


An abstract painting with a rich, textured background. The top half is dominated by deep blues and teals, with some lighter, cloud-like strokes. The bottom half transitions into vibrant greens and yellows, with bold, expressive brushstrokes in white, orange, and red at the very bottom. The overall effect is one of dynamic energy and depth.

Cosmopolitanism

Ideals and Realities

DAVID HELD

J. Held

Cosmopolitanism

David Held

COSMOPOLITANISM

Ideals and Realities

polity

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Preface

The arguments in this volume have evolved over the past decade. Throughout this period three key terms have defined my intellectual preoccupations: democracy, globalization and cosmopolitanism. Each of these refers to a set of ideas as well as social processes which have shaped, and continue to shape, our lives.

Democracy, from ancient cities to contemporary political systems, has been the most powerful of all political ideas, expressing, as it does, the yearning for self-determination and all the achievements and limitations of the actual processes involved. From cities to nation-states, democracy has become associated with the aspiration of people to rule themselves in their own community, and with the gains and frustrations associated with this. Democracy has set itself against arbitrary rule in all its forms and yet has only incompletely achieved its core objective.

Globalization defines a set of processes which are reshaping the organization of human activity, stretching political, economic, social and communicative networks

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across regions and continents. Power is no longer simply articulated in particular geographic sites and locations, but is spread and diffused across the world in such a way that what occurs in one place can have ramifications across many others. If democracy expresses the idea of self-government within a delimited space, the local and national territory, globalization refers to activities and systems of interaction which create what I call overlapping communities of fate – the interlinking of the fortunes of cities and countries.

Democracy and globalization pull in different directions, or so it seems. Democracy pulls towards the self-organization of activity in delimited territories, and globalization pulls towards the creation of new dense forms of transborder interaction, raising the question of how these can be brought under democratic control and rendered accountable. If all our key political ideas and mechanisms have been developed with reference to particular communities and spaces, how can they be reinvented to embrace a global age?

Clues to an answer to this question can be found in the third term: cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism elaborates a concern with the equal moral status of each and every human being and creates a bedrock of interest in what it is that human beings have in common, independently of their particular familial, ethical, national and religious affiliations. It does not deny the historical, sociological and political significance of these kinds of identity, but argues that they can obscure what it is that all people share – the bundle of needs, desires, anxieties and passions that define us all as members of the same

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species. Human life can come to an end for diverse reasons, but these have common roots: hunger, illness, loneliness and so on. Human life cannot be sustained without satisfying basic needs whether these be physical, psychological or social.

We need to understand the latter if we are to grasp the proper limits to human diversity, limits which specify necessary conditions for human activity, whether it is found in families, groups or nation-states. These limits articulate necessary boundaries which no human activity should cross – boundaries concerning violence, arbitrary decision-making, the nature and scope of power, among other pressing concerns.

If democracy is about self-determination, globalization about transborder processes and cosmopolitanism about universal principles which must shape and limit all human activity, together they help us understand that the fate of humankind can no longer be disclosed merely by examining self-enclosed political and moral communities, and that the principles of democracy and cosmopolitanism need to be protected and nurtured across all human spheres – local, national, regional and global. If some of the most powerful processes and forces in the world are to be brought under the sphere of influence of public deliberation and democratic accountability, then we need to articulate the changing basis of communities and the interconnection among them. This is both an empirical challenge and a political one.

These concerns do not generate a simple aspiration for one global community, democratically organized on cosmopolitan principles. Rather, it suggests the necessity

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to recognize the multilevel and multilayered nature of human associations in which we already live, and to find new procedures and mechanisms to ensure that they are bound together by common principles and democratic processes which allow for democracy to flourish, from cities to global networks, in the context of a shared commitment to boundaries which define necessary limits on human action, whether these are political, economic, social or environmental. This volume addresses this overriding concern.

