IMPERIAL ENDGAME

Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire

BENJAMIN GROB-FITZGIBBON
Imperial Endgame
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Imperial Endgame
Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire

Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon
Assistant Professor of History, University of Arkansas, USA
For my wife, Amanda,
and my children,
Sophia, Isabel, and Kieran
The central purpose of British Colonial Policy is simple. It is to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.

*Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1948*

There is nothing in the colonial record of Great Britain for which we have cause to hang our heads. I claim that The Queen's peace, the advance of enlightenment and knowledge, the increased prosperity, the rising standard of life, freedom from fear, which we have brought with us, are achievements with which we can face the verdict either of history, or of a still higher judgement, with pride and confidence.

*Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1953*

As I see it the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice? The struggle is joined, and it is a struggle for the minds of men. What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life.

*Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister, 1960*
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This is my third book. It has been by far the most satisfying and the most challenging. For that reason, I have accumulated a debt of gratitude to many. At the University of Arkansas, I have received generous financial and moral support. I am particularly grateful to the Dean of the Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences, Bill Schwab, and to my department chair, Lynda Coon, both of whom have stood behind me throughout this enterprise. Fulbright College has provided me with much financial assistance, as has the Cleveland C. Burton professorship (of which I am the inaugural holder), the Nolan endowment, the Robert C. and Sandra Connor endowment, and the E. Mitchell and Barbara Singleton endowment. In the department of history, I am grateful for the support of my colleagues, particularly Randall Woods, Elliot West, Dan Sutherland, Patrick Williams, Joel Gordon, Tom Kennedy, and especially Calvin White, Jr.—I have come to value their friendship and good judgment on a daily basis. Thanks also to Beth Juhl and the other staff at Mullins Library and Dean Bob McMath of the Honors College.

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Prologue

The story of the British Empire in the twentieth century is one of decline, disarray, and despondency. Or so we have been told. Historians have generally viewed Britain's postwar imperial journey through the lens of reactive defeat. Ronald Hyam best captures this consensus in his work *Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968* when he uses a cricketing analogy to describe the four main interpretations of Britain's end of empire: "Either the British were bowled out (by nationalists and freedom-fighters), or they were run out (by imperial overstretch and economic constraints), or they retired hurt (because of a collapse of morale and 'failure of will'), or they were booed off the field (by international criticism and especially United Nations clamor)." The key point here is that in each of these cases, Britain lost the match. Hyam adds his own voice to this cacophony of defeat: "'[S]uccess' is not a theme or prediction that history can endorse for the twentieth-century British empire." This viewpoint is prominently held in the literature on decolonization, where it is implied that prior to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's famous "wind of change" speech in 1960, decolonization—like the birth of empire—occurred in a fit of absence of mind. Historians have overwhelmingly held that Britain's end of empire was a mismanaged disaster. Those who administered it were paralyzed by uncertainty, inaction, and a general lack of direction, and those in charge received contradictory and conflicting advice that crippled proper governance. At first blush, it is not hard to see the source of this stance. For the fifteen years following the Second World War, the British
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Empire was ablaze with insurgencies: in Palestine, insurrectionary bombings and an underground terrorist organization; in Malaya, a powerful communist revolt; in Kenya, the Mau Mau uprising; in Cyprus, a terror campaign waged by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston—the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters); and in Aden, Oman, and Dhofar, tribal rebellions. Throughout it all, British politicians, colonial administrators, and the security forces struggled to put out the flames to prevent empire’s end.

Yet British counterinsurgency policy in the postwar empire was not merely a matter of military strategy, nor did the British government view each campaign in isolation. In this book, I reveal that the policy developed by the government was in fact one carefully calculated to allow decolonization to occur on British terms rather than those of the indigenous people. With remarkable consistency, and in response to the insurgencies in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and the Middle East, the British government crafted an imperial strategy that was designed to guide much of the formal empire into the British Commonwealth and, as such, into the British and American sphere of influence during the Cold War. When necessary, the government employed counterinsurgency techniques to achieve this end, isolating potential troublemakers—whether nationalists, communists, or tribal rebels—from the general populace while winning the hearts and minds of the majority of colonial subjects. The government’s hope was that these territories might remain within the British world rather than leave it when finally granted independence.

