Joar Vittersø   *Editor*

Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being

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Editor

Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being

Springer

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I dedicate this volume to my wife, Astrid Musland, for her enduring love and support. Thank you.

Acknowledgments

The idea of this handbook originated in my office, some years ago, when Professor Joe Sirgy was visiting Tromsø, in conjunction with our Northern Insights work, funded by the Research Council of Norway. We had not seen each other for quite a while and had a lot to catch up on. During our conversation, the word eudaimonia kept popping up, and at some point, Joe proposed that the time might have come for a handbook on eudaimonic well-being. I am very grateful to Joe for this idea and for the everlasting enthusiasm he dedicates to the science of well-being. Without it, this book would not have been realized (at least not in its current form).

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The Most Important Idea in the World: An Introduction

Joar Vittersø

It has been said that Darwin's theory of evolution is "the best idea in the world" (Dennett, 1995). Such praise has hardly been offered to the concept of eudaimonic well-being, but the idea of eudaimonia has another advantage: it matters more to us than anything else. Eudaimonia asks not how life evolved, but at what our lives should be aimed. The idea boldly proposes that, given the right circumstances, humans can deliberately develop into beings that both act good and feel well. If this notion is true, what can possibly be more important?

We may speculate that Darwin had a hunch about these insights. At least, it turns out, he reminded himself to "Begin the discussion by saying what happiness is." It is not entirely clear what Darwin meant by this sentence, but he penned this plan to say something about happiness in one of his notebooks (McMahon, 2006, p. 410). Other thinkers and scientists have articulated the eudaimonic idea more explicitly than Darwin, partly by developing arguments about why a proper understanding of morality and the meaning of life is not only the most important, but also the most difficult of all intellectual problems (Flanagan, 2007). The Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being offers a collection of comprehensive and updated reviews on these

imperative matters and its 38 chapters provide an overview of what we currently know—and don't yet know—about individual and societal goodness.

1.1 Everyone Wants to Be Happy

Happiness is the only thing in life worth having. That is what Voltaire told us (Tatarkiewicz, 1976, p. 327), echoing Aristotle and summarizing the essence of the eudaimonist axiom.[1] Socrates went even further. He said that merely asking the question is a silly thing to do "since it would be absurd to deny it" (Annas, 2002, p. 5). Any reasonable person must, therefore, ask himself or herself how to live. The answer to this question is "the person's conception of eudaimonia" (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 31–32).

These perspectives bring forward very broad notions of a life that is going well. However, when it comes to concreteness such philosophical eudaimonism offers nothing more than "a thin specification" of what happiness or "the final end" is (Annas, 1993). Aristotle realized that this basic assumption of eudaimonia by itself was not very useful, as people disagree widely about what happiness is. For instance, in

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[1]The eudaimonist axiom is defined by Jost (2002, p. xiv) as the doctrine that "Happiness is desired by all human beings as the ultimate end (telos) of all their rational acts."

Table 1.1 Twelve conceptions of happiness in the ancient era

Source	Ideas about the good life
Homer's heroes	Wealth, physical health and attractiveness, strength of character, courage, justice, generosity, and piety
Hesiod	Flourishing and prosperous communities populated by honest people, living in peace, and enjoying the fruits of their labor, with an absence of worries and disease
Pythagoras	The unobservable harmony within an unobservable entity, which is the immortal soul
Heraclitus	Maximization of desire satisfaction is neither necessary nor sufficient for the good life
Empedocles	A transmigrating soul-like daimon within each individual that ultimately experiences a current good or bad life and accumulated credits
Protagoras	Features depend on individual preferences
Antiphon	Careful and accurate observations of nature, thinking "correctly" about what causes "distress" and "joy," and generally following nature's guides to a long and pleasant life
Democritus	Unobservable orderly and harmonious atomic activity
Plato	External goods like wealth and goods of the body like health are important, but goods of the mind like moral virtue are even more important
Iamblichus	Trust and law-abidingness for good human relations
Aristotle	Living well and doing well. It is achieved insofar as one deliberately engages in the unimpeded excellent exercise of one's capacities for the sake of doing what is fine, excellent, or noble, provided that the deliberation and activities are undertaken from a virtuous character and accompanied by an appropriate amount of external goods and pleasure
Epicurus	Pleasure, as consisting of a healthy body, peace of mind, and moral virtue

Note: Adapted from Michalos and Robinson (2012)

a review of the different conceptions of happiness in ancient times, Michalos and Robinson (2012) identified a dozen distinct conceptions of happiness in the period from the eighth to the third century BCE. A summary of this review is given in Table 1.1.

There is perhaps a vague communality across these ideas. Hudson was, for instance, able to identify three primary meanings of eudaimonia in the ancient texts written between the fifth and fourth centuries BCE: prosperity, pleasure, and moral attainment (Hudson, 1996, p. 62). To me, the most striking feature in Table 1.1 is rather the large variety of meanings even the ancients applied to the word happiness. Today the number of definitions and conceptualizations is much higher and quite overwhelming. The many meanings of "happiness" is so large that it is actually hard to understand what Tolstoy had in mind when he wrote the famous opening sentence in *Anna Karenina*, suggesting that "All happy families resemble one another" (Tolstoy, 1993, p. 1). No person knowledgeable about the scientific literature on happiness could have written these words. Hence, rather than finding a "Tolstoyian alikeness" as I battled my way through the literature on eudaimonia, I identified with George Eliot's character Edward Casaubon. In her classic novel Middlemarch, Eliot (1985) portrays the Reverend Casaubon as a pedantic clergyman who is obsessed with finding a common structure among the major religions in the world. His scholarly project is to write the definitive book in the tradition of syncretism, i.e., the idea that different and often contradictory beliefs from mythologies and religions can be combined into a consistent whole. Casaubon's book was never finished.

1.2   Jingles and Jangles

In 1890 the economist William Jevons complained that "Perhaps the most common cause of bad reasoning is the use of ambiguous terms, which mean one thing in one place and another thing elsewhere. A word with two distinct mean-

ings is really two words" (Jevons, 1890, p. 114; cited in Cabanac, 2009, p. 234). The problem certainly applies to the study of happiness. As recognized by the authors of the handbook, a commonly accepted conceptual language remains to be established for eudaimonia. To some extent, this state of affairs may be a good thing, according to Tiberius (Chap. 38, this volume), who suggests that concluding prematurely about the nature and causes of human happiness is not what we want. We should aim, rather, toward a better articulation of the different positions must be an ideal toward which happiness research should aim. The goal for the Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being is therefore to nourish this striving toward a clearer conceptualization and better understanding of what good lives and good societies look like. The plan is to present chapters that articulate the varieties of human goodness, while carefully considering the many complexities that confront such an endeavor. This introduction starts with a warning against two common fallacies in the literature, followed by examples of how such misconceptions create unnecessary confusion in the study of eudaimonia.

