Published in the United States by Isaac Publishing
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Copyright © 2009 Patrick Sookhdeo
UK edition © 2004 Patrick Sookhdeo. Published by Isaac Publishing, Pewsey, UK as Understanding Islamic Terrorism.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
ISBN 978-0-9787141-6-1
ISBN: 9780989290593
Printed in the United States of America
Foreword
1 Introduction: The Interpretation of Sources
2 Sources: Qur’an, hadith, Shari’a
3 The Theology of War, Peace and Empire-Building
4 History: Muhammad and His Successors
5 Violent Sects and Movements Within Islam: Past and Present
6 The Motivation of Terrorists and Suicide Bombers
7 The Making of an Islamist Terrorist
8 Contemporary Muslim Debate
9 Responses to Islamist Terrorism
10 Conclusion
Appendix 1: Traditional Divisions of Islam
Appendix 2: Modern Trends in Islam
Appendix 3: Various Networks of Radical Islam
Appendix 4: “Bin Laden” Audiotape
Appendix 5: Editorial in Al-Masaa (2 February 2004)
Appendix 6: The Zarqawi Document
Glossary
References and Notes
Bibliography
Index of Qur’an References
Index of hadith References
Index
Many books have been published in the past two years purporting to explain the roots of Muslim fundamentalism. Some, like Noam Chomsky, say it is simply a response to American imperialism. Others, following the lead of Samuel Huntington, see it as the result of an inevitable clash between faith-based civilisations. Others again see it as a “pathological response” to the spread of liberal democratic values – having much in common with the mid-20th century aberrations of communism, fascism and nihilism. On this view the blame lies with the failure of liberal civilisation to live up to its own ideals. Hence the Islamist solution is to sweep away the existing order and replace it with God’s rule on earth. But all such reductionist explanations miss the mark unless they cast light on the Muslim tradition of jihad, to which Christianity has no counterpart. Is this to be understood as a holy war of conquest to be pursued until the whole world embraces the Muslim faith, or at least submits to Muslim rule? Or is it more correctly seen as a spiritual struggle against temptation and sin to improve and purify oneself – jihad of the heart? Is it true that Mr. bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against “the Jews and the Crusaders” is regarded by many if not most Muslims as a travesty of their faith? More particularly is suicide bombing rightly seen as a sure route to holy martyrdom or a grotesque distortion of Islam?
Few people are better qualified to interpret the Islamic doctrine of war than the author of this short book. Patrick Sookhdeo comes from a Guyanese background and his knowledge of Islam is derived not only from academic study but also from personal experience. He holds a Ph.D. from London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies, and is a Visiting Fellow at Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science. There are few people to be found anywhere in the world with a better understanding in practice of how Islam works. So while this book relies, as it must, on extensive quotations from the Qur’an and other sources (hadith, Shari‘ah) it is far from being an academic thesis. On the contrary it focuses, quite precisely, on how those sources have led, by means of a logical reasoning process, into an enormously detailed set of rules to regulate every aspect of devotional, family, social, economic, military and political life.
This book falls into four main parts. The first, having introduced the sources and the way in which they are interpreted, sets out the resulting theology of war, peace and the creation of empire. The second deals, in summary outline, with the dramatic expansion and subsequent slow decline of the Muslim world from the seventh century to the present day. The third part deals with the violent sects within Islam, both past and present, the motivation of terrorists and how they are recruited, trained and sent on their deadly missions. The last part deals with the contemporary Muslim debate and offers ten options for dealing with the problem of Islamist terrorism.
This book offers no easy solutions. One has to grapple with the texts, whose meaning is by no means always obvious; and where they oppose each other either reconcile them or live with the contradiction. One has to face the facts of faith and practice which are sometimes ugly and often very alien to our own. One has to admit to glaring mistakes made by the West in trying to cope with Islam over the past thirteen hundred years. Above all one has to think clearly and dispassionately how best to cope with Islamic fundamentalism as we find it today. As Patrick Sookhdeo says “A spider weaves its web in secret in a dark corner, and cannot be tackled until a light is shone upon it”. This book shines a clear light into many corners of this convoluted subject. It is an indispensable primer for all who seek to respond to the Islamic doctrine of war – or even simply to understand it better.
General Sir Hugh Beach GBE, KCB, MC
Hugh Beach spent forty years in the Royal Engineers. His last appointment was as Master General of the Ordnance (Army Board Member for Procurement). After leaving active service he was Warden of St George’s House in Windsor Castle for five years, and in later years he chaired the Boards of Management of both Church Army and SPCK.
