The Lure of Technocracy
Jürgen Habermas

The Lure of Technocracy

Translated by Ciaran Cronin
Contents

Preface to the English Edition vii

Part I: The Lure of Technocracy
1 The Lure of Technocracy: A Plea for European Solidarity 3
2 European Citizens and European Peoples: The Problem of Transnationalizing Democracy 29
3 Keywords on a Discourse Theory of Law and of the Democratic Constitutional State 46

Part II: European Conditions. Continued Interventions
4 The Next Step – An Interview 63
5 The Dilemma Facing the Political Parties 73
6 Three Reasons for ‘More Europe’ 80
7 Democracy or Capitalism? On the Abject Spectacle of a Capitalistic World Society Fragmented along National Lines 85

Part III: German Jews, Germans and Jews
8 Jewish Philosophers and Sociologists as Returnees in the Early Federal Republic of Germany: A Recollection 105
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9  Martin Buber – A Philosophy of Dialogue in its Historical Context</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Our Contemporary Heine: ‘There are No Longer Nations in Europe’</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes and References 154
Preface to the English Edition

The texts included in the third part of this essay collection deal with the relationship between Jews and Germans, a topic that touches the most sensitive nerve of the political self-understanding of citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. The essay on Heinrich Heine also revisits the European theme of the two preceding parts of the volume.

In the first part, the title essay, which presents my view of the crisis politics of the Eurozone, is followed by two more strictly academic contributions. My interest in the complex issue of European integration has always also been informed by the viewpoint of the philosophy of law. The entirely unique character of the European Union has thus far eluded clear conceptualization in political science and constitutional law. If the project is not destined to fail after all, then this unification process could signal a decisive step towards a postnational world order, one which is also indispensable if unbridled global capitalism is to be steered into socially acceptable channels. The second part of the book contains political interventions from the past two years. They are meant to familiarize British readers in particular with a German perspective on problems that affect us all. In both respects, the present book is a continuation of my two previous studies on European politics.¹
However, the results of both the most recent European election and current opinion polls reflect a high degree of scepticism towards and rejection of ‘Brussels’. Given this desolate state of affairs, my perseverance in advocating European integration will be greeted with amazement. But in view of the deepening European political divide between the continent and the UK, it is all the more necessary for us to familiarize ourselves with each other’s perspectives.

The unanimous opposition of all British parties to the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission, and hence as the leader of the Brussels executive, was a clear signal of the antagonisms that exist – and have existed from the beginning – between the UK and most continental countries over the goal of European unification. To date, conflicts over goals have been sparked mainly by the question of whether each of the incremental territorial ‘enlargements’ of the Union must be followed by a corresponding ‘deepening’ of its institutions – or whether the purpose of the Union should be more or less exhausted in a single market.

Since the banking and sovereign debt crisis, the question of further integration has acquired renewed urgency. On this occasion, economic imperatives necessitated another step of integration within an insufficiently institutionalized monetary union – that is, within the Eurozone. In the UK, this development has stirred up old conflicts, even if the triggering causes of the increasing Europhobia did not have their origin in the country itself but on the continent.

In order to avert the dangers of the current economic crisis, the member states of the European Monetary Union have been compelled to engage in closer intergovernmental cooperation over the past five years. This has led to regulations that fall far short of halting the trend towards increasing imbalances between the national economies
of these countries. However, the new technocratic form
of cooperation, which for the present still largely eludes
democratic controls, has increased the awareness of an
already existing shortfall in legitimacy. The national par-
liaments have been caught by surprise by the measures to
combat the crisis. As a result, there is a heightened sensi-
tivity in the Eurozone that the European decision-making
structures are in need of an overhaul. This explains the
outrage that arose here when, after the most recent
European election, the heads of government wanted
to disregard the most successful among the candidates
fielded by the European parties for the post of President
of the Commission. The need for further democratization
is felt more strongly in the core European countries than
in the countries on the periphery.