Røysamb and Nes (Chap. 16, this volume) comment on the jingle and jangle fallacies, and how they hamper research on well-being. According to Thorndike (1913), the jingle fallacy was originally introduced by a "Professor Aikins," who described it as the mistake of interpreting different things to be the same because they have similar names, or as the "unthinking acceptance of verbal equality as a proof of real equality" (Thorndike, 1913, pp. 10–11). The jangle fallacy was introduced by Kelley somewhat later, and defined to be "the use of two separate words or expressions covering in fact the same basic situation, but sounding different, as though they were in truth different" (Kelley, 1927, p. 64). The literature on well-being is teeming with jingle/jangle fallacies and the most dramatic one comes from ignoring the distinction between happiness as "a state of mind" and happiness as "a complete life that goes well for the person leading it".

1.2.1 The Two Cultures About Happiness

Happiness researchers comprise a large community, and within it, more or less isolated tribes have arisen. Tribes everywhere foster their own language and classifications in order to organize a view of their world. As noted by the French anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1966), conceptual schemes often evolve as binary oppositions, and the communities of happiness researchers are no exception. Some of them speak of objective versus subjective qualities of life (Glatzer, 2015), others about cognitive versus affective well-being (Schimmack, 2008), including variants such as experiential well-being versus evaluative well-being (Stone & Mackie, 2013), or being happy IN your live versus being happy WITH your life (Kahneman & Riis, 2005). But the most vivid duality in the literature on happiness is the one between happiness as something "mental" versus happiness as something commonly agreed upon as "complete" (e.g., Haybron, 2011; Tiberius, 2013).

The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has expressed his view on this difference as "a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 52). Haybron argues (using different terms for these two kinds of happiness) that "psychological and prudential happiness[2] are not different theories, or conceptions, of happiness; they are different concepts altogether, and denote different things" (Haybron, 2000, p. 211).

As illustrated in the above quotes, the task of finding appropriate and commonly agreed upon names turns out in itself to be a challenging mission. For instance, the "state of mind" kind of happiness has been referred to as "psychological

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[2]Prudential happiness is a term that seems to have been introduced by Griffin: "I am using 'prudence' here in the philosopher's especially broad sense, in which it has to do not just with a due concern for one's future, but with everything that bears on one's self-interest" (Griffin, 1986, p. 4).

happiness" (Haybron, 2011), "psychological well-being" (Bradburn, 1969; Vallerand, Chap. 13, this volume), "subjective well-being" (Diener, 1984), and "hedonic well-being" (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999), to mention only some of the most commonly applied terms. The words used to describe "complete happiness" vary just as much. Badhwar (2014) calls it "the highest prudential good," Foot (2001) prefers "deep happiness," Broadie (2007) speaks of "complete happiness," Nussbaum (2001) about a "complete human life," Tiberius (2013) makes use of the word "well-being," and Haybron draws on both "prudential happiness" and "well-being." In this chaotic situation it is tempting to adopt the strategy brought forward by Evans and Over (1996) for the study of thinking and decision making: The good old jangle fallacy had bewitched this domain with a conglomerate of words used for the same phenomenon, and to sort things out Evans and Over suggested simply employing the term "Type I rationality." A different plurality of words was used to refer to another phenomenon and Evans and Over suggested conversion to the term "Type II rationality." This strategy was later implemented with great success by Kahneman (2011), who relabeled Type I and Type II rationality into System 1 and System 2 thinking, respectively.

Comparably, it might be easier to communicate about the two major forms of happiness if they simply were referred to as Happiness 1 and Happiness 2. Sticking to the analogy from cognitive science, in which System 1 thinking is the quickest and least sophisticated form of reasoning, Happiness 1 should be the term used for the "subjective" or "state of mind" kind of happiness. On the other hand, Happiness 2 should refer to a kind of happiness that is more reflective or complex in the sense of being "complete," "deep," "prudential," or describing a life that in all respects "goes well for the person leading it."

A life that is good in the Happiness 2 sense has to be "complete" in some way or another, and a person's own judgments about how well his or her life is going will never be a sufficient criterion for this kind of goodness. If a person thinks she is happy, she is happy according to Happiness

1, but not necessarily according to Happiness 2. To illustrate the distinction between the first-person perspective of Happiness 1 and the third-person perspective of Happiness 2, Haybron uses the example of a man named George: "Imagine that George is living a cheerful life with his family and friends. George considers himself to be satisfied. However, George's family and friends can't really stand him, they are only pretending that they like him because of his money. If George was to discover these facts, he would have been devastated. But George never finds out. He remains ignorant his entire life" (Haybron, 2013, p. 304).

Michalos and Robinson (2012) have classified this distinction between objective[3] and subjective elements of a good life into four possible categories, or rather places, in which people can be happy.

1. Real paradise (people living in good conditions who evaluate their lives as good)
2. Real hell (people living in bad conditions who evaluate their lives as bad)
3. Fool's paradise (people living in bad conditions but evaluate their lives as good)
4. Fool's hell (people living in good conditions but evaluate their lives as bad)

From the perspective of Happiness 1 there is of course no fool's paradise or fool's hell, since a person's evaluation of his or her life is all there is to a happy life. Nevertheless, both Happiness 1 and Happiness 2 claim to conceptualize the goodness of a life as a whole. For instance, most Happiness 1 researchers seem to act as if the idea behind a complete life really can be measured by the use of questionnaires. Ever since Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1960) started to investigate self-reported well-being in representative samples, the phrase "taking all things together" has been commonly used as an introduction for items about avowed happiness. And many well-being researchers reason that since they ask people to

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[3]There are complexities related to the distinction between objective and subjective that I will not discuss here, but an interested reader will find a recent treatment in Badhwar (2014).

respond considering "all things," the data collected must consequently inform us about "all things." Good illustrations of this assumption are found in Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009), claiming that the "all things together items" provide information about everything important in people's lives, and in Oishi (2012) who, in his otherwise excellent book, suggests that survey questions about well-being capture virtues just as well as they capture pleasant experiences. Finally, Diener and Tov (2012, p. 139) argue that "subjective well-being is a concept that includes all the various ways that a person evaluates his or her life in a positive manner."