The jihad is the Islamic bellum justum and may be regarded as the very basis of Islam’s relationships with other nations.
– Majid Khadduri1
Jihad is the signature tune of Islamic history.
– M.J. Akbar 2
Introduction:The Interpretation of Sources |
1 |
Is the cup half full of water, or is it half empty? Human interpretation of basic data can be influenced by many different factors, exterior and interior, conscious and subconscious. This is particularly true in the religious arena, where basic sources are liable to be given a whole spectrum of interpretations, for ultimately there is no way of proving or disproving any particular believer’s understanding of a religious text.
There is also plenty of scope for contrasting interpretations in many other areas of life. America’s “war on terror”, following the tragic events of September 11th 2001, is considered a “war on Islam” by many Muslims despite repeated denials by western leaders.
The theme of this book is the doctrine of war in Islam, a subject which is surrounded by much confusion. What we can be sure of is that a discussion of war features overtly in Islamic theology and thought from its earliest days until now. We can also be sure that there are a multitude of different interpretations which are sincerely held and practised by different individual Muslims.
An example of difference in interpretation can be clearly seen in the varying understandings of the word “jihad” (literally “striving”). For some Muslims this means military war to spread Islam as a religious and political system – jihad of the sword. For others it is a spiritual struggle against temptation and sin to improve and purify oneself – jihad of the heart. Intermediate are two other possibilities – jihad of the tongue3 and of the hands, aimed at correcting wrongs and supporting what is right.
It is worth noting here that the term “holy war”, so often used as an English translation of “jihad”, did not exist in classical Arabic usage. There is a word for war [harb] and a word for holy [muqaddas] which are sometimes put together in modern Arabic, but were never combined in classical Arabic. However, the use of the term “holy war” in the sense of “war ordained by God” can be supported by the fact that the word “jihad” in the Islamic source texts is commonly followed by the phrase “in the way [i.e. path] of God” and by the fact that the military meaning of jihad was predominant in the understanding of the classical Islamic theologians and jurists.4
Although Islamist terrorists – who are included in those who consider jihad to be military war – are few in number, they should not necessarily be considered a marginalized fringe group rejected by the mainstream of Islamic society as “not real Muslims”. Their guiding principles are not a modern aberration of some undeniably peaceful true Islam but have deep roots in Islamic history and theology. Such terrorists are simply following a particular interpretation of the sources of Islam. They have selected and prioritised certain aspects and texts of Islamic source material. Other interpretations take the same source material and come to a different conclusion. Those who deny the validity of the terrorists’ interpretation are usually very liberal Muslims, whose own interpretations of Islam are unacceptable to the majority. One such example is Bassam Tibi, Professor of International Relations at the University of Göttingen, Germany and formerly Bosch Fellow and Research Associate at Harvard University, who states categorically: “The terrorism of Islamic fundamentalists is not a jihad in the authentic tradition – even though they conceive of their actions as a jihad.”5 It should be noted that others may make similar public denials not through conviction but for tactical reasons.
Contemporary Islam has also produced a range of newer perspectives on war, making a discussion of the subject more complex than it would have been in an earlier age. In the past there was much more of a consensus (albeit always with some dissident variations) on what a Muslim should believe about war. This classical historic understanding has now been challenged by many alternative interpretations. The following chapters of this book will seek to set out the classical Islamic doctrine of war, for this is still the interpretation with which all other interpretations are compared and contrasted by their respective proponents. It is also the doctrine still followed closely by many modern Muslims as will be seen in the latter part of the book.
Some modern arguments against the classical Islamic doctrine of war
Before embarking on a description of the classical Islamic doctrine of war, it is helpful to consider briefly some of the main threads of argument offered by contemporary Muslims who have a more pacific faith than historical Islam. A useful discussion from this viewpoint can be found in the chapter “War and Peace in Islamic Law” by Harfiyah Haleem and Abdul Haleem in The Crescent and the Cross.6 Like other Muslims with a peaceable perspective, the authors tackle a range of points found in the classical Islamic scholars’ doctrine of war and offer alternative interpretations. Clearly it is sometimes a struggle to maintain respect for the revered scholars of the past whose classical interpretations are now being so radically revised. Shafi‘i (768-820)7 is described as confused, and opinions are attributed to him with phrases like “as Shafi‘i himself probably realised” or “this does not necessarily mean that Shafi‘i thought non-combatants could be killed”.8
The purpose of war in Islam is to suppress tyranny, ensure the right of man to his home and freedom within his nation, prevent persecution in religion and guarantee freedom of belief to all people.18
Interestingly both Haleem et al. and Abd es-Salam confound the two justifications – self-defence and the elimination of oppression – and treat these two ideas as if they were one. Perhaps this is indicative of a preferential concern for oppressed Muslims rather than for oppressed people in general.19 (See also the comments of Mohammed al-Asi quoted on page 146.)
