The Cosmopolitan Vision
What is enlightenment? To have the courage to make use of one’s cosmopolitan vision and to acknowledge one’s multiple identities – to combine forms of life founded on language, skin colour, nationality or religion with the awareness that, in a radically insecure world, all are equal and everyone is different.
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This book developed out of an intense conversation and exchange of ideas with Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, whose numerous promptings I have accepted and who consistently provided very valuable comments on drafts. Thus this book also presents results of our joint research project (funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft) with a specific focus on ‘Reflexive Modernization’ (see, in addition, Beck, Levy and Sznaider 2004). This research project itself exemplifies the topic of the book: Daniel Levy teaches sociology at the State University of New York, Stonybrook, Natan Sznaider at the Academic College of Tel Aviv and I in Munich and London. Without this international network of exchange and cooperation, which also includes Michael Pollak, a sociologist and editor in New York, and numerous colleagues at the London School of Economics and Political Science, this book would not have been possible. In addition, Edgar Grande, Boris Holzer and Angelika Poferl have carefully read individual chapters and made highly stimulating comments on them, for which I offer them my sincere thanks. Finally, this book benefited greatly from what Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim was writing concurrently in her book Wir und die Anderen. The larger research project of which this book is a part will be documented in the volume Entgrenzung und Entscheidung, edited by myself and Christoph Lau.

My work has been generously supported by the Volkswagen-Stiftung, for which I am very grateful.
Introduction

What is ‘Cosmopolitan’ about the Cosmopolitan Vision

What makes the cosmopolitan outlook ‘cosmopolitan’? What do we mean by ‘cosmopolitanism’? This word evokes at once the most marvellous and the most terrible histories.

The greatest and most productive controversies of the European Enlightenment are connected with it, but they have long since been forgotten. Some, such as Heinrich Laube in the middle of the nineteenth century, invoked the therapeutic value of the fatherland against the allegedly excessive demands of cosmopolitanism: ‘Patriotism is one-sided and petty, but it is practical, useful, joyous and comforting; cosmopolitanism is splendid, large, but for a human being almost too large; the idea is beautiful, but the result in this life is inner anguish’ (1973: 88). Cosmopolitanism is in the end just a beautiful idea: ‘Nowadays in our concern for humanity we tend to lose sight of human beings; and in this time of conflagrations, cannons and fiery speeches this is abject. The idea is a beautiful thing, too large for almost everybody, and it remains a mere idea. If it does not take on a concrete individual form, it might as well have never existed’ (ibid.: 131).

Heinrich Heine, by contrast, who regarded himself as an embodiment of cosmopolitanism, prophesied around the same time ‘that in the end this will become the universal conviction among Europeans, and . . . it has a greater future than our German chauvinists, these mere mortals who belong to the past’ (1997: 710). He criticized German patriotism, which in his view involved ‘a narrowing of the heart, which contracts like leather in the cold, and hatred of all things foreign – a desire no longer to be a world citizen or a European but merely a narrow German.’ He excoriated ‘the shabby, coarse, unwashed opposition to a sentiment which is the most splendid and sacred thing Germany has produced, that is, opposition to the humanity, the universal brotherhood of man, the cosmopolitanism to which our great minds, Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Jean Paul and all educated people in Germany have always paid homage’ (ibid.: 379). (These quotations, like many others in this introduction, are taken from Thielking 2000.)

Nowadays there is no point in arguing over whether patriotism, although practical, is too petty, whereas cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is splendid, but
cold and unliveable. The important fact now is that the human condition has itself become cosmopolitan. To illustrate this thesis we need only highlight the fact that the most recent avatar in the genealogy of global risks, the threat of terror, also knows no borders. The same is true of the protest against the war in Iraq. For the first time a war was treated as an event in global domestic politics, with the whole of humanity participating simultaneously through the mass media, even as it threatened to shatter the Atlantic alliance. More generally, the paradox that resistance against globalization itself produces political globalization has been apparent for some time. The globalization of politics, economic relations, law, culture, and communication and interaction networks spurs controversy; indeed, the shock generated by global risks continually gives rise to worldwide political publics.

