This book is dedicated to my family and above all to my wife and companion since more than 40 years, Inger Bäcklund

I have enjoyed constant support and encouragement over many decades of travel and overtime work

Contents

• Acronyms

• Academic Preface
  • Key Concepts: The EU, Security and Impact
  • Inspiration for Future Research

• Introduction
  • What role does the European Union play in this context?
  • The main focus: Generic problems of impact
  • The structure of the book

• 1. The Conflict Cycle
  • 1.1 Defence
  • 1.2 Crisis Management
  • 1.3 Conflict Prevention

• 2. Flow Security
  • 2.1 Flow Security
  • 2.2 Organized Crime
  • 2.3 Terrorism
  • 2.4 WMD Proliferation

• 3. Organizational Cultures
  • 3.1 Geography
  • 3.2 Thematic Cultures: Development, Freedom and Justice
  • 3.3 Multilateral
  • 3.4 Crisis

• 4. Policy Contexts
  • 4.1 Intergovernmental/Community Nexus
  • 4.2 Internal–External Nexus
  • 4.3 Explicit and Implicit Security Policies

• 5. Institutionalization
  • 5.1 Legal Basis
  • 5.2 Budgetary and Staffing Resources
  • 5.4 Structures and Activities

• 6. From Problem Identification to Impact Assessment
  • 6.1 Focusing on the Problem
  • 6.2 Impact Assessment Ex Ante
  • 6.3 Impact Assessment Ex Post

• 7. Power and Influence
  • 7.1 Actor Capability and the Objects of Power
  • 7.2 Enabling Assistance
  • 7.3 Values
  • 7.4 Perceptions

• 8. Timelines

• 9. EU and Security
  • 9.1 Towards Wider, Comprehensive Approaches
  • 9.2 Conceptualizing Security Policies
  • 9.3 Focusing on the Problems Rather than the Instruments
  • 9.4 The Added Value of Thinking Both Fast and Slow
  • 9.5 Who, When, What, How, Where?
  • 9.6 The EU as One Option for Security Action
  • 9.7 Democratic Legitimacy, Education, and Research
  • 9.8 A Smaller Europe in a More Complex World With a Diffuse Distribution of Power
  • 9.9 The Risk of Over-Securitization

• 10. Personal Note

• 11. Acknowledgements

• References

• Index

Acronyms

Academic Preface

Observers of the European Union, scholars and other interested readers will from the outset want to know the genre of this book. Clearly, more than anything else it should be regarded as a handbook written on the basis of decades of discussions with interlocutors, both practitioners and academics, within and outside the EU institutions.

It is intended to help practitioners and students to create a strategic perspective for themselves.

It is also hoped that the book will inspire future research. But it is important to be clear about the limitations of the book from an academic perspective.

The analytical framework of the book is not derived primarily from the scholarly literature. Although a conscious effort was made to relate to this literature, including theoretical work, the book was not written with a dedicated ambition to improve on any particular theory beyond a strong emphasis on the need for a comprehensive approach to security.

Ideally, other scholars should be able to replicate scientific works on the basis of available material or at least attributable sources.¹ Case studies² are needed based on a systematic selection of material that helps test well-defined hypotheses. The present study has clear limitations in this regard.

Much of the analysis in the following chapters is based on the author’s personal experience over the years, some of which cannot be explicitly attributed to identifiable sources. In the discussion of problems of impact, the study presents different examples that are linked to processes where the author can claim to have some comparative advantage in terms of experience in his professional career. This obviously entails a risk of bias. However, it can be considered progress if some, either as scholars or practitioners, take inspiration from questions that are put forward.

Thus, the material was not collected in a single systematic effort according to predefined hypotheses. Notably, interviews were undertaken in several contexts over a number of years and were partly designed for the purpose of other, closely related studies. The interview results have not been coded systematically but have for the most part been recorded.³

References to the literature primarily suggest further reading and give examples of the point that is being made. References to interviews are often not explicit due to a commitment to protect the respondents.