The chapters that follow were all written initially as essays. The dates of their original publication can be found in the acknowledgements. They all have been substantially rewritten for this book in order to develop arguments where relevant, to minimize overlap, to avoid repetition and to change examples if the originals now seem out of date or anachronistic. Chapter 4, 'Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age' (written in November 2001), has been least altered because it is my attempt to make sense of 9/11 and the military response that followed, and because I think the arguments and examples are still valid despite the passage of some years. Reworked, the chapters constitute an account of my thinking about democracy, globalization and cosmopolitanism – their changing rationale and relevance to life in a global age.

Of the many people who have influenced this book, I would particularly like to acknowledge my co-authors of chapter 6, Kevin Young, and of chapter 7, Angus Fane Hervey. Neither chapter would have the shape or detail they have without their contribution. Pietro Maffettone has been indispensable in helping to compile

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and edit the book, as has Charlie Roger, whose eye for detail has been immensely valuable.

David Held
January 2010

Introduction: Changing Forms of Global Order

Until recently, the West has, by and large, determined the rules of the game on the global stage. During the last century, Western countries presided over a shift in world power – from control via territory to control via the creation of governance structures created in the post-1945 era. From the United Nations Charter and the formation of the Bretton-Woods institutions to the Rio Declaration on the environment and the creation of the World Trade Organisation, international agreements have invariably served to entrench a well-established international power structure. The division of the globe into powerful nation-states, with distinctive sets of geopolitical interests, and reflecting the international power structure of 1945, is still embedded in the articles and statutes of leading intergovernmental organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Voting rights are distributed largely in relation to individual financial contributions, and geo-economic strength is integrated into decision-making procedures.

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The result has been susceptibility of the major international governmental organizations (IGOs) to the agendas of the most powerful states, partiality in enforcement operations (or lack of them altogether), their continued dependency on financial support from a few major states, and weaknesses in the policing of global collective action problems. This has been dominance based on a ‘club’ model of global governance and legitimacy. Policy at the international level has been decided by a core set of powerful countries, above all the ‘G1’, G5 and G7, with the rest largely excluded from the decision-making process.

Towards a multipolar world

Today, however, that picture is changing. The trajectory of Western dominance has come to a clear halt with the failure of dominant elements of Western global policy over the past few decades. The West can no longer rule through power or example alone. At the same time, Asia is on the ascent. Over the last half-century, East and Southeast Asia has more than doubled its share of world GDP and increased per capita income at an average growth rate almost two and a half times that in the rest of the world (Quah, 2008). In the last two decades alone, emerging Asian economies have experienced an average growth rate of almost 8 per cent – 3 times the rate in the rich world (*Economist*, 2009).

As a result, Asia has been both a stabilizing influence on and a steady contributor to world economic growth.

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According to the IMF, China alone accounted for around a third of global economic growth in 2008, more than any other nation, and its economy was the only one of the world's 10 biggest which expanded in the wake of the financial crisis (IMF, 2009). Other Asian economies have bounced back from the financial crisis far more quickly than anyone expected. As an article in the *New York Times* (2009) points out, the United States has always led the way out of major global economic crises, but this time the catalyst came from China and the rest of Asia. These countries are no longer simply beholden to the US and other Western countries as recipients of their exports, and this decoupling has to some extent allowed Asian economies to recover more quickly. Boosted by increased consumer spending and massive government-led investment, the region as a whole grew by more than 5 per cent in 2009 – at a time when the old G7 contracted by over 3.5 per cent. Simply put, we are seeing a fundamental rebalancing of the world economy, with the centre of gravity shifting noticeably to the East.

The trajectory of change is towards a multipolar world, where the West no longer holds a premium on geopolitical or economic power. Moreover, different discourses and concepts of governance have emerged to challenge the old Western orthodoxy of multilateralism and the post-war order. At the same time, complex global processes, from the ecological to the financial, connect the fate of communities to each other across the world in new ways, requiring effective, accountable and inclusive problem-solving capacity. How this capacity can be ensured is another matter.

The paradox of our times

What I call the paradox of our times refers to the fact that the collective issues we must grapple with are of growing cross-border extensity and intensity, yet the means for addressing these are weak and incomplete. While there is a variety of reasons for the persistence of these problems, at the most basic level the persistence of this paradox remains a problem of governance.