Julia Annas (1993, 2011) disagrees with the assumption that self-reports truly taps into the idea of a "complete life", and has taken great efforts to clarify just how different the concepts of Happiness 1 and Happiness 2 really are. If I should embark on the impossible task of reducing her extensive writings to a slogan, it might be that Happiness 2 is the overall end a person aims at by living well, something that applies to the person's life *as a whole* and not merely to what he or she thinks or feels about it.

The "as a whole" part is important to Annas. According to Michalos and Robinson (2012), it occurs about 90 times in her 455 page book on the Morality of Happiness (Annas, 1993). Another neo-Aristotelian, Martha Nussbaum, speaks of Happiness 2 as: "a kind of living that is active, inclusive of all that has intrinsic value, and complete, meaning lacking in nothing that would make it richer or better" (Nussbaum, 2008, p. S90). As articulated in another of her texts, the meaning of "the whole" when used about a good life can be explained as follows: "if one can show someone that [a person] has omitted something without which she would not think her life complete, then that is a sufficient argument for the addition of the item in question" (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 32).

It is important to note that subjective experiences are included in the notion of "the whole." A good life is simply not complete without positive feelings. Even if the good life cannot be just pleasure, Annas (2011) writes, pleasure must be woven into it. According to Annas, there is no separation between well-being as felt and well-being

as motivation or behavior. Aristotelian pleasure is something that comes along with, or supervenes upon, the activity. Pleasures completes virtuous activity like "the bloom on the cheek of a healthy young person" (Nussbaum, 2008, p. S88). Hudson (1996) explains that "there is not a single version of classical eudaimonism that does not depict the happy person possessing some manner of desirable mental state" (p. 63).

The "completeness" of Happiness 1, on the other hand, is constrained by its first person perspective. It is therefore operating on a different scale than the completeness of Happiness 2, and if these differences are ignored, severe jingle fallacies easily emerge. For example, when Ryan and Martela (Chap. 7, this volume) argue that for Aristotle, happiness was not the primary aim of living, they must be referring to Happiness 1. Another reminder about the two cultures of happiness is provided by Sirgy and Uysal (Chap. 32, this volume). Their chapter categorizes prudential happiness as a Happiness 1 concept, whereas philosophers would typically locate it under the Happiness 2 umbrella (e.g., Griffin, 1986; Haybron, 2011; Qizilbash, 1997). Law and Staudinger (Chap. 9, this volume) enter the landscape of happiness duality with a discussion about morality. The authors point out that several psychological theories of eudaimonia seem to ignore the issue of moral goodness, which is a limitation that Law and Staudinger attempt to correct by including a sense of moral-practical in their own conceptualization of eudaimonia. This is a very delicate issue at the core of the Happiness 1 versus Happiness 2 debate. Philosophers such as Annas (e.g., 1993) maintain that eudaimonia under Happiness 2 does not allow for a separation between the moral good (i.e., acting without violating other people's moral rights) and the prudential good (i.e., concerning only the goodness of the person whose life it is). Within the domain of Happiness 1, such a merging of morality and well-being is not easily achieved.

Ryff's classic 1989 article also illustrates the different meanings of Happiness 1 and Happiness 2. The title of her article asks if "Happiness is everything," which, as we have heard from Socrates, is a silly question to ask. But as a critique of mainstream approaches to Happiness 1

research, Ryff's reflection is timely. It has helped give birth to a new branch of happiness studies. As one would expect with the rise of a new tribe, a set of novel binary terms appeared in their vocabulary as well, such as psychological eudaimonia versus philosophical eudaimonia (Tiberius, 2013), psychological eudaimonics versus philosophical eudaimonism (Haybron, Chap. 2, this volume), hedonic enjoyment versus personal expressiveness (Waterman, 1993), and hedonic well-being versus eudaimonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

The complexities of Happiness 1 and Happiness 2 are not easily articulated, but a daring attempt to portray a simplified depiction of some of their characteristics is offered in Fig. 1.1. In the taxonomy, Happiness 1 is presented as comprising two sub-components, which roughly correspond to the distinction between bipolar concepts such as affective well-being and cognitive well-being (Schimmack, 2008), emotional well-being and life evaluations (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010), experiential well-being and evaluative well-being (Stone & Mackie, 2013), and between psychological happiness and prudential happiness (Sirgy & Uysal, Chap. 32, this volume), to name a few. Happiness 2 is considered one-dimensional in this taxonomy.

1.3   Conceptualizing Eudaimonia

The meaning of the term eudaimonia is woven into a complex fabric of etymological, historical, cultural, philosophical, and psychological conceptualizations. Hence, trying to define it once

and for all is still a premature endeavor, although some clues exist as to how the term may be applied.

1.3.1   The Etymology

Contrary to popular belief, Aristotle didn't originate the concept of eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). It was included in the Greek vocabulary hundreds of years before he was born (Haybron, Chap. 2, this volume; McMahon, 2006). Actually, Aristotle never seemed particularly interested in the etymology of eudaimonia and the term had little influence on his thinking (Kraut, 2010). The reason is, Kraut suggests, that Aristotle regarded "eudaimon" as a mere substitute for the more important expression of eu zên ("living well").

Beyond debating Aristotle's use of the term, opinions diverge when it comes to the exact etymological meaning of eudaimonia. The Encyclopedia Britannica declares that the term literally means "the state of having a good indwelling spirit, a good genius." Kraut (2010) points out that the term is composed of two parts: 'eu' meaning well and 'daimon' meaning divinity or spirit. Other scholars, such as Dean (Chap. 34, this volume) translate 'eu' into good or wellness, but maintains that 'daimon' originally referred to what might be regarded as a person's soul or essence, or to what Kant would later describe as the 'noumenal self.' Accordingly, the translation of 'daimon' into demon, alluding to supernatural spirits, came later. Waterman (personal communication, October 2015) asserts the syllable 'ia' at the end of a Greek word refers to a feeling, like in

Fig. 1.1 A schematic difference between happiness 1 and happiness 2

euphoria, melancholia, and anhedonia. Expressed as eudaimonia then, an experiential element in the term is indicated. Hence, to Waterman eudaimonia translates into a subjective interpretation "centering on the feelings present when acting in a manner consistent with the daimon." The position that eudaimonia is a subjective experience that is lived and felt is also defended in the chapter by Kimiecik (Chap. 23, this volume).

As is the case with the term happiness, the noun eudaimonia can be used as an adjective (eudaimon) and as an adverb (eudaimonically). Eudaimonia can also be used in referring to an ideology (eudaimonism). Haybron (Chap. 2, this volume) further makes the distinction between a psychological version (eudaimonic), and a philosophical version (eudaimonistic).

