Translated by E. M. Edghill
1
Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have
a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs
for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay
claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named,
for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding
with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what
sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be
appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’
which have both the name and the definition answering to the name
in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are
univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the
definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in
what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would
be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their
name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus
the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the
courageous man from the word ‘courage’.
2
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of
the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the
individual man, and is never present in a subject.
By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts
are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from
the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable
of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the
body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never
predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and
present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human
mind, it is predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in
a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man
or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which
is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable
of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such
being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical
knowledge is present in a subject.
3
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.
Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but ‘animal’ is
predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the
individual man also: for the individual man is both ‘man’ and
‘animal’.
If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are
themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus
‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘two-footed’,
‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of
knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One
species of knowledge does not differ from another in being
‘two-footed’.
But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing
to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater
class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of
the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
4
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action,
or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance
are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits
long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as
‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the
category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’,
under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time.
‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’,
state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be
cauterized’, affection.
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an
affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive
or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is
admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are
not in any way composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’,
cannot be either true or false.
5
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of
the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor
present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.
But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within
which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those
which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual
man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the
species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore-that is to say, the
species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal,-are termed secondary
substances.
It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For
instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man. Now in this
case the name of the species man’ is applied to the individual, for
we use the term ‘man’ in describing the individual; and the
definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated of the individual man,
for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name
and the definition of the species are predicable of the
individual.
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are
present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their
name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are
present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there
is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For
instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of that in
which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition,
however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body.
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes
evident by reference to particular instances which occur. ‘Animal’
is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the individual
man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be
predicated, it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all.
Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies,
for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it
could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary
substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is
present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be
impossible for anything else to exist.
Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance
than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For
if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is,
he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to
the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus.
Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man
by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for
the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater
degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives
an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more
instructive account by mentioning the species ‘tree’ than by
mentioning the genus ‘plant’.
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie
every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them
or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between
primary substance and everything else subsists also between the
species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject
is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species,
whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have
a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly
substance than the genus.
Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera,
no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a
more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the
species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse
by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of
primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an
individual man is not more truly substance than an individual
ox.
It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone
the name ‘secondary substance’, for these alone of all the
predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by
stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any
individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by
stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things
that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on,
are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone,
apart from primary substances, should be called substances.
Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same
relation that subsists between primary substance and everything
else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the
primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute
which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the
subjects of all such. If we call an individual man ‘skilled in
grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the species and to
the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all
cases.
It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is
never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither
present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with
regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following
arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a
subject. For ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man, but is not
present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the
individual man. In the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the
individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is
present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to
that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet
of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the
definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the
definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to
the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a
subject.
Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case
that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The
characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of
the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in man.
Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of
that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance,
if the characteristic ‘terrestrial’ is predicated of the species
‘man’, the definition also of that characteristic may be used to
form the predicate of the species ‘man’: for ‘man’ is
terrestrial.
The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in
the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we
should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in
explaining the phrase ‘being present in a subject’, we stated’ that
we meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’.
It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all
propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated
univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either
the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary
substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the
predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the
species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the
species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are
predicated of the species and of the individuals. Moreover, the
definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to
the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For
all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of
the subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be
applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated
above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things which
had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore,
established that in every proposition, of which either substance or
a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated
univocally.
All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In
the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the
thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we
speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’, our form of speech gives
the impression that we are here also indicating that which is
individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a
secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a
certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary
substance is; the words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more
than one subject.
Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the
term ‘white’; ‘white’ indicates quality and nothing further, but
species and genus determine the quality with reference to a
substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The
determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the
genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is
herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word
‘man’.
Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could
be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual
man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a
contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but
is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing
that forms the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits
long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A man may contend that
‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of ‘small’, but of
definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.
Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of
degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or
less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated’
that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of
varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular
substance, ‘man’, cannot be more or less man either than himself at
some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man
than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than
some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more
or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same
quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees
at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at
one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer
or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to
be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at
one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance,
more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of
variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we
should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed
this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black.
Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good
with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame
substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of
admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one
time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at
one time good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else,
though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an
exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be
both true and false. For if the statement ‘he is sitting’ is true,
yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will
be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly
that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this
same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this
exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in
the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves
changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that
that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a
different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and
that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same
way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are
capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and
opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the
alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes
to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but
it is at one time true, at another false, according to
circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to
opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes
place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be
capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself
changing that it does so.
If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that
statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary
qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions
are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo
modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of
something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on
facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of
admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can
alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change
takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of
admitting contrary qualities.
But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within
the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of
admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself
either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this
sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary
qualities.
To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change
in the substance itself.
Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
6
Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some
quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative
position to the other parts: others have within them no such
relation of part to part.
Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of
continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and
place.
In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common
boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but
the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts
three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to
generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that
there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always
separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.
The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is
evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean
here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete
quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common
boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and
distinct from the rest.
