Cassava Republic Press Book

First published in Nigeria by Cassava Republic Press 2013

Copyright ©2013 Max Siollun

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the Nigerian National Library

ISBN: 978-978-944-449-6

Cover by Lynn Hatzius

Typeset by Amina Gimba

Cassava Republic Press

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“The legacy of heroes is the honour of a great name and the inheritance of a great example.”

This book is written for, and is dedicated to the memory of my father - a man who lived and died in service of his country.

-Max Siollun

CONTENTS

PREFACE

Nigerian Military Rule in Perspective

Nigeria is a country of great diversity and contradiction. A country with over 150 million people spread across over 250 different ethnic groups, half of them Christian, half of them Muslim. It has world class wealth, yet is full of poor people. Christians live in the supposedly Muslim north; Muslims live in the supposedly Christian south, and some ethnic groups (like the Yoruba) practice both Christianity and Islam. Yet through all the contradiction, diversity and linguistic confusion, there has been one constant in Nigerian life: military interference in politics.

In 2010 Nigeria celebrated 50 years as an independent nation. As it passed this milestone there is renewed interest in its history. Although modern Nigeria cannot be understood without reference to its era of military rule, there is little objective literature on the fifteen years of military rule (1984 –1999) that preceded the current civilian government. The small body of literature on the era of military rule consists largely of hagiographic biographies by, or about, some of the key personalities of the era.

The second period of military rule between 1984 and 1993 crafted modern Nigerian society, and effected cataclysmic changes in Nigeria’s political, economic and religious character that nearly tore the country apart on several occasions. There is need for stock taking and objective analysis of the mistakes of the past. The story of Nigerian military rule is an untapped vault for the non-academic audience, with few scholars devoting serious effort to accurately recording it. Little is known of Nigerian military political history due to an almost Mafia-like code of silence by its leading figures. The result has been public discourse dominated by JFK-esque conspiracy theories, rumour and innuendo. Official sources have been reluctant to divulge details of Nigeria’s recent past largely because most of the key dramatis personnae are still alive, and to avoid inflaming passions in an already volatile country.

Powerful personalities behind Nigeria’s military governments are still active and influential in political positions, even if they have removed their uniforms and transformed themselves into civilian rulers. David Mark (current Senate President and the third most powerful person in Nigeria’s political hierarchy) is a retired army brigadier. His former military colleagues include active politicians such as Governors Murtala Nyako, Olabode George (both retired navy officers), and Jonah Jang (a retired air force officer).

The retired military even constitute the most significant opposition figures. The leading member of the opposition to the ruling People’s Democratic Party is former military head of state Major-General Muhammadu Buhari. Even some of the most powerful traditional rulers in Nigeria are former military officers. The current Sultan of Sokoto, Amir-ul Mumineen¹ Muhammadu Sa’adu Abubakar, was formerly Brigadier Abubakar of the Nigerian army’s armoured corps. The current Emir of Zuru, Sani Sami is a retired major-general, and the Etsu Nupe Alhaji Yahaya Abubakar is a former army colonel.² There are very few Emirs without sons or nephews in the military. This continues a long tradition of blue bloods in the military first pioneered by Major-General Hassan Katsina, the late Chief of Army Staff and son of the former Emir of Katsina, Usman Nagogo. Major-General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, older brother of Nigeria’s former President Umaru Yar’Adua, was also of aristocratic origin. His father Mallam Musa Yar’Adua was the Mutawallen Katsina (custodian of treasury of the Katsina Emirate Council).

After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, Nigeria’s parliamentary Westminster-style democracy collapsed on January 15, 1966, when a group of radical young army majors staged a military coup and overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Although the coup leaders did not manage to seize power for themselves, the coup’s violent nature, and assassination of key government personnel such as Prime Minister Balewa, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the Northern Region), Samuel Akintola (Premier of the Western Region), and Festus Okotie-Eboh (Finance Minister) was enough to topple the government and persuade the rump cabinet to cede power to the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the army, Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi.

Although Ironsi had suppressed the coup and was not among its planners, he was unable to escape the stigma attached to it. Northern soldiers were aggrieved at the coup’s lopsided nature and became suspicious of it, and of Ironsi’s motives. Since most of the coup’s planners were Igbo, their victims were non-Igbo, and its outcome was a military government led by an Igbo army officer, northerners suspected that the coup was an orchestrated conspiracy to wrest power away from the northern-led civilian government. These tensions and suspicions led to another coup by northern officers in July 1966, during which Ironsi was assassinated and replaced by Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. Gowon governed until July 1975 when he was deposed by the same soldiers who had staged the coup that brought him to power in the July 1966 Coup.

