

The Globalization and Development Reader

Perspectives on
Development and
Global Change



Second Edition

Edited by J. Timmons Roberts,
Amy Bellone Hite, and Nitsan Chorev

WILEY Blackwell

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Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

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Preface and Acknowledgments

You may wonder, “Why do we need yet *another* book about globalization and development?” “Globalization” – the spread of economies, cultures, and power across national borders – has become a buzzword which is usually evoked unquestioningly. It is used so sloppily that it often produces little illumination. Because it is widely seen as inevitable and nearly inalterable, globalization is often presented as a force that must be embraced without reserve, but doing so benefits some people while putting others at grave risk. The term “development” is loaded enough to turn off thoughtful people of many ideological stripes. Leonard Frank once called development “a whore of a word,” since it hid within its rosy and altruistic-sounding exterior the selfish interests of imperialistic governments, expansionist firms, careerist professionals, and international “humanitarian” agencies that benefit from the neediness of poor nations. So do we simply throw these terms in the rubbish bin?

We don’t believe so. These terms, when used carefully, are useful not only to policy wonks, corporate visionaries, academic types, or empire-builders, but to everyone concerned about the world’s future, and their own. Our goal in compiling the selections for this book and its previous edition has been to demystify the social impacts of large-scale global economic change by offering non-specialist audiences carefully selected and manageable excerpts of both classic and current path-breaking scholarship. We hope these provide readers with tools to understand globalization and development better, to clarify the scope of this field, to question the causes and consequences of these processes, and to rethink their inevitability and direction.

The Globalization and Development Reader, published in 2007, was actually a substantial revision of our 2000 Reader, *From Modernization to Globalization*. We compiled both of those volumes to give students and other interested readers a taste of the best readings in the field – broadly social science perspectives on international development and global change. As we considered the request from Wiley-Blackwell for another update, we envisioned substantial changes and sought new and fresh perspectives on the field by inviting Nitsan Chorev as an additional editor. This

volume is the fruit of this latest collaboration, offering a major revision and something of an expansion: of the book's 33 selections, 21 are new.

First of all, we've maintained most of the classics from the previous editions, even restoring one from the first volume, the controversial 1968 Lewis piece about slum culture and development. The first two sections maintain the great foundational pieces and thinkers, like Marx and Engels, Weber, Rostow, Huntington, Frank, Cardoso, Wallerstein, and Gereffi, while adding the classic 1962 Gerschenkron piece on economic backwardness in Part I and three new pieces in Part II. Those are Amsden's 1979 analysis of Taiwan's state-led approach to development, an evaluative summary of scholarship on gender and development by Pearson and Jackson, and an innovative 2004 article by Ramamurthy that attends to gender in the "commodity chain" approach, which studies supply chains of products from extraction to producer to marketer and consumer.

We almost entirely revamped the latter three sections, with large numbers of new and recent pieces. Just four of the 20 pieces in Parts III, IV, and V appeared in the first edition (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye; Norberg; Friedman; and part of the original Keck and Sikkink). For several selections, we include more recent work by key scholars: McMichael, Sassen, Harvey, Sklair, Rodrik, and Evans. Several of these and the other new readings are already classics; some we believe should be a part of core development studies canons. Many build upon each other in useful ways or take opposing views that allow the reader to contrast their positions.

In addition to updating the selections by leaders in this field, we selected the new 21 pieces based on suggestions from reviewers and readers, as well as the global social changes affecting the world in the last half-decade. We include more focus on India and China, whose rise has reshaped the global economic and geopolitical systems. We have added a series of pieces that seek to capture the reshaped globe after the 2008–10 "Great Recession" in the global North, and what it has meant for developing countries. We have added pieces on gender, on the role of cities, on agriculture, and on the governance of pharmaceuticals and climate change politics. We finish the volume with some new classics.

The need for a globally sophisticated generation of students, scholars, and practitioners has never been greater. We have sought to make this Reader useful for teaching and learning about critical and rapidly changing global issues. However, we must remind readers of the limitations of such a text. First, we always sought pieces accessible to upper level undergraduates and early graduate students, and our introductions and abridging were completed with them in mind. Second, in spite of careful abridging and succinct introductions, page limitations inevitably result in the exclusion of many great pieces. We thank our many reviewers of the previous editions and our proposed revisions for this one, who alerted us to important omissions and possible additions. We were unable to include all the important work suggested, and we had to shorten some pieces more than might have been ideal: we hope readers will take up these authors' work more fully. We hope the discussions that result from teaching these works are exciting, and that emerging scholars in this field will find inspiration in what is here as well as in what is missing.

In addition to the authors of the selections we present here, many individuals contributed to this volume. At Blackwell, we owe special thanks to Justin Vaughan and Ben Thatcher. Their patience and support for the project were invaluable. Ann Bone did the most thorough and extremely competent copy editing work we have ever seen. Given her ability to improve stylistic and substantive elements of the manuscript, we'd grant her an honorary degree if we could. Zeb Korycinska came in with a wonderfully thorough and useful index that creates a whole new perspective on the volume. We're grateful for all their work, and for that of the typesetters. Finally, we owe many, many thanks for the love and support our families have offered as we pored over this manuscript during hours that were rightly theirs.