To be sure, these causes are merely triggers for the dis-
pute over the objectives that the citizens associate with
European unification. Such conflicts over goals carry
weight when they break out, even for understandable
reasons, between whole nations. Attitudes towards the
project of unification that was once outlined in vision-
ary terms by Winston Churchill are shaped by a mixture
of national interests and the historical self-understand-
ing of a nation. Such an issue cannot be a matter of the
one side being right and the other wrong. In retrospect,
the political elites are at worst open to the charge of
having pressed ahead with this project over the heads
of their populations. Now, in a long-overdue process of
political will-formation among the citizens themselves,
lost ground has to be recuperated under unfavourable
circumstances.

It may help us to gain a better understanding of
national differences to recall the truly historic speech
delivered by the great statesman and rousing orator
Churchill in the Festsaal of the University of Zürich
on 19 September 1946. The Shakespearean format of
this speech has often been praised. One need only call
to mind the ruined landscape of a Europe reduced to rubble and bled to death in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the recent mass murders and crimes against humanity, to be amazed even today at the improbability and the visionary power of that far-sighted perspective presented in this speech. To his contemporaries, this man, whom they knew to be an inveterate political realist, must have seemed like a dreamer.

Churchill is clearly aware of this situation and speaks first in the conditional: ‘If Europe were once united in sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to happiness, to the prosperity and the glory . . .’ Then he evokes present and future dangers – ‘the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny and terror’ – but only to offer a surprising answer to the rhetorical question of what could rescue the situation: ‘We must build a kind of United States of Europe.’ Given the perplexity that this could be expected to arouse among his audience, he appeals to the courage of the hesitant: ‘All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing.’ And then Churchill becomes practical, well aware that his proposal could not fail to appear unreasonable to a contemporary audience: ‘I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be partnership between France and Germany. . . . The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones . . .’ From these beginnings a supranational union of states should progressively emerge: ‘Why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted people of this turbulent and mighty continent?’
It may come as a surprise to today’s readers that Churchill mentioned the vantage point from which he was speaking only at the end of his address – with his impassioned words, he was appealing as a Briton to Frenchmen and Germans, and to their neighbours. He was addressing those governments and peoples of the continent who would be called the ‘core’ of Europe only half a century later, from the perspective of a friendly and helpful observer. As was still quite obvious at the time, he saw Great Britain and the Commonwealth, alongside America and Russia, as ‘sponsors’ of the unification process he was recommending.

Almost seven decades later, the improbable has become a reality. Even the British themselves have in the meantime become citizens of the European Union. And soon they will have to make up their own minds whether they want to withdraw back into the observer perspective of the far-sighted adviser of that time, or whether they prefer after all to remain true to the role that they have adopted in the meantime – that of addressees who followed his wise counsel.

Jürgen Habermas
Starnberg, August 2014
I

The Lure of Technocracy
1

The Lure of Technocracy
A Plea for European Solidarity

(1) In its current form, the European Union owes its existence to the efforts of political elites who were able to count on the passive consent of their more or less indifferent populations as long as the peoples could regard the Union as being also in their economic interests, all things considered. The Union legitimized itself in the eyes of its citizens primarily through the results it produced rather than by fulfilling the citizens’ political will. This can be explained not only from the history of its origins but also from the legal constitution of this unique formation. The European Central Bank, the Commission and the European Court of Justice have intervened most profoundly over the decades in the everyday lives of European citizens, even though these institutions are almost completely beyond the reach of democratic controls. Moreover, the European Council, which has energetically taken the initiative during the current crisis, is made up of heads of government whose role in the eyes of their citizens is to represent their respective national interests in distant Brussels. Finally, at least the European Parliament is supposed to establish a bridge between the political battles of opinions in the national arenas and the momentous decisions taken in Brussels. But there is hardly any traffic on this bridge.