Another important contemporary voice who takes the line that jihad is primarily to rescue the weak from persecution is Ali Asghar Engineer.20
A different kind of contextual argument is used by Shaltut with reference to the Qur’anic command “Fight the unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you” (Q 9:123). This Shaltut interprets as a tactical directive for application once legitimate fighting has broken out; it is a war plan which tells the Muslims that “when enemies are manifold, it is imperative to fight the nearest first of all, then the nearest but one and so on, in order to clear the road from enemies and to facilitate the victory.”23
The same reasoning is applied by some scholars to sections of other Islamic teaching on war, not found in the Qur’an. In the words of Dr Bayoumi such legislation is “situation-related” or “time-related”24 and therefore not universally applicable.
Scholars who argue as above are also usually at pains to emphasise that when war becomes necessary it should be fought justly and without recourse to excessive violence. For example, non-combatants should not be harmed, neither should crops, animals or the environment.34 There is also an emphasis on the fact that those who go to war should have the right motives – not for personal glory or for personal gain but what the Qur’an calls fi sabil illah [in the way of God].35
Such scholars may also assert that early Muslims who took a more aggressive stance on war were merely heterodox sects like the Khariji,36 who they argue were not part of mainstream Islam. Nevertheless the scholars’ own efforts to counter and argue away the classical Islamic teaching on war do seem by implication to acknowledge how widely accepted this doctrine has been for many centuries. It is still the benchmark against which all other teaching on war is compared. This is the doctrine which will be outlined in the following chapters.
The development of the classical doctrine
The Islamic doctrine of war was developed over a period of time by the same processes which Islamic scholars used to develop other areas of Islamic doctrine and law. The primary source of Islamic teaching is the Qur’an, revered by Muslims as the word of God, the original being engraved in Arabic on a stone tablet in heaven. Muslims believe that the text of the Qur’an was revealed piecemeal to Muhammad during the last twenty-three years of his life (610-632). Various collections of the revelations were put together, differing slightly from each other, but between 650 and 656 efforts were made to suppress all but one of these.
Second in importance and authority as a source is the hadith, that is traditional accounts of what Muhammad said and did. They gain their authority from Muhammad’s own command in his farewell sermon to hold on to two things he was leaving them that would prevent them going astray – the Qur’an and the hadith.37 Further authority is given by a verse in the Qur’an which urges Muslims to follow Muhammad’s example:
Ye have indeed in the Apostle of God a beautiful pattern (of conduct) Q 33:21
The stories are numerous, and different scholars have made their own collections, the largest ones dating from two or three centuries after Muhammad. Much scholarly effort has been put into ascertaining which of the many stories are the most reliable. Validity is usually judged by the chain of transmission i.e. the list of people by whom the story was passed down. The most reliable collections are recognisable by the word sahih [true] before the name of the compiler.
From these two sources Islamic jurists gradually evolved a detailed body of legislation called the Shari‘ah. Five main versions of this exist today – four different Sunni schools of law and one Shi‘a school – each being favoured in different parts of the world. The Sunni schools were founded by Hanifa, Malik, Shafi‘i and Hanbal, the Shi‘a school by Imam Ja‘far. Although differing on minor points, the five schools agree on basic issues. These enormously detailed sets of rules to regulate every aspect of devotional, family, social, economic, military and political life were derived from the Qur’an and hadith by a logical reasoning process known as ijtihad. It is worth taking some time to look at the main types of problems facing those engaged in ijtihad.
Firstly, despite the fact that the Qur’an and Muhammad’s own words and actions were all held to be divinely inspired, there often appeared to be a conflict of opinion between these various sources. Even within the Qur’an itself there were many verses which seemed to contradict each other. Furthermore the Qur’anic text is often remarkably vague and ambiguous; many individual verses are open to a multitude of interpretations, some examples of which have been given above. So although the Qur’an was more authoritative, the hadith was often easier to understand. Then there was the problem of how to legislate on issues not actually mentioned in either the Qur’an or the hadith.