In this way cosmopolitanism has ceased to be merely a controversial rational idea; in however distorted a form, it has left the realm of philosophical castles in the air and has entered reality. Indeed, it has become the defining feature of a new era, the era of reflexive modernity, in which national borders and differences are dissolving and must be renegotiated in accordance with the logic of a ‘politics of politics’. This is why a world that has become cosmopolitan urgently demands a new standpoint, the cosmopolitan outlook, from which we can grasp the social and political realities in which we live and act. Thus the cosmopolitan outlook is both the presupposition and the result of a conceptual reconfiguration of our modes of perception.

The national outlook – or, in technical terms, methodological nationalism – opposes this structural transformation. Until now it has been dominant in sociology and in the other social sciences, such as history, political science and economics, which analysed societies on the assumption that they are nationally structured. The result was a system of nation-states and corresponding national sociologies that define their specific societies in terms of concepts associated with the nation-state. For the national outlook, the nation-state creates and controls the ‘container’ of society, and thereby at the same time prescribes the limits of ‘sociology’.

Cosmopolitanism which has taken up residence in reality is a vital theme of European civilization and European consciousness and beyond that of global experience. For in the cosmopolitan outlook, methodologically understood, there resides the latent potential to break out of the self-centred narcissism of the national outlook and the dull incomprehension with which it infects thought and action, and thereby enlighten human beings concerning the real, internal cosmopolitanization of their lifeworlds and institutions.

What enables and empowers the concept of cosmopolitanism to perform this task? Paradoxically, two contradictory tendencies: the fact that it represents an age-old, untapped and unexhausted tradition, and the fact that
it has had a long and painful history. That cosmopolitanism has been forgotten, that it has been transformed and debased into a pejorative concept, is to be ascribed to its involuntary association with the Holocaust and the Stalinist Gulag. In the collective symbolic system of the Nazis, ‘cosmopolitan’ was synonymous with a death sentence. All victims of the planned mass murder were portrayed as ‘cosmopolitans’; and this death sentence was extended to the word, which in its own way succumbed to the same fate. The Nazis said ‘Jew’ and meant ‘cosmopolitan’; the Stalinists said ‘cosmopolitan’ and meant ‘Jew’. Consequently, ‘cosmopolitans’ are to this day regarded in many countries as something between vagabonds, enemies and insects who can or even must be banished, demonized or destroyed.

Adorno thought that one cannot write poems after Auschwitz. However, the contrary also holds: all poems speak or remain silent about Auschwitz.

Which contemporary author is not an author of the Holocaust? What I mean is that the Holocaust does not have to be made an explicit theme for us to sense the undercurrent of trauma that has haunted modern European art for decades. I would go even further: I know of no genuinely good and authentic art in which one cannot discern such a rupture, like someone shattered and disoriented after sleep haunted by nightmares. For me the Holocaust represents the human situation, the terminus of the great adventure at which Europeans have arrived after two thousand years of ethical and moral culture.

Imre Kertész also stresses the power of this negative experience to found new traditions: ‘In my view, when I consider the traumatic impact of Auschwitz I touch on the fundamental question of the viability and creative energy of present-day humanity; which means that, in reflecting on Auschwitz, I am, perhaps paradoxically, thinking about the future rather than the past’ (Kertész 2003: 2, 51, 255).

To paraphrase Gottfried Benn – ‘Words, words – names! They need only take wing and the millennia fall away with their flight’ – the name ‘cosmopolitanism’ need only take wing and the European trauma will fall away with its flight. This lends it a sober seriousness and lightness, a sharpness and penetration, by which it may succeed in breaking open the iron conceptual cage of methodological nationalism and reveal how, and to what extent, global reality can become cosmopolitan, thereby rendering it visible, comprehensible and even liveable.