Timmons Roberts, Amy Bellone Hite, and Nitsan Chorev
Providence, New Orleans, and Princeton

Globalization and Development: Recurring Themes

Amy Bellone Hite, J. Timmons Roberts,
and Nitsan Chorev

One week in April 2013 brought home how global forces of change affect our lives, and how important it is to understand development and the international system to know how we might respond.

- A huge factory in Bangladesh producing cheap goods for the global market collapsed, killing over 1,100 people and injuring 2,500 others. The Rana Plaza workers were earning under US\$50 per month sewing garments for giant firms like Walmart, J. C. Penney, Dress Barn, and Primark.
- Two ethnic Chechen immigrants who came to the United States from Dagestan, a region long oppressed by Russian occupation, placed homemade bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and wounding over 200 spectators.
- Tensions between China and Japan over islands between them impeded economic growth for both countries, a tremor felt around the world since they are both important customers, lenders, and investors.
- The six-month anniversary for victims of Superstorm Sandy was the filing deadline for federal disaster assistance in the eastern United States. Estimates of damage had risen to over 70 billion US dollars, an amount only surpassed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. These kinds of extreme events are expected more often with climatic change induced by human beings.
- Negotiations in Bonn, Germany sought to craft an international response to climate change, by small groupings of countries and in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process, now two decades old. Among those pushing for rapid action were Bangladesh, Haiti, and Pacific Island atolls, all facing devastating coastal flooding as oceans warm and expand and the polar icecaps melt.

Production, trade, investment, terror, security, climate change, and statesmanship all involve new types and intensities of flows of goods, people, greenhouse gas molecules, and ideas around the world. Meanwhile, the unevenness of economic development and cultural and social change around the globe continues to present us with stark paradoxes and contrasts.¹ These contrasts of the hypermodern with traditional ways of life, often in the same place and at the same time, are microcosms of inequality between the two worlds that exist on our one planet: the so-called “developed” and the “underdeveloped” worlds, the “First World” and the “Third World,”² the poor and the rich nations, the “global North” and “global South,” Americanization and Africanization, “McWorld” and Islam. Within most poor nations, the great divides that pervade the globe are more startling because the contrasts are so close together.

Why should people in wealthy nations, which also face many disparities and contradictions, care about these poorer countries’ economic development and their experiences with social change? A hundred people would give as many answers. Some people in the wealthier nations are excited about economic opportunities in what might be a booming market for export products in the “developing South.” Some see a source of cheap imports to keep inflation down. Others want to know about development because they worry about losing jobs to new industries in the South or about losing European and US control over the world’s political and economic arenas. Some experts worry about political instability or extremism in developing countries threatening business interests abroad or security at home. There is grave concern in some places about large-scale immigration from poorer areas of the world. Many people appreciate the close association between poverty and disease, and worry that the next pandemic will be caused by inadequate public health and medical infrastructure in the poorer parts of the world. Others still are troubled about the global environment and are aware of poorer nations’ crucial role for climate change, pollution, biodiversity, or species preservation. Others care about developing countries because they have experienced their warm beaches, jungles, mountains, pyramids, and temples. These are some concrete reasons to care.

Some people’s concern springs from very different places, based in moral, religious, or purely academic roots. Some specialists who have devoted their lives to “development studies” or who work in development agencies are aware that of the world’s more than 7 billion people, over 3 billion live in countries where the average income is less than \$2.50 a day.³ Oxfam International reports that the richest 85 individuals in the world have as much wealth as the poorest 3 billion people combined.⁴

Many religious groups have targeted these billions as the greatest potential growth areas for their churches, sending missionaries, money, and material aid. Some are concerned with converting all the world’s major population groups to hasten or to be prepared for the Second Coming of Christ. Other religious groups might be concerned with studying and documenting gaps in development, so that their populations might live without the daily indignities of poverty. Some people want to understand the roots and potential cures of the problems that cause the desperate poverty of which we are reminded on television ads for groups who bring aid.

Finally, a few people point out that in countries where Western economic and social systems have not fully penetrated, there remains a possible alternative to the development model followed in wealthy countries. Beyond the material level, many authors are now proposing that we can learn from aboriginal cultures not just their medicinal uses of plants and land-use, but also their cosmology and non-materialist values. More concretely, education and health techniques have “trickled up” from Brazil and Central America to wider application in the rich nations. Under duress from the collapse of the Soviet empire and an embargo from the United States, for example, Cuban agriculture conducted the largest experiment ever in organic farming. Innovative urban solutions of mass transit, recycling, and job training are coming from the city of Curitiba in the south of Brazil.⁵

People, then, have diverse and often multiple reasons to care about what happens to the poor nations, and it is critical to grasp the roots of their interest to understand the approach they take and the conclusions they reach. This volume puts at your fingertips the original words of scholars attempting to understand how societies are changing. The goal of this introduction is to provide some context for new readers and some framework for old hands. It begins with a discussion of the deep divide in our society over who people believe are to blame for the poverty of poor nations. This divide runs through the decades of debate about international development, which this reader attempts to chronicle. We then introduce the five sections of the book by briefly discussing their contexts, main questions, and approaches.