Some rules and tools were devised to guide the scholars in their perplexity. Firstly there was the concept of naskh. This term is most often translated into English as “abrogation” and describes a simple rule of Qur’anic interpretation whereby in any case of self-contradiction within the Qur’an the later-dated verse (nasikh, that which abrogates) is assumed to take precedence over the earlier verse (mansukh, that which is abrogated). Some scholars emphasise that this does not mean the earlier verse is actually untrue and cancelled out, but that it has been subordinated to and modified by the later verse. The application of this simple rule is made complex in practice by the fact that the Qur’an is not arranged in chronological order so considerable scholarship is needed to know the relative dates of any two verses, and in some cases scholars differ. The huge impact of naskh on the classical Islamic doctrine of war is explained in chapter 2.
Other tools of ijtihad included ijma‘ [the consensus of Muslim scholars on any given subject] and qiyas [analogical reasoning, helpful when trying to derive laws on subjects not covered in the sources]. Other factors taken into consideration, but carrying less weight, included the prevailing customs of pre-Islamic Arabia and various general principles such as the public good, a harm must not be removed by means of a greater harm etc.38
The founders of the five schools of Islamic law lived in the eighth century and the first half of the ninth century. In the eleventh century the Islamic state began to disintegrate and one of the Sunni caliphs, seeking to prevent the development of too many new groupings, announced that “the door of ijtihad” had closed i.e. that no further law-making was necessary. The existing Sunni schools were sufficient. This has created a great reluctance amongst the majority of Sunni Muslims to indulge in ijtihad even to this day. The belief that the door of ijtihad has yet to be re-opened (if ever), is reinforced by a belief that ijtihad can only be practised by scholars of unusual personal piety as well as unusual learning.39 Hence it is that the majority of today’s Sunni Muslims see it as heresy to consider altering or updating the Shari’a.40
Nevertheless, since the closing of the door of ijtihad, there have been many individual Muslims who have departed from the standard teaching. Two of the best known in medieval times were al-Ghazali (d.1111) who promoted Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes, 1126-98) who took a rationalist approach.
Modern calls to return to the original sources and make a new ijtihad may seek to reform Islam in one or other of two directions. Some seek a modernisation and liberalisation to keep Islam in step with other contemporary civilisations, others seek to create a stricter and more puritanical faith completely unblemished by any outside influence. With regard to the Islamic doctrine of war, we have already looked briefly at some examples of the former (see pages 13-16). Some examples of the latter will be considered in chapter 5. Other aspects of the debate are mentioned in chapter 8.
Other sources
Non-Muslim scholars have identified some non-Islamic sources of the Islamic doctrine of war. The influence of these external sources would be denied by devout Muslims, who would not wish to acknowledge that uninspired human input had played any part in the development of their faith. But for the sake of completeness it may be helpful to outline the main factors.41 Pre-Islamic factors include:
In this lawless tribal society, hostility to all other tribes was presumed, unless a specific agreement had been made with a particular tribe. The inter-tribal raid (ghazwa or razzia) was a frequent and normal part of life. In many ways the raids were more like sport than war. The result was generally a redistribution of wealth (e.g. livestock) or women from the losing tribe to the winning tribe, and loss of life was rare. There appear to have been at least some rules governing the conduct of razzias, including a prohibition on attacking non-combatants with lethal intent. Harming women and children was probably considered dishonourable. (See also pages 75-76.)
There was also another kind of tribal conflict called manakh, which was rarer and more bloody. These were generally disputes over resources like grazing ground or wells and only arose in exceptional circumstances such as severe drought. Manakh was effectively a battle for the survival of the tribe.
Byzantine culture had an ideology of imperial victory (derived from Roman ideas) and divine aid (derived from Judaism). Muslim rulers would most likely have felt the need to affirm the same two concepts in respect of the Islamic state. Byzantine culture can also be seen as having had an influence on the development of the Islamic concept of the unity of the Islamic state under a single ruler (caliph or imam). Only the state, under its head, can launch a jihad (see page 42). The Byzantines viewed war as a great evil and had some notion of the possibility of a just war, for example, against external enemies in self-defence. Justice and mercy were supposed to characterise the emperor’s dealings with his own people.
The Sassanians had an ideology of imperial victory and divine support similar to that of the Byzantines. They appear to have held that only defensive war was justified, but that included defence of their religion (Zoroastrianism) as well as of their territory. Sometimes there seems to have been a requirement for the emperor to act justly, as in Byzantine culture, though there does not appear to have been a similar requirement for him to act mercifully, at least not in the context of keeping order within his empire. External enemies could be dealt with severely.