Key Concepts: The EU, Security and Impact

The character of a handbook requires that all concepts be used in accordance with EU official documents. This affects the use of key concepts such as the EU, security and impact.

First, the vision of the EU as an actor⁴ thus differs depending on the context. Sometimes it is quite clear that EU action will need to be implemented through a consensus procedure along a single line of command with clear time limitations and real-time control from member states’ representatives in Brussels. Sometimes the effort is much more differentiated, with less clear time limitations, and is deployed using different decision-making procedures in both intergovernmental and community contexts, perhaps also including efforts by member states themselves.

Second, the book illustrates that the concept of security⁵ also varies depending on the context. Again, this has to do with the fact that this is a study based on declared EU policy objectives, not an analytical construct of what these objectives should be in terms of security.

Third, the book demonstrates that the models for impact assessment differ widely, far beyond the technical methodology developed for impact evaluation in the literature..⁶

EU member states have instructed their citizens and governments and the EU institutions to comply with the Treaty of Lisbon, with the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and with a number of other international commitments. They have also put resources at the disposal of the EU institutions until 2020. But they have not prescribed a single actor to implement these commitments, and they have not defined a single coherent objective for the work in terms of security. Rather, they have allowed a considerable amount of flexibility in the interpretation of the treaties and other commitments both in terms of the evolution of EU actor capability, ways in which EU actions are securitized and ways in which impact assessment is to be made.

This ambiguity also means that the question ”security for whom?”⁷ cannot be addressed in the same way throughout the book. Sometimes it is obvious that measures of success are intermediate, referring to the situation in a particular conflict area, the policies of other governments, the compliance with international commitments, the interdiction of dangerous flows into the Union, the protection of important flows of energy, trade etc.

The EU treaties refer to both values and interests. This means that the EU is not supposed to work only for the security of citizens or the member states. Notably, the EU and its member states provide more than half the development assistance in the world.

A key concept employed in the study is impact. The question was put during the writing of this book if it is possible to discuss problems of impact if case studies evaluating earlier impact have not been undertaken. In this regard most readers will agree that both the academic literature and the political discourse in the EU are clear enough: even if EU documents are often somewhat self-congratulatory when evaluating earlier policies, a massive literature is available on shortfalls in terms of EU impact on security. This book contains many examples of such shortfalls that have been either publicly described or discussed in interviews. There are also dedicated efforts underway to deal with some of these shortfalls in major policy areas as well as through reviews of existing structures, notably the European External Action Service itself,⁸ and policies in the context of the financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020.

Areas where the lack of sufficient impact has been criticized include (in no particular order):

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is shown throughout the book to be in difficulty, ranging from poor capacity building, isolation from other policy areas, bad micromanagement in terms of procedures, lack of strategic and long-term objectives beyond capacity building, etc.⁹

Neighbourhood and enlargement policies that are often stovepiped, where the comprehensive approach has not yet been systematically applied, uniform strategies have not been developed, and there is a lack of serious impact assessment including agonizing reappraisals.¹⁰

Policies based on conditionality such as sanctions, clauses etc. where the literature shows very uneven and sometimes unprincipled performance in areas such as WMD proliferation and human rights.¹¹

Policies relating to so-called strategic partners where the concept itself seems to have created considerable confusion when governments or policies in the partner countries have changed dramatically.¹²

When dealing with good and bad flows, problems in creating a coherent framework of internal and external policies covering many different types of flows ranging from transnational threats, cyber security, maritime security and the protection of energy supply.

Finally, the eternal problem of conflict and crisis prevention where crises in many areas time and again demonstrate a lack of contingency planning and sufficient efforts before the crisis has escalated to try to defuse and prevent them.