This volume chronicles two major social revolutions and the transition between them: the industrial revolution and the shift to global economic production. Part I, which covers the earliest theories of social change and the development of capitalism, begins the volume with two “classical” pieces by pivotal thinkers on these questions: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels and Max Weber, and then moves on to W. W. Rostow and Alexander Gerschenkron’s classic pieces on economic growth, Oscar Lewis’s controversial piece on “the culture of poverty,” and Samuel Huntington on politics and change. Part II includes seven pieces from what some argue was the earliest “globalization” theorizing, by writers who developed what came to be called the “dependency” and “world-systems” approaches. Parts III, IV, and V contain 20 path-breaking pieces on the relationship between globalization and development, of which 16 are new for this edition.

The first of these three sections on globalization represents a segment of the array of conceptualizations of economic globalization. Part III features a classic description of the global division of labor by Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye, Johan Norberg’s positive assessment of global capitalism, Greta Krippner’s piece on financialization, and Thomas Friedman’s famous argument that “the world is flat.” In addition to Krippner’s work, Part III features three additional selections (by Sklair, Babb, and Harvey) pertaining to the 2008–10 economic crisis (and its roots in financialization of the economy), and what the crisis can teach us about how the global and national economies function. As globalization has unfolded, there have been strong debates about what role foreign aid and international banks should play, described in Part IV by Steven Radelet and Patrick Bond. Also in Part IV, McMichael and Sassen take up

globalization's impact on the countryside and the cities respectively, while Bardhan compares the rise of China and India, and Rodrik explores the limits to democracy and globalization. The volume concludes with a sampling of pieces we describe as "Global Themes Searching for New Paradigms," which includes descriptions of new forms of governance, by Anne-Marie Slaughter and by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, and analyses of international debates over environment and health by Roberts and Chorev. The book ends with three thought-provoking selections assessing possibilities for progressive change from Amartya Sen, Michael Burawoy, and Peter Evans.

This introduction, then, seeks to set some of the historical stage for the current debate over globalization and development, and to provide background on where some of these debates originated and where they have been. To do a complete job of this is of course impossible, but we use a few themes to illustrate abiding, opposing positions in at least the broadest strokes. For more detailed discussions of the distinctions among the theories represented in this volume, we have provided new introductory material at the start of each of the five sections. These commentaries are designed to quickly orient readers, tell them about the authors, and summarize a few of each piece's key points. The limitations of culling excerpts is apparent throughout the book, since nearly every author has generated a lifetime of intricate, elaborate, and evolving ideas. Nonetheless, we hope that this introductory material will provide a simple but useful framework of the most basic ideas of each group, upon which readers can build the nuance these authors deserve. In turn, we hope that readers will someday explore the original works more fully to avoid the risks of oversimplifying the bodies of literature from the few small excerpts we can fit in this volume.⁶

Why Are the Poor Countries Poor? Diverging Opinions

"Why are the poor countries poor?" This seemingly simple question has elicited widely polarized views and driven starkly divergent national and international policies. Debates about developing countries reflect a similar chasm within most societies over whether individuals are poor due to factors that are within or out of their control. Who is to blame: the poor or their society? This debate not only runs through the classic works of philosophy and religion, but also engages politicians, business groups, labor unions, and advocates for the poor. In both Britain and the United States, the division often seems to split us along party lines. On one side are those who believe that poor people are lazy and will only improve their lot if they "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps," finding ways to make themselves rich by their own inventiveness. On the other side are those who see poor people as victims of their birth into bad conditions, of economic hard times like mass layoffs as industries close or move location, or as victims of discrimination based on having the "wrong" skin color, gender, or ethnicity. There is similarly deep disagreement among social scientists about the ability of individuals to change things.

Given the state's central role of linking individuals to their larger structural contexts, it is difficult to overstate how profoundly this split over the role of the state affects the roles of national governments and international organizations. Should "the state" step in and try to overcome some of the structural barriers that create poverty? Or should states get out of the way and let ingenuity and the market solve the problem? Throughout the readings in this volume, the "proper" role and size of states are constantly reverberating themes.

There are surprising parallels between these acrimonious national debates and those over why poor countries are poor and what we should do about them. This book is a vehicle for gaining familiarity with the most important of the many, complex theories that explain national poverty, development, and distributions of wealth. One guidepost for navigating this complexity is to consider whether authors believe national poverty or "backwardness" is due to *internal* or *external* factors. That is, are nations poor because their society lacks key elements like an efficient government or freely operating markets, or is their situation the product of centuries of colonial exploitation and continuing political and economic domination by more powerful imperialist nations like Holland, Spain, Britain, the United States, and Japan? From the beginning to the end of this volume, you should see that debates about development are both stark and long raging. The "modernization theorists" we introduce in the following section, for example, see *internal* factors as what drives development; the authors represented in Part II of the volume, however, stress the importance of *external* factors in the development process. More recently, international financial institutions representing the interests of world powers championed a brand of development policy during the 1980s and 1990s known as the "Washington Consensus." This dominant ideological current promoted the liberation of markets from ineffective governments as the key to moving countries out of poverty. Parts IV and V show just how unsettled this debate is: the "consensus" is now being openly challenged.

Social Turmoil and the Classical Thinkers

To understand the startling contrasts and bewildering changes globalization fomented, contemporary "development" thinkers often look back to earlier changes associated with the age of industrialization. Political, economic, scientific, and social turmoil served as the backdrop for the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theorists such as Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–90), German theorists Karl Marx (1818–83), Friedrich Engels (1820–95), and Max Weber (1864–1920), and the Frenchman Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Albeit with many decades of layers of sophistication superimposed on their core ideas, these theorists' work serves as bedrock for many contemporary explanations of development and social change.