What do we mean, then, by the ‘cosmopolitan outlook’? Global sense, a sense of boundarylessness. An everyday, historically alert, reflexive awareness of ambivalences in a milieu of blurring differentiations and cultural contradictions. It reveals not just the ‘anguish’ but also the possibility of shaping one’s life and social relations under conditions of cultural mixture. It is simultaneously a sceptical, disillusioned, self-critical outlook. Nothing can show this better than a couple of examples.
In sociological research there is currently much talk of new identities, including the demonstrative reassertion of national, ethnic and local identities all over the world. What is new about them becomes clear when we examine their peculiarities. They are identities which are perhaps too quickly labelled as ‘neonational’ but which, in contrast to the explosive fascistic nationalisms of the twentieth century, do not aim at ideological and military conquests beyond their own borders. These are introverted forms of nationalism which oppose the ‘invasion’ of the global world by turning inwards, though ‘introverted’ here should not be confused with ‘harmless’. For these domestic nationalisms do in fact foster an aggressive intolerance which is capable of turning on anybody or anything. Their novelty consists in the fact that they involve usually conscious resistance to the cosmopolitanization of their life-worlds, to globalization and globalizers who are perceived as threatening the local form of life of the ‘natives’. Those involved seek refuge in a strategic ‘as-if’ essentialism of ethnicity in an attempt to fix the blurred and shifting boundaries between internal and external, us and them. Two things follow. First, these nationalisms also presuppose the daily experience of globalization. And, second, without a proper understanding of how globality overcomes and reconfigures differentiations, hence without a cosmopolitan outlook, the new topographies of identity and memory, and the introverted nationalisms they potentially foster, remain utterly incomprehensible.

Some time ago on a flight to Helsinki the passenger next to me, a Danish businessman, irritated me by repeatedly emphasizing how advantageous the European Union is for his business dealings. Less out of curiosity than finally to get a word in edgeways, I asked him whether he felt more Danish or more European. He responded with barely disguised amazement that he saw himself as neither the one nor the other but as a cosmopolitan citizen, a ‘global citizen’. He is at home in all countries in the world. Wherever he goes he speaks English, in which he is fluent. Everywhere a hotel bed is waiting for him. He chooses the well-known hotel chains where he can be sure of uniform standards regardless of the location. In China he eats Indian food, in India French. His business partners see things from a similar viewpoint. Experienced as he is, he knows whom he can trust and whom he can’t, whether in business or in choosing a taxi. By the same token, he is Danish born and bred, lives in Denmark and feels Danish. At Christmas he is a Christian, at election time a social democrat. Recently, however, he joined a civic movement supporting a restrictive immigration policy. God knows he is in favour of foreigners, he added without a glimmer of embarrassment, but the flood of immigrants has to stop! And so on, and so forth. After a brief pause he returned to my question: no, he is not a European – the idea never even occurred to him.

This is without doubt a paradigm example of a determination of identity that has replaced the either/or logic with the both/and logic of inclusive
differentiation. One constructs a model of one’s identity by dipping freely into the Lego set of globally available identities and building a progressively inclusive self-image. The result is the proud affirmation of a patchwork, quasi-cosmopolitan, but simultaneously provincial, identity whose central characteristic is its rejection of traditional relations of responsibility. That this is not necessarily synonymous with the cosmopolitan humanitarianism one usually associates with the label ‘world citizen’ should be clear from the fact that, although politics is a matter for election day for our ‘global manager’, at the same time he is campaigning against immigrants.

Here things are being yoked together that do not fit. For the invoked attachments do not fit into the fragmentary composition which is presented with a ring of inner conviction. It is like a painting of Picasso or Braque in which the naïve viewer looks for familiar traces of a coherent landscape or a group of people, whereas the work is playing with tokens of reality. This is a valid comparison, for our Danish world business citizen with his xenophobic outbursts is drawing freely on the historical refuse of formerly exclusive identities and lived identity-formations, just as cubism and expressionism drew on the ruins of realism and classicism.

