CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

MACV-SOG

RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

Finding the elusive SOG

TRAINING

One-Zero Course RT training

APPEARANCE

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Individual equipment Weapons

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

BELIEF AND BELONGING

ON CAMPAIGN

Mission preparation

EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE

Post-mission

AFTERMATH OF BATTLE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MACV-SOG RECONNAISSANCE TEAM IN VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1960s the insurgency in South Vietnam gradually escalated. While denying involvement, North Vietnam had long supported the insurgency with arms, munitions, supplies, and advisers. Some small North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units were operating in South Vietnam in support of the Viet Cong (VC), the military arm of the National Liberation Front, the outlawed South Vietnamese communist party.

While some of the troops and materials arrived in the south by crossing the demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel, which separated North and South Vietnam, and others by boat, by far the most were sent through Laos and Cambodia. This was accomplished via the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail, which North Vietnam had begun to develop in mid-1959. The North Vietnamese government issued a resolution changing its “political struggle” in the south to an “armed struggle.” At the end of 1964 the first NVA regiment marched down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and entered South Vietnam. Events escalated rapidly. In February 1965 the US authorized air attacks against North Vietnam. In March the first US Marine ground-combat troops arrived and the following month US troops were authorized to conduct offensive operations. In May the first US Army conventional ground-combat troops arrived and NVA divisions began deploying via the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Known as the Truong Son Road after the 1,500–8,000ft Laotian mountain range it traversed, the name “Ho Chi Minh Trail” was bestowed by the Americans, and was later adopted by the North Vietnamese. It was not merely a trail or road winding through the forested hills and valleys of Laos and Cambodia; the route was a network of interconnected roads and foot trails allowing alternate ways to bypass flooding and deceive air attacks. It was never known what roads would be in use or which were under repair at any one time, misleading analysts. The trailhead was at Techepone, inside southeastern Laos. Truck convoys reached it over numerous roads running out of North Vietnam. The trucks were for supplies; troop units and replacements traveled on foot. Units traveled south in battalion- and company-sized increments and transported their own crew-served weapons. Replacements traveled in groups varying in size from five men to up to 500, the most common being 40–50. They carried only individual weapons and five days’ supply of rice. They would march for four or five days, staying at a way station each night, after which they would have a rest day and were resupplied with rations.

This short section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos was a highly desirable target because it snaked along a hillside above a river. B-52 bombs bursting on either side would bury or collapse the road. Approaching insertion helicopters could discern the Trail’s route from miles away. (John Plaster)

Huge amounts of supplies were shipped south. In order to supplement the trucks, ox carts, reinforced bicycles, and even elephants were used. Supplies also flowed down the region’s rivers, allowing some to get through during the wet season, which essentially shut down the roads. Even fuel pipelines were laid. The foot and bicycle trails were 2–5ft wide, while truck roads were 18ft wide. In 1964, 20–30 tons of supplies a day were hauled down the trail. By the 1965 dry season it was 90 tons a day.

A GAZ-51 cargo truck runs down the muddy Ho Chi Minh Trail as it is photographed by an SOG RT. In many places the Trail was wide enough for two-way traffic. (John Plaster)

It developed into a monumental logistics effort, operated by the 559th Transportation Group, which maintained the trail system, supply caches, storage dumps, barracks, maintenance facilities, hospitals, and command-and-control facilities, as well as base areas where the supplies and troops were marshaled and sent into South Vietnam on branch trails. The 559th Transportation Group was organized into 15 logistical-base units (binh tram), later 27, each responsible for 30-50 miles of trail. They typically were composed of two truck-transport, engineer, and air-defense battalions and single communications-liaison, signal, security, and medical battalions. Sometimes there was an SA-2 missile battalion and a food-production unit, which cultivated gardens and raised livestock. Besides defending, repairing, maintaining, and expanding the trail system, the base units operated way stations and provided guides. Local Laotian and Cambodian guides were employed until 1965, after which only VC/NVA communications-liaison agents were used, for security purposes. The 559th’s motto was “Build roads to advance, fight the enemy to travel.”

The weather played a major role in both the NVA’s supply effort and Free World measures to interdict it. The southwest monsoon (rainy season) ran from mid-May to mid-September, bringing heavy rains, overcast skies, and high temperatures. The northwest monsoon (dry season) lasted from mid-October to mid-March, with limited rain and moderate temperatures. This is when the Trail saw its heaviest use, and when American reconnaissance and air interdiction aimed at it was at its most intense.

A heavily bomb-blasted portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is pockmarked with 500lb, 750lb, and 1,000lb bomb craters. (John Plaster)

Obviously the Ho Chi Minh Trail’s use as a logistics and replacement transportation system, its base areas, and the privileged sanctuary it provided the NVA/VC was an extremely important aspect of the Vietnam War. A basic precept of war is to interdict the enemy’s line of communications. This was much easier said than done with the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The vast majority of it ran beneath jungle canopy, bridges and fords were camouflaged, and routes were frequently changed. Areas were laid bare by bombs and the spraying of defoliant, but these areas were often bypassed and camouflage screens were erected. Antiaircraft defenses were heavy, and in particularly dangerous areas truck travel was undertaken at night.