Finally, eudaimon may be spelled 'eudeamon', which is an anglicization of the Greek word and not commonly used anymore. Eudaimon comes closer to the Greek origin, and the "eudaemon" spelling has, according to Nussbaum (2001, p. 31), acquired some hedonistic connotations by its associations of human goodness to a pleasant feeling state.

1.3.2 Translating Eudaimonia into English

Over the centuries, eudaimonia has almost universally been translated into English as happiness (Jost, 2002). One reason is that, historically, the English word happiness used to be associated with civic duties and social obligations, i.e., as Happiness 2 (Austin, 1968; Hudson, 1996; McMahon, 2006; Oishi, 2010). As discussed, however, Happiness 1 is now the concept more commonly used for "happiness," hence translating eudaimonia as happiness has become troublesome to many philosophers. Starting with Anscombe (1958), eudaimonia has therefore become rendered in English as flourishing, a tradition followed by other philosophers (e.g., Cooper, 1975; Flanagan, 2007; Kristjánsson, 2013; Nagel, 1972). Eudaimonia is also translated into well-being (e.g., Haybron, 2008) and proper functioning (e.g., Casebeer, 2003). Yet,

some authorities still prefer to translate eudaimonia as happiness (e.g., Annas, 2011; Russell, 2013), while being very clear that happiness is more than just subjective feelings and/or life satisfaction. Russell writes: "By 'happiness' here we do not mean a mood or a feeling but a life that is rich and fulfilling for the one living it" (Russell, p. 7). It goes without saying that when Annas and Russell refer to eudaimonia as happiness, it is in the Happiness 2 sense of the word.

Another analysis is offered by Ross, in his 2009 introduction to The Nicomachean Ethics. Ross writes: "Defining happiness as outstanding rational activity may seem puzzling to those who assume happiness is a mental state, a state of subjective well-being. To ease the problem, some have suggested that eudaimonia should instead be translated 'flourishing' or 'fulfilment.' Clearly by 'happiness' Aristotle is not speaking of any kind of mental state, still less of one where subjects' self-reports are invited and treated as definitive" (Ross, 2009, p. vii). Sumner (2002, p. 37) argues along similar lines: "We understand eudaimonia as more or less equivalent to well-being." Sumner even suggests that the interpretation of eudaimonia as happiness is silly and absurd, whereas interpreting it as well-being may, given a lengthy philosophical argument, be sensible. Sumner must have had Happiness 1 in mind when writing his comment about happiness, because elsewhere in the book he holds that eudaimonia "corresponds much more closely to our notion of welfare (= well-being): a complete state of being and doing well" (Sumner, 1996, p. 69).

Jost (2002) reviews the translation debate in some detail and includes a juicy statement given by Gregory Vlastos, a philosopher. Vlastos ridiculed the attempt to translate eudaimonia into well-being. Eudaimonia would and should be translated as happiness, he insisted, as well-being "has no adjectival or adverbial forms. This may seem a small matter to armchair translators, philosophers dogmatizing on how others should do their jobs. Not so if one is struggling with its nitty-gritty, trying for clause-by-clause English counterparts that might be faithful to the sentence structure, no less than the sentence, of the Greek

original. And 'well-being' suffers from a further liability: it is a stiff bookish phrase, bereft of the ease and grace with which the living words of a natural language perform in a wide diversity of contexts. Eudaimonia fits perfectly street-Greek and Aristophanic slapstick" (Jost, p. xxii). Referring to its "street-Greek" and "slapstick" jargon, we are encouraged by Vlastos to use the term happiness rather than well-being when translating eudaimonia into English.

Another disadvantage of translating eudaimonia into 'flourishing' is that "animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possibly only for rational beings" (Hursthouse, 2013, p. 9). A third argument against translating eudaimonia into a more "catchy" word is presented by Besser (Chap. 5, this volume). She reminds us that using the term well-being or flourishing or some other fancy word would not help us much unless the conceptual understanding of the new term is properly established. A survey that includes a few items about "flourishing" comes no closer to the idea of Happiness 2 than one using items such as "everything considered, how happy are you with your life?" A survey participant may still be completely wrong about his or her own Happiness 2, whether or not it is referred to as "flourishing." In the philosophical meaning of flourishing, a person simply can not decide for herself whether she is flourishing or not (Hursthouse).

A different problem with translation appears in the literature on subjective well-being. In "Dienerology," as Haybron (2008) half-jokingly calls it, happiness and well-being are typically used interchangeably (e.g., Hirata, Chap. 3, this volume). Hence, in these circles, the suggestion to change the translation of eudaimonia from happiness to well-being makes no sense. Neither do statements such as "Aristotle had no theory of happiness. He had a theory of well-being" (Haybron, p. 32). As pointed out by Thin (Chap. 37, this volume), the title of the present tome testifies to this confusion, since, according to some translations of eudaimonia, it is to be read "Handbook of Well-being Well-being" or "Handbook of Eudaimonistic Eudaimonia"

(see Haybron, Chap. 2, this volume). Another confusion created from these different meanings and translations of eudaimonia is illustrated by Sheldon (Chap. 36, this volume). From a Happiness 1 perspective, which Sheldon subscribes to, well-being is a subjective experience. By contrast, eudaimonia as Happiness 2—and with reference to what G. E. Moore named the "naturalistic fallacy"—subjective experiences cannot be a defining characteristic of well-being. Consequently, Sheldon argues that eudaimonia cannot be defined as well-being.

In several authoritative interpretations of eudaimonia, however, positive feelings are presented as an integrated part of eudaimonia: "Happiness in eudaimonist thinking does not exclude pleasure, but it excludes the idea that happiness could just be pleasure. It answers to our thoughts that happiness must in some way have pleasures 'woven into it'" (Annas, 2011). Similarly, Broadie (1991, p. 313) advocates that "Aristotle maintains that the highest good is necessarily pleasant."

Finally, it is worth remembering that not every psychologist treats happiness and well-being synonymously. Seligman (2011), who now concludes that well-being and happiness are very different concepts, is an example in case. His new theory advocates that happiness cannot account for all the important elements of a good life, but well-being can. Note that Seligman speaks of well-being as a construct and not as a concept, a terminological twist with some unfortunate implications (Michell, 2013). Happiness, Seligman suggests, is neither a concept nor a construct, but a "thing"—a thing that is "so overused that it has become almost meaningless" (Seligman, loc. 256).