The new military leader was Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, the leader of the July 1966 coup. After Muhammed was assassinated during an abortive attempted coup in February 1976, he was replaced by his deputy, Lt-General Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo remained in power for almost four years, leading the country back to civilian democracy before stepping down in October 1979 after multi-party elections were won by Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The voluntary surrender of power was a source of great pride and prestige to the military, but it amplified its political ambitions by giving it a self-righteous air of being the nation’s political custodian and moral conscience.

The transfers of power from one military regime to another were not random. Each coup and government had substantial continuity of personnel. The same people have controlled Nigerian political and military life since 1966. The group of officers that brought Gowon to power in August 1966 formed the foundation of all succeeding military regimes until 1998. Although leadership of the regimes changed, the personalities behind the coups and regimes did not. The 1966 cadre created successive dynastic military regimes for the next 32 years. The young non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and lieutenants who blasted Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi from power in 1966 became the colonels who ousted his successor General Gowon in 1975, and they became the Brigadiers and Major-generals who overthrew President Shagari in 1983. These officers included Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, Muhammadu Buhari, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Aliyu Mohammed, Joshua Dogonyaro, Jerry Useni and Ibrahim Bako.

Between 1966 and 1979, Nigerian military regimes ruled with a deft touch, and rarely resorted to ruthless force. Apart from being unelected, they behaved little differently from the civilians they replaced. Most regimes during this era would probably have defeated their predecessor civilian government in an election and were generally more popular than civilian governments. The military was perceived to be an agent of order and stability, in contrast to the institutional chaos that accompanied civilian politicians. The military governed with popular appeal and little opposition. To Nigerians, military rule was an attractive alternative to civilian governance. Each military government was welcomed with jubilation and great optimism. The incoming government would then reciprocate that optimism with grandiose promises of reform and an end to the ills of its predecessor.

The army’s journey into politics was akin to sitting an exam prior to attending lectures. The 1980s Nigerian army was a legacy of the civil war during which mass military recruitment swelled the military’s manpower from 10,000 in 1966 to approximately 250,000 by the end of the war in 1970. A swollen military became a drain on government finances, and an internal security risk. Nigeria faced no external military threat from a foreign power, thus the army’s role was largely devoted to the suppression of communal riots and international peacekeeping missions. With no external enemies to fight, military heroism tended to be sought in the political arena rather than on the battlefield. The nature of military governance changed greatly during the 1980s. Coups became motivated by a desire for personal gain, rather than by altruism or ideology. Public optimism about military rule dissipated when the public realised that only the leaders had changed, but the underlying problems which were cited as justifications for military governance continued despite the change of personnel.

The military doctor became infected by the ills it came to cure. Soldiers were corrupted by politics as quickly and absolutely as civilians had been. Although the military claimed to bring law and order, communal, criminal and religious violence increased under its watch. It continually promised to eradicate corruption, yet military officers were indicted for corruption. As it extended its rule to attempt resolution of these new issues, the military found itself engaged in an endless merry go round of fire-fighting. By the time it tackled one issue, several more had arisen. As the military became more politicised, ethnic and religious cleavages in civil society replicated in the officer corps. Ultimately, the military became overburdened by its workload of governance, political reform, and transitioning back to democracy, while simultaneously trying to keep its own house in order and protect itself against coups from within. Military rule became more toxic than incompetent civilian rule, because soldiers can get away with much more in government since they control the state’s instruments of violence, and do not have to worry about becoming unpopular enough to lose elections.

This book is the story of Nigeria’s political journey between January 1, 1984 and August 27, 1993. This is the story of how things fell apart.

Map: Location of Major Nigerian Ethnic Groups

Map: Courtesy of Indiana University Press

Map of Nigeria with Nineteen States (1976 - 1987)

Map: Courtesy of Indiana University Press

Map of Nigeria with Thirty States (1987-1991)

Map: Courtesy of Indiana University Press

1   “Commander of the Faithful” or “Leader of the Faithful”.

2   Promoted to Brigadier in retirement.

CHAPTER ONE

Democracy With Military Vigilance¹

Between 1979 and 1983 the military essentially acted as a government-in-waiting. The military saw itself as a national governmental custodian, and an emergency rescue team that could be called out to depose the civilian government any time the public got fed up with its policies. It regarded itself as a patriotic defender of the national interest, rather than as Nigeria’s physical defender against external aggression. For example, the officer who announced the first military coup of the 1980s, declared that “I and my colleagues in the armed forces have, in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national interest, decided to effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria…”.