We face three core sets of problems – those concerned with (i) sharing our planet (climate change, biodiversity and ecosystem losses, water deficits); (ii) sustaining our humanity (poverty, conflict prevention, global infectious diseases); and (iii) developing our rulebook (nuclear proliferation, toxic waste disposal, intellectual property rights, genetic research rules, trade rules, finance and tax rules) (Rischar, 2002). In our increasingly interconnected world, these global problems cannot be solved by any one nation-state acting alone. They call for collective and collaborative action – something that the nations of the world have not been good at, and which they need to be better at if these pressing issues are to be adequately resolved. Yet, the evidence is wanting that we are getting better at building appropriate governance capacity.

One significant problem is that a growing number of issues span both the domestic and the international domains. The institutional fragmentation and competition between states can lead to these global issues being addressed in an ad hoc and dissonant manner. A second problem is that even when the global dimension of a problem is acknowledged, there is often no clear divi-

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sion of labour among the myriad of international institutions that seek to address it: their functions often overlap, their mandates conflict and their objectives often become blurred. A third problem is that the existing system of global governance suffers from severe deficits of accountability and inclusion. This problem is especially relevant in regard to how less economically powerful states and, hence, their entire populations are marginalized or excluded from decision-making.

Economic liberalism and international market integration

For the past two to three decades, the agenda of economic liberalization and global market integration – the Washington Consensus, as it is sometimes called – has been the mantra of many leading economic powers and international financial institutions (see Held, 2004). The thrust of the Washington Consensus was to promote this view and to adapt the public domain – local, national and global – to market-leading institutions and processes (see chapters 5 and 6). It thus bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the common political resistance or unwillingness to address significant areas of market failure, including:

- the problem of externalities, such as the environmental degradation exacerbated by current forms of economic growth;
- the inadequate development of non-market social factors, which alone can provide an effective balance

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between ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ and thus ensure an adequate supply of essential public goods, such as education, effective transportation and sound health;

- the underemployment or unemployment of productive resources in the context of the demonstrable existence of urgent and unmet need; and
- global macroeconomic imbalances and a poor regulatory framework – policies that led to the financial crisis.

Today, there are strong grounds for doubting that the standard liberal economic approach delivers on promised goods and that global market integration is the indispensable condition of development. The implementation of such policies by the World Bank, the IMF and leading economic powers has often led to counter-productive results at national and global levels. The countries that have benefited most from globalization are those that have not played by the rules of the standard liberal market approach, including China, India and Vietnam.

Leaving markets alone to resolve problems of resource generation and allocation neglects the deep roots of many economic and political difficulties, such as the vast asymmetries of life chances within and between nation-states, the erosion of the economic fortunes of some countries in sectors like agriculture and textiles while these sectors enjoy protection and assistance in others, the emergence of global financial flows which can rapidly destabilize national economies, and the

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development of serious transnational problems involving the global commons.

The financial crisis is a case in point. High levels of consumer spending in the West, fuelled by easy access to credit, underwritten by high rates of savings in exporting countries in the East (especially China) and aided by China's fixed exchange rate and the accumulation of reserves in sovereign wealth funds, created a global liquidity overflow. The resulting asset bubbles and excess leverage which eventually caused the crisis were, however, not due to these factors alone. The key fault-line can be traced to a 'light touch' regulatory system that encouraged risk-taking and allowed money to be diverted into very specific areas: mortgage securitization and off-balance sheet activity (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008). The fallout, when it came, was devastating – and while many financial institutions have emerged relatively unscathed, the damage to Western economies has been huge. The financial crisis has to be understood as part of the structural weakness of the Anglo-American model of capitalism – a model which recently sought to reshape the post-war welfare state through privatization and deregulation in the name of promoting economic efficiency and market success (Lim, 2008).