Adam Smith's landmark book of 1776, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, is the classic treatise on economic liberalism (free markets), and that era's best description of what was the emerging capitalist system. Smith

argued that human selfishness is universal and, left untouched in the area of production and trade, would create benefits for the whole society, as freely operating markets would lead selfish actors to seek the greatest profits, which they would make by meeting the greatest human needs. At a time when the economy was based largely on merchants buying in one area and selling in another (mercantilism), nations were adding regulations, tariffs, and quotas to try to protect their own industries and to raise money for their armies and growing bureaucracies. Smith suggested that the best way to meet the needs of the people was not through such regulation but through letting selfish human forces loose, while reserving policy-making for non-market aspects of society. Smith called the impersonal force of markets creating an overall benefit to society the “invisible hand”:

he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. (Book 4, ch. 2)

Smith’s book is the foundation for modern economics; its description of human action forms the basis for countless analyses of whether economic systems are working as they should or whether government interventions are distorting them. On protecting national industries through the imposition of tariffs on imports – what he refers to above as affecting “trade for the public good” – Smith argues:

By restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly of the home-market is more or less secured to the domestic industry employed in producing them. Thus the ... high duties upon the importation of corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to the growers of that commodity ... That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it ... cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident. (Book 4, ch. 2)

Smith insists that areas should specialize in production according to their special endowments, what he termed a “comparative advantage.” “The natural advantages which one country has over another in producing particular commodities are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all the world to be in vain to struggle with them” (Book 4, ch. 2).

In many ways, Smith’s great book on the wealth of nations sought to reassure readers that capitalism, including the great disruptions and inequality that economic growth and free markets were bringing, would ultimately serve the greater good. His argument was clear: stay out of the way and allow humans to solve these problems. These same points will be made again and again as successive periods of change

reverberate through the world economy, right up to the current debates over globalization. As the selections throughout this volume illustrate, the nature of a society's specialization, or comparative advantage, has monumental consequences.

Many people were not so assured about the future as was Adam Smith. While factories, railroads, and cities were proliferating, centuries-old institutions such as religion, intimate communities, and the authority of traditional rulers like kings and lords were unraveling before everyone's eyes. As colonial rebellion and then industrial revolution rocked Europe, fear of its disruptions spread. Poor peasants lost their land to "enclosures" by capitalist ranchers. Old, moneyed, landowning classes saw their power to control government weaken as urban-based business-people gained influence in first economic, and then political circles. But, perhaps most frightening to many people were the masses of urban unemployed and industrial workers hired up in the sprawling new factories. These workers' brusque, unrefined ways offended many "proper" urbanites; and as living conditions were often tight and unsanitary, physical disease, problematic social patterns, promiscuity, and unrest were seen as deplorable or inevitable. Factory work and city life were changing peasants into a new type of proletarian laborer. Controlling them and planning for the future required understanding the fundamental but unknown implications of this enormous class.

Just as current efforts to explain "globalization" give a clear sense that society is in the midst of fundamental social, political, and economic change, during the mid to late nineteenth century there was a similar sense among these important theorists that fundamental change was happening before their very eyes. It was very apparent that modern Western society was fundamentally different from anything that had come before. The new developments seemed to correspond to eroding political, economic, and social structures, without there being a clear notion of what would emerge in place of the old. Social theorists asked how new social structures emerged and how they were engendering different ways of thinking, working, and organizing.

Addressing these big questions were two major German social theorists, whose works are presented in the first section of readings: Karl Marx (1818–83), in collaboration with Friedrich Engels (1820–95), and Max Weber (1864–1920).⁷ The authors whose words we print here, and many others, saw a sharp shift from "traditional" to "modern" ways of life that manifested in myriad ways. They documented a breakdown of the ties and institutions governing those "traditional" societies. These theorists observed and documented a process of *increased division of labor*. That is, they saw different members of a society increasingly specializing in specific tasks (such as trading, banking, carpentry, fishing, etc.). Perhaps most importantly, they observed that society was changing from one where authority and beliefs stemmed from traditions, superstitions, fatalism, or emotions, to one dominated by the application of reason and practicality, an appreciation of efficiency and the ability to explain the world scientifically. This new complex of beliefs – that nature could be understood and controlled and that life should be organized with a goal of efficiency – they termed "rationalization."

In general, all of these classic social theorists saw this shift to modernity in terms of increased complexity. In other words, what people do and how they do it, how

people relate to one another, how people envision their universe, how individuals organize as a group, and how people make decisions all become more specialized, segmented, and complex. For example, someone working in a modern factory and living in a city might specialize in creating one thing in exchange for a daily wage and would use new technologies in production. This “modern” person might not know his or her neighbors. Instead of believing in natural forces, they would put faith in and base decisions on science, law, and accounting. Instead of knowing only a few people intimately, they might have daily but superficial contact with hundreds of individuals very different from themselves. Their interactions with these near-strangers would be based on their survival needs of making an exchange of money for goods, services, or work.