The daily reality of war must have shaped popular attitudes. For example the Byzantine emperor was not, despite the ideology, always victorious in battle, which would surely have created some question marks in the minds of his subjects.
Traditions concerning the imminent end of the world were very widespread. With Jewish, Christian or Hellenistic roots, these prophecies often foretold war – even defeat – as a precursor to the Last Days and ultimate victory. Apocalyptic thought appears to have been particularly popular in the Christian kingdom of Axum (Ethiopia). It must also have brought comfort to the beleaguered Byzantines, who lost huge areas of territory to the Persians in the early seventh century and then again to the Muslims a few years later. Islam has a full and detailed eschatology in which war is a key portent. Possibly Muhammad and his followers saw themselves as instruments of God, cleaning up the world by eliminating false belief, in preparation for the Day of Judgement.
Later influences on the Islamic doctrine of war include:
While the Crusades had no effect on the theory or conduct of jihad42 they are worth mentioning as they appear to have produced a heightened religious fervour because the Muslims were once more fighting Christians (albeit Europeans). This reminded them of the golden age of early Islam when their ancestors had swept to victory against the Byzantine Christians.
This influence came from the Turkish and Mongol tribes of central Asia who were introduced to the Islamic world as slaves, troops or migrants from the ninth century onwards. They eventually established a number of Muslim regimes in different parts of the world lasting from the eleventh to the twentieth centuries. The main departure from classical Islamic doctrine was the concept that a ruler had absolute authority to make “secular” state law, independent of any religious law. This created a tension between two parallel law systems, as was seen markedly in the Ottoman Empire.
Sources:Qur’an, hadith, Shari‘ah |
2 |
While many Muslims would condemn the use of war or terrorism in the name of Islam, the source texts of Islam do contain some passages which can without difficulty be interpreted to permit, even to command, violence of this kind. This violence is targeted primarily against polytheists, but also against Jews and Christians, and against erring Muslims.
During his early years of prophethood in Mecca (610-622), Muhammad focused on prayer and meditation. His approach to Jews, Christians and other non-Muslims was peaceful, cooperative and non-violent. After opposition and persecution forced him to flee to Medina in 622, he became the spiritual, political and military leader of an Islamic state. While in Medina he believed that God gave him permission to fight those who were persecuting the Muslims.1 As he gained power, he became much more aggressive in his pronouncements and his actions2 against all opponents and non-Muslims, including his Meccan adversaries, massacring many, enslaving others and expelling them from their lands. He made a particular point of attacking trade caravans.
Qur’an
Because of Muhammad’s change of attitude when he moved from Mecca to Medina, the Qur’an is a contradictory mixture of the peaceable and the bellicose. The nineteenth century Islamic jurist Ibn Abidin highlighted the gradual stages by which the transition was made:
Know thou that the command of fighting was revealed by degrees, for the Prophet was at first commanded to deliver his message, then to discuss and dispute and endeavour to convince the unbelievers by arguments, then the believers were permitted to fight, then they were commanded to fight at first at any time, except the sacred months, then absolutely, without any exception.3
According to the rule of abrogation (naskh, see page 18), it is the harsher and more violent Medinan passages that apply today because they are later, while the earlier conciliatory passages dating from Muhammad’s days in Mecca are not applicable. Mahmoud Mohamed Taha summarised the situation in classical Islam: “All the verses of persuasion, though they constitute the primary or original principle, were abrogated or repealed by the verses of compulsion (jihad).”4
There are a considerable number of verses which speak of love, peace and forgiveness towards non-Muslims. Many of these are in sura (chapter) 2. For example:
Quite a number of the People of the Book5 wish they could turn you (people) back to infidelity after ye have believed, from selfish envy, after the Truth hath become manifest unto them: but forgive and overlook, till God accomplish his purpose: for God hath power over all things. Q 2:109
Those who believe (in the Qur’an) and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, – any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. Q 2:62
But a number of Muslim scholars assert that all such verses are abrogated by the so-called “Sword Verse”, Q 9:5, which commands Muslims to fight anyone who refuses to convert to Islam.6 This verse is a favourite of modern Islamist militants.7
But when the forbidden months are past, then fight them and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for God is oft-forgiving, most merciful. Q 9:5
In addition to the Sword Verse, there are a plethora of other apparent Qur’anic injunctions to make war, particularly war against non-Muslims with the aim of converting them to Islam.