Security

From the period following the Second World War until 1989, the nature of national security was shaped decisively by the contest between the United States and the

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Soviet Union. The dominance of these world powers, and the operation of alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, constrained decision-making for many states in the post-war years. In the post-Cold War world of the 1990s and the 2000s, the constraints upon state security policy have not been eradicated so much as reconfigured. Instead of bipolarity, the global system now exhibits characteristics of a multipolar distribution of political-economic power. Within this more complex structure, the strategic and foreign policy options confronting an individual state are still significantly defined by its location in the global power hierarchy. But there is much more uncertainty and indeterminacy in the system.

The war against Iraq in 2003 gave priority to a narrow security agenda which was at the heart of the post-9/11 American security doctrine of unilateral and pre-emptive war. This agenda contradicted most of the core tenets of international politics and international agreements since 1945, and had many serious implications. Among them was a return to an old realist understanding of international relations, in which states rightly pursue their national interests unencumbered by attempts to establish internationally recognized limits (such as self-defence or collective security) on their ambitions. But if this ‘freedom’ is granted to the US, why not also to Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and so on? It cannot be consistently argued that all states bar one should accept limits on their self-defined goals. The flaws of international law and multilateralism can either be addressed or taken as an excuse for the further weakening of international institutions

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and legal arrangements. In either event, America's unilateralist moment proved to be short-lived – Iraq and Afghanistan have subsequently revealed the dangers of such a strategy. The US and its allies generalized the wrong warfare model – the Cold War model – onto an era of fragmented, complicated conflicts, and stalled at best, lost at worse.

Most armed forces of the world – military/air/navy – are still developed on a model of nation-states at war with one another, based on the organizational principle of conflicting geopolitical state interests. And global military spending, fuelled by such preconceptions, has been on a sustained upward trend. Total global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have reached \$1.464 trillion, representing an increase of 4 per cent in real terms compared to 2007, and of 45 per cent over the 10-year period 1999–2008 (SIPRI, 2009: 179). To put this in perspective, the total is:

- 2.4 per cent of global GDP, or \$217 for every person on the planet;
- 13 times the total spent on all types of development aid;
- 700 times the total amount spent on global health programs;
- roughly the same as the combined total GDP of every country in Africa;
- only the total cost of the financial crisis, eight times as large, dwarfs it.

The United States accounts for the majority of the global increase – representing 58 per cent of the global increase since the turn of the century, largely due to the

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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have cost around a trillion dollars thus far (ibid.: 185). However, the US is far from the only country to pursue such a determined course of militarization. China and Russia have both nearly tripled their military expenditure, while other regional powers – such as Algeria, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, South Korea and Saudi Arabia – have also made substantial contributions to the total increase. Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, only France has held its spending relatively steady, with a rise of just 3.5 per cent in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The effects of the global financial crisis – in particular, growing government budget deficits and the economic stimulus packages that are aimed at countering the crisis – seem to have had little impact so far on military spending, with most countries, including the US and China, remaining committed to further increases in the years ahead.

Yet, according to the 2009 SIPRI yearbook, the most comprehensive open-source account of developments in global conflicts and security, of the 16 major armed conflicts that were active in 15 locations around the world in 2008, not one was a major interstate conflict (ibid.: 69).

Militaries remain organized on a national, rather than regional or multilateral basis, with vast duplication, overlap and waste of resources. In countries like the UK and the US, spending levels are now far in excess of any plausible *defensive* needs, and are no longer justified on such grounds. With the exception perhaps of the US and China, no country is capable of acting independently in major conflicts or of intervening against regimes that

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threaten global peace and security. There is something quite baroque about existing armaments, defence positions and tactics (Kaldor, 1982, 2007). Against this background, the way we conduct military spending looks increasingly anachronistic. It bears pointing out that total global spending on multilateral operations such as peacekeeping forces was \$8.2 billion, or 0.56 per cent of total global military expenditures (SIPRI, 2010).