This is not the story we have been told. It has become conventional wisdom to argue that Britain’s postwar counterinsurgency campaigns were an ad hoc and uncoordinated reaction to immediate events on the ground. As such, they have not held a prominent place in our accounts of imperial decline. For example, John Darwin’s otherwise comprehensive Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World devotes just three pages to events in Cyprus, despite a five-year
conflict there, and only four pages to the twelve-year Malayan emergency. Darwin makes little attempt to connect the campaigns one to the other and offers no suggestion that those in Kenya or Aden were even mildly aware of what was occurring in Malaya or Cyprus. Studies that have been dedicated to the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s—such as Charles Townshend’s *Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, Thomas Mockaitis’ *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960*, and John Newsinger’s *British Counter-Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*—have failed to place such events in the larger context of British decolonization, instead compartmentalizing each conflict and exploring them in the context of violence and state control using the tools of the military historian.

The few works that have addressed colonial insurgencies in the framework of decolonization have done so only as national case studies, such as Caroline Elkins’ *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya*, David Anderson’s *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*, Daniel Branch’s *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization*, and R. F. Holland’s *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*. In each of these works, the fact that the colonial office was simultaneously struggling with insurgencies in numerous territories, and that administrators, soldiers, and policemen alike were being constantly transferred from one colony to the other does not merit mention. Yet British decolonization policy, and the counterinsurgency campaigns that supported it, did not pigeon-hole each territory into separate sections, with one viewed in isolation from the others by different government departments. Rather, the British government developed a concerted imperial strategy designed to secure the colonies for the Commonwealth in an orderly transfer of power while maintaining British influence in the region and strengthening overall Western dominance in the Cold War world. This book argues that in this endeavor the government met with considerable success.
That is not to say, of course, that these counterinsurgency campaigns were clean, for they were not. These were Britain’s dirty wars of empire, wars that defied any attempt to place them into the neat categories of black and white and were instead fought in the gray shadows of empire and morality. The British government’s decolonization strategy was predicated on notions of liberal imperialism, on Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden.” British prime ministers, colonial secretaries, and foreign secretaries in both the Labour and Conservative parties drafted policy with the belief firmly in mind that the values and society Britain had achieved over the previous 700 years—based on democracy, good governance, the sanctity of property, and respect for the rule of law—were universal in nature, and that it was the British government’s unique responsibility to present these gifts to the world.

As it became clear that twentieth-century populations rejected the authoritarian methods that Britain had used to inculcate these ideas into the minds of colonial subjects in the Victorian age, the government changed tack to instead steer with the winds of self-governance and national independence. For those within colonial societies who were willing to follow Britain’s timetable toward sovereignty and to do so within the confines of the Commonwealth, the government promised education, social welfare, training in the arts of administration and security, and eventual power. For the minority who rejected Britain’s way, however, there could only be the hard hand of the military. For as has always been the case with liberal imperialism, illiberal measures are required to protect it. These dirty wars of empire were Britain’s imperial endgame. This is their story.
The Attlee Years

July 27, 1945, to October 26, 1951

I. A promised land, but to whom?

George Henry Hall had been His Majesty's colonial secretary for less than three months when, together with the foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, he met with Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and Moshe Shertok, head of Palestine's Jewish Agency. It was early on the morning of November 2, 1945, and despite the elegance of the foreign office building in which they sat, their conversation was as grim as the November day outside. Dispensing with all normal diplomatic pleasantries, Bevin at once accused the Jewish Agency of collaboration in the shocking events of the day before, when terrorists in Palestine had sunk three police naval vessels, severed the railway in 242 places, bombed the stationmaster's office in Jerusalem, and badly damaged seven locomotives. Bevin asked whether the British government was now to assume that the Jews wished to settle the Palestine question by force, warning that if so, the British would respond in kind.

