber and scout squadrons were equipped with identical aircraft. Later, during the war, the scout squadrons were disbanded and combined with the divebombing squadron. The fighter squadron was retained and grew in size as the war unfolded. A fourth squadron remained equipped with torpedo bombers that could also operate as level bombers. This organization was standard for the larger carriers of the Lexington and Yorktown classes; the smaller Ranger and Wasp were designed without provision to support a torpedo squadron so, in its place, a second fighter squadron was embarked.
Prewar carriers each had a permanently assigned air group. Each of the four squadrons was numbered after the hull number of the ship it was assigned to. For example, Lexington’s fighter squadron was numbered VF-2, her dive bombers VB-2, her scout bombers VS-2 and her torpedo squadron VT-2. After July 1938, air groups were known by the name of the ship. Thus, the squadrons listed above comprised the Lexington