Some occur even in sura 2, where so many peaceable verses are found.
Fight in the cause of God those that fight you, but do not transgress the limits; for God loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; Q 2:190-191
And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression. Q 2:193
Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Q 2:216
And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God altogether and everywhere; but if they cease, verily God doth see all that they do. Q 8:39
Let not the unbelievers think that they can get the better (of the godly): They will never frustrate (them). Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may no know, but whom God doth know. Q 8:59-60
Fight those who believe not in God nor the Last day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. Q 9:29
Many other examples could be given of verses which can easily be understood to command or commend warfare (and especially to convince Muslims who were reluctant to fight).8 There are also other verses which speak of non-Muslims as the enemies of Muslims,9 and about Islam’s ultimate goal to establish Islamic authority over the whole world.10
Reuven Firestone distinguishes four kinds of war verses and concludes that the transition from pre-Islamic ideas about war to the fullyfledged Islamic doctrine of jihad was far from smooth, and that there must have been many early Muslims who were opposed to militancy and had to be persuaded to overcome their reluctance to fight.11
Hadith
The hadith traditions recording the words and deeds of Muhammad, although secondary in comparison with the Qur’an, are of huge significance as a source because Muslims must model their lives on Muhammad’s in every detail. It is clear from the hadith that Muhammad and the first Muslims understood jihad to include physical warfare and literal killing.12 Recorded in the hadith are many statements commanding or commending violence. One of the most often quoted (though less clear than many) is:
Allah’s Apostle said, “Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords.” Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 73: Narrated ‘Abdullah bin Abi Aufa13
Others are more specific about the enemy and the aim of jihad, apparently indicating that Muslims must fight non-Muslims until they are willing to convert to Islam.
Allah’s Apostle said, “I have been ordered to fight with the people till they say, ‘None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,’ and whoever says, ‘None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,’ his life and property will be saved by me except for Islamic law, and his accounts will be with Allah, (either to punish him or to forgive him.)” Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 196: Narrated Abu Huraira
The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said: “I am commanded to fight with men till they testify that there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is His servant and His Apostle, face our qibla, eat what we slaughter, and pray like us. When they do that, their life and property are unlawful for us except what is due to them. They will have the same rights as the Muslims have, and have the same responsibilities as the Muslims have.” Sunan Abu Dawud Book 14, Number 2635: Narrated Anas ibn Malik
Some are concerned with fighting particular named categories of non-Muslims, for example polytheists.
The Apostle of Allah (peace_be_upon_him) appointed Abu Bakr our commander and we fought with some people who were polytheists, and we attacked them at night, killing them. Our warcry that night was “put to death; put to death”. Salamah said: “I killed that night with my hand polytheists belonging to seven houses.” Sunan Abu Dawud Book 14, Number 2632: Narrated Salamah ibn al-Akwa‘
Some very chilling hadith, which describe inanimate nature rising up to betray the Jews, are quoted in the literature of certain radical Islamist groups today. For example:
Allah’s Apostle said, “You (i.e. Muslims) will fight with the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones. The stones will (betray them) saying, ‘O ‘Abdullah (i.e. slave of Allah)! There is a Jew hiding behind me; so kill him.” Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 176: Narrated ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar
Examples of the assassination of individuals also occur in the hadith.
Allah’s Apostle sent a group of the Ansar to Abu Rafi. Abdullah bin Atik entered his house at night and killed him while he was sleeping. Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 265: Narrated Al-Bara bin Azib
The Prophet said, “Who is ready to kill Ka‘b bin Al-Ashraf who has really hurt Allah and His Apostle?” Muhammad bin Maslama said, “O Allah’s Apostle! Do you like me to kill him?” He replied in the affirmative. So, Muhammad bin Maslama went to him (i.e. Ka‘b) and said, “This person (i.e. the Prophet) has put us to task and asked us for charity.” Ka‘b replied, “By Allah, you will get tired of him.” Muhammad said to him, “We have followed him, so we dislike to leave him till we see the end of his affair.” Muhammad bin Maslama went on talking to him in this way till he got the chance to kill him. Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 270: Narrated Jabir bin ‘Abdullah
Ka‘b bin al-Ashraf, who was Jewish on his mother’s side, was a poet who wrote verse satirising and lampooning Muhammad and some of his close companions. This incident was the result – the hurt which Muhammad refers to had been inflicted by Ka‘b’s pen. There are also accounts of Muhammad ordering torture.