Weizmann and Shertok insisted that they deplored the violent acts, and Weizmann quoted a resolution passed by the agency to make his point: "The Agency repudiates recourse to violence, but finds its capacity to impose restraint severely tried by the maintenance of a policy which Jews regard as fatal to their future." Bevin immediately dismissed the resolution as a half-hearted statement, pointing out that the latter part of the sentence even...
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seemed to condone violence. The meeting ended on a sour note, with disagreement between Bevin and Weizmann over the level of access the British government had given to the Jewish Agency and with Weizmann reluctantly agreeing to issue a second categorical denunciation of all violence in Palestine. The four men had spoken for less than an hour. The colonial secretary, although technically responsible for the Palestine Mandate, had been a mere observer, overshadowed by the more charismatic Bevin. 2

This was not how Hall had imagined his first three months as colonial secretary would end. He had come to the office with a great sense of optimism, one shared by most members of his party. The general election had taken place on July 5, 1945, although it was not until July 26 that the electoral commission declared the results and only on July 27 that King George VI officially asked Clement Attlee to form the new government. 3 And what an election it had been. Parliament had sat uninterrupted for the previous ten years, all elections suspended during time of war, and although Winston Churchill had formed a national coalition government upon entering Downing Street in May 1940, the cabinet had still been dominated by members of the Conservative Party. Indeed, a Labour prime minister had not held the reins of power since Ramsay MacDonald submitted his letter of resignation amid the great economic crisis of 1931. 4 In late May 1945, however, with the Nazis beaten on the continent and the defeat of Japan seemingly imminent, the Labour Party withdrew from the national coalition, forcing the king to dissolve Parliament and call the first general election in a decade. 5 Despite Churchill’s wartime success, the Labour Party inflicted a shock defeat on the Conservatives, picking up 239 new seats and a majority of 145 over all other parties. 6 It was just the sort of mandate Clement Attlee needed in order to achieve his ambitious program of socialist reform. It was a good time to be a member of the Labour Party. 7

Even so, it had taken the new prime minister a nail-biting week to finalize his cabinet, and Attlee had only called upon Hall to take charge of the colonial office on Friday, August 3.
Hall had expected a ministerial role in the government, having served the Labour Party faithfully since 1922 and acted successively throughout the war as parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies, financial secretary to the admiralty, and parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, but being named colonial secretary exceeded all his hopes and dreams. There was real power in the colonial office, and the territories over which he now presided spread from Canada in the west, across much of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, to Australia and New Zealand in the east. It was truly an empire upon which the sun never set, and in 1945 it was at its greatest geographic expanse.

The three months that followed his appointment, however, quelled all of Hall's initial enthusiasm, and although November 2 was the first time he had actually met with Weizmann and Shertok, it was not his first encounter with the Jewish Agency or the Palestine question. Quite the opposite, it had been the most dominant issue encountered since he had become colonial secretary. British forces had seized Palestine from the Ottoman Empire during the First World War to prevent it from falling into German hands. On November 2, 1917, A. J. Balfour, the British foreign secretary, issued the Balfour Declaration, which read in part: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object." The problem was that in 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, had already promised Palestine to Husain ibn Ali, the Grand Sharif of Mecca, in return for Husain raising Arab armies against the Ottomans in the initial British conquest; and in 1916, the British and French governments had secretly agreed that Palestine would go neither to the Jews nor to the Arabs but would instead, together with the rest of the Middle East, be partitioned into British and French colonies. Ultimately, none of these three promises were fulfilled. In 1922, the newly formed League of Nations delegated to the British the Palestinian territory as a mandate,
under which the British government would administer Palestine but the Palestinian people would remain sovereign rather than British subjects.\textsuperscript{12} To all intents and purposes, Palestine was a British colony but, on paper at least, there was the possibility for both Jewish and Arab independence from British rule.