1.3.3 Psychological Theories of Eudaimonia

The literature on psychological eudaimonics is dominated by three "big" theories: Waterman's Eudaimonic identity theory (Waterman, 1984, 1993), Ryff's version of Psychological well-being

(Ryff, 1989)[4] and Deci and Ryan's Self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2001). All three are rooted in a nature-fulfillment philosophy (Haybron, Chap. 2, this volume), in humanistic and existential psychology, and to some extent in clinical psychology. All three theories link the good life to the fulfillment of the ultimate purpose of being human, with the concept of ultimate purpose typically taken to mean an optimally functioning life. More concretely, Waterman, whose "Two concepts of well-being" article from 1993 is the most cited text on eudaimonia (according to Google Scholar), defines eudaimonia as both a feeling and a condition. Self-realization in the sense of identification and development of one's best potentials is the most important part of Waterman's theory. The concept of "feelings of personal expressiveness" is also essential, since such feelings signal that the present activity of the individual is in harmony with the daimon, that is, the true self. Ryff's theory of eudaimonic well-being comprises six dimensions, or "ultimate purposes in life," that include, but are not restricted to, Aristotle's version of eudaimonia (Ryff, Chap. 6, this volume). The dimensions—autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relationships, purpose in life, and self-acceptance—are discussed by most authors in the Handbook, including Bauer, Proctor and Tweed, Ferguson and Gunnell, and Jayawickreme and Dahill-Brown. Self-determination theory is influenced by the literature on intrinsic motivation, by Rogers (e.g., 1963), and by the idea that needs are necessary in order to explain human motivation. Ryan and Deci's link between goodness and ultimate purpose is articulated as a stepwise process. It starts with activities aimed at regulating one's life in an intrinsic, autonomous, and reflective manner. Such activities will in turn produce feelings of autonomy, competence, and connectedness. Then, in a third step, the feelings of autonomy, competence, and connectedness will generate

subjective experiences such as positive affect, fulfillment, life satisfaction, happiness, thriving, wellness, meaning, vitality, and depth. These experiences are, however, not included in the concept of eudaimonia, but are rather considered to be hedonic by-products of eudaimonia (Ryan & Martela, Chap. 7, this volume). The eudaimonics of SDT are widely used in the literature on well-being, and most chapters in the present handbook make reference to it. For instance, Sirgy and Uysal (Chap. 32, this volume) show how these principles are applicable to areas such as tourism research.

The big three of psychological eudaimonics differ in their ideas about what it takes to fulfill the ultimate purpose of being human. A critical distinction concerns the role of subjective experience and particularly the feeling of pleasure. Pleasure has been a central element in all philosophical theories of happiness since the dawn of western thinking (e.g., Haybron, 2008), but Ryff's theory of Psychological well-being is silent about it. In Self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2001), pleasure is excluded from the concept of eudaimonic well-being, but not from hedonic well-being. In the scheme of goodness presented by Waterman (1993), pleasure is at the core of eudaimonia, in the form of "higher pleasure" or "feelings of personal expressiveness."

1.3.4 Other Understandings of Eudaimonia

The different conceptualizations offered by the big three reflect only a fraction of the variability that exists in understanding psychological eudaimonics. As underscored by several critics (e.g., Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008), the broad range of eudaimonia interpretations that have been proposed represents a problem for the possibility of developing a coherent science of eudaimonic well-being. To illustrate this problem, I have assembled a small "convenience sample" of definitions and descriptions of eudaimonia that have been proposed (Table 1.2). The table is not intended to be exhaustive and readers inter-

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[4]Competing conceptualizations also referred to as Psychological well-being include those developed by Bradburn (1969), Su, Tay, and Diener (2014), and Vallerand (2012).

Table 1.2 Some descriptions of eudaimonia

	Description	Author(s)		Description	Author(s)
1	The ancient Greeks saw the concept of eudaimonia as denoting a "broad idea of a life's going well"	Annas (1993)	9	Acting in an exemplary or extraordinary fashion	Fishman and McCarthy (2013)
2	The emotional state associated with full engagement or optimal performance in meaningful activity	Averill and More (2000)	10	The meaningful life	Gallagher, Lopez, and Preacher (2009)
3	Eudaimonic well-being deals with the appraisal that one feels good while explicitly considering one's sense of meaningfulness in life	Bauer, McAdams, and Pals (2008)	11	In the sense of the classical Greeks is "having a good guardian spirit," that is "the state of having an objectively valuable life"	Griffin (2007)
4	[To Aristotle happiness comes from] the pleasure that one takes in certain doings or activities – especially those that involve capacities that one has made an effort to develop	Benditt (1974)	12	The ultimate source of meaning in life	Halusic and King (2013)
			13	A sense of purpose, meaning, and engagement with life	Heller et al. (2013)
5	A life experienced as valuably meaningful and as engaging	Berridge and Kringelbach (2013)	14	Encompassing a wide range of possible content other than subjective satisfaction, although that is not excluded	Hudson (1996)
6	The fulfillment of one's true nature, including both self-actualization and commitment to socially shared goals. Today this approach to the study of well-being comprises a wide range of constructs, such as self-actualization and self-acceptance, perception of purpose and meaning, self-determination, cultivation of competences, trust in relationships, and cooperation	Delle Fave (2013)	15	Being fully functional (i.e., realizing or developing one's potential)	Huppert (2005)
			16	Seeking to use and develop the best in oneself, in congruence with one's values and true self	Huta (2013)
			17	The well-being of individuals sought as their own good	Jost (2002)
			18	Eudemonic measures refer to underlying psychological needs, encompassing various dimensions of wellness, such as autonomy, personal growth, or purpose in life, which contribute towards well-being independently of any positive affect they may convey	Kapteyn, Lee, Tassot, Vonkova, and Zamarro (2015)
7	The eudaimonic component, referred to as psychological well-being, is conceptualized as the search and attainment of meaning, self-actualization, and personal growth	Donaldson, Dollwet, and Rao (2015)	19	Meaning and purpose; taking part in activities that allow for the actualization of one's skills, talents, and potential	Kashdan et al. (2008)
8	A self-realization theory that makes happiness or personal well-being the chief good for man (…) "What is eudaimonia?" is then the same question as "What are the best activities of which man is capable?"	Encyclopedia Britannica	20	Embodying a value judgment about whether a person is leading a commendable life	Kesebir and Diener (2008)
			21	"my activity" (not a state 'arising' in me) that is explicated in terms of living virtuously	Keyes and Annas (2009)

Table 1.2 (continued)