It is important to note, as the index shows, that these different types of partial failures of EU policies are not dealt with in any specific chapter of the book. Many of them reappear in chapters throughout the book from different complementary perspectives. It is argued that it is necessary to apply most if not all of these perspectives in order to optimize outcome. The fact is that individual parts of the EU structures, whether a geographical directorate in the European External Action Service, a thematic unit in a line directorate general in the Commission, or an EU delegation to an international organization are nearly never competent to apply all these perspectives. The EU therefore needs to develop a comprehensive approach.

Ideally, again, the book should have been based on clear-cut assessments of the actual impact of EU policies. Such annual assessments do exist, such as the rating of the success of EU and member states’ foreign policies by the European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR).¹³ The present study is not an attempt to replicate such studies, certainly not with an academic ambition. References to impact in this study are by necessity provided by way of examples derived from the literature or from interviews.

Inspiration for Future Research

The chapters and the extensive bibliography illustrate that there is a serious body of literature that deals with various issues brought up throughout the book. But several problems were discovered that may be useful as a guide for future research:

First, practitioners express a recurring dissatisfaction with existing research in a number of different areas. They often argue that research is too general to be useful for actual policy-making and that it is often made available too late to be effectively taken into account. The fact that the EU academic network for conflict prevention, created a decade ago, was discontinued indicates a serious problem in this regard.¹⁴ It remains to be seen whether the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium will encounter the same fate. In the Horizon 2020 research programme, administered by the European Commission, there is significant funding for relevant academic research.¹⁵ It will be interesting to see whether this investment will be more successful than previous similar attempts. Much will arguably depend on the interaction between stakeholders and researchers throughout the process.

Second, it is noteworthy that research on the EU and security in an overall context is still seeking its frame of reference. A large part of the discourse on the EU as a peace project before the arrival of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was not explicitly securitized. Issues relating to integration within and outside the EU have for various reasons not been discussed systematically from a security perspective. And when the CFSP and the ESDP/CSDP did arrive in the late 1990s, the approach was entirely intergovernmental, with very limited interaction with the existing community framework. It was only when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force a decade later that the conditions were created in terms of both legal basis and resources for a more explicit comprehensive approach. This is obviously reflected in the literature and it will most likely take another decade for a substantial body of literature to be developed from a comprehensive perspective.¹⁶ In certain specific areas examined in the book there also seems to be a gap in available analytical research. One notable such area is the literature on flows. There is a great deal of material on transnational organized crime, financial flows, energy flows, migration flows, etc. But whereas generic models for integrated border management have been developed and described in the literature this does not seem to be the case as regards a holistic analysis of good and bad flows. It is for instance noteworthy that issues relating to WMD proliferation are not well integrated with other related issues in the literature. The tension between different schools of thought as regards norms, power, crisis management, functional analysis, etc. also lead to questions concerning how EU security actions are to be assessed in terms of impact. Hopefully, chapters 6 and 7 in particular will generate new research. Sometimes the literature assumes that the issue is the role of the EU. Alternatively, the issue is defined as the extent to which EU partners comply with what the EU or the international community dictates. In other contexts a study may deal with the extent to which a recipient of assistance is enabled to do what is necessary in line with jointly agreed objectives. But the literature is more seldom based on systematic surveys of perceptions.¹⁷ The proof in many situations after all is the extent to which populations in other countries, as well as within the EU, find EU policies in line with their concerns and priorities and the extent to which these policies help to provide hope for the future. Restrictive policies and military force always have to be deployed with this clearly in mind.

Finally, it is noteworthy that an evaluation of evaluations and lessons-learned exercises undertaken so far in the EU is warranted. The evaluations undertaken ex-post of the impact of important EU assistance policies typically cover a long period of time and are still not well focused on security, with a few exceptions.¹⁸ Questions addressed in these evaluation studies often seem to be standardized, with limited effort to address more critical questions. For example, it may be asked whether earlier evaluations of EU policies in countries affected by the Arab Spring addressed the issues that are now obvious in those countries. The present book gives a few examples in this regard. Second, lessons-learned exercises in the intergovernmental domain are often classified and not systematically subjected to academic discussion. Third, there seems to be a glaring lack of systematic application of ex-ante impact assessment in external relations, starting with the establishment of the European External Action Service itself and the communication on the comprehensive approach. Neither of these important exercises was accompanied by an analysis of the financial implications or the need for change-management capabilities, including consequences for staffing.