Factory work and city life were changing former peasants into a new type of laborer, becoming what Marx labeled “proletarians.” Controlling them, and planning for the future, required an understanding of the fundamental but unknown implications of these new relationships and the new, enormous groups industrialization created. For Marx, this led to important questions about how economic relations created social and political groups, and how these groups negotiate capitalism. For Weber, these developments led him to attempt to explain how these changes arose, what the relationship between people’s “mindsets” and their production was, and how changes in economic and social organization were associated with changes in the type of authority that controlled society. Marx’s and Weber’s focus on the relationship between capitalism and social change begin Part I, as those perspectives brought us into the twentieth century, when social sciences began to flourish.

Becoming Modern

Why do some countries remain poor and “backward” despite exposure to capitalism and other aspects of modern life? What can be done to make capitalism develop further in these countries? These were the questions addressed by a group of theorists whose ideas heavily influenced US efforts to foster capitalist development in poorer nations, then called the “Third World.”⁸

After World War II, the United States found itself alone at the top of the world power structure. It was the only nation on either side of the war that had its physical and economic infrastructure intact. It had a near monopoly on new technology, and the industry in place to produce goods that would sell for a high price around the world. Nevertheless, without functioning economies to buy these products, the growth of the US economy was limited. Promoting the recovery of Europe and Asia through a massive aid program called the “Marshall Plan” was not only a pragmatic solution to debilitated foreign markets, but it was also a mechanism to stem the spread of communism.

Coupled with US concern for the well-being of trading and military partners in Europe was worry about what was to become of the billions of people living in the poor, sometimes newly independent nations in the southern hemisphere. On the

one hand, there was a fear among people in wealthier countries of the kind of social unrest that could result from such widespread poverty in a world of modernity and prosperity. On the other hand, there was an even larger, more evident threat: the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union offered a solution to development that had strong mass appeal and something of a proven track-record. Politicians, development experts, academicians, and the public were afraid that people in Latin America and Africa would decide that communism was a surer path to development than capitalism. In response, theories about development that were generated in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States provided an explicitly non-communist solution to poverty and underdevelopment.

A group of influential development experts saw three obvious problems impeding the industrialization of poorer countries. First, companies there simply were not big enough to construct the modern factories needed to compete with the huge corporations of the big powers of Europe and North America. Second, access to great amounts of capital allowed corporations in “industrialized” nations to continually develop and adapt new technologies, and this was sorely lacking in the poor nations. Third, and most important for our discussion here, they saw the cultural, institutional, and organizational features of poorer countries as roadblocks in their attempts to develop and to democratize. Therefore, according to this group of “modernization theorists,” poorer nations are poor because they lack adequate capital, technology, and modern social organization and values.⁹ This group of theorists set out to explain the reasons for these absences and laid out policy recommendations to overcome them. The introduction to Part I reviews these theories in detail, and then offers several classic examples.

After two decades of dominance in development circles, modernization theory came under attack from several angles. First, it was ahistorical: modernization theory failed to make distinctions between countries, regions, structural conditions, or specific historical experiences. For example, modernization theorists did not address the fact that these poorer regions exhibited not one situation of poverty or one type of society, but multiple “premodernities.” Many of the countries that would be classified as “undeveloped” in fact already had “modern” industries, educational systems, or the other “precursors” that were thought necessary for modernity. Second, critics alleged that “modernization” was only a euphemism for “Americanization,” a point supported by a closer read of several early authors in the lineage. The field was therefore labeled ethnocentric and pro-capitalist, an explicit tool of the American Cold War anticommunist effort. Third, by emphasizing nations’ internal problems as the cause of underdevelopment, modernization theory seemed to blame the victims themselves for their poverty. Finally, critics claimed that important external causes of poverty and underdevelopment were ignored.

Some modernization ideas have come back into fashion both on what is called the right, and from some surprising quarters of the left. Two 1998 pieces serve as examples. On the right, the monumental book by Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, concludes that “Some people [respond to markets] better than others, and culture can make all the difference.” On the other side of the spectrum, Cristóbal

Kay endorses Osvaldo Sunkel's 1993 opinion that "The heart of development lies in the supply side: quality, flexibility, the efficient combination and utilisation of productive resources, the adoption of technological development, an innovative spirit, creativity, the capacity for organisation and social discipline ..."¹⁰ Some postmodernists hold that culture has now become more important than economics in driving social change, and that in fact it probably always was so. As argued below, analyses of development which entirely ignore internal "cultural" variables between (and even within) nations will fail to provide complete answers to the question of why the different parts of the world are diverging under globalization. Finally, many theories of social change continue to include expectations that nations will move through a series of necessary stages, a central tenet of the modernizationists.

Dependency Theory and World-Systems Analysis

By focusing on internal factors and arguing that poor nations lacked the right cultural values, were modernizationists "blaming the victims"? Beginning in the late 1950s, harsh refutation of the modernizationists' ideas came from a steadily growing group of scholars and planners in Latin America and Africa, a group whose formative critiques of colonial and neocolonial relationships would come to be called "dependency theory."

