It is no accident that ideology has been underplayed and even avoided in the discourse on extremist Islam. Political correctness is one of the explanations for this, but there are some deeper dynamics behind a sanitized approach to Islam. There has been a tendency to explain violence and the rise of some radical groups by providing a range of sociopolitical and historical explanations. Poverty or relative deprivation has been at the top of the list. Crusades and centuries of colonial suppression have supplied another popular narrative. The modern geopolitical reality, and especially the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir are also often invoked. However, any explanation that deliberately disregards the ideological component implies different motivations. It may reflect a staunchly secularist approach and a consequent unwillingness to engage with any religious aspects. It may indicate a fear of criticizing Islam. It may be an attempt to whitewash Islam and intentionally to disassociate it from violence.

The story of the Islamic State (IS) is instructive. Its emergence and its quick expansion in 2014 brought the controversy over ideology to the fore. The Islamic State’s ideology and interpretation of Islam was so drastic and troubling that political leaders in the West quickly pronounced it unIslamic. Tony Blair commented on the Islamic State, “It’s an ideology based in a complete perversion of the proper faith of Islam.”¹ Barak Obama’s statement became the most quoted, “Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not ‘Islamic’. No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL’s victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state.”² IS ideology also exposed divisions within the Muslim community. While some explicitly condemned the Islamic State and found their actions repulsive, others could relate to and even sympathize with the IS. Indeed, a steady stream of recruits for the IS in 2013-2014 suggested ideological support for the Islamic State in different parts of the world. Certain target groups readily identified themselves with the IS and did not see it as an aberration. According to the result of the opinion polls in Saudi Arabia 92% of the target group believed that “IS conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic law.”³

However, the actions of the Islamic State, especially against other Islamic factions and local Muslims, also provoked strong reactions from within the Muslim community. There were numerous individual attempts to condemn the Islamic State and its actions. Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Fawzan described the Islamic State as “a rogue, external criminal organization”.⁴ Sheikh Adnan Mohammed al-Aroor and Sheikh Abu Basir al-Tartusi compared ISIS to Kharijites, a radical breakaway group of the 7th century. Sheikh Adnan Mohammed al-Aroor suggested that “ISIS are either Khawārij or infiltrated by the [Syrian] regime. It is composed of three groups of people: brutal Takfīrīs, wicked infiltrators and people deceived by them.”⁵ In September 2014 about 120 Muslim scholars and leaders cosigned the “Open Letter to al-Baghdadi”, where they tried to rebut many theological claims and interpretations made by the IS. For instance they stressed that the Islamic State misappropriated jihad: “Jihad without legitimate cause, legitimate goals, legitimate purpose, legitimate methodology and legitimate intention is not jihad at all, but rather, warmongering and criminality.”⁶

Despite the strong ideological component underpinning the actions of some Islamic groups, a grievance based explanation of violence continues to dominate the narrative, whether in politics, in the media or among Muslims themselves. Grievances are important and one cannot simply discard the discontent of the Muslim community, especially of its young people, whose numbers are growing significantly. In fact, the youth “bulge”, high levels of unemployment, social upheaval and political instability, corruption, and dysfunctional governments are all important catalysts to the volatility of the Middle East and elsewhere. However, an explanation which reduces the reasons for the rise of extremist Islamist groups to political and economic factors can be misleading. Members of other religious communities often suffer in the same way as their Muslim neighbors from corruption and nepotism, unemployment and poverty, yet they do not resort to employing their religion as a mobilizing force for violence and bigotry. They do not justify an onslaught by referring to religious teaching and instructions, and they do not encourage intolerance by expelling or slaughtering other minorities. Furthermore, some Muslims themselves have become targets of their coreligionists who have espoused extremist views and interpretations. It is striking, and important to understand, that a particular ideology may encourage violence against others or, conversely, negate it.

Different Islamist groups have excelled in combining a variety of tactics they deem appropriate with a narrative that articulates their grievances and sense of outright injustice, and with a proposed Islamic solution. Organizations ranging from al-Qaeda to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir have been riding on the rhetoric of grievance with enthusiasm and vigor. They may well scorn Western solutions such as democracy, liberalism and the capitalist marketplace. Instead they advocate the comprehensive agenda of the Islamic society and state: a shari‘a-ruled world where everything, from jurisprudence to everyday life, from economics to politics, and from literature to science, is defined and regulated by Islamic scripture and the life of Muhammad.