The unique contribution of the present book is the combination of different overlapping perspectives to better identify links between various problems of impact. It is meant to show the very wide and differentiated scope of links between various aspects of EU security-related policies. The need to explore more thoroughly and more strategically the potential added value of the EU for security is demonstrated. Such an effort has seldom been made in the past few decades, certainly not with an open mind to both the intergovernmental and Community frameworks for cooperation in the EU and not taking into account the overall civilian and defence-related potential of the Union.

This is an exploratory study to encourage further analytical and empirical work in a number of areas. Those engaged in scholarly work on the EU as a normative power and other major research traditions may find that the study starts at the wrong end. It addresses some of the main theoretical issues only in the final chapter and mainly through linking up with some of the most important theoretical discourses rather than discussing them in depth.

The present author has published some dedicated studies elsewhere on different aspects of issues dealt with in this book. These contributions range from follow-up to the European Security Strategy, the need for a comprehensive approach in EU external action, effective multilateralism, the EU and non-proliferation, inter-institutional cooperation between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and other regional organizations in Europe, the UN and regional organizations outside Europe, the democratic legitimacy of EU security policies, etc.¹⁹ The present study is informed by these other contributions referenced in respective chapters, but the structure of this book is adapted to the questions that are developed relating to problems of impact.

This is a study where a practitioner’s experience meets theoretical analysis, rather than the other way around. The added value of the book is at the same time not the descriptive empirical material on each issue but rather the attempts to establish links between various problems of impact and to provide a broader scope for analysis. There are many books, studies, articles, and reports on individual issues in the literature that go deeper and contain more solid descriptive analysis. A number of very useful and important edited volumes provide many perspectives on security issues. Sometimes they provide a set of empirical case studies that give added insight into the role of the EU as a security actor. There are also volumes such as those that the present author has contributed to that explore the added value of the EU in specific dimensions of policy. But little material was found covering the entire scope of the relationship between the EU and security: no entire volumes were found that describe a more organic link between the different paradigms analysed here.

1   See the discussion of methods of observation in Harrison, L, & Callan, T: Key research concepts in politics and international relations, SAGE, 2013

2   See the analysis of the case study concept in Ibid.

3   For a brief description of the methodological aspects related to interviews see Ibid.

4   For examples of a great number of different perspectives on this issue in the literature – see the bibliography.

5   For a conceptual overview see Buzan, B, & L Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2009 and specifically as regards the EU in international organisations see Jørgensen, K E, The European Union and International Organizations, Routledge, 2009.

6   As an example of the latter see: Khandker, S, G B Koolwal, & H Samad, Handbook on Impact Evaluation, no. 1, 2009, pp. 1–239.

7   See Weaver, O, J Sperling, & J Hallenberg, ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 34, No. 1, 1996.

8   See EEAS, EEAS Review, 2013.

9   G Grevi, D Helly, & D Keohane, ‘European Security and Defence Policy The first 10 years (1999–2009)’, 2009, reviews the impact of a number of different ESDP missions and enumerates close to a hundred different problems of implementation during the first decade.

10 See for example Lehne, S, ‘Time to reset the European Neighborhood Policy’, Carnegie, 2014.

11 See for example Grip, L, ‘The EU non-proliferation clause: A preliminary assessment’, SIPRI, background paper, 2009; Zwagemakers, F ‘The EU’s Conditionality Policy: A new Strategy to achieve Compliance’, IAI Working papers 12, 2012.

12 See Schmidt, A, ‘Strategic Partnerships – a contested policy concept; a review of recent publications’, SWP, 2010.

13 See ECFR, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014, 2014.

14 Rummel, R, ‘Die Europäische Union lernt Konfliktprävention’, Konfliktprävention zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Wien 2007, pp. 39–59.