Dependency theorists, and the World-Systems researchers who were influenced by them, all tied "globalization" – referring not to the current term so much as to international political economy – to the colonial era starting around 1500, and to the long-term exploitation of the people and resources of Africa, South America, and Asia by wealthy countries in Europe and North America. Rather than saying that global trade and its impacts are brand new, dependency theorists argued that this history goes back hundreds of years, at least to the rise of mercantile capitalism, which relied on trading goods across these regions of rich and poor, or imperialist and colonized. Thus, dependency theorists were reacting explicitly to "modernization theories" that said that poor nations lacked the capital (investable piles of money in a few hands), values (of hard work and investment), and business practices (like modern accounting) to make firms and nations succeed. Dependency theorists considered this "blaming the victims."

The earliest ideas came from a group of economists working in Santiago, Chile in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a United Nations agency that analyzed how development could be achieved in the region.¹¹ When Raúl Prebisch led ECLA in the 1950s there emerged a theory that because of colonial and later neocolonial relationships, European powers had subordinated the "Third World," linking to them merely as a source for cheap raw materials and as a market for its more expensive manufactures.¹² The problem with this arrangement was that while the value of manufactures has a tendency to rise steadily over time, the value of raw materials and primary foodstuffs generally declines. ECLA identified this trend of *declining terms of trade* as a key reason why Latin America remained less

developed than wealthier nations: poor countries had to sell more and more goods to get the same or less in return. The readings in this volume testify to the importance of terms of trade by consistently returning to this historical pattern of relationships and its impacts on development and social change.

Dependency theorists paid special attention to explaining the savage inequalities in poor nations, tying them to colonial histories of those regions and to current economic and political systems of exclusion and repression of the masses. They thought that arguing that later industrialization should be as easy as early industrialization, while ignoring colonial legacies, was blatantly self-serving for the rich nations. Dependency theorists did not put all the blame for the poorer nations' poverty outside the nations, however. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Alain de Janvry, and several others identified local elites (meaning within the poorer nations) as agents of dependency and underdevelopment because they profit from paving the way for transnational corporations, so that unfavorable trade and banking arrangements are maintained. In other words, dependency theorists mainly saw foreign groups "feasting" at the table of poorer nations, but elites from those same poorer countries, they theorized, were the ones who "set the table."

By the late 1960s, the fusion of elements of ECLA's work with that of neo-Marxist theory emerged as a serious theoretical challenge to the US-led modernization theory.¹³ Some members of this new "dependency school" were ECLA economists, others were academics, some were members of a vibrant Latin American leftist movement. While dependency theory was already influencing policy in Latin America in the 1950s, it was not until the late 1960s that authors like Andre Gunder Frank "popularized" the theory and development scholars in the rich nations began to take note. Frank simplified many of the dependency group's ideas and was the first author widely published in English.¹⁴ In the era of Vietnam and other military interventions by the US around the world, the dependency theory's ideas were a welcome alternative approach that profoundly questioned the direction of mainstream social science.

Reviewed in more depth at the beginning of Part II of this volume, dependency theory took many forms, ranging quite significantly in complexity and in the degree to which the theorists saw the possibility of developing nations escaping this exploitative relationship. In particular, some dependency theorists, most notably Andre Gunder Frank, viewed a situation of dependency as inescapable as long as poorer nations participated in the capitalist world economy. Other dependency theorists, represented in this volume by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, saw opportunities for various nations at various historical junctures to adjust this system of exploitation in their favor.

Emerging from this latter variant of dependency theory, and taking into account the many critiques of dependency, is World-Systems analysis. Criticisms of dependency theory centered on its difficulty in generating testable hypotheses, as well as its lack of explanatory power. Furthermore, after dependency theory's initial splash in the development theory arena, many analysts sought to move beyond the rather crude dichotomy of core-periphery (as outsiders often mistakenly portrayed it) and

to engage in more rigorous attention to the impact of historical contexts. The result of this splitting off from dependency theory (especially its initial variants) was an attempt to analyze development in a manner more comprehensive than ever before (perhaps with the exception of Weber's work). It also was the "Americanization" of a development theory that was quite opposite to the dominant, modernist, US theories of development. As such, world-systems research became increasingly cross-sectional (using data about one point in time) and quantitative.¹⁵ This was not always the case, as the historical works of Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein attest.¹⁶ World-systems analysis attempted a comprehensive study of the development process not only from a historical perspective, but also through systematic analyses of the operation of capitalism and the global economic system. While groups of sociologists and geographers using world-systems and other political economy perspectives advanced their analysis of global systems of production and power, a new literature on "globalization" sprouted from other fields and from the popular press.

From Development to Globalization

From the earliest social theorists all the way through the dependency theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, the literature on social change and development was largely associated with industrialization and the gaps between wealthier and poorer nations. Marx and Weber wrote about and analyzed the industrial revolution; modernization theorists thought an urban, industrial milieu was a sort of school for modernity; and many dependency theorists thought that if Latin America wished to become part of the "developed world" it would need to have more national industries. Since then, theorists from all geographical, disciplinary, and ideological corners are moving beyond this industrial milieu. Contributions to the three latter sections of this volume perceive development differently. First, it is no longer a given that building factories and infrastructure is sufficient for raising well-being of a nation or its people. Rather, economic development is increasingly linked to access to information, technology, and innovation capabilities. Second, it is also no longer a given that development should be understood in economic terms. Concerns with social development – the needs of the population – have moved from the margins of the discussion to the halls (and websites) of institutions such as the World Bank. Third, much of the new literature on globalization moves beyond the "poor versus rich" image of nations grouped into distinct "worlds." Instead, this literature conceptualizes a highly interdependent and integrated world. The sentinel piece by Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye coined the term "the global assembly line" back in 1980, noticing how closing factories in Europe and the US was tied to new strategies by large corporations of moving the labor-intensive stages of their production process overseas. Twenty-five years later, in 2005, Thomas Friedman's bestselling book *The World Is Flat*, and his article reprinted here, insisted that this process had continued and accelerated after the year 2000, to the point where the world had become "flat." Friedman argues that quantum leaps in technology and advances in education and

global sourcing spread economic opportunity and risk everywhere, to the point that old boundaries simply no longer apply. Peter Dicken, author of *Global Shift*, would characterize as “hyperglobalist” Friedman’s ideas that globalization is leveling the playing field and is inevitable.¹⁷