The range of tactics is often contingent on the preferred methodology of the group (an imposed revolutionary strategy or a gradualist approach from within a society), and on whether the Muslims are a majority or minority in a particular region. It also depends on the leadership and their decisions, on what they are willing to do and how far they are willing to go on a range of issues (for instance Zawahiri’s stance on bombing and beheadings versus that of Zarqawi’s propensity for violence and brutality⁷). There are also pragmatic factors that influence the choice of tactics, and the adoption or abandonment of particular tactics. Boko Haram in Nigeria has been mimicking the approaches employed by al-Shabaab and the Islamic State or ISIS. Thus it is becoming increasingly brutal and seeking to seize territory. In turn the Taliban’s tactics have evolved and these now include PR operations, outreach to civilians, and even strategic employment of the Internet and social media.

There is a popular notion that though Islamist groups may differ in tactics, they still share the same goal. They ultimately strive for the establishment of an Islamic state. Palmer and Palmer differentiate between two main approaches, identifying “jihadists” (e.g. al-Qaeda) and “radical moderates” (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah). They suggest,

Islamists’ tactics range from processes of grassroots Islamization to more radical actions such as bombing and insurgency. What may be misleading is that their tactics often mirror the tactics of other movements, and these may not necessarily be Islamic ones. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, copied the Christian missionaries’ approaches to working in the community; he also adopted the tactics and practices of the Nazi party and of Communists.⁹ Suicide attacks are not limited to radical Islamist groups, but also feature in the history of Japan with the kamikaze pilots of World War II, who reflected a tradition of honorable death rather than acceptance of defeat that has roots in samurai culture. Some modern terrorist tactics (bombings, assassinations and other forms of political violence) were initially associated with radical underground activism among students in Tsarist Russia.

The U.S. strategy over the past decade has been to engage and partner with the second group, the gradualist Islamist organizations which prefer nonconfrontational methods and may openly condemn terrorism and violence in the name of Islam. There is a certain logic to this approach, though it may yet prove to be shortsighted. The problem is not only with the ultimate goal of Islamist organizations that is shared by both sides of the spectrum, but also with the difficulty of defining what may or may not be moderate. Those who gradually but consistently promote their agenda are considered to be moderates because they do not resort to violence. However, such groups never ask hard questions about their faith, and never truly engage in reasoning, or in reforming Islam. Their agenda remains deeply fundamentalist because they are driven by faith, and faith alone.

The U.S. strategy for combating terrorism was released under the Obama Administration in 2011 (for an overview of the counterterrorism policies and strategies in the West see Appendix 1). The main premise of the document Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (August 2011) and a follow up document Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (December 2011), also known as SIP, is to engage with grassroots communities in order to deter the “ideologically inspired” violence. The strategy became commonly known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and it was the first attempt to provide guidelines for preventing violent extremism. Both documents may be read as examples of political correctness since their language is carefully crafted to avoid either any reference to Islam (as in the case of the SIP which mentions “Muslims” only once) or to mention it only in a positive light. The emphasis in the documents is placed squarely on partnership, communities, engagement, activities and training.¹⁰

Frank Gaffney was among the first vocal critics of this strategy. In his piece “Enemy inside the Wire” published in the Washington Times he objects to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Obama Administration and to the unhelpful term “Countering Violent Extremism”. He believes that a definition loophole has allowed the unrestrained operation of “nonviolent” Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Gaffney explains that:

The release of the strategy documents also coincided with a review of training for law enforcement and military officers in the U.S, and the blacklisting of instructors considered to be anti-Islamic. This has greatly undermined the training process as it has created a reluctance to address the question of ideology. In his critical review of CVE strategy Bjelopera, notes that while ideology is central to radicalization, the CVE training guidance is “silent regarding radical ideologies”.¹²

There is a pressing need to address both the ideology of Islamists and their rhetoric, and to understand the motivations both of Islamist extremist groups and of those pursuing a gradualist approach. It is an ideological battle and by ignoring its central component, one is bound to face an even worse crisis than ever before. There is a tectonic shift taking place, as extremist Islamist groups gain ever increasing numbers of recruits, turn ever more violent and audacious, and even seize territory. There is also pressure on states and societies from nonviolent Islamic groups who show a tendency to approach Islam, its Scripture and its prophet within the prescribed parameters of the regulations that Islamists seek to impose.