15 Including calls related to the EU as a global actor; border security and external security, including conflict prevention and peace building.

16 For recent contributions to the comprehensive approach analysis see in particular High Representative & European Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’, 2013 and other examples listed in the bibliography.

17 For a recent example of surveys of relevance which also include Russian perceptions see German Marshall Fund of the US, ‘Transatlantic Trends 2014’, 2014.

18 See chapter 6.

19 L-E Lundin, ‘From A European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Ten Content-Related Issues’, UI Occasional Papers vol. 11, 2012, L-E Lundin, ‘From a European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Take II: Policy options’, UI Occasional Papers vol. 13, 2013, L-E Lundin, ‘The EU as a regional organization. Effective multilateralism in conflict management’ in P Wallensteen, & A Bjurner (eds.), Regional Organisations and Peacemaking Challengers to the UN, L-E Lundin, ‘The EU, the IAEA and the Comprehensive Approach’ in S Blavoukos, D Bourantonis, & C Portela (eds.), EU and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Palgrave, 2015, L-E Lundin, ‘Effective Multilateralism: the EU Delegation in Vienna’ in J Bátora, & S David (eds.), European Diplomacy post-Westphalia, Palgrave, 2015.

Introduction

Ever since the end of the Second World War, most Europeans have felt fortunate to have lived through the longest period of relative peace ever experienced on the continent. Some now take this for granted.

Is their sense of security realistic? Other people have led completely different lives in very different circumstances. Millions have little or no hope for a peaceful, let alone prosperous, future. Is there cause to hope for more security in places like Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia? Or are these countries and their regions simply going to remain arenas where conflicts can be contained and managed but without any prospects for real solutions?

The answers to these questions must also take into account that security is increasingly perceived not only as the absence of war. It now also includes development, freedom, and justice, all part of a comprehensive concept of security.

What role does the European Union play in this context?

This is a question that often came to mind during the writing of this book, in the three years 2012 to 2014. When the work started, most people in Central and Northern Europe saw security as a remote issue, but with the Ukraine crisis of 2013–14 it has become much more real. At this point probably few would challenge the notion that the European Union is an important security actor. However, whether the EU can be called effective in the realm of security, as proposed by the EU member states in the EU Council is still debated:

From the EU member states’ Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive Approach 2014:

The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice.²⁰

Further destabilization in the European Neighbourhood – countries to the east and south of the EU territory – not least after the Arab Spring protests that broke out in the end of 2010, has been an important subject of discourse. However, it was the events in Ukraine that really brought the issues to life, as the 9/11 attacks on the United States did in 2001. Crises make us see things in a new light. But of course, the crux of the matter is the response to crisis in the short, medium, and long term.

A decade ago the European Security Strategy (ESS) eloquently defined the challenges ahead for Europe, again optimistically as regards the future role of the European Union:

From the European Security Strategy 2003: In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.²¹

So there is a reason to explore the added value in terms of security of the European Union to governments and individuals within and outside the Union. This book identifies problems encountered in creating this added value.

The main focus: Generic problems of impact

The focus of this book is on what can be called generic problems of impact. These are the problems, issues, challenges, or opportunities that can be expected to be relevant in the medium to long term. The notion is that – to the extent such issues can be dealt with – this may increase the impact of EU security-related policies. The problems may be directly and indirectly security-related. The main emphasis is on EU external action.

This study collects ideas in the literature and through interviews, referring to such problems of impact and recapitulates them, section by section throughout the text in order to help the reader see them from different angles. Each angle represents a key policy perspective in EU external action. The full arguments are concentrated in sections where this seemed useful to promote the flow of the text. Each section or perspective is organized in its own set of arguments with a structure deemed appropriate for the topic at hand. Sometimes several sets of arguments represent different sub-perspectives in a section. The recurrence of individual perspectives can be searched using the index at the end of the book.