	Description	Author(s)
22	An inner imperative, a feel of living in truth to oneself that is unique for each person. When an individual is living this feel, he or she flourishes in many ways	Kimiecik (2011, p. 782)
23	The fulfillment (including positive feelings) that comes from engagement in meaningful activity and the actualization of one's potential	King (2008)
24	A life is well-lived, embedded in meaningful values, together with a sense of engagement in that life. This is the cognitive or Aristotelian ingredient of happiness	Kringelbach and Berridge (2009)
25	Achieved through the development and fulfillment of one's potentials	Linley (2013)
26	Expresses the more general notion of human prosperity and sense of well-being. (…) It refers to quality of life as a whole, and especially to an individual's virtuous functioning in life	Naor, Ben-Ze'ev, and Okon-Singer (2014)
27	A lived experience whereby the "individual experiences the whole of his life in every act, and he experiences parts and whole together as necessary, such that he can will that nothing be changed"	Norton (1976)
28	A sense of meaning and purpose in life, or good psychological functioning	OECD (2013)
29	Eudaimonic well-being, measured with the satisfaction with life scale and a short version of the psychological well-being scale	Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours, and Lekes (2012)
30	Not pursued for the sake of pleasure, it is the end achieved by living a virtuous life in accordance with reason—pleasure is a byproduct of exercising good character	Proctor, Tweed, and Morris (2015)

	Description	Author(s)
31	Focuses on meaning and self-realization and defines well-being in terms of the degree to which a person is fully functioning	Ryan and Deci (2001)
32	The idea of striving toward excellence based on one's unique potential"	Ryff and Singer (2008)
33	Focus on becoming a better person by leading a virtuous life and achieving important goals	Schueller and Seligman (2010)
34	People's perceptions of the meaningfulness (or pointlessness), sense of purpose, and value of their life—a very broad set of considerations	Stone and Mackie (2013)
35	A complete state of being and doing good	Sumner (1996)
36	The life which is worth living or good in itself	Telfer (1980)
37	Ingredients of well-being that go beyond positive affect and life-satisfaction	Tiberius (2013)
38	Denotes that simply feeling good is not everything. The essence of a good life is seen in "living good" rather than in "enjoying life" and living good is seen as "psychological development"	Veenhoven (2013)
39	"feelings of personal expressiveness"	Waterman (2008)
40	A lifestyle characterised by the pursuit of virtue/excellence, meaning/purpose, doing good/making a difference, and the resulting sense of fulfillment or flourishing	Wong (2011)
41	The good composed of all goods; an ability which suffices for living well; perfection in respect of virtue; resources sufficient for a living creature	Wikipedia

ested in a more complete analysis may be better informed by reading the work of Huta (Chap. 15, this volume; Huta & Waterman, 2014). Rather, what the table offers is a non-pretentious attempt to illustrate how the task of defining eudaimonic well-being has turned into something of a conceptual cottage industry.

1.4   Conceptual Controversies

Already St. Augustine, in his book "The City of God," complained about the number of theories about happiness that the ancient philosophers had produced. He counted 288 competing theories, although it has been held against Augustine that his calculation was an exaggeration (Hudson, 1996, p. 63). As testified by Table 1.2, the tradition of proposing definitions and taxonomies about the good life is not restricted to the ancient era. Indeed, Benjamin, Kimball, Heffetz, and Szembrot (2014) recently published a list of 136 "aspects of well-being," which, according to the authors, represented "the most comprehensive effort to date to construct such a compilation." Work by the Australian Centre on Quality of Life may have escaped the attention of Benjamin and his co-authors, though, as the Australians ended up with a list of 173 domains of well-being and no less than 447 measures of quality of life (reported in Rapley, 2003). The chapter by Jayawickreme and Dahill-Brown (Chap. 31, this volume) also discusses lists of well-being taxonomies in some detail.

It is in this unfortunate situation that Nussbaum (2008) calls for a break, in order for happiness researchers to rethink their concepts and models. In her "Who Is the Happy Warrior?" paper, Nussbaum takes issue with the empirical literature on happiness, criticizing it for being "so riddled with conception confusion and normative naïveté that we had better pause and sort things out before going any further" (p. S108). The Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being aspires to offer such a pause, and its authors were invited to comment on Nussbaum's concerns. Several

chapters in the book are partly written as a response to Nussbaum's critique.

But the Handbook is not only responding to Nussbaum's challenge by re-*thinking* the good life. The best way forward may not be by reflection alone—the study of happiness has certainly had its share of that, over the millennia. To the contrary, Thagard (2012) argues that philosophers' attempts to "analyze" concepts have not been very successful simply because we cannot trust reason to generate fruitful scientific taxonomies. The structure of the atom or vitamin C are not intuitively given to us, and neither is geometry—despite Kant's insistence of its a priori nature. Harris (2010) has even proposed that the scientific principle of confronting theoretical reasoning with empirical observations also applies to the science of goodness and morality. Relatedly, Thin (Chap. 37, this volume) asks if Nussbaum's own strategy towards conceptual clarity has been such a success. After all, how clarifying is her defense of the Aristotelian idea of the good life as a complete life in the sense of "lacking in nothing that would make it richer or better"? Not very, Thin suggests, characterizing such a conceptualization of eudaimonia as "obviously absurd."

Perhaps the problem in the science of happiness is not so much that researchers do not acknowledge the importance of conceptual clarity. Indeed, all the present chapters consider the current state of conceptual ambiguity as unfortunate. Rather, the crisis may be hidden in a general unwillingness to confront old ideas with new knowledge. Mill seized this phenomenon eloquently in his portrayal of Bentham as "[failing] in deriving light from other minds" (cited in Nussbaum, 2008, p. S83), and the problem is not limited to happiness research. The lack of conceptual progress in economics drove John Maynard Keynes to write that "The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds" (Keynes, 1936, p. viii).

Few scholars have articulated this problem better than the biologist Ernst Mayr. His highly

respected book on the growth of biological knowledge (Mayr, 1982) convincingly shows how science progresses more rapidly from conceptual improvements than from the discovery of new facts: "it seems to me that progress in the biological sciences is characterized not so much by individual discoveries, no matter how important, or by the proposal of new theories, but rather by the gradual but decisive development of new concepts and the abandonment of those that had previously been dominant. In most cases the development of major new concepts has not been due to individual discoveries but rather to novel integration of previously established facts" (Mayr, p. 856).