A simple dirt road is not as easily disrupted as a modern hard-surfaced highway. A wide highway is easily located, even in forested areas, is straighter than a narrow dirt road snaking beneath the trees, and is easier to hit with a bomb for these reasons. Three things happen when a 750lb general-purpose bomb is dropped on a dirt road: a large hole is created, nearby vegetation is blown away from the hole, and loose soil is displaced and scattered about. Only two things needed to be done to bypass a large hole in a road; nearby vegetation needed to be removed and loose soil laid to provide a new road surface bypassing the hole. The bomb craters also provided water reservoirs and bathing facilities.

A Laotian valley peppered with bomb craters, completely obliterating a portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In some instances the NVA were able to rebuild such a battered section by winding the route through the craters and making it look like it did not exist. In other instances they completely bypassed the area with a new road. (Frank Greco via John Plaster)

The Trail was well protected by air defenses and ground troops. These may not have always been trained infantry and security units, although combat units passing through the area would often be pressed into security and pursuit duties. Service troops would be turned out to search for American reconnaissance teams. There were also very efficient NVA counter-reconnaissance companies who actively sought and pursued recon teams. In order to determine the exact location of the hidden routes, bridges, fords, dumps, rest areas, truck parks, and air defenses, and to determine which trails and roads were in use, the traffic pattern and schedule, etc., someone had to go in on the ground and look at it up close. Aerial visual reconnaissance, aerial photographs, satellite surveillance, and radio interception provided little if any of this much-needed intelligence information.

An aerial photograph of the Ho Chi Minh Trail showing bulldozer tracks in Laos where overnight repairs of bomb craters have been made. Bulldozer tracks were sometimes confused with tank tracks. Regardless, air attacks on the area to destroy dozers were valuable, as they inhibited efforts to repair the Trail. (Ted Wicorek via John Plaster)

A One-Zero armed with a silencer-equipped .45-cal. M3 “grease gun.” A Claymore bag is carried at his right hip and a strobe-light case is on the right shoulder strap of his STABO harness. The man in the background is armed with a 5.56mm XM177E2 submachine gun. (John Plaster)

Prior to 1965 there was no existing unit capable of covertly operating in such a dangerous environment.

MACV-SOG

As with any new and unprecedented initiative, the early days of MACV-SOG were flawed with misconceptions, over-expectation, and mistakes. Aware of extensive NVA infiltration of advisers and supplies, in 1961 the new Kennedy administration implemented a National Security Action Memorandum that expanded the Central Intelligence Agency’s authority to introduce South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam and Laos. The CIA did not have the specialized tactical expertise or the logistical resources to conduct such operations. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs provided the training expertise. Efforts were made to drop South Vietnamese agents into the North and it proved a disaster. Of the 22 teams inserted in 1961-63, by late 1963 only four remained operational with most having been killed, captured, or turned. The CIA’s ineffective ability to run this program led to many of the paramilitary projects in Vietnam being transferred to the military. Operation Switchback in November 1963 turned the programs over to US Special Forces (USSF). This included ground-reconnaissance operations in Laos. The operation was not concluded until December, and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG, pronounced “Mac-Vee-Sogg”) was established on January 24, 1964.

In 1969 Project Ford Frum saw SOG members aboard Army O-1 Bird Dog observation aircraft of the 219th Aviation Company photographing points of interest in Laos and Cambodia. Here six NVA graves were revealed in a bomb-shattered bamboo thicket. (Frank Greco via John Plaster)

The group’s cover mission was to conduct analysis of lessons learned in combat involving all branches of service. It was actually a joint unconventional task force tasked with conducting covert strategic reconnaissance missions into Laos and South Vietnam, as well as sabotage and “black” psychological operations. Ground, air, and naval assets were employed to insert, collect, extract, and otherwise support these operations.

MACV–SOG was first headquartered in Cholon outside Saigon, and moved into Saigon in 1966. Its air assets – Air Studies Group – operated infiltration and various specialized support aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing. The naval assets – Maritime Studies Group – operated specialized high-speed watercraft for infiltration and raiding. The MACV– SOG Training Center and Airborne Operations Group provided specialized training. A Psychological Studies Group operated broadcasting stations. The largest and most important SOG unit was the Ground Studies Group (OP-35). It operated several forward operating bases (FOBs) throughout South Vietnam. These were launch sites for small reconnaissance teams that conducted extremely dangerous intelligence-collection missions, mainly aimed at the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These usually had two or three Americans, with the rest of the team made up of men indigenous to the region. Most of these men were Montagnards, Cambodians, or Nùngs. The SOG began missions into Cambodia in June 1967.