A number of different individual perspectives are applied that are frequently discussed in the literature, but less often from a comprehensive perspective. And when they have been discussed from a broader perspective proposing a comprehensive approach, there is usually a single point of departure, such as conflicts, crises, geography, norms, or power. The EU treaties have for some time required coherence in the policy actions of the EU institutions. However, a comprehensive approach is more than that: it entails seeking real synergies between various policy areas as agreed by the EU member states:

The Council stresses that the comprehensive approach is both a general working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of tools and instruments, collectively can develop and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, actions and results. The need for such a comprehensive approach is most acute in crisis and conflict situations and in fragile states, however, its fundamental principles are also relevant for the broad spectrum of EU external action.²²

Comprehensive approaches require capacity building, not only in relation to key objectives in each specific policy context but also with a view to achieving these synergies.

Capacity building must be coherent with a comprehensive concept of security. This does not mean securitizing every policy area, but it does mean creating an awareness of the direct and indirect relevance of different policies for security in the comprehensive sense.

A real comprehensive approach needs to take into account the fact that implementation is not improved through a strict hierarchical ordering of perspectives, except in overall dramatic crises, but rather through an informed development of policy where each responsible actor in the system is aware of and tries to coordinate with others. In concrete terms this means that a truly comprehensive approach cannot only take as its point of departure conflicts or crises, but as many as possible of the policy approaches existing in EU external action and the problems of impact encountered in those approaches.

Broad ownership and respect for the competencies of others thus are key in combination with the realization that impact is achieved through the constant interaction of different actors and factors.

The issue of generic problems of impact is the primary focus of the book rather than historical references to efforts to solve the problems. When discussing capacity building in order to achieve a security impact, they refer to shortfalls and when discussing projects and operations they refer to reasons for suboptimal impact.

There is a dual reason for the emphasis on problems of impact: the book is intended to help define a future-oriented agenda rather than evaluate the outcome of previous efforts to deal with the problems. This choice is in no way intended to underestimate the efforts that have been made throughout the years, nor to devalue the successes achieved. The choice of generic problems of impact is based on literature and interviews carried out in several stages over the two years 2012 to 2013.²³

This study may help practitioners to orient themselves in their security analysis, using a broad scope. The issue is not delimited to the added value to the European Union. When asking what the EU can do for the security of its citizens, it is obvious that EU policies may also influence governments and individuals of the member states and be important in other contexts, such as NATO or the United Nations. Furthermore, one cannot assume that all readers are interested in the EU as such; they may identify with a region that includes both EU and non-EU countries, be it in the Nordic–Baltic context or in the Mediterranean setting or in the transatlantic relationship. Some continue to be worried about the notion of a ‘Fortress Europe’, while some have a global perspective and are primarily concerned about the security of people worldwide.

As work on this book progressed, a framework for the analysis of these problems of impact was generated that provides an overview of the main chapters (see figure 1). This framework is under constant development. The endeavour has been to make it intuitively reasonable for practitioners. It is thus not primarily analytically derived but rather based on decades of discussions with colleagues within and outside the European institutions.

The chapters were not written in a linear order. There was a conscious attempt to develop the analysis through a number of redrafts that identified analytic links between different types of problems of impact.

Figure 1.

The structure of the book

The analysis is presented in each chapter based on this Venn diagram as depicted in figure 1.

The book focuses on a number of instruments and methods deployed in EU external action and to a certain extent in EU internal security-related policies of particular relevance for external action. The delimitation of the examples discussed throughout the chapters is guided mainly by the overall definition of EU external action as provided in the Treaty of Lisbon, article 21, in the context of the CFSP. This text is worth quoting in extenso:

Article 21 Treaty on the European Union:

1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;

(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;

(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;

(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;

(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;

(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;

(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and

(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.

The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.

As seen from the treaty, the scope of action for the EU is wide and there are many approaches.