The Jewish Agency formed shortly thereafter, in 1923, and was established according to the twenty-seven articles laid down by the League of Nations at the creation of the Palestine Mandate. Taking their lead from the Balfour Declaration, these articles committed the British government to nurturing Palestine towards the establishment of an eventual "Jewish National Home" by creating the economic, political, and administrative conditions under which Jewish independence from the British Empire could be achieved.\textsuperscript{13} An Arab Agency, designed to protect Arab interests in light of this generally pro-Jewish charter, was rejected by Arab leaders, thus creating an imbalance in the mandate that would continue for the subsequent two and a half decades.\textsuperscript{14} For the five years after the beginning of the mandate, from 1923 to 1928, the Arab population struggled to form a response to the declared British policy of a Jewish national home, all the while contending with increased Jewish immigration into Palestine. While the Jewish Agency strengthened its hold on Jewish-Palestinian society, liaising with the British government to ensure that those newly arrived Jews received proper housing, jobs, and other necessities of life, there was a distinct lack of leadership in the Arab community.\textsuperscript{15}

All this changed in September 1928. On the twenty-fourth of that month, on \textit{Yom Kippur} (the Jewish day of atonement), Jewish leaders placed a screen on Jerusalem's Western (Wailing) Wall to separate Jewish men from women. This wall, however, was regarded by Palestine's Muslim population as sacred, being the spot where Prophet Muhammad had tethered his horse after his journey from Mecca to Jerusalem. The precedent laid down by the Ottoman rulers was that no foreign objects could be attached to places perceived as holy by either religion, a policy known as the principle of \textit{status quo}. Under mandate rule, the
British continued this practice. Edward Keith-Roach, the British deputy district commissioner in Jerusalem, therefore ordered the police to remove the screen, which they duly did. The Arab leadership in Palestine pointed to the Yom Kippur incident as evidence of Jewish foul play and began a propaganda campaign aimed at enhancing Muslim claims on Palestinian land. This campaign was accompanied by Arab building work directly next to and above the Western Wall, from which bricks would occasionally be dropped onto Jewish persons praying below.

Tensions between the two communities rose throughout the spring and summer of 1929 and climaxed on August 16, when the Arab community held a demonstration after Friday morning prayers at the Muslim Haram ash-Sharif (the Temple Mount) by the Western Wall, during which thousands of Muslims raised banners, listened to sermons, and burned Jewish prayer books. For the next week, there was a strained standoff between Jerusalem’s Jewish and Muslim populations until on August 23 a number of bloody riots erupted, beginning in Jerusalem but spreading throughout Palestine. In all 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, and a further 339 Jews and 232 Arabs wounded. Following these riots of 1929, the situation in Palestine worsened considerably. In response, in October 1930, the British government published a White Paper that sought to reduce Jewish immigration into Palestine and limit the purchase of land by Jews from Arabs. Following opposition from the Conservative and Liberal parties, however, the Labour prime minister withdrew the White Paper’s policy recommendations in February 1931 and immigration continued unabated.

Between November 1931 and December 1946, 350,800 Jews immigrated to Palestine, with a further natural increase (births minus deaths) of 116,900, compared to Muslim immigration of just 100,000 and a natural increase of 271,000. Consequently, while in 1931 the Jewish population constituted 20 percent of the total population of Palestine (174,600 Jews; 693,000 Muslims; with a negligible number of Christians), by 1946, it had risen to 37 percent (625,000 Jews; 1,044,000 Muslims).
For the four years following the 1929 riots, there was an uneasy quiet in Palestine, but in October 1933, rioting again broke out, with fifteen people killed in Jaffa on the twenty-seventh of that month. Clashes continued throughout the final days of October, and by the end of the month 27 people had been killed and 243 wounded, 46 of whom were in serious condition.19 This time, in contrast to the aftermath of the 1929 riots, the British government made no policy changes and the anger in the Palestine Arab community continued to grow. It was only a matter of time before the tensions underlying this anger bubbled to the surface. In 1936, riots escalated to an Arab general strike followed by an all-out Arab revolt for independence, lasting till 1939.20