A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is
possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the
case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of
the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a
common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the
case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time,
past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space,
likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy
a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that
the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the
solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid.
Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for
its parts have a common boundary.
Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative
position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a
line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies
somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to
state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort
of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of
a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was
the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The
same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be
impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative
position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what
parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time,
for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that
which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better
to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being
prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ is
prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of number
may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be
impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds
good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding
existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible
to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they
cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which
have position, and some of those which have not.
Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong
to the category of quantity: everything else that is called
quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we
have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that
we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is
white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is
large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the
time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim
the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how
long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the
time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of
that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white
object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it
covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in
their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name
in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.
Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite
quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the
contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of a
surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that
‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and ‘great’ of ‘small’. But
these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or
small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act
of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain
large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others
of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an
external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ were used
absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain
large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and
few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as
numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many
in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber
those in the house. The terms ‘two cubits long, “three cubits
long,’ and so on indicate quantity, the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’
indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard.
It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as
relative.
Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have
no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute
which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by
reference to something external? Again, if ‘great’ and ‘small’ are
contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit
contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will
themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that
the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be
small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with
another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at
one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary
qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when
substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary
qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is
capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same
time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white
and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary
ways at one and the same time.
Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be
contrary to themselves. For if ‘great’ is the contrary of ‘small’,
and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then
‘small’ or ‘great’ is the contrary of itself. But this is
impossible. The term ‘great’, therefore, is not the contrary of the
term ‘small’, nor ‘much’ of ‘little’. And even though a man should
call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have
contraries.
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears
to admit of a contrary. For men define the term ‘above’ as the
contrary of ‘below’, when it is the region at the centre they mean
by ‘below’; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the
extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed,
it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have
recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are
contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the
greatest possible distance.
Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One
thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.
Similarly with regard to number: what is ‘three’ is not more truly
three than what is ‘five’ is five; nor is one set of three more
truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said
to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of
quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which
variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity,
therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and
inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities
is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to
be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have
these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity
that have been mentioned.
That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be
termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular
disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no
means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but
rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of
quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.
7
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be
of something else or related to something else, are explained by
reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is
explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority
over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression
‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of
something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this
kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit,
disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance
of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in
no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is
knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So
it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those
terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained
by reference to something else, the preposition ‘of’ or some other
preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain
is called great in comparison with son with another; for the
mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again,
that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and
all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be
noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes,
but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be
seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the
aforesaid attitudes.
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has
a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a
contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;
‘double’ and ‘triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such
term.
It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.
For ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’, have the
modifications ‘more’ and ‘less’ applied to them, and each of these
is relative in character: for the terms ‘like’ and ‘unequal’ bear
‘unequal’ bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is
not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term
such as ‘double’ admits of this modification. All relatives have
correlatives: by the term ‘slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by
the term ‘master’, the master of a slave; by ‘double’, the double
of its hall; by ‘half’, the half of its double; by ‘greater’,
greater than that which is less; by ‘less,’ less than that which is
greater.
So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to
express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by
knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that
which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception
of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended
by perception.
Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear
to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to
which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man
states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion
between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be
possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The
reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing
is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many
creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If,
then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be
reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference
necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being
such because of its wings.
Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word
exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we
define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our
definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have
this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no
rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word
‘boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ‘rudder’.
As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more
accurate if we coined some word like ‘ruddered’ as the correlative
of ‘rudder’. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate
the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ‘ruddered’ thing is
‘ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A
head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that
which is ‘headed’, than as that of an animal, for the animal does
not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.
Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing
is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a
name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the
first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances,
when we derived the word ‘winged’ from ‘wing’ and from
‘rudder’.
All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I
add this condition because, if that to which they are related is
stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be
interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the
case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each,
there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not
by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of
irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if defined as related,
not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that
sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which
it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one
thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology
used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be
removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was
correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated
correlation will still exist. If the correlative of ‘the slave’ is
said to be ‘the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of
the said ‘master’, such as ‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’,
‘human’, should be removed, and the attribute ‘master’ alone left,
the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will
remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be
the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not
correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and
that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be
correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have
disappeared.
For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said to be
‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing”the bird’; if the
attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the correlation
between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the
man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the
attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will no
longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged,
it follows that ‘the wing’ has no correlative.
Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly
designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be
easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the
terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives
are interdependent.
Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.
This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and
the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of
that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master
necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies
that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule.
Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it
follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also
applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true
in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.
The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge
itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of
objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of
which was contemporaneous with that of its object.
Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist,
cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative,
the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of
knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will
no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if
knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may
nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of
the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge,
though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the
knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all
animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there
might yet be many objects of knowledge.
This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the
object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of
perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will
cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel
the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body
perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that
which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is
annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body
does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist.
Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of
perception.
But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the
perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that
perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body,
heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.
Again, perception is generated at the same time as the
perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as
the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception;
for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is
itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and
before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists
before perception.