Some of these approaches are aimed at capacity building, which can be seen as an intermediate measurement of success aiming at ultimate impact through the EU or in other contexts. This is important since it often entails building capacity in member states or through other actors, including international organizations, recipient countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOS), etc.

Each chapter as mentioned contains a more or less explicit chronological perspective – not simply in order to describe the interplay of the other perspectives but also to allow for the possibility that time itself may be a factor influencing impact. For instance, there is a significant time lag between when decisions to acquire defence capability are made and when they are realized. The setting up of organizational structures requires time to be effective. So sometimes, even if there is political will and the resources are at hand, it is impossible to be effective in the short term. Alternatively, in the opposite direction, the political will to make a difference may be negatively affected by time itself. As an example, the ‘CNN effect’ may for a certain time bring political attention to a crisis-related issue, which in turn may catalyse important decisions. Then, as these decisions are translated into programmes, projects, or missions, attention may diminish and the original political will may be translated into something else. The chronological perspective also brings out the links to different trends and megatrends, such as globalization, environmental change, and demographic developments further discussed in chapter 8.

Chapter 1 of the study opens with a discussion of security from the military perspective. The point of departure is the most well known generic problems of impact discussed in the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). First is the issue of defence as an objective in CSDP and capacity building for this purpose. Second is 1.2 crisis management, which has become a format for the use of these resources in the EU, mainly in the context of military but later also civilian crisis management. Third is 1.3 conflict prevention, illustrating generic problems of impact in preventing conflicts and crises, dealing with their aftermath, and coping with the fact that in practice CSDP operations often intervene in conflict prevention or post-conflict rehabilitation situations with the main objective to stabilize.

After having dealt on a relatively general level with these issues, which are already familiar to those interested in CSDP, the book proceeds to a second discourse in Chapter 2, which much less often is seen as a part of overall European security and defence analysis. This discourse is not systematically integrated into CSDP but is often seen as a part of the wider CFSP. Several of the key aspects of this discourse have, however, been described by the EU member states as fundamentally important for security. They are grouped together because of the linkages between them. The issue here is flow security, where problems of impact are seen from four overlapping perspectives. The first (2.1) is closely linked to globalization as a process over time and refers to the protection and promotion of flows, such as trade, finance, energy, movement of people, etc. At the same time it highlights threats against such flows that may be due to environmental changes over time, natural or man-made hazards, etc. More or less hidden in the enormous volume of this material and virtual communication within and between states, there are also bad flows, sometimes referred to as transnational threats, beyond man-made problems of an environmental or some other nature. These may be primarily motivated by financial gains and thus take the form of organized crime²⁴ (2.2), including different types of trafficking. On the other hand they may have political motives illustrated in terms of terrorism, (2.3). In a fourth section the perspective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is applied (2.4). Such a process may be state-sponsored as a part of defence policy; it can also be the object of organized crime, such as smuggling, or a part of terrorist activities. All generic problems of impact relating to good and bad flows may be overlapping and interlinked in different ways. Organized crime can be used to finance terrorism, and good flows can be exploited for criminal and terrorist purposes.

Chapter 3 introduces a third perspective, looking at problems of impact through the lens of four organizational cultures that may be considered predominant in the EU structures. They are all familiar to students of European Union external action. The first culture, (3.1), a predominant organizing principle for the EU External Action Service (EEAS), is geography. The second (3.2) is the thematic organizing principle dominating the differentiation of European Commission structures into several dozen major policy areas. The third culture (3.3) is the multilateral organizing principle in a broader than traditional sense, basically including the negotiation of international documents between more than two parties, the representation in international organizations, and the interaction with several other states and non-state actors at the same time in various informal and formal contexts, on the international level or within specific countries. Finally, (3.4) returns to the crisis perspective, with an emphasis on the generic interface between normal bureaucratic routines, including contingency planning and crisis prevention efforts, and crisis itself, which may affect every area of EU action within and outside the Union. All of these organizational cultures, with the addition of those dealing specifically with legal, budget, and staff issues (see Chapter 5), overlap, also in a bureaucratic sense since a geographic department may have thematic sub-entities and vice versa. Multilateral and crisis response departments also exist in the EEAS and several Commission Directorates-General (DGS). Again, there is a need to cross-reference the context for the CSDP in Chapter 1 with that defining flow-relevant policies in Chapter 2. For instance, the Central Asian regional strategy cannot be properly understood without taking into account the proximity to Afghanistan and the various problems of impact existing there that are relevant to CSDP.