Although back to military duties, the senior officer corps consisted mostly of officers who had been members of the last military government that stepped down in 1979. Approximately 30 senior officers were SMC members or governors in the last military government.² These included Lt-General Gibson Jalo (Chief of Defence Staff), Lt-General Mohammed Inuwa Wushishi (Chief of Army Staff), Major-Generals Babangida, Buhari and Domkat Bali, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, and Ebitu Ukiwe, Murtala Nyako and Godwin Ndubisi Kanu of the navy. Even President Shagari’s own chief of guards, Colonel Bello Kaliel, was a member of the previous military government. Although Nigeria had an elected government, some officers could not divorce themselves from politics. Some senior military officers drafted a list of government ministers they wanted President Shagari to remove, and nominated their preferred replacements. They delegated their boss, Lt-General Wushishi, to submit the list to Shagari on their behalf.

Military Lions at the Civilian Gate

Apart from having to cope with political interference, Shagari also had to manage military egos. Relations between the Shagari government and some senior military officers such as Major-General Muhammadu Buhari became strained.

Buhari was in charge of troops sent to Nigeria’s north-eastern border region in 1983 to prevent infiltration by armed rebels from the neighbouring republic of Chad. After his troops successfully cleared the Chadian rebels from the border area, the troops advanced several kilometres into Chadian territory. The political hierarchy ordered Buhari to withdraw his troops, but he refused, arguing that the Chadian rebels would return to the area as soon as his troops departed. Buhari’s view was that it was futile to risk the lives of soldiers by confronting the rebels, only to withdraw and allow them to return once the objective had been achieved. Buhari was finally persuaded to withdraw after President Shagari enlisted Buhari’s superior officers Lt-Generals Jalo and Wushishi to order him to pull back.³ However, the incident caused Buhari to lose confidence in Shagari, and thereafter he maintained a frosty distance from him. It also caused enough concern in the government for the Transport Minister Umaru Dikko to place Buhari under surveillance. Dikko also pressured the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General Wushishi, to block Buhari’s posting to Lagos.

Civil-military tensions went beyond meddling. The Shagari government received numerous warnings of coup plots against it. The Director-General of the National Security Organisation (NSO), Umaru Shinkafi, detected up to ten coup plots against Shagari. However most of them were nebulous intelligence ‘chatter’ that the government could not act on. The overt exception was a coup plot detected in 1983, and incited by one Alhaji Bukar Mandara. In 1983 the commander of the Brigade of Guards in Lagos reminded his men during a parade that they were duty bound to report any knowledge they had of coup plots against the government, and that any soldier who failed to report a coup plot to the authorities would be punished in the same manner as the plot’s ringleaders. Shortly after the parade, a soldier present at the parade walked into his commander’s office and informed him that Mandara was trying to recruit soldiers from the brigade to overthrow the government.⁴ Mandara had previously been awarded a contract to supply food to the Brigade of Guards but became aggrieved when the contract was revoked in 1979 following the restoration of civilian rule. He decided to get even with the government by inciting a military coup to depose it. Mandara was arrested and convicted of treason, but on appeal was subsequently released due to a technicality involving the venue at which the charges against him were brought.

However, others were more experienced and skilled in coup plotting than Mandara. Civilians and the military played a cat-and-mouse game with the civilians trying to pacify the military and the military prowling and looking out for civilian political errors that would justify a return to military rule. As far back as 1982, senior officers considered overthrowing the government, but restrained themselves as the political climate was not yet ripe for a coup. The coups of the 1980s were opportunistic. They were not planned or executed in response to adverse political events. Rather, they were planned first, and then their planners waited for the government to make mistakes that would justify the coup’s execution. General Babangida confirmed this:

We could have toppled that government in 1982, before the [1983] elections. But then, we said no, because the people might go against us. We knew damn well that they were not going to conduct that election freely and fairly, and, therefore, we waited for the right time. You see, to stage a coup, there is one basic element that everybody looks for; there must be frustration in the society. So, by 1983 when we voted, everybody was not happy; there were complaints over this and that; and the frustration built gradually. We found the coup easier when there was frustration in the land.⁵

Politicians continually fell into every trap set for them by military conspirators. A factor that few Nigerians will admit today is that the military always enjoyed widespread public support any time it deposed an elected government. The military were always cajoled into political power and welcomed as heroic redeemers after each coup. Each military regime would probably have defeated its predecessor civilian government in an election had the public been allowed to choose between military or civilian rule. Babangida again revealed the extent to which civilian preference for military rule over democracy encouraged the military to retake power:

We in the military waited for an opportunity. There was the media frenzy about how bad the election was, massively rigged, corruption, the economy gone completely bad, threat of secession by people who felt aggrieved. There was frustration within society and it was not unusual to hear statements like, ‘the worst military dictatorship is better than this democratic government’. Nigerians always welcome military intervention because we have not yet developed mentally the values and virtues of democracy.⁶