This collection addresses the ideological challenge of Islamism in its various forms. In Chapter 1, “The Role of Religion in the Battle Space since 9/11”, Patrick Sookhdeo provides a very helpful foundation for understanding the importance of religion in the ideological, theological, cultural, and sociopolitical realms. He approaches ideology within a historical context and outlines its main components. Drawing on his experience in training military and law enforcement personnel, he identifies a lack of any overarching strategy and a number of erroneous approaches. He believes that it is counterproductive to separate violent and nonviolent Islamists, and thus to engage with Muslim groups who actually should not be empowered, and to follow an outdated UK model of preventing terrorism. He also notes that religion and its role are grossly misunderstood when a secular approach is adopted or/and it is reduced to Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Patrick Sookhdeo also provides a number of case studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lybia and Syria – all seemingly unquenchable hotspots. Finally, he dwells on the implications for current policy and suggests a plan of action.

Robert Reilly analyzes the war on ideas in Chapter 2, “Information Operations: Successes and Failures”. He writes from his personal experience in “information operations” as a former Senior Advisor for Information Strategy in the Office of The Secretary of Defense. He cites Voice of America (VOA) as an example and stresses the necessity of broadcasting to the most critical regions of Brazil, China, Russia, and the Middle East. He also highlights the failure to engage at the religious level in countries like Afghanistan. He particularly dwells on events in Iraq and the attempts to provide broadcasting coverage for the local population there. The main thesis of Robert Reilly’s essay is that military strategy should be planned along with communication strategy. Current attempts to do this are episodic and reactionary; they are also inadequate and unproductive.

In Chapter 3, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Doctrine, Strategy, Operations and Vulnerabilities”, Michael Waller draws an extensive profile of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Perhaps one of the most controversial bodies, the Muslim Brotherhood deserves special attention. Michael Waller not only follows its historical development and clarifies its strategic culture, but also tackles such issues as violence and ties to al-Qaeda. He emphasizes the doctrinal commitment of the Muslim Brotherhood and the fact that the organization does not differentiate between religion and politics. He focuses on its means of warfare from violent to political, ideological and even psychological. He also exposes the so-called “Civilization Jihad”, a stealthy practice of infiltrating and using front organizations. The discursive dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood is evaluated through the work of ISNA and CAIR, key front organizations for the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. The analysis concludes with an exploration of the vulnerabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood and argues for a different approach to this organization which poses a national security threat to the United States.

In Chapter 4, “Islamic Activism through the Lens of Social Science”, Anna Bekele demonstrates how Social Movement Theory (SMT) may be applied to the study of Islamic activism. Poverty or relative deprivation often emerge and re-emerge in debates about the causes of terrorism. However, social scientists have increasingly been trying to debunk this justification and to highlight other factors that play a role. Some Islamic groups have been building up their support base with the help of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) such as mosques, NGOs and various student organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular is known for spawning its support networks at the grassroots level. Networks are critical, as their dynamic nature plays an important role in mobilization and identity formation. While the ideological aspect has been understated in social science, SMT does provide valuable insights into the process of frame alignment, i.e. how Islamist movements make their message resonate with the audience. In order to understand the processes within an Islamic organization, and the group’s successes (or failures) in recruiting and mobilizing others, one needs to draw from multiple sources, whether social science, anthropology, theology or ideology.

Finally, in Chapter 5, “The Importance of Progressive Arab Reformers”, Stephen Ulph offers an engaging introduction to the world of Muslim advocates of reform. It is vital to understand this critical perspective if one is prepared to acknowledge that the war on terror has failed. Not only has it failed but the world is now in a worse condition than before. Since 2001 the voices of genuinely progressive Muslim scholars have been ignored. Some of these intellectuals have been particularly disadvantaged due to the language barrier. Stephen Ulph methodically helps to amplify their voices by providing an overview of the key issues and offering a glimpse of debate among progressive Arab scholars. Some of these arguments are controversial, not for lack of evidence but because of the dominance of the narrative that is being challenged. Stephen Ulph extensively quotes such Arab scholars as Lafif Lakhdar, Muhammad Sanduk, Abdelmadjid Charfi, and Hashem Saleh, among others, who promote the re-evaluation of Islamic tradition, the revisioning of the history and legacy of Islam, and even textual criticism.