The outbreak of the Second World War brought great change to Palestine. In May 1939, just four months before Adolf Hitler's Panzer troops invaded Poland, the British government published a new White Paper in response to the Arab revolt. It declared that the government would move towards an independent Palestine within ten years and placed restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases over a five-year period, the former capped at 75,000 for that half decade. Immigration subsequent to this five-year period would be dependent on Arab consent.21 The Muslim population in Palestine had rebelled against British policy and, as a consequence, had been granted their demands. This lesson was not lost on Palestine's Jewish population. If force could work for the Arabs, so too could it work for the Jews. A war on the European continent, where the British government was distracted by and ultimately engaged in a struggle for survival with Nazi Germany, provided the perfect backdrop against which to launch a campaign of violence.22

Nevertheless the majority of Zionists in Palestine decided to suspend agitation against the British government until after Nazi Germany was defeated; a violent minority was not so accommodating. The Lohamel Herut Israel (LEHI—Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) formed in 1939 as a breakaway group from the Irgun Zvai Leumi (the IZL—National Military Organization), the
militant wing of Zionism, which had largely allied itself with the British on the outbreak of war. LEHI’s founder, Avraham Stern, was heavily read in the literature of Europe’s revolutionary past; he formulated LEHI as a seditious organization that would employ terror against the British Empire, in his view the chief enemy of Zionism. Once the British were defeated and expelled from Palestine, he believed the Zionists would be free to set up the state of Israel, a true national home for the Jews.

The leadership of the IZL initially condemned Stern’s campaign of violence, seeking to instead work with the Jewish Agency towards a peaceful resolution of the Palestine question. The situation changed dramatically in the autumn of 1943, however, when one of the Irgun’s inner leadership circle, Arieh Ben-Eliezer, returned to Palestine from the United States with confirmation that the rumors of a Jewish Holocaust on the European continent were true. This infused a new sense of urgency into the IZL and convinced it that an independent Jewish homeland was needed sooner rather than later. Despite growing revelations of this Holocaust, the British government refused to amend in any way the restrictions placed on Jewish immigration by the 1939 White Paper. This policy decision seemed murderous to many Jews. Consequently, together with Yaacov Meridor, the head of the IZL, Ben-Eliezer approached a recent Polish immigrant named Menachem Begin. They informed him that the Irgun had lost its way and that its leadership—including Meridor—had become old and devoid of ideas. A fresh commander was needed. They asked Begin if he would be that man. With a heavy heart, and fully knowing the consequences of the decision for his life, Begin accepted.

Menachem Begin was an unlikely guerilla warrior. A bespectacled man with a short stature, he was born on August 16, 1913, in Brest-Litovsk, at that time a Russian territory. His early years were spent as a war refugee moving from village to village in the face of the German advance and Russian counter-advance. In 1923, at ten years old, he joined Hashomer Hatzair, a Zionist-scouting organization of sorts, and five years later progressed
to Betar, a radical Zionist fascist party not unlike Germany's Nazi Party in ideology. Here he came under the leadership of Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founder of the Zionist-Revisionist movement, which was dedicated to the immediate establishment of a Jewish state. Following a time at Warsaw University where he studied law, Begin became a political organizer for Betar, rising to become head of its Propaganda Department in September 1935 and Betar commissioner in Poland in April 1939. With the outbreak of the Second World War and the partition of Poland, Begin found himself a political prisoner in the Soviet Union's Lukishki prison and Pechora labor camp throughout 1940 and 1941. He was released only in early 1942 under the condition that he would fight the common German enemy as part of the Polish Free Army. In May of that year, he first set foot in Palestine, brought there by the army he had been forced to join as it made its way through Iran and Iraq.