The military did not have to wait long for its opportunity as politicians became embroiled in one corruption scandal after another. This culminated in an acrimonious and rigged election in October 1983, which saw Shagari re-elected for his second and final term of office. Although an examination of the Shagari government is beyond the scope of this book, a brief summary of its performance is required in order to contextualise the emergence of the military regimes that succeeded it. The esteemed Professor of African politics Ali Mazrui wrote that the:

Shagari administration was one of the most economically corrupt and incompetent in Nigeria’s history. The nation’s oil resources were rampantly abused, its finances substantially depleted, its laws of contract desecrated, its laws against corruption ignored, its teachers unpaid, its people impoverished. Never was a country’s economic promise so quickly reduced to economic rampage. Shagari’s balance sheet was stark: impressive political freedom against incredible economic anarchy… Shagari’s economic sins of anarchy were deemed to be more relevant than his political virtues of freedom.⁷

1983: “Coup Baiting”

The army had civilian accomplices. There seems to have been a conscious plot to depose Shagari inside the army, and another one among the civil society. President Shagari claimed that after he was re-elected, frustrated opposition politicians who were defeated in the elections cavorted with, and incited army officers to depose him via a military coup. He claimed that these politicians engaged in what he termed “coup baiting”.

“Coup baiting” is a term employed to describe the deliberate preparation of civil and military political opinion for a coup. Shagari’s ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), had an elaborate zoning system for distributing government portfolios - including the presidency. Since the presidency had been zoned to President Shagari (from the north), the southern multi-billionaire businessman, Moshood Abiola hoped he would benefit from the NPN’s zoning system. His expectation was that when President Shagari’s term of office expired, the NPN would “zone” the presidency to the south, and he would be allowed to run as its presidential candidate. He was wrong. Abiola’s presidential ambition was rebuffed by the powerful Minister of Transport Umaru Dikko, who told him that “the presidency is not for sale to the highest bidder”. Abiola “retired” from politics soon after – totally exasperated with the NPN. He would have his revenge, later re-emerging from the shadows to play a key role in Nigeria’s political history.

Abiola had been a close friend of army officer Ibrahim Babangida for over two decades. His publishing empire was used to launch frequent vitriolic attacks on the government with the intention of discrediting it sufficiently to psychologically prepare the public for its replacement by a military regime. In his memoirs, President Shagari obliquely referred to the financing and support given to military conspirators by an unnamed “well-known Nigerian business tycoon”.⁸ Although he declined to name this tycoon, contextually it was an obvious reference to Abiola. Babangida went further in unequivocally confirming Abiola’s role in financing the plot against Shagari and using his influence to destabilise Shagari’s government. He later revealed that Abiola was “very good in trying to mould the thinking of the media. We relied on him a lot for that. So there was both the media support and the financial support”.⁹

Abiola was not the only civilian collaborator. Other media outlets, opposition politicians and the public joined in with the lacerating criticism of Shagari’s regime. The press was particularly fierce in its condemnation of the government, and published critiques that crossed into libel and bordered on seditious incitement. Babangida revealed that:

We couldn’t have done it without collaborators in the civil society – collaborators in the media, collaborators among people who have the means. Because the means were not easily available but we received some from people who were convinced it was the right thing to do… The elite who participate want recognition, maybe patronage as time goes by.¹⁰

One source referred to Babangida as the “moving spirit” behind the plot against President Shagari.¹¹ Yet Babangida was adept at concealing the plot from Shagari. The president was particularly struck by a late-night visit he received in late 1983 from Babangida and Colonel Aliyu Mohammed. During the visit, Babangida repeatedly assured Shagari of his and the army’s absolute loyalty to Shagari. Shagari wondered why Babangida made such an effort to reassure him of loyalty he took for granted.¹²

Assuming that senior officers held on to regional and ethnic loyalties, Shagari ostensibly did not seem in great danger. His personal security was entrusted to individuals from his home state of Sokoto in the north-west. The commander of the Brigade of Guards, Commissioner of Police in Lagos, the GOCs of the army’s 2nd Division, and director-general of the NSO were all, like Shagari, from Sokoto State. Shagari had also been the NSO boss’ teacher when the latter was a schoolboy. In addition, all four divisions of the army had northern GOCs, and the commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) was also a northerner.

The only prominent senior officer holding a command position who was not from Sokoto State and/or the north was the Inspector-General of Police, Sunday Adewusi.

December 1983 – Senior Military and Security Hierarchy

However, insufficient attention to history and military postings played a part in Shagari’s downfall. If Shagari had analysed previous coups, he would have noticed that they had almost always been carried out by the same group of military officers. Had Shagari, early during his term, acted decisively in his position as the Nigerian armed forces’ Commander-in-Chief and retired these men, his government might have survived (the only notable senior officer retired by Shagari was Major-General Joe Garba).