The three perspectives outlined above do not apply solely to the European Union. They are equally applicable on the level of the EU member states and other actors outside the Union. But there is a fourth, more general paradigm, discussed in Chapter 4, that is much more specific to the EU itself as a sui generis case of international cooperation. This fourth set of overlapping ovals addresses generic problems of impact, starting (4.1) with the dichotomy of intergovernmental and Community policies, with reference to the more general context in which they are produced. For instance, it is noteworthy that CFSP, with its integral part the CSDP, are both intergovernmental policies. They are (4.2) also fundamentally external to the Union. They are to a large extent (4.3) explicit security policies, although the scope of CFSP goes beyond security in a strict sense, including human rights, etc. As any student of the EU knows, much of the debate on EU external action and security is about getting these various policy contexts to function in synergy. One way to do that is through the double-hatting of the roles of the High Representative for foreign and security policy on the one hand and as vice-president of the European Commission on the other, through a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), as set out in the Lisbon Treaty.

In the fifth paradigm, discussed in Chapter 5, the focus is on the interplay between the (5.1) legal, (5.2) budgetary/staff, and (5.3) structural problems of impact in EU security-related policies. The legal basis for everything that is being done in the European Union is defined with a point of departure in the treaties. Problems are linked to financial and staff resources at the disposal of the institutions for their administrative and, as regards the Commission, operational budgets. The financing of military CSDP takes place through direct financial contributions by member states. The way static and dynamic structures are set up bring additional problems.

Chapter 6 discusses difficulties encountered in the process from the definition of problems to be addressed and the measurements of success (6.1), to impact assessment ex ante (6.2) and ex post (6.3) in the European Union. The acronym SMARTER (indicating that policies should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Time bound and subject to Evaluation and Reevaluation) helps to structure this discussion.

In chapter 7, a step back is taken in a brief overview that examines the overall picture from the perspective of power and influence. This makes it clear that the EU’s actions and non-actions can affect security in both planned and unplanned ways. First, the traditional discourse on power and influence (7.1) is referred to. The chapter then proceeds to discuss problems relating to 7.2 assistance, which of course is a major tool of the European Union both in terms of enabling recipients to do what they otherwise could not achieve, with or without conditionality.²⁵ This second discourse is closely linked to a third, the EU as a normative power (7.3), with explicit values linked to interests but also to internationally agreed commitments. The fourth section refers to the importance of perceptions (7.4). The perceptions of objects of influence is a central part of the soft power discourse where the proof of the pudding is not what the European Union does but what it is perceived as doing and what it is perceived to stand for in terms of intentions, values, etc. This fourth section, of course, raises a wide range of questions relating to impact for discussion, including how the power of attraction of the European Union has been influenced by its internal integration processes, its perceived democratic legitimacy, and hopes and expectations for the future.

Chapter 8 contains a discussion of timelines.

Chapter 9 contains a concluding personal reflection on the overall issue of the EU and security.

The wide scope of the book in terms of substance means of course that not all problems of impact can be identified and discussed. The choice in each section was made through enumeration rather than classification. Obviously, many issues could not be covered.

The reader will note the inclusion of quite a number of explicit quotations from EU official documents, starting with Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union and continuing with a number of explicit and detailed references to agreements among the EU Member States in the EU. As EU practitioners will know a detailed analysis of such texts is essential to understand the declared level of agreement in the EU on key issues discussed in this book.