As an intellectual supporter of Zionism, a party organizer, and a soldier with the rank of private, Begin had never held a leadership position in a militant organization, nor did he have any experience of directing organized violence. His selection as IZL commander in late 1943 was, therefore, surprising. Nevertheless, the 30-year-old Begin approached his new position with vigor. He immediately settled on a strategy of targeted terrorist attacks against institutions of British authority. To carry out this strategy, he reorganized the IZL along the lines of an underground guerilla army, dividing Palestine into military districts and placing each under a senior officer with assault teams, propaganda units, and recruitment officers. Each member of the IZL was given a military rank, and Begin established an intelligence department to carry out reconnaissance on potential British targets. Finally, on February 1, 1944—just three months after taking command—Begin published a declaration of revolt against the British, proclaiming that the armistice between the IZL and British forces was over. On February 12, less than two weeks after this declaration, the IZL began its campaign of terror, simultaneously bombing immigration offices in Jerusalem,
Tel Aviv, and Haifa. The Palestine problem, simmering since the establishment of the mandate in 1922, had finally come to a boil in open insurgency.

In February 1944, however, the British government had greater concerns before it. Beginning on February 12 and continuing until May 17, British soldiers were bogged down in the three battles of Cassino in Italy, where their repeated assaults on German positions at the monastery of Monte Cassino were viciously repelled. Further to the east, on March 12, the Japanese army launched its offensive towards Imphal and Kohima, where British and Indian troops courageously held ground, but only at great cost in lives and material. In the world's oceans, allied losses at sea continued, with the Germans sinking seventy-one merchant ships between January and March 1944. Finally, the preparations for Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, had been set into place in late 1943 and by February 1944 the planning was well underway.

Nevertheless, the British cabinet kept a close eye on developments in Palestine. To assist it in this task, Palestinian police secured the services of an informer within the IZL, Jankelis Chilevicius. Based on the information he provided, in late March 1944, the police arrested fifty individuals for "recent terrorist outrages," including Ben-Eliezer. In return for this information, the police promised Chilevicius passage to the United States. However, American immigration authorities insisted that the normal visa procedures be followed, with a delay of up to six months. Concerned for his safety, the British authorities in Palestine moved Chilevicius to Egypt. Unfortunately, the police in Cairo received information from informers that the IZL knew where he was located. On April 15, 1944, therefore, Sir Harold MacMichael, the British high commissioner in Palestine, sent a telegram to the colonial secretary, Oliver Stanley, requesting that Chilevicius be moved to South Africa. Stanley, rightly realizing that the sanctity of the British intelligence system rested upon its ability to protect informers, immediately contacted William Ormsby-Gore, 4th Baron Harlech, the British high
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commissioner in South Africa. Harlech, however, told MacMichael that there was a “large Zionist population in South Africa” and that if Chilevicius were to come there, “it seems certain that they would learn of it and it is not impossible, though perhaps improbable, that he would be in danger here.” He suggested that it would be better to hold Chilevicius in “some other British territory where there [were] no local Jewish militant factions.” MacMichael reluctantly agreed.

Consequently, Chilevicius was given secret passage to Casablanca on an American military aircraft. However, British authorities in Morocco were not informed of his impending arrival. It was with some confusion, then, that the British consul in Casablanca wrote to the colonial secretary to inform him that a Palestinian had arrived at his office on May 15, 1944, refusing to give his name as anything other than “John,” claiming that he was on an “official mission,” and requesting that the British government help him obtain a French exit visa for the United States. Stanley forwarded the consul’s telegram to MacMichael, who informed him that “John” was Chilevicius. Stanley gave the matter serious consideration and on June 2 ordered the consul in Casablanca to assist Chilevicius in obtaining his visa for the United States. By mid-summer 1944, Chilevicius had settled in New York. In the first intelligence operation in its campaign against the IZL, the British government had successfully infiltrated the organization, gained information leading to the arrest of fifty suspects, and protected its informant with safe passage to the United States. It was an achievement to be proud of.

Nevertheless, the situation in Palestine continued to worsen. Following the attacks of February 12, the IZL exploded bombs on February 27 at income tax offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. It then turned to target the Palestine police, bombing the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) stations at Haifa, Jerusalem, and Jaffa on March 23. At Haifa, these bombs killed three police constables and wounded a fourth; at Jaffa, the CID station was destroyed but without loss of life; and at Jerusalem,