Many of the officers plotting Shagari’s ouster were stationed in, or in close proximity to, the country’s commercial capital and nerve centre in Lagos. Among them were Major-General Ibrahim Babangida (Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans), Brigadier Sani Abacha (Commander, 9^th Mechanised Brigade), Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon (Military Secretary, Army), Major Sambo Dasuki (Military Assistant to the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General Wushishi). The Director of Military Intelligence Colonel Aliyu Mohammed contributed funding to the plotters from his military intelligence budget.¹³ However, apart from the conspirators named above, who were the “we” that Babangida earlier spoke of? A formidable cabal of military coup conspirators was assembled across the country including:

Major-General Muhammadu Buhari

Brigadier Ibrahim Bako (Brigade Commander)

Lt-Colonel Halilu Akilu

Lt-Colonel David Mark

Lt-Colonel Jonathan Tunde Ogbeha

Major Abdulmumuni Aminu

Major Lawan Gwadabe

Major Mustapha Haruna Jokolo (Senior Instructor, Basawa Barracks – Zaria)

Major Abubakar Umar

An overlooked aspect of the plot against President Shagari is the role allegedly played by former Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo. Many have speculated that the coup which overthrew Shagari was carried out with the connivance, or support, of retired military officers. In his memoirs Beckoned To Serve President Shagari accused Obasanjo of also engaging in “coup baiting”. Shagari alleged that Obasanjo and other retired officers severely criticised his regime with the aim of inciting the military to overthrow him. Shagari’s observations are given credence by a subsequent interview with Babangida in which Babangida claimed that the original aim of the coup plot was to bring Obasanjo back to power. Obasanjo declined as he felt it would destroy his credibility as a statesman. However, he did not try to dissuade the conspirators from overthrowing Shagari. The text from this part of the interview is reproduced below:

Question: It was also said that those of you who ousted Shagari actually wanted to bring back General Obasanjo as Head of State in 1984. Is this true?

Babangida: It is true. But to be very fair to General Obasanjo, he rejected the offer. He said no. He said it would destroy his integrity, that he handed over to Shagari and that it is not right for him to get involved. But he [Obasanjo] said he was not stopping us from going ahead with the plot.¹⁴

Babangida himself was then approached to become the new head of state but he too declined. One of the plotters, Mustapha Jokolo, later revealed that the former Chief of Army Staff Lt-General Danjuma(retired) was also briefed about the plot against Shagari: “We told him [Danjuma] of our plans to overthrow Shagari and he lent us his support in the papers”.¹⁵

The stage was set for another military rescue operation. It was a question of when, not if, the military would strike. In September 1983, Major-General Babangida visited Major-General Domkat Bali in Jaji. Babangida sought Bali’s opinion on the desirability of overthrowing the government via a military coup. Bali told Babangida that a coup would be premature and to give the politicians more time.

In December 1983 in Jos, Major-General Buhari asked Bali whether he still felt that a coup was premature. This time Bali assented and told Buhari that a coup would not be premature or unpopular.¹⁶ On December 30, 1983 Bali received a note marked “for your eyes only” from Buhari, which was hand-delivered to him by Colonel Salihu Ibrahim. The note asked Bali to come to Jos immediately, so that he could fly to Lagos with Buhari to attend a meeting of senior officers. However, by the time Bali got to Jos, Buhari had already flown to Lagos, leaving instructions for his plane to return to Jos and fly Bali to Lagos. Clearly, something dramatic was happening in Lagos.¹⁷

Pillow Talk and Intrigue

The plotters decided early on in their plans that the coup should take place without bloodshed. To ensure the bloodless arrest of President Shagari, Colonel Tunde Ogbeha was tasked with arranging the peaceful surrender of the Abuja Brigade of Guards. The Brigade of Guards is the army unit detailed to guard and protect the Nigerian head of state. Ogbeha was based in Lagos and travelled to Abuja to pacify the brigade and convince them to surrender without a fight. However, when he arrived in Abuja, Ogbeha discovered that the brigade’s commander Colonel Kaliel had travelled to Lagos. Ogbeha headed back to Lagos to find Kaliel, but by the time he arrived there, Kaliel had returned to Abuja. Ogbeha once again headed back to Abuja.¹⁸ However Kaliel (a former member of a previous military government and no stranger to coup intrigues) became suspicious. Moreover, the conspirators included some of Kaliel’s coursemates from his days as a cadet at the Nigerian Defence Academy (such as Colonels Joshua Dogonyaro and Aliyu Mohammed). Kaliel relayed orders to his men in Abuja instructing them to resist any attempt by unauthorised officers to get near President Shagari.