Thus, to the present day there remains a gulf at the
European level between the citizens’ opinion- and will-formation and the policies actually pursued for solving the pressing problems. This also explains why conceptions of the European Union and its future among the general population continue to be diffuse. Informed opinions and articulate positions on the direction of European development have to the present remained substantially the monopoly of professional politicians, economic elites and scholars with relevant interests; not even the intellectuals who usually participate in public debates have made this issue their own.¹ What currently unite European citizens are the Eurosceptical mindsets that have become more pronounced in all of the member countries during the crisis, albeit in each country for different reasons and for reasons that tend to polarize. Although this trend is an important factor to be taken into account by the political elites, the growing resistance is not really decisive for the actual course of European policymaking, which is largely uncoupled from the national arenas. The influential European political camps are forming in the circles that decide on the policies in accordance with controversial crisis diagnoses. The corresponding orientations reflect the well-known basic political orientations.

The European political groupings can be differentiated in accordance with preference variables that are located in two dimensions; it is a matter, on the one hand, of conflicting assessments of the importance of nation-states in an increasingly integrated and highly independent world society, and, on the other, of the familiar preferences for or against strengthening politics vis-à-vis the market. The fields of the cross-classification table that can be constructed by combining these pairs of attitudes towards the desired future of Europe yield, ideally speaking, four patterns of attitudes: among the defenders of national sovereignty, for whom even the decisions taken since May 2010 on the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and in the Fiscal Compact go too far, are, on the one hand, ordoliberal proponents of a lean nation-state and, on the other, republican or right-wing populist proponents of a strong nation-state. Among the proponents of the European Union and its progressive integration, by contrast, are, on the one side, economic liberals of various types and, on the other side, those who argue that the rampant financial markets should be tamed by supranational institutions. If we divide up the advocates of an interventionist policy once again according to where they are located on the left–right spectrum, we could distinguish among the Eurosceptics not only, as mentioned, between republicans or left communitarians and right-wing populists, but also within the integrationist camp between the Eurodemocrats and the technocrats. Of course, the Eurodemocrats should not be summarily equated with ‘Eurofederalists’, because their ideas on the desirable shape of a supranational democracy are not confined to the model of a European federal state.

The technocrats and the Eurodemocrats constitute, together with the Europe-friendly economic liberals, the temporary alliance of those who are pushing for deeper integration, though only the supranational democrats want to continue the unification process in order to bridge the gulf between politics and policies which is the decisive factor in the existing democratic deficit. All three factions have reasons for supporting the emergency measures adopted thus far to stabilize the single currency, whether out of conviction or willy-nilly. Most likely, however, this course is being pursued and implemented mainly by a further group of pragmatic politicians who follow an incrementalistic agenda. The politicians who wield power and decide on the course are moving without a comprehensive perspective towards ‘More Europe’, because they want to avoid the
far more dramatic and probably more costly alternative of abandoning the euro.

From the perspective of our typology, however, cracks are forming in this heterogeneous alliance. The pragmatists who are setting the agenda in the short run are allowing the snail’s pace of reforms to be dictated by short-term economic and everyday political ‘imperatives’, while the more far-sighted pro-European forces are pulling in different directions. The market radicals are primarily interested in relaxing the restrictions on the European Central Bank’s self-chosen refinancing policy. The interventionists, buoyed by a tailwind from the crisis-hit countries, are demanding that the austerity course imposed by the German government be supplemented with targeted investment offensives. The primary concern of the technocrats, meanwhile, is to strengthen the decision-making power of the European executive, while the Eurodemocrats defend different models of a Political Union. Driven by different motivations, these three forces are striving to supersede in different directions the rickety status quo to which the governments and political parties, which are under pressure to demonstrate their legitimacy, are clinging in the face of growing Euroscepticism.

The dynamic of the conflicting motives shows that the existing pro-European coalition will disintegrate as soon as the unresolved problems compel the political elites to view and deal with the crisis within an extended time horizon. The road map for a deepening of the institutions of the Economic and Monetary Union drawn up by the Commission, the President of the Council and the Central Bank is testimony to the dissatisfaction with the reactive nature of the existing approach. The heads of government of the Eurozone initially requested this plan, but immediately shelved it again, because they shy away from grasping the hot iron of a formal transfer of sovereignty rights to the European level. For