These progressive Arab intellectuals are already fighting the ideological battle. Their ideas need not only to be aired, considered, discussed and promoted, but also implemented if extremism is to be dealt with effectively. The battle may take place in geographic locations, the media, legal and political institutions and even among friends and family members. However, the original and most influential battleground is not geographical or physical, it is ideological. It is fought in people’s minds. Thus, an understanding of ideology and its role is essential. The contributors to this collection offer a challenge to the widespread and regrettable dismissal of the importance of religion and ideology in the debate about political Islam – a dismissal especially evident in the media and in academia. They wish to enhance and extend that debate. Enabling progressive Muslim scholars represents one way of countering extremism and its ideological narrative. An honest and engaging discussion of political Islam in its violent as well as gradualist forms should lead to new and pragmatic solutions.

The concept of the cultural battle – Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”⁴ – is now being more widely recognized, despite its original rejection by many. Yet, it covers only one element of the truth. In recent years, American and other Western policymakers have also come to recognize the importance of ideology in the struggle against violent Islamism. But an equally crucial step has yet to be taken by many, namely, to acquire a correct understanding of the religious ideology of the Islamists. A correct understanding of the ideology is possible only by means of a correct understanding of the theology that undergirds it.

The quotations cited by Michael Scheuer were all from the first four months after 9/11. But, as can be seen from the quotations at the head of this paper, serious misunderstandings regarding the role of Islam in Islamist terrorism continued over the next decade. President Bush, President Obama and Prime Minister Blair all expressed their belief that there is no relationship between Islam and Islamist terrorism or its guiding ideology. They failed to recognize that it is an interpretation of the theology of Islam that validates the terrorism of al-Qaeda (AQ) and its associates in their own eyes.

After 9/11 Henry A. Crumpton, who was Deputy Chief (Operations) of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, was tasked by President George W. Bush with defeating AQ and Osama bin Laden. Crumpton recalls in his memoir how he considered many Muslims to be America’s allies in the struggle against AQ and its affiliates:

Crumpton rightly affirms that Muslims should be our allies, but how did he conceive that AQ had emerged from the wider Muslim culture? He does not appear to understand that religion had motivated both bin Laden and the entity that bin Laden created. Indeed, his comment about building alliances “across the true Islamic faith” suggests an assumption that whatever kind of religious ideology inspired and drove bin Laden and his followers, it was not derived from “the true Islamic faith”. How did he envisage that Muslim allies could defeat them without tackling the religious ideology that motivated and drove bin Laden and his followers? Crumpton even adds that Muslim clerics would be included amongst America’s allies.

A few weeks after 9/11, Crumpton attended a briefing with President Bush at Camp David to discuss a strategy for a response to AQ in Afghanistan. At the briefing, CIA analyst Emile Nakhleh described the ideological impact of AQ on Muslims around the world.⁷ Nakhleh, a Palestinian Christian, had joined the CIA in 1993 and eventually became Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence. He often gave solo briefings to senior policymakers. Nakhleh’s fascinating book, A Necessary Engagement,⁸ written after his retirement in 2006, focuses on the ideology of Islamism but without recognizing any link with the theology of Islam itself. He holds that Muslims living in nonMuslim-majority countries “should be able to reconcile their faith and their citizenship in these countries”.⁹ We can be very thankful that large numbers of Muslims living in minority contexts of this kind do indeed succeed in reconciling their two identities as Muslims and as citizens of a nonMuslim-majority country. But it should be acknowledged that this reconciliation is not necessarily straightforward and automatic, for a Muslim who is a good citizen in a nonMuslim context can follow only certain interpretations of Islam and not others.

Nakhleh appears to care mainly about whether any particular Islamic group accepts or eschews violence as a method of achieving its goals. He shows little interest in knowing what the goals are, an attitude shared more generally by the American policymakers whom he briefed.¹⁰ To focus on the means and not the end is extraordinarily short sighted. Islamists all share the same aim – the recreation of the Caliphate, ruled by shari‘a – and this is an end result completely incompatible with freedom, equality or democracy. Daniel Pipes asserts that “nonviolent Islamists pose a greater threat than the violent ones”, arguing that the nonviolent methods are more effective than the violent.¹¹ He will certainly be proved right if the U.S. government is content to let nonviolent Islamists have their way in remolding politics, economics and society in their countries, while focusing all their attention on restraining the violence of the violent Islamists.