An excellent analysis of knowledge and its role in the development of taxonomies is provided by Thagard (1992), who also offers several paradigmatic examples of taxonomic and conceptual developments throughout the history of science. They all include the abandonment of the old conceptual schemes. One example is the celestial bodies and how the systems of their classification have changed. As commonly known, the planet Earth was given a privileged position as a unique "major" celestial body in the taxonomy describing the universe before the scientific revolution. With the introduction of the heliocentric worldview, its status was reduced to an ordinary planet on par with others in our solar system. The taxonomy changed dramatically. Another illuminating example comes from Nersessian (2008), who details how the taxonomy of birds started out according to some rather primitive schemas. One of the old classification systems was, for instance, based exclusively on the bird's beak and foot. As knowledge in biology grew, the taxonomies also became more sophisticated. Today ornithologists use a much broader range of properties to catalogue birds, drawing on aspects of the feather, plumage, and tarsus as well as the beak and feet.

Trivial as these examples may seem, their wisdom bears on how taxonomies develop as a consequence of improved knowledge. For example, some "boxologies" in our own field make a distinction between hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being, with the first category typically comprising both pleasant feelings and life satisfaction (e.g., Henderson & Knight, 2012). This move leaves the concept of life satisfaction in an ambiguous position, however. Thus, for the dichotomy to be fruitful, an agreement must be reached about the nature of life satisfaction. Is it a hedonic concept, as Vittersø (Chap. 17, this volume) suggests? Or is such an understanding deeply mistaken, as Haybron (Chap. 2, this volume) argues? According to Haybron, the term hedonic has to do with pleasure, and life satisfaction "is not hedonic in any plausible sense of the word." But Vittersø maintains that from a psychological point of view, both pleasant feelings and judgments about life satisfaction seem to be subcategories of the same overarching class of good-bad evaluations. In order for such disputes to be solved, better knowledge on the nature of pleasure and evaluations must be integrated in the theories of happiness. And once a unified concept has emerged, the old ideas must be retired.

According to Mayr (1982, p. 840), nothing strengthened the theory of natural selection as much as the refutation, one by one, of all the competing theories. This important part of scientific development was popularized in a recent book edited by Brockman (2015), and the Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-Being promotes these important insights as well. In what follows, highlights of some of the most pressing issues will be presented. The review starts with the concept of eudaimonia and asks if it is necessary for a theory of Happiness 1.

1.4.1 Do We Really Need the Concept of Eudaimonia?

The most fundamental dispute in the Handbook—and it is a big one in the general happiness literature as well—concerns the question of whether the concept of eudaimonic well-being is warranted at all. Three chapters, written by Ward and King (Chap. 35, this volume), Sheldon (Chap. 36, this volume), and Thin (Chap. 37, this volume), are particularly critical of this term. Rather than contributing to our knowledge of human goodness, these authors suggest, the concept of

eudaimonia just makes things unnecessarily complicated.

There is no reason to propose complex models of well-being if we don't have to. After all, the appeal of hedonic well-being, in the narrow sense of proposing that an abundance of pleasure is the only good worth having, is precisely that it offers a one-dimensional view of happiness. As pointed out by Hirata (Chap. 3, this volume), such simplicity has the great advantage of reducing the multitudes of goodness and badness to something that can be maximized. And we can only maximize goodness if it can be represented along a single dimension. As both Hirata and Thin (Chaps. 3 and 37, this volume) explain, a taxonomy of happiness that comprises more than one dimension of goodness cannot be submitted to the principles of maximization, because intensifying one dimension may hamper another, thus reducing the individual's total well-being.

The importance of parsimony persuaded a scholar of Kahneman's stature to promote the idea of hedonic well-being for many years. However, Kahneman shifted his stance as he came to realize that humans also value things other than pleasant feelings. Goals and projects are important in our lives as well, whether or not they bring pleasure (see Little, Chap. 19, this volume). Thus, a one-component definition doesn't work for happiness, Kahneman argues, "because you cannot ignore life satisfaction as a measure of well-being" (Kahneman, 2012, p. 27). But adding the concept of life satisfaction to a one-dimensional taxonomy of human goodness makes the model quite complex, since a balance between two distinct forms of goodness must be established. This problem remains unexplained in the literature on subjective well-being.

Aristotle's version of eudaimonia purports to have solved the problem by its argument that happiness is "one single thing" (White, 2006, p. 18). Russell (2013) makes note of some passages in the Nicomachean Ethics that underline the unidimensionality of classic eudaimonia theory. According to Aristotle, "there is exactly one final end per person, and what's more, it is the same final end for each of us" (Nicomachean Ethics, I.2, cited in Russell, p. 9). Besser (Chap.

5, this volume) concludes that the classical notion of eudaimonia is a holistic one and that accordingly, a life cannot be well lived if it is divided into a set of "wellness dimensions" (see also Vella-Brodrick, Chap. 26, this volume).

Applying this one-facet model from philosophical eudaimonism to psychological eudaimonics will not take us very far, however. As Besser (Chap. 5, this volume) points out, carving up the concept of goodness into separate dimensions seems unavoidable in empirical research, and she thinks that this state of affairs segregates philosophical and psychological approaches to eudaimonia. Confronted with the history of science more generally, Besser's prediction is probably correct. The history of scientific advancement is ripe with examples of concepts that were first conceived of as homogenous, but could not be properly understood until they were partitioned into finer components. In physics, the concept of the atom is a well-known example; in biology, a longstanding debate about the concept of telos was not resolved until it was dissected into four subcomponents. Hence, from a scientific point of view, the Aristotelian idea of a telos cannot be considered a single thing. It must be divided into at least four different dimensions (Mayr, 1982).

Thus, as a scientific concept, psychological eudaimonics must be multi-dimensional. The only way to justify the notion of psychological eudaimonics against more parsimonious competitors is therefore to identify at least one psychological element of a life well lived that cannot be accounted for by pleasure or life satisfaction, even if it is a first-person perspective that defines its goodness. The most promising place to look for such a subjective goodness is within our human nature.