Cosmopolitan empathy

Thinking in either/or categories prevails not just in classical sociology but also in sociobiology and in ethnological theories of aggression and conflict. The practice of exclusive differentiation is seen as a necessary principle of anthropology, biology, political theory and logic which, all false idealism aside, compels us to differentiate between all kinds of groups, be they tribes, nations, religions, classes or families. Whoever is naïve enough to disregard this ‘logic’ promotes aggression – that is the argument. Accordingly, to this day the myth that defining and demarcating ourselves over against what is foreign is a precondition of identity, politics, society, community and democracy preserves its bloody power in the core domains of the social sciences. Let us call this the ‘territorial either/or’ theory of identity. It assumes that a space defended by (mental) fences is an indispensable precondition for the formation of self-consciousness and for social integration.

This metatheory of identity, society and politics is empirically false. It arose in the context of the mutually delimiting territorial societies and states of the first modernity and generalizes this historical experience, in the shape of methodological nationalism, into the ‘logic’ of the social and the political. But the suffering of human beings in other global regions and cultures, for example, no longer conforms to the friend–foe schema. Whoever asks from a cosmopolitan perspective what fuelled the global protest against the war in Iraq in many major cities across the world finds an answer in cosmopolitan empathy. The protests were driven by what one might call the ‘globalization of
emotions'. Everyone knows that the twentieth century witnessed an incredible refinement of weapons systems and we have learnt that the killing and dying continued unabated long after the peace treaties were signed. And once television images of war and its victims are broadcast all over the world it becomes clear that violence in one corner of the globe incites the readiness to resort to violence in many others, so that the resulting military chain reactions can easily spin out of control. This realization goes hand in hand with the capacity and the willingness to put oneself in the position of the victims, something which is also in large part a product of the mass media. The tears we guiltily wipe from our eyes before the television or in the cinema are no doubt consciously produced by Hollywood trickery and by how the news is stage-managed. But that in no way alters the fact that the spaces of our emotional imagination have expanded in a transnational sense. When civilians and children in Israel, Palestine, Iraq or Africa suffer and die and this suffering is presented in compelling images in the mass media, this produces cosmopolitan pity which forces us to act.

‘For the first time in human history and with the help of major political and technological changes’, writes Howard V. Perlmutter,

we have the possibility of a real time, simultaneously-experienced global civilization with almost daily global events, where global cooperation is in a more horizontal than vertical mode. This is why we now see the possibility of the emergence of one single world civilization with great diversity in its constituent cultures and interdependence among poles. From this historical perspective, there is but one human civilization which is seamless and global in its character but with a magnificent variety of indigenous variations on the life experience. (Perlmutter 1992: 103)

However, it would be a fatal error to conclude that cosmopolitan empathy is replacing national empathy. Instead, they permeate, enhance, transform and colour each other. A false opposition between the national and the transnational would generate an endless chain of misunderstandings. In fact, the transnational and the cosmopolitan should be understood as the summation of the redefinitions of the national and the local. This in no way alters the fact that the territorial theory of identity is a bloody error that might be called the ‘prison error’ of identity. It is not necessary to isolate and organize human beings into antagonistic groups, not even within the broad expanses of the nation, for them to become self-aware and capable of political action.

The social image of frozen, separate worlds and identities that dominated the first modernity of separate nationally organized societies can be completely overcome only when one contrasts exclusive differentiation with the inclusive differentiation that has been investigated and developed in the sociology of the second modernity (Beck, Bonss and Lau 2001, 2004). By way of explanation, consider the emergence of transnational forms of life promoted by the mass media (Robins and Aksoy 2001). Here too the framework of the nation is not overcome. But the foundations of the industries and cultures of
the mass media have changed dramatically and concomitantly all kinds of transnational connections and confrontations have emerged. The result is that cultural ties, loyalties and identities have expanded beyond national borders and systems of control. Individuals and groups who surf transnational television channels and programmes simultaneously inhabit different worlds. How should sociologists describe Turkish- and German-speaking transmigrants who live in Berlin, though not only in Berlin, because they also inhabit transnational networks, horizons of expectation, ambitions and contradictions? Under the presuppositions of methodological nationalism, German-Turkish both/and identities are located and analysed in either one or the other national frame of reference, and are thereby stripped of their both/and character. Hence they appear as ‘uprooted’, ‘disintegrated’, ‘homeless’, living ‘between cultural stools’, and are seen as deficient or negative from the unitary mononational point of view (Beck-Gernsheim 2004).