A group of eight men from the tribe of ‘Ukil came to the Prophet and then they found the climate of Medina unsuitable for them. So, they said, “O Allah’s Apostle! Provide us with some milk.” Allah’s Apostle said, “I recommend that you should join the herd of camels.” So they went and drank the urine and the milk of the camels (as a medicine) till they became healthy and fat. Then they killed the shepherd and drove away the camels, and they became unbelievers after they were Muslims. When the Prophet was informed by a shouter for help, he sent some men in their pursuit, and before the sun rose high, they were brought, and he had their hands and feet cut off. Then he ordered for nails which were heated and passed over their eyes, and they were left in the Harra (i.e. rocky land in Medina). They asked for water, and nobody provided them with water till they died. (Abu Qilaba, a sub-narrator said, “They committed murder and theft and fought against Allah and His Apostle, and spread evil in the land.”) Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 261: Narrated Anas bin Malik
Muhammad’s decision to ethnically cleanse all non-Muslims from the Arabian peninsula is recorded in the hadith.
Umar heard the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) say: “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula and will not leave any but Muslims.” Sahih Muslim, Book 19, Number 4366: Narrated by Umar ibn al-Khattab
The hadith also records Muhammad’s famous statement that jihad will be performed continuously until the Antichrist comes.
The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said: “A section of my community will continue to fight for the right and overcome their opponents till the last of them fights with the Antichrist.” Sunan Abu Dawud Book 14, Number 2478: Narrated Imran ibn Husayn
The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said: “Three things are the roots of faith: to refrain from (killing) a person who utters, ‘There is no god but Allah’ and not to declare him unbeliever whatever sin he commits, and not to excommunicate him from Islam for his any action; and jihad will be performed continuously since the day Allah sent me as a prophet until the day the last member of my community will fight with the Dajjal (Antichrist). The tyranny of any tyrant and the justice of any just (ruler) will not invalidate it. One must have faith in Divine decree.” Sunan Abu Dawud Book 14, Number 2526: Narrated Anas ibn Malik
Shari‘ah14
Not only does the Shari‘ah cover the personal, family and devotional life of an individual Muslim but also it lays down how an Islamic state should be governed. Reflecting the political and military ascendancy of Islam in the eighth and ninth centuries when it was compiled, the Shari‘ah assumes that power lies in the hands of Muslims.
It is natural, given the sources used and the context in which it was created, that the Shari‘ah should contain a set of rules specifically governing the manner in which Muslims are to wage war. These very practical, earthy and militarily relevant instructions leave no doubt that the writers of the Shari‘ah believed jihad to encompass actual warfare. There is little difference between Sunni and Shi‘a law concerning war.
A number of practical handbooks and other forms of written guidance on the conduct of war were produced by scholars from the various schools of law. The general consensus was that the participants must be adult male Muslims, able-bodied and free (not slaves). They should also be without debt, have spiritual motives and their parents’ permission. Opinion on other aspects of the conduct of the war varied, for example, whether non-combatants should be spared, whether crops and animals should be destroyed.15
The Hanafi school of Shari‘ah16 has a standard text known as the Hedaya, which is available in English translation, albeit eighteenth century English. Book IX contains chapters called “On the Manner of waging War”, “Of making Peace, and concerning the Persons to whom it is lawful to grant Protection”, “Of Plunder, and the Division thereof ”, “Of the Conquests of Infidels”.