Brigadier Ibrahim Bako (a brigade commander) was given the task of arresting Shagari after Shagari’s guards had supposedly been neutralised by Ogbeha. As well as being a close friend of Major-Generals Buhari and Yar’Adua, Bako was chosen for this role because his father was Shagari’s personal friend. Although he had never been appointed to an overtly political role, Bako served on the National Census Board as a logistics officer during the 1973 census back when he was still a lt-colonel.

Bako travelled to Abuja with an armed detachment of soldiers to effect the peaceful surrender of Shagari and his guards (thinking they had already been briefed and pacified by Ogbeha). However, something went terribly wrong. The plot had leaked to President Shagari. The source of the leak was pillow talk between an army officer within the plot and his wife who was a sister-in-law to the wife of Plateau State Governor Solomon Lar. When news of a coup plot reached Lar, he informed Shagari.¹⁹

December 31, 1983 – State House, Abuja

Shagari was approached by Captain Augustine A. Anyogo of the Brigade of Guards on the night of December 31, 1983. In the presence of Shagari’s ADC, Major Ali Geidam, and a member of the National Security Organisation, Ali Shittu, Anyogo informed Shagari that he had some urgent security information for him. Anyogo told Shagari that a couple of hours earlier, he had been approached by Colonel Tunde Ogbeha and informed of a ‘military operation’ scheduled for midnight at the State House, Abuja. Ogbeha told Anyogo to arrest President Shagari at midnight and detain him pending the arrival of senior officers from Kaduna. In response to the strange order, Anyogo replied that he would take orders only from his own commander, and not from Colonel Ogbeha (whose base was in Lagos). Shortly afterwards, Anyogo briefed his commander Lt-Colonel Eboma. Eboma arranged for troops to be put on alert and to take defensive positions on approach roads to State House, and reinforced the guards at the State House itself. The second tier of guards around the State House were deployed as a do or die last-ditch perimeter around Shagari. Shagari went to bed as events unfolded.

Colonel Bello Kaliel was also contacted, but unfortunately his deputy and other members of his unit were among the conspirators. Kaliel was arrested and detained. The Brigade Major of the Brigade of Guards at Bonny Camp in Lagos was one Lt-Colonel Mike Iyorshe, who would later be implicated in a subsequent coup plot.

In the early hours of the morning, President Shagari was woken up by his security men and informed that troops led by Brigadier Ibrahim Bako were headed to the State House to arrest him. Shagari was evacuated from the State House in order to get him out of harm’s way during an anticipated gun battle between his guards and Bako’s troops. After arriving in mufti to take Shagari into custody from what he thought were pacified guards, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako was killed in murky circumstances. How did Bako die? Several different conspiratorial accounts (usually laced with subterfuge and innuendo) have been given.

I was informed by a reliable source that Bako was arrested by Shagari’s guards, but was shot dead in a melée while trying to escape after being arrested. It seems that while Bako was in their custody, Shagari’s guards ran into an ambush (or at least thought they were being ambushed) and opened fire. Bako was killed in the crossfire. This is corroborated by the account of Bako’s death given by Captain Augustine Anyogo (one of Shagari’s guards), who witnessed the event. Shagari claimed that Anyogo told him:

I was the company commander of the guard battalion of Abuja during the change of government in December, 1983. Neither I nor members of my guard were informed of the impending change of government, and in the process of finding out what group of soldiers were trying to change the government, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and my driver, Private Sule, were shot and killed, when I entered into the ambush mounted by Recce [Reconnaissance] troops brought by the officers from Kaduna. This happened about 11 kilometres away from the State House where ex-President Alhaji Shehu Shagari was staying. The officers, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and Lt-Colonel Tunde Ogbeha were both in civilian dress during the operation and they did not identify themselves to me as senior officers. At this time there were rumours that some junior officers were planning to take over government and we were careful this was happening [sic] in our area of jurisdiction. The two officers were disarmed and put in front of my vehicle and we were on our way to the State House of Abuja under the orders of my commanding officer Lt-Colonel Eboma. When we entered into the ambush it was Lt-Colonel Tunde Ogbeha who jumped in front of my vehicle when somebody shouted the order, ‘fire him’. In the resultant ambush firing, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and my driver Sule died.²⁰

Babangida also claimed that soldiers opened erratic fire after hearing an accidental discharge of ammunition that made them believe that they were being attacked.²¹ Bako was buried in Kaduna on January 3, 1984.