Despite a plethora of scholarship and decades of use, the term “globalization” is still too often used without clarification. First, and most broadly, globalization refers to a set of processes that increasingly make the parts of the world interdependently integrated.¹⁸ Although the world has long had important international linkages, globalization refers to functional integration where firms are interdependent, production is linked on a global scale, there is a dramatic increase in visible and invisible trade, and national economies are linked. Beyond this increase in trade and globally organized production, for some authors globalization means also the control of decision-making by a new, global, political and economic elite, or more critically and explicitly, the “Wall Street–US Treasury–IMF/World Bank complex.”¹⁹ For these authors, globalization is significant not just because of economic integration, but in its association with centralized, homogenized, control. There is sharp debate about both of these dimensions of globalization.

Debt has played an important part in the globalization process. The poorer nations took on heavy debts in the 1960s and 1970s to try to build their industrial sectors and infrastructures to catch up with the core nations. Loans allowed these poor nations to finally do some development planning, building factories, roads, airports, new capitals, dams, and oil refineries. But the rates for their loans were often adjustable, and like a credit card or house mortgage debt with an adjustable rate, an increase in US interest rates – which was triggered by the oil crisis – exponentially increased the total debt burden of these countries. In 1982 Mexico and then Brazil said they could not pay their debts, and soon the list of defaulting nations grew. To continue to get the money they needed to pay even just the interest they owed, these nations had to secure more loans, but by then it was only multinational agencies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that agreed to lend to them. In exchange for these loans, the heavily indebted nations had to submit to a sweeping program of cuts in food, housing and transport subsidies, privatization of state-run companies, and lowering tariff barriers to force local industries to face global competition.²⁰ These sweeping reforms (which the banks called structural adjustment programs) were the subject of two decades of bitter debate, protests, riots and even rebellions across the global South and even in European countries in need of the backing of these international financial institutions.²¹ Cutting government intervention in the economy, changing political and economic structures and acting to stabilize macroeconomic indicators is more broadly called “neoliberalism,” referencing the liberal economic policies long ago advocated by Adam Smith. This shift toward embracing free, global trade and promoting smaller, less intrusive states is the context to which the majority of the selections in the latter three parts of this volume are responding.

At the crux of economic globalization, of course, is trade. In recent decades, debates about the merit or menace of free trade have moved well beyond the category of esoteric, academic debates. While most non-specialists are thinking more

about trade policy, much less understood are the current global efforts to forge regulatory frameworks for what already is a completely global system of trade. What is unique about trade in this current era is the complexity and depth of interactions (both direct and indirect) among actors. Communication and transportation technologies allow companies to place an order to a factory halfway around the world and have it met in as little or less time than by a factory down the street. What's more, the goods from a complex web of suppliers around the world can be orchestrated to come together at precisely the right time at assembly sites which can be strategically located nearly anywhere. Also unique is the expansion of world trade not just to goods, but to services as well. Our phone calls are often answered half a world away; our rebates and forms are processed anywhere in the world; and the money we set aside to invest could be at work for us in almost any place in the world.

Some have argued that by being so tightly reliant on people around the world, a more peaceful "global society" has emerged. Production is entirely globalized; this means that, to the extent that trade is a social process, we are intimately and continuously linked to people of nationalities, classes, social and cultural groups vastly different from our own in this "global society." In another sense, however, vast differences remain in the world between rich and poor, "global North" and "global South," or among "less developed"/developing and developed nations. Critics point out that growing social inequality makes it difficult to conceptualize a "global society" as any sort of coherent social group. In what is perhaps the great paradox of our time, our economic lives are more interdependent than ever, yet these interdependencies coexist alongside vast differences in cultures, wealth, and social or political organization.

Part III offers readers various perspectives to clarify what globalization means, and what we can learn from global economic crises such as the most recent Great Recession of 2008–10. Reflecting this volume's focus on economic development and social change, we have limited these selections to those focused on *economic* globalization, so we have by necessity largely excluded the vast literature that explores globalization as a phenomenon with dimensions that are revolutionizing arenas as diverse as the media, culture, states, and international relations. Even so, readers can note how vast the linkages and effects associated with globalization are.