As a counter-image to the territorial prison theory of identity, society and politics we can provisionally distinguish five interconnected constitutive principles of the cosmopolitan outlook:

• first, the principle of the experience of crisis in world society: the awareness of interdependence and the resulting ‘civilizational community of fate’ induced by global risks and crises, which overcomes the boundaries between internal and external, us and them, the national and the international;
• second, the principle of recognition of cosmopolitan differences and the resulting cosmopolitan conflict character, and the (limited) curiosity concerning differences of culture and identity;
• third, the principle of cosmopolitan empathy and of perspective-taking and the virtual interchangeability of situations (as both an opportunity and a threat);
• fourth, the principle of the impossibility of living in a world society without borders and the resulting compulsion to redraw old boundaries and rebuild old walls;
• fifth, the mélange principle: the principle that local, national, ethnic, religious and cosmopolitan cultures and traditions interpenetrate, interconnect and intermingle – cosmopolitanism without provincialism is empty, provincialism without cosmopolitanism is blind.

One can understand these principles in a normative-philosophical sense; but one can also understand them in an empirical-sociological sense, uncover their internal contradictions and investigate their concrete manifestations. In a certain sense, Alexis de Tocqueville already made a start in this direction, though only with reference to the post-hierarchical, democratic America of his day; however, his observations can be applied to postnational empathy. In the age of the cosmopolitan outlook when
all men think and feel in nearly the same manner, each of them may judge in a moment of the sensations of all the others; he casts a rapid glance upon himself, and that is enough. There is no wretchedness into which he cannot readily enter, and a secret instinct reveals to him its extent. It signifies not that strangers or foes are the sufferers; imagination puts him in their place; something like a personal feeling is mingled with his pity and makes himself suffer while the body of his fellow-creature is in torture. (Tocqueville 1945: 2.175–6)

Natan Sznaider applies these observations to the transnational world. Imagined pity plays a key role in the development of Western humanism:

We are compassionate, and if we are not we ought to be. Only in a democratic setting can compassion be almost substitutive for representation. Public compassion is not only an individual manifestation of human conduct and care for others. Such episodes of human conduct occur everywhere and at all times. A sociology of public compassion addresses a social and collective pattern of conduct in which substantial numbers of people believe that to alleviate the sufferings, pains, and humiliations of others is the right thing to do. (Sznaider 1998: 128–9)

The world of the cosmopolitan outlook is in a certain sense a glass world. Differences, contrasts and boundaries must be fixed and defined in an awareness of the sameness in principle of others. The boundaries separating us from others are no longer blocked and obscured by ontological difference but have become transparent. This irreversible sameness opens up a space of both empathy and aggression which it is difficult to contain. This is a consequence both of pity and of hatred – pity, because the (no longer heterogeneous) other becomes present in one’s feelings and experience, and observing oneself and observing others are no longer mutually exclusive activities; hatred, because the walls of institutionalized ignorance and hostility that protected my world are collapsing.

Both of these sentiments, pity and hatred – the sense of boundarylessness and the longing for the re-establishment of the old boundary-lines – prove that the cosmopolitan outlook is a politically ambivalent, reflexive outlook. When apparently fixed differentiations and dichotomies become sterile, no longer provide orientation, dissolve and intermingle, when the world has mutated into a ‘Babylonian madhouse’ (Robert Musil), when the historical fetishes of the state and the nation can no longer order and control the lives and interactions of human beings, they must themselves find a way to redefine their interests and interrelations among the ruins of former certainties in whatever way makes continued coexistence possible.