Both Major-General Buhari and Shagari’s guards became concerned for Shagari’s safety, fearing that angry soldiers loyal to Bako might kill Shagari in revenge for Bako’s death. However, Shagari initially evaded arrest. He escaped and hid at a farm owned by Group Captain Usman Jibrin (former military governor of Kaduna State) on the outskirts of Keffi, then later moved to a village called Tunga (about 80 kilometres away). He emerged from hiding and submitted himself into official custody only after being given assurances of his safety by the military. His eldest son Captain Mohammed Bala Shagari was retired from the army, and another son, Musa, was expelled from the Air Force Secondary School in Jos. Shagari remained in detention, largely incommunicado, until July 1986. He was permitted to see visitors only toward the latter end of his detention. The few non-relatives who visited him in detention included Moshood Abiola and the Ooni of Ife. While he was detained, his older brother Magaji Muhammed Bello died and two of his wives gave birth.

Lagos, December 31, 1983

Around 2:30 am, armed troops moved to strategic locations, set up roadblocks and took over the radio and television stations in Lagos. Communication lines were severed and airports, border crossings and ports were closed. A column of armoured vehicles converged at Bonny Camp, which the coup plotters used as their tactical headquarters. Chief of Army Staff Lt-General Wushishi was unable to resist. The head of his guards had been suspiciously switched overnight – perhaps to facilitate the coup. Many of the soldiers used for the operation were tutored by Major-General Babangida during his days as an instructor at the NDA. At 7 am normal radio and television programming was interrupted by martial music interspersed with the following broadcast by a hitherto unknown army officer:

I and my colleagues in the armed forces have, in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national interest, decided to effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a Federal Military Government. This task has just been completed… Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

It was the monotone voice of Brigadier Sani Abacha, the commander of the 9^th Mechanised Brigade in Ikeja.²² After Abacha’s broadcast, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon made another broadcast shortly after midday telling listeners to stand by for further announcements. On the last day of 1983, the army abandoned the barracks in order to “save this nation from imminent collapse”.

President Shehu Shagari was overthrown only three months after being re-elected for his second and final term of office in an election that was marred by accusations of electoral malpractice. A faction of the military government that had handed power to Shagari in 1979 returned four years later to take it back from him.

The plotters learned lessons from previous coups. Scarred by the memory of the mass bloodshed that followed the bloody military coups of 1966, the coup plotters wisely did not harm any senior government figures. The coup’s success was unsurprising. Coups by senior officers succeed more frequently than those executed by middle or junior ranks. Coups by junior or middle ranks frequently cause instability or provoke counter-coups because of the inability of junior/middle ranks to rally support for their coup from their military superiors. This was the case with the Majors’ coup of January 1966 and the 1976 Dimka coup. In an organisation most comfortable with obeying orders from above, coups by senior officers are more likely to succeed because senior officers will face less rigour in convincing junior ranks to obey them. Junior officers are more likely to fall in line with the new directives issued by their superiors.

Coups and the Constitution

The coup itself was an illegal act. Section 1(2) of the 1979 constitution forbade any assumptions of governmental authority that are not in accordance with the constitution: “The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.” That section was drafted with a military coup in mind, but was suspended by the incoming regime.

“Coup” is a benign term for what is in effect the double crimes of treason against the state, and mutiny against the military hierarchy. Treason is the gravest offence that a citizen can commit against his or her country, and mutiny is correspondingly the most serious offence that a military officer can commit. The possibility of being prosecuted for staging a successful coup was slim, since those who could prosecute the crime were members of the deposed government, who were now either under arrest, in hiding or fleeing from the military. Only failed military coups are ever prosecuted. Successful coups are termed “revolutions”. As Babangida put it: “Not all coups succeed, but those that succeed, you don’t call them illegal. This is because the moment you succeed, you put our constitution away and declare martial law. And who would come and challenge you?”²³

The Nigerian press and public became accomplices in legitimising these twin crimes against their civil and military authorities, by welcoming news of a military coup d’etat and the overthrow of a government they elected, with characteristic jubilation. Civilians converged on the Benin border to prevent corrupt politicians from fleeing into exile.

The new military regime suspended several parts of the 1979 constitution (primarily those relating to the offices of the president, governors and other elected officials), disbanded the National Assembly and all political parties, and forbade political activity.²⁴ Ironically, the first act of the military, which regarded itself as the defender of the constitution and a protector of the citizen, was to suspend those parts of the constitution that politically empower the people.

Muhammadu Buhari

Major-General Muhammadu Buhari became the new head of state. Buhari claimed he had no idea he was going to be appointed head of state until after the coup had been executed and a plane was sent to fly him down to Lagos from Jos.²⁵ His appointment was announced in his broadcast to the nation shortly after 12:15 am on Sunday January 1, 1984. Babangida later denied rumours that Bako would have become head of state had he not been killed. He also revealed that he was approached to become the new head of state but declined as “Buhari was our senior, so I did not want anybody to jump [ahead of] him.”²⁶

Buhari was a Fulani born in Daura in the far north west on December 17, 1942. He was the last of his mother’s 13 children and also the last of his father’s 23 children. His father Hardo Adamu was the Fulani chief of a village near Daura named Dumurkol. After his father died when he was only four years old, he was raised by his mother Hajia Zulaihatu Musa (a Hausa widow who already had seven children from a previous marriage when she married Buhari’s father). He attended the Katsina Provincial Secondary School with Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, and the two were boyhood friends living in the same school dormitory.