The debates over what is globalization, which we have emphasized so far, may seem benign compared to debates over the effects of globalization. The stakes, indeed, are incredibly high. Those who support neoliberal economic policies and the global processes they induce claim that globalization has led to unprecedented economic growth in different parts of the world, and those countries that were left behind suffer from not enough neoliberal reforms rather than from too many. But whether or not neoliberal economic reforms led to economic growth is fiercely debated. Of greater significance are the equally contentious questions of whether neoliberalism and globalization have reduced poverty and inequality. These are extremely important empirical questions that are strongly contested partly because data is difficult to collect and hard to interpret. Part IV offers a number of critical accounts of globalization that highlight the cost of global processes by looking at

Africa's experience of structural adjustment programs, the fate of food, and, in Saskia Sassen's piece, the increasing vulnerability of women. These critics are effective in calling our attention to globalization's many "losers." Others, in turn, contest that positive results – such as the unprecedented economic growth in some countries, including China and India – are due to what Rodrik calls hyperglobalization. Many have argued that those countries that have shown promising economic growth have done so by rejecting hyperliberalization rather than by embracing it.

Following the logic of earlier debates on development, the pieces in Part IV think of globalization as a political–economic project. Part V, which concludes the Reader, brings politics back in. The readings remind us both of the ways in which globalization is transforming politics, both national and international, as well as of the potential for local, national, and international politics to transform globalization. In the mid-1990s, the same moment in which scholarship "invented" globalization, parallel scholarship considered the fate of the nation-state. The free flow of capital, in particular, suggested a weakening control of governments over their economies and therefore, as Susan Strange (among many) has predicted, the "retreat" of the state.²² The pieces by Bardhan and Rodrik in Part IV suggest that this has not necessarily been the case. Others argued, instead, that if the state did not retreat, at minimum it transformed. As a result, so did international organizations, as described by Slaughter in Part V. Social movements, too, have adapted to the new reality – or, possibly, created it – by mobilizing in ways that transform the traditional boundaries of domestic politics. The result, as Roberts shows in his discussion on international environmental negotiations and Chorev shows in her discussion on international negotiations over access to medicines, is different types of coalitions, processes, and, eventually, international policy outcomes. Whether the outcomes of either transnational or domestic politics could be progressive is a question that concludes this section and our Reader. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen offers one of the most promising discussions on development by redefining it as freedom. Freedom, like development, is likely only to be achieved by social demand. Michael Burawoy offers a pessimistic account of the possibility for social change, but we conclude with an uplifting piece by Peter Evans who draws on Sen's work for describing the contours of the twenty-first-century developmental state and outlining the conditions under which such socially oriented states could emerge.

Before finishing, we need to express one great hesitation. The modernizationists and dependency theorists agreed on far more than they might admit, as Bob Sutcliffe once wrote in a piece called "Development after Ecology."²³ He argues that both left and right shared the view "that development was desirable" (that it would solve the human welfare needs of the majority), that whole nations develop or don't as a whole, and that any obstacles were human: social, economic, or political. While other critics were chiseling away at modernity and development, profound environmental concerns surfaced about the desire for nations to rise from poverty. The most uncomfortable point for many of us is the realization that "the globalization of the characteristics of developed countries would surely make the planet uninhabitable." Sutcliffe stated flatly that, "the development of underdevelopment has also been the

development of unsustainability.” This suggests simply that development is going in the wrong direction. It is the underdeveloped countries, he asserted, which provide better models for sustainable societies than do developed ones. Even as development agencies and firms have hijacked the term “sustainability” for their own ends and then moved on to the next fad, the profound ecological critique put forward by Sutcliffe is the 500-pound gorilla which is essentially ignored by virtually all social studies of development. The only encouraging sign is the dawning realization of the complex interweaving of climate change, development issues, and cultural survival.

We believe that social scientists working in the area of development need to be aware of the debates that preceded them so that they can glean insights and avoid repeating old mistakes. We hope this volume provides readers with the opportunity to begin to examine this crucial debate over the past century and a half. Though helping the poor nations should be enough reason to care, the social sciences of development are no longer only about helping the poor nations. The emerging work on globalization and on the environmental consequences of development has taken away any doubt from the proposition that our fate is intricately linked to those of the other 7 billion souls with whom we share the planet.

Why are the poor countries poor? Who are the winners and losers from globalization? Who’s to blame for the unintended consequences of development? And what can be done? Should states step in and try to overcome some of the structural barriers that create poverty, or should they get out of the way and let ingenuity and the market solve the problem? These audacious questions – those of the well-being and survival of 3 or perhaps all 7 billion of the world’s population – are the ones that the readings in this volume explicitly attempt to address.

Notes

- 1 Many of the terms used here are highly debated, perhaps none so much as the term “development” itself. Rather than enter into that debate here, we follow Kincaid and Portes in conceptualizing national development as change in economic growth, social welfare, and citizenship (political rights). A. Douglas Kincaid and Alejandro Portes, *Comparative National Development: Society and Economy in the New Global Order* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 2.
- 2 In what is now outdated, Cold War terminology, the first world consisted of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada, while the second world was the communist bloc of the Soviet Union and its allies. The rest was the Third World.
- 3 Anup Shah, “Poverty Facts and Stats” (based on World Bank Development Indicators 2008), at <http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats> (accessed May 2014).
- 4 Oxfam International, “Working for the Few: Political Capture and Economic Policy,” Briefing Paper, 20 Jan. 2014, at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-working-for-few-political-capture-economic-inequality-200114-en.pdf> (accessed June 2014).
- 5 J. Timmons Roberts and Nikki Demetria Thanos, *Trouble in Paradise: Globalization and Environmental Crises in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2003).