1.5   Fulfilling the Intrinsic Values of Human Nature

Aristotle's entry point for debating goodness was the identification of an intrinsic value, or ultimate purpose, of the human nature. This strategy led him to the notion of functioning, and from functioning to virtue, or arête, which he regarded as

necessary but not sufficient for the good life (see the Chap. 4 by Fowers, Chap. 2 by Haybron, and Chap. 27 by Mckay in this volume). The Aristotelian concept of virtue means something like excellence of character, or excellence in the sense of fulfillment of human capacities. Badhwar, a philosopher, translates Aristotelian virtues as "an integrated intellectual-emotional disposition to think, feel, and act at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way" (Badhwar, 2014, p. 143). From a scientific point of view, this formulation is quite a mouthful. Nevertheless, a few elements may, perhaps, be translated into something researchable without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Schwartz and Wrzesniewski (Chap. 8, this volume) give a brilliant example of how such an endeavor can be carried out. Their chapter strikes a balance between the scientific ideas of excellence and the classical thinking of Aristotle. The authors line up behind the eudaimonic view that well-being follows from certain forms of activity, and that there are certain features about activities that make them eudaimonic. The goal of the activity, or telos, is such a feature. The goodness of human life is associated with the development of excellence, and this development requires effort and a strenuous pursuit that cannot be categorized as pleasure or amusement. Schwartz and Wrzesniewski lean toward the neo-Aristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre, and his definition of "a practice" when clarifying what this means. MacIntyre (1981) pointed out four salient features of the concept of a practice, summarized as complexity, excellence, integration of means and ends, and continuous development of the practices and the goods toward which they are aimed. The latter element of a practice implies that as individuals continue to practice, their standards of excellence change. In his work on leisure, Stebbins (Chap. 33, this volume) has identified some parallels between different leisure practices and the features described by MacIntyre. In what Stebbins refers to as serious leisure, many of the characteristics of optimal functioning can be observed.

In his chapter on virtues and culture, Mckay (Chap. 27, this volume) probes further into MacIntyre's concept of practice and how it applies to anthropological accounts of the good life. The role of culture, Mckay advocates, is basically overlooked as a foundation for the realization of virtues, and to overcome this limitation, his chapter promotes an approach referred to as critical eudaimonics. As noted by Proctor and Tweed (Chap. 18, this volume), thorough perspectives on virtues like the one proposed by Mckay are hard to find in the psychological literature on eudaimonia. Due to their minimal representation of virtue, most measures of psychological eudaimonics are incomplete. A much-noted exception to this lack of interest in virtues is the project launched by Peterson and Seligman (2004) that has evolved into a massive, global research paradigm. Several chapters of the Handbook present results from this research program (e.g., Røysamb and Nes; Proctor and Tweed) and a comprehensive report is provided by Harzer (Chap. 20, this volume). Her chapter provides a review of the "Values in Action (VIA) Classification of Strengths and Virtues" and documents that some of these strengths and virtues, like zest and hope, correlate with the mainstream indicators of SWB. Other strengths and virtues, such as love of learning and judgment (a kind of openness to experience dimension) are not correlated with indicators of SWB. Rather, these strengths and virtues correlate with indicators of personal growth, illustrating again how measures of SWB fail to account for central elements of a good life.

Dean (Chap. 34, this volume) employs the terms virtue and practice from a societal perspective in his justification of eudaimonia. It is essential for individuals to flourish, Dean says, but we want them to do so as members of good societies. The contemporary priority of a 'work-first' policy is on par with hedonic and utilitarian principles, but not with solidaristic and eudaimonic principles. As an alternative to the 'work-first' policy, he has developed a set of principles referred to as a 'life-first' ethic, which is both consistent with and inspired by eudaimonic thinking. It may even be extended to encompass

the idea that eudaimonic well-being is a social right. "Its simple meaning is that human life is about more than individual utility and that this provides a foundation for social policy making" (Dean, Chap. 34 this volume).

Investigating excellence and virtue from the perspective of wisdom, Law and Staudinger (Chap. 9, this volume) write with insight on what a scientific approach to the elusive issue of *virtue research* may look like. The chapter defends the view that wisdom (phronesis) is the perfect integration of mind and virtue. Law and Staudinger offer a series of important arguments for why pleasure and satisfaction cannot account for the concept of wisdom, and how it sometimes even hampers it. The contradiction between satisfaction on the one hand, and the development of an "excellent character" on the other was evident already in the work of Erik H. Erikson. In the last of Erikson's developmental stages, the one concerning the conflict between integrity and despair, satisfaction is achieved by individuals able to adapt to the losses experienced over the years. As Law and Staudinger point out, the reward for such integrity is high levels of hedonic well-being at the cost of reduced eudaimonic well-being. The abandoning of aspirations and life goals might well lead to satisfaction, but it will not lead to continued growth and goal attainment. In other words, personal growth and hedonic well-being are under some circumstances not only independent, they are in opposition to each other. A similar argument is put forward by Bauer (Chap. 10, this volume). From a narrative perspective on self-identity, it has been repeatedly documented that wisdom is not positively correlated with hedonic happiness. To the contrary, pleasure can sometimes reduce it.

Virtue can also be approached through studying another prototypical example: the hero (Franco, Efthimiou & Zimbardo, Chap. 22, this volume). In their chapter, heroism is considered as the pinnacle of human excellence and virtue in history, and the authors review a series of links between eudaimonia and the traits of a hero. Of particular interest is the elements they identify as being good without being perceived as pleasant.

Taken together, the above chapters show that some elements of a good life, things we value from a subjective point of view, are not necessarily associated with pleasure or life satisfaction. The principal indicators of subjective well-being simply do not reflect these ways of being well, and this important point is sometimes overlooked by critics of psychological eudaimonics.

For example, Ward and King (Chap. 35, this volume) are concerned with Mill's "dissatisfied Socrates," who illustrates a different kind of eudaimonic goodness than the one defined by subjective well-being. But the character portrayed as eudaimonically happy in the literature on psychological eudaimonics is typically a person who lives well in the SWB sense of leading a good life, with the possible exception that the eudaimonic person is even more happy. "Whenever eudaimonic goodness is articulated, good feelings and life satisfaction are never far away," Ward and King write, reminding us that when eudaimonic self-report instruments are examined more closely, they overlap substantially with measures of SWB—in the area of 0.80 or even above (see also Disabato, Goodman, Kashdan, Short, & Jarden, 2016; Røysamb & Nes, Chap. 16, this volime). The weakness of this argument, however, is a heavy reliance on a limited set of self-report measurements about eudaimonia. As elaborated by Proctor and Tweed (Chap. 18, this volume), the complexity of eudaimonic goodness does not lend itself easily to quantification and statistical treatment. The information extracted from the current measures of eudaimonic well-being may therefore not be a precise reflection of the eudaimonic idea. For example, Vittersø (Chap. 17, this volume) illustrates how eudaimonic self-report scales are contaminated with a bias toward hedonia.

The subjective well-being approach holds that the concept of life satisfaction is able to capture concepts like goal importance and goal achievement (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). In mainstream SWB research, therefore, a quick response obtained from self-reported survey items about life satisfaction is proposed to adequately capture everything important in a person's life, including the process of identifying and pursuing important