On the distinction between globalization and cosmopolitanization

In charting the conceptual topography of the cosmopolitan outlook, it makes sense to distinguish between globalization (or globalism) and cosmopolitanization.
In public discourse the fashionable political term ‘globalization’ is understood primarily in a one-dimensional sense as economic globalization, and is closely connected with what can be called ‘globalism’ (Beck 2005). Globalism promotes the idea of the global market, defends the virtues of neoliberal economic growth and the utility of allowing capital, commodities and labour to move freely across borders. This is also what economists and large sections of the public have in mind when they speak of ‘globalization’. It is argued that globalism is responsible for economic growth in the last two decades all across the globe, and in particular in the so-called developing countries, because it promoted the ‘deregulation’ of markets during the 1980s. Even opposition to globalization remains fixated on this view when it presupposes and defends the power of the autonomous nation-state, which was a feature of the first but not the second modernity.

Cosmopolitanization, by contrast, must be interpreted as a multidimensional process which has irreversibly changed the historical ‘nature’ of social worlds and the standing of states in these worlds. Cosmopolitanization, thus understood, comprises the development of multiple loyalties as well as the increase in diverse transnational forms of life, the emergence of non-state political actors (from Amnesty International to the World Trade Organization), the development of global protest movements against (neoliberal) globalism and in support of a different kind of (cosmopolitan) globalization. People campaign for the worldwide recognition of human rights, for the right to work, for global protection of the environment, for the reduction of poverty, etc. To this extent there are the beginnings (however deformed) of an institutionalized cosmopolitanism, for example, in the paradoxical shape of the anti-globalization movement, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations. When the Security Council makes a resolution it is received as though it speaks for the whole of humanity.

But, one might object, isn’t ‘cosmopolitanization’ simply a new word for what used to be called ‘globalization’? The answer is ‘no’ and it is provided by this book as a whole. To anticipate: precisely the opposite is true, for what takes centre stage is the historically irreversible fact that people, from Moscow to Paris, from Rio to Tokyo, have long since been living in really existing relations of interdependence; they are as much responsible for the intensification of these relations through their production and consumption as are the resulting global risks that impinge on their everyday lives.

If we ask who are the intellectual progenitors of this internal cosmopolitanization of national societies, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Dewey come to mind, as well as such classical German thinkers as Kant, Goethe, Herder, Humboldt, Nietzsche, Marx and Simmel. All of them construed the modern period as a transition from early conditions of relatively closed societies to ‘universal eras’ [universellen Epochen] (Goethe) of interdependent societies, a transition that essentially involved the expansion of commerce and the dissemination of the principle of republicanism.
For Kant, even more so for Marx and in different ways also for Adam Smith and Georg Simmel, the dissolution of small territorial communities and the spread of universal social and economic interdependence (though not yet of risks) was the essential mark, and even the law, of world history. Their pre-occupation with long lines of historical development made them sceptical towards the idea that state and society in their nationally homogeneous manifestations could constitute the non plus ultra of world history.

The experience of delimitation and interdependence has in the meantime condensed and become normalized into a ‘banal cosmopolitanism’, not unlike the ‘banal nationalism’ characteristic of the first modernity (expressed in the waving of national flags, for instance). A small example, which nonetheless speaks volumes, can clarify what is at stake here: the modern odyssey of ‘authentic’ Indian cuisine. Anyone who thinks that the trademark ‘Indian restaurant’ implies that Indian cuisine comes from India is sorely mistaken. Indians in India have no tradition of public restaurants. As the British sociologist Sami Zubaida has shown, the ‘Indian restaurant’ is an invention of Bengalis living in London, as are the ‘exotic dishes’ which are now celebrated and consumed all over the world as ambassadors of Indian traditions. In the course of its march to globalization, the Indian restaurant and its characteristic menu were also ultimately exported to India, which stimulated Indian households to cook Indian food in accordance with the London inventions. Thus it came to pass that today one can eat ‘Indian’ food even in India, thereby confirming the myth of origins.