Some examples may indicate the level of detail involved in the Hedaya’s instructions. The important question of dividing the plunder takes six pages. One fifth must go to the state and the remaining four-fifths is allocated to the troops, with cavalry getting more than the infantry. After this principle is laid down, things become complicated. Should the cavalryman get double or triple what the foot soldier has? What if he has more than one horse? Is his share affected by the quality of his horse? What if he mainly goes into battle on horseback but occasionally on foot? What if his horse was killed or he sold it at the end of the campaign? Then there is the question of what to give slaves, women, children and non-Muslims, and what to do with the fifth that was set aside for the state. All these issues are argued in detail, referring to historical precedent, the example of Muhammad and the opinions of other Muslim scholars.17
A fascinating paragraph on the role of women in war is worth quoting in full:
It is lawful for aged women to accompany an army, for the performance of such business as suits them, such as dressing victuals, administering water, and preparing medicines for the sick and wounded; – but with respect to young women, it is better that they stay at home, as this may prevent perplexity or disturbance. The women, however, must not engage in fight, as this argues weakness in the Mussulmans [Muslims]; women, therefore must not take any personal concern in battle unless in a case of absolute necessity: and it is not laudable to carry young women along with the army, either for the purpose of carnal gratification, or for service: if, however, the necessity be very urgent, female slaves may be taken, but not wives.18
With respect to the question of whether women can fight or not, it is interesting to note that Ayesha, one of Muhammad’s wives, led troops into battle at the Battle of the Camel (656), but her army was defeated. In the Battle of Jabiya-Yarmuk (636), Muslim women in the camp played an important role by shaming any Muslims who fled the battlefield, sometimes even fighting against them.19
Another important work of the same era which is also available in English translation is Shaybani’s Siyar.20 Shaybani (750-804) lived during the days of the ‘Abbasid dynasty, centred on Baghdad. Born in Iraq, Shaybani was only fourteen when he joined the circle of Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi school of Shari‘ah. Although Abu Hanifa himself died some three years later in 767, Shaybani continued as a follower of Abu Hanifa’s disciple Abu Yousuf, and went on to become a teacher, a judge and an adviser to the caliph as well as a prolific author.
Siyar is the branch of Islamic law concerned with international relations, and Shaybani’s was the first major work on this subject. Literally “motion”, siyar had come to mean by Shaybani’s time the conduct of the Islamic state in its relationships with non-Muslim communities. Interestingly, the early Muslim jurists used to deal with siyar under the general heading of jihad. Shaybani’s Siyar begins with a citation of hadiths about war and then goes on to a systematic study (in the form of a dialogue) on how Muslims should relate to non-Muslims, including chapters on the following subjects: the conduct of the army in enemy territory, the spoils of war, relationships between Muslim territories and non-Muslim territories, peace treaties, and safe-conducts.
The detail which Shaybani covers is fascinating. In the following extract he considers what to do when confronted with a human shield as well as the issue of killing non-combatants.
I asked: If the Muslims besieged a city, and its people [in their defence] from behind the walls shielded themselves with Muslim children, would it be permissible for the Muslim [warriors] to attack them with arrows and mangonels?
He replied: Yes, but the warriors should aim at the inhabitants of the territory of war and not the Muslim children.
I asked: Would it be permissible for the Muslims to attack them with swords and lances if the children were not intentionally aimed at?
He replied: Yes.
I asked: If the Muslim [warriors] attack [a place] with mangonels and arrows, flood it with water, and burn it with fire, thereby killing or wounding Muslim children or men, or enemy women, old men, blind, crippled or lunatic persons, would the [Muslim warriors] be liable for the diya [blood money] or the kaffara [atonement]?
He replied: They would be liable neither for the diya nor for the kaffara.21
The fact that Shaybani permits an attack on a place known to have Muslims within it is pertinent to the suicide plane attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11th 2001; it negates the argument that the attack could not have been the work of Islamic terrorists since there were Muslims in the building who were killed in the attack. Other jurists take a range of positions on this issue, some agreeing with Shaybani, others advising that only limited violence should be used if Muslims might be endangered. Al-Awza‘i advised that no attack should be made at all, unless individual enemy soldiers showed themselves and could be picked off.22
Abu’l-Hasan al-Mawardi (972-1058), a jurist of the Shafi‘i school of Shari’a, wrote what is in effect an instruction manual for Islamic rulers entitled al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya [The Ordinances of government] with detailed instructions on the ruler’s duties and obligations in time of war. He defines the enemy in a jihad as those who refuse to convert to Islam:
The idolators in enemy territory are of two classes. One, those who have received the call to Islam but rejected it and turned away from it… The other are those whom the call to Islam has not yet reached, who would be very few today on account of the victory the Almighty has accorded His Prophet’s mission, unless there be nations unknown to us beyond the Turks and Greeks we meet in eastern deserts and remote western areas. We are forbidden to launch surprise attacks on such people and kill them or burn their property, for we may not initiate action against them before inviting them first to Islam, making the Prophet’s miracles known to them, and informing them of such arguments as would make them respond favourably. Should they persist in their unbelief after such evidence is shown them, he [the commander] should fight them, for they are from his standpoint in the same class as those who have received the call.23
Al-Mawardi is uncertain as to whether old men can be killed in battle, but forbids the killing of women, children or young slaves.
Another important Shafi‘i text was written by Ibn Naqib (d.1368) and is called ‘Umdat al-Salik [Reliance of the Traveller24