Like many northern officers, Buhari’s choice of a military career was influenced by sage advice from royal quarters. Buhari recalled that as a young man “the Emir of Kano told one of us that if soldiers could overthrow a line of kings descended directly from the Prophet, it could happen anywhere. So we should go and join the army.”²⁷

Buhari began his training by enlisting at the fifth course of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) in 1962. His school classmate Yar’Adua enlisted with him, and there, the two young men met other cadets who would later become prominent leaders in Nigerian politics including Ibrahim Bako. Thereafter he proceeded to the Mons Officer Cadet School at Aldershot in the United Kingdom between October 1962 and January 1963. One of his coursemates at Mons was the former chairman of the National Population Commission Chris Ugokwe.²⁸ On his return he was commissioned into the Nigerian army in January 1963, upon which he was posted to the 2^nd Battalion, then stationed at Abeokuta.

Buhari had been involved in all but one change of government and coup in Nigeria’s history. He was one of the planners and executors of the July 1966 mutiny that overthrew Nigeria’s first military government, led by Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi. He was again among the conspirators who overthrew General Gowon in July 1975. Following the 1975 coup he served in the military governments of Generals Muhammed and Obasanjo, firstly as military governor of Borno State, and later as minister of petroleum. Although he was unharmed during the abortive February 1976 coup in which General Muhammed was assassinated, he reported an unauthorised changing of his guards while the coup was in progress. He was the GOC of the 3^rd Armoured Division in Jos when the December 1983 coup occurred.

The disciplined, tough and stoic Brigadier (later Major-General) Tunde Idiagbon, was appointed Buhari’s deputy, as the Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters. When Buhari was reassigned from his position as military governor of Borno State in the late 1970s, Idiagbon succeeded him as Borno State military governor. Buhari and Idiagbon were very similar in temperament and made a good pairing. Idiagbon had his officer training at the Pakistan Military Academy, and radiated the bonhomie of a fridge freezer. Idiagbon’s stern, unsmiling and uncompromising discipline resonated with the equally disciplinarian Buhari.

The New Military Government

After a successful military coup, its executors always face tough decisions. They have numerous options on how to replace the government they have just deposed. In order to avoid disrupting the military’s chain of command, they might choose to submit to the authority of the overall military commander (as happened when the majors who staged Nigeria’s first coup in 1966 submitted to the authority of their GOC Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi).

Alternatively, they may entrust governmental responsibility to a group of senior officers they respect. This occurred in 1975 when the colonels (Yar’Adua, Babangida, Buhari, Abdullahi Mohammed, Taiwo) who planned and executed the overthrow of General Gowon nominated three brigadiers (Muhammed, Obasanjo, Danjuma) to form a troika at the head of a new regime. However, unless the nominated senior officers are the most senior in the military, some house cleaning is required to remove officers that are senior to them. As a third option they might decide to operate the new regime themselves. This is the most messy and risky option, and potentially causes the greatest dislocation to the military’s command and control. It requires the expulsion (by retirement, death or otherwise) not only of superior officers, but also other cohort or junior officers who do not share the coup planners’ political inclinations. Such officers are removed in order to prevent them from becoming future sources of opposition and counter-coups. Neutral officers must also be purged to ensure loyalty and obedience to the new military junta.

The officers who staged the coup chose the third option. Although they were senior, they were not the most senior in the army. They had several three- and two-star generals who were either senior to, or held equivalent seniority to them. The successful conspirators had to decide what to do with their superiors and colleagues. Babangida and Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon informed the service chiefs, Lt-General Gibson Jalo (Chief of Defence Staff), Lt-General Mohammed Wushishi²⁹ (Chief of Army Staff), Air Vice-Marshal Abdullahi Dominic Bello (Chief of Air Staff), and Vice-Admiral Akin Aduwo (Chief of Naval Staff), that their services were no longer required. All four of them were immediately retired and placed in ‘protective custody’ for four days at Bonny Camp in Lagos. The detainees distrusted the new leaders so much that they refused to sleep in separate rooms, instead opting to huddle together in one room, to reduce the chances of one of them being surreptitiously eliminated at night without the others’ knowledge.³⁰

Major-General Domkat Bali initially sought the position of Chief of Army Staff, but was turned down by Buhari who explained that Babangida insisted on having the post, and had to be awarded it given the key role he had played in facilitating the coup. As will be shown later, that proved to be an unwise decision. Bali was instead appointed defence minister.