
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The Story of International Relations, Part Two
Cold-Blooded Idealists
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Contents

Abbreviations

BCCIS	British Coordinating Committee for International Studies
BIN	*Bulletin of International News* (of the Royal Institute of International Affairs)
BIS	Bank of International Settlements
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CISSIR	Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations
DBFP	*Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*
DHP	Deutsche Hochschule für Politik
ICIC	International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
ICO	International Cooperation Organisation
IICI	Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle
IIEC	International Institute of Educational Cinematography
IIIC	International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPF	International Police Force
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
ISC	International Studies Conference
LNU	League of Nations Union
LON	League of Nations
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
OJ	*Official Journal* (of the League of Nations)
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs
SDN	Société des Nations
UA	UNESCO Archives
WEC	World Economic Conference

CHAPTER 1

1932: Material and Moral Disarmament, a Mission to China and a Conference in Milan

Sanctions Before Disarmament: The French Position and Its Critics

In the view of French policy-makers, the defiance of the Covenant of the League of Nations (LON) in the form of the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces during the last quarter of 1931 and thereby on the very eve of the LON's Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments (Disarmament Conference), only served to reinforce the 'well-known French thesis' that there can be no disarmament unless means are found to replace national forces.[1] The French insistence on this thesis meant that France was singled out for much criticism before and during the Disarmament Conference. For example, in an address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London in October 1931, V. A. G. R. Bulwer-Lytton the 2nd Earl of Lytton stated that while 'year after year' Germany had been the 'great protagonist of disarmament,' the French had increasingly adopted an 'obstructive and immovable attitude' towards it. A delegate of Great Britain at the Twelfth Assembly of the LON in September 1931, Lytton observed that whereas alongside other nations Britain had stood for disarmament, the French had 'stood for security.' He noted

[1] Henri Rollin, 'The First General Disarmament Conference,' *Problem of Peace: Sixth Series: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August 1931* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932), 59.

J. Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part Two*,
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in relation to this that a German delegate at the Twelfth Assembly had remarked in contemptuous tones following a speech by the French foreign minister Aristide Briand that one only had to 'pinch the French bird and he…utters "Security".'[2]

Lytton told his audience that the behaviour of the French delegates at the assembly that year was 'in many ways deplorable,' however, he warned that there was a 'great danger' in the British tendency to dismiss the French as 'perfectly impossible' and urged that an effort should be made to understand their point of view.[3] Lytton suggested that a means of overcoming the impasse between the French demands for security and the push by other states for disarmament might be found in a proposal put by the Spanish delegate Salvador de Madariaga at the Twelfth Assembly. As an alternative to the International Police Force (IPF) that France had advocated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and of which Joseph Paul-Boncour had on occasion spoken in favour as a French delegate to the LON, Madariaga proposed that should an outbreak of violence occur, states would combine forces to put an end to the fight.[4] He contended that while mutual protection was as necessary to states as it was to individuals, its practice in the international arena had been greatly hindered by the policy of 'neutrality towards war.'[5] Madariaga argued that given that the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Pact of Paris) of 1928 had declared that the use of force is no longer an acceptable means of imposing one state's will on another and denied that war is a right of states, it was incumbent upon those states which had signed this pact to put an end to any outbreaks of violence: in his view, the pact entailed that there can be no such thing as the 'rights of neutrals.'[6]

In relation to Madariaga's proposal, Lytton stated that it did not involve states agreeing, as the French had proposed they should, on a definition of the aggressor, such that states would be obliged to enter a dispute on

[2]Earl of Lytton, 'The Twelfth Assembly of the League of Nations,' *International Affairs* 10, no. 6 (1931): 740–59, 742–3, 748.

[3]Ibid., 743, 759.

[4]Ibid., 749.

[5]Ibid., 750.

[6]Ibid., 751. The General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy was unofficially known as the Pact of Paris. It was also often referred to as the Kellogg-Briand Pact after its two official sponsors: the American secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg, and the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand.

the side of one state or another. Rather, Madariaga's proposal, which Lytton emphasised did not involve any derogation from the 'full sovereign rights and powers and…full discretion' of states, simply stipulated that those engaged in violent quarrels should be pulled apart: the rights and wrongs of the matter could be resolved