Learning has been slow, but now some of the world's most senior military figures have taken up the challenge and are changing the way warfare is conceived. In a speech at Chatham House, the new head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, warned that traditional methods and forms of warfare are becoming redundant (*Guardian*, 2009). According to Richards, globalization is increasing the likelihood of conflict with non-state and failed state actors, and reducing the likelihood of state-on-state warfare. Despite the use of impressive amounts of traditional combat power, the US and NATO, 'the most powerful military alliance in the history of the world', has failed to impress or deter opponents with recourse to asymmetric tactics and technology (*ibid.*). Similarly, General Stanley McChrystal, formerly NATO's most senior commander in Afghanistan, has warned that the West's military strategy is failing, and that a new approach is necessary. He is reported to have said that the initiative may have been handed to the Taliban by NATO forces charging like bulls at 'matador' insurgents and haemorrhaging with each thrust of the sword (*Independent*, 2009).

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What might such an approach look like? For a start, armed forces of the future will have to deal with new types of weapons systems and methods of warfare. According to General Richards, the lexicon of today is ‘non-kinetic effects teams, counter-IED, information dominance, counter-piracy, and cyber attack and defence’ (*Guardian*, 2009). Armed forces of the future will need to be relevant to emerging security challenges and the increasingly sophisticated adversaries they face. Moreover, General David Petraeus, until recently head of the US Central Command, and the man who oversaw the 2007 and 2008 ‘surge’ in Iraq, has pointed out that new techniques of warfare are not enough. He stresses the importance of a more comprehensive approach to conflict. By this he means that while the traditional military approach to high ground, bridge crossings and key infrastructure remains valid to varying degrees ‘the terrain that matters most is the human terrain’ (2010: 116). He emphasizes that ‘we have to understand the people, their culture, their social structures, and how systems to support them are supposed to work – and how they do work. And our most important tasks have to be to secure and to serve the people, as well as to respect them and to facilitate the provision of basic services, the establishment of local governance, and the revival of local economies’ (ibid.).

The impact of the global financial crisis

The financial crisis and its after-effects are a particular instance of both of the themes discussed so far – the end of the Washington Consensus and the decline of inter-

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state conflict. It will put further pressure on budgets, and put in sharp relief trade-offs on public expenditure. Of course, such trade-offs are nothing new. The issue is less about the contraction of available money as it is about a shift in public priorities. Security threats are in the process of being downgraded, and at the top of the agenda are now unemployment, finance and low carbon growth, as well as ring-fenced domains such as health services. In short, a time is rapidly approaching when defence budgets will not only taper off as war supplements disappear, but will also compete against ballooning mandatory spending programmes for fewer and fewer tax resources – all, of course, amidst an uncertain path to recovery in the US and Europe.

The financial crisis has also resulted in the emergence of the G20 as the new de facto governance coalition of powerful states – with the US and China at the forefront of all negotiations. While both countries still acknowledge the significance of multilateralism, the shift from the G1, G5 and G8 to the G2 and the G20 reflects the changing balance of power in the world.

Shared problems and collective threats

Today, there is a newfound recognition that global problems cannot be solved by any one nation-state acting alone, nor by states just fighting their corner in regional blocs. As demands on the state have increased, a whole series of policy problems have arisen which cannot be adequately resolved without cooperation with other states and non-state actors. There is a growing

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recognition that individual states are no longer the only appropriate political units for either resolving key policy problems or managing a broad range of public functions.

The policy packages that have largely set the global agenda – in economics and security – have been discredited. The Washington Consensus and Washington security doctrines have dug their own graves. The most successful developing countries in the world are successful because they have not followed the Washington Consensus agenda, and the conflicts that have most successfully been diffused are ones that have benefited from concentrated multilateral support and a human security agenda. The future of organized force in countries like the UK is through regional and international organizations. Cooperation between states is still important, if not more so, but what has changed is the rationale, which is now deeper and more complex. The old threat was the ‘other’; the new threat is shared problems and collective threats. Here are clear clues as to how to proceed in the future. We need to follow these clues and learn from the mistakes of the past if democracy, effective governance and a renewed multilateral order are to be advanced.

Or, to sum up, realism is dead; long live cosmopolitanism!

A cosmopolitan approach

Just as there is not one form of liberalism or one single way to conceptualize democracy, there is not one unified