Banal cosmopolitanism is manifested in concrete, everyday ways by the fact that differentiations between us and them are becoming confused, both at the national and at international level. The modest, familiar, local, circumscribed and stable, our protective shell is becoming the playground of universal experiences; place, whether it be Manhattan or East Prussia, Malmö or Munich, becomes the locus of encounters and interminglings or, alternatively, of anonymous coexistence and the overlapping of possible worlds and global dangers, all of which requires us to rethink the relation between place and world.

Cosmopolitan Munich

I happen to live in Munich. If it is true that the cosmopolitan outlook reveals the cosmopolitan potentialities of the provinces, then it should be possible to show that this is also true of Munich. What does cosmopolitan Munich signify? In the first place, and in the spirit of banal cosmopolitanism, Bayern Munich soccer club.

Thomas Mann wrote: ‘Munich is radiant.’ If I may trivialize Mann somewhat: Bayern Munich is radiant, at least when the professional footballers of this world-famous soccer club score beautiful goals. Does Bayern Munich
stand for Bavaria? Without a doubt. Does it stand for ‘we are who we are’ or, in Bavarian dialect, ‘mir san mir’? No! Absolutely not! Who scores the goals? Often a Brazilian whose wizardry lends the Bavarian football club a touch of world class. Bayern Munich players, of course, are neither from Bavaria nor from Munich; they are of many different nationalities, speak many different languages and have many different passports. What is so dear to many Bavarian hearts – ‘we are who we are’ and the others are others – does not hold when Bavarian hearts are beating fastest. Bayern Munich stands for a profane cosmopolitan ‘We’ in which the boundaries between internal and external, between the national and the international, have long since been transcended. Bayern Munich symbolizes a cosmopolitan Bavaria that officially cannot and must not exist in Bavaria, but which exists nonetheless. Indeed, without this taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism, Bayern Munich, hence Bavaria, would not exist.

Three authors who, among other things, also wrote about Munich and won fame far beyond Munich – Thomas Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger and Oskar Maria Graf – embody in their persons and works three distinct traditions of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, cosmopolitanism which has both ‘roots’ and ‘wings’, namely, national cosmopolitanism (Thomas Mann), German-Jewish cosmopolitanism (Lion Feuchtwanger) and Catholic cosmopolitanism (Oskar Maria Graf).

In Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, written in the shadow of the First World War, Thomas Mann struggles with the question: what does cosmopolitanism mean? He finds words connoting demarcation – ‘non-polyglot facility and sophisticated dilettantism’, ‘non-pacified Esperanto-world’ – but also positive terms: ‘encounters’, ‘intermingling’, even ‘global sense’, and, anticipating the globalization debate, ‘sense of boundarylessness’. He rejects the alternative ‘nationalism versus internationalism’ and formulates the position of a national cosmopolitanism of intellectual Germany, although he is well aware of the in-built ambivalences. Accordingly, he emphasizes that ‘it is almost part of German humanity to act in a non-German, or even anti-German, fashion; it is commonly assumed that a sympathy for the cosmopolitan that is corrosive of national sensibility is inseparable from German nationality; that one may have to lose one’s Germanness in order to find it; that without an addition of the foreign it may be impossible to achieve a higher Germanness’ (Mann 1983a: 71).

Mann also stresses the mélange principle, the both/and of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. By the same token, he draws a problematic distinction between ‘German world citizenship’ and ‘democratic internationalism’. He considers ‘whether German world citizenship is not something different from democratic internationalism, and whether being a German world citizen is not indeed compatible with a deep love for one’s nation’ (Mann 1983a: 152). How easily this bourgeois-intellectual nationalist-cosmopolitanism can mutate into ignorance and conceit can be seen when Mann identifies