Nakhleh writes much about ideology but little about theology. Similarly, The 9/11 Commission Report recognized that the AQ ideology was a root cause of Islamist terrorism, but failed to acknowledge that the ideology was itself rooted in the classical interpretation of the religion of Islam, as formulated in Islam’s first three centuries by the consensus of scholars of the main schools of Islam. As the Report stated:

The 9/11 Commission, Nakhleh, and Crumpton all optimistically asserted that it is possible to develop a strategy that separates AQ violence from the religion of Islam. Crumpton was right in asserting that the U.S. and the West are not at war with Islam. This point must continue to be affirmed, for the Western nations cannot be at war with a religion. However, what he and Nakhleh have failed to appreciate fully is that a religion can have multiple interpretations. If any of those interpretations leads to religious violence, then those interpretations must be addressed, which makes addressing the religion itself unavoidable. There has to be a battle of ideas, and it has to include theology.

Donald Rumsfeld was much mocked in some quarters when, in 2002, as Secretary of Defense, he sought to distinguish “known unknowns” from “unknown unknowns”. But his realism and his humility in acknowledging the administration’s lack of knowledge and understanding and its inability to change other people’s thinking should be commended. In 2009 he said:

The 9/11 Commission Report, issued on July 22, 2004, had urged the need for the U.S. to use public diplomacy to counter the insurgent ideology. A year later, Karen Hughes, a former television reporter who had been a close advisor of President George W. Bush, was appointed to head up efforts to do this, despite the fact that she appears to have had no background knowledge of the Islamic theology that she needed to counter.¹⁵

The lack of success of American public diplomacy in changing Islamist ideas can be attributed in part at least to the inefficacy of some of the methods attempted. One example is Radio Sawa, a 24 hour Arabic language service that was launched in 2002 to replace Voice of America’s twelve hour, content rich Arabic service. Radio Sawa plays mainly pop music, both Arab and Western. It has large audiences amongst young people in the Middle East and is therefore deemed successful, but does it have any kind of relevant effect in the war of ideas when the ideas to be changed are based on theology? Robert Reilly comments:

The ideology of Islamism is derived directly from the theology of Islam itself. It would be dangerously misleading to draw a line of separation between one and the other, for they are intimately connected.

The standard Islamic doctrine of abrogation teaches that, in cases of conflicting teaching within the Qur’an, the later verses take precedence over the earlier verses. Although the relative dating of certain Qur’anic verses has never been settled by Islamic scholars, there is no debate over the general statement that the peaceable verses date from Muhammad’s early days in Mecca, while the aggressive verses date from Medina, where he lived for the last ten years of his life. According to classical Islam, it is therefore the hostile verses calling for war and violence against nonMuslims that must be followed.

The well-known Egyptian scholar, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943-2010), has noted:

Second in importance to the Qur’an are the hadith, various collections of traditions recording the words and deeds of Muhammad and his earliest followers. These hadith, though varying in authenticity and therefore in authority, are extremely influential in guiding devout Muslims, especially on subjects where the Qur’an may be silent or ambiguous. But on the question of violence, they fully back up the teaching of the later verses of the Qur’an, since they include many stories of violence by Muhammad and the first Muslims.

The importance of Muhammad’s model (sira) cannot be overstated, for devout Muslims set themselves to imitate every aspect of his life. The hadith record his involvement in raids, wars and assassinations, particularly targeting pagans and Jews. Often he explicitly commanded such violence.

The influential Islamist Abdallah ‘Azzam (1941-1989) celebrates Muhammad’s role as a military leader:

From the Qur’an and the hadith, the classical Islamic scholars derived a detailed set of laws, the shari‘a, to guide Muslims in their personal devotional life, their family life and every aspect of society and governance, including relations between the Islamic state and other states. Such relations were to be based primarily on conquest and military subjugation, and within the shari‘a are carefully codified rules on how to achieve this.

The example of war-fighting set by Muhammad continued without a break after his death in 622 A.D. and led to a breathtakingly rapid expansion of Islamic power by the conquest of nonMuslims across the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Europe and Asia. Alongside this were internal wars amongst Muslims, often over dynastic, leadership and tribal issues. Barely 20 years after Muhammad’s death, a civil war had split the Muslims into three groups: the Kharijis, the Shi‘as and the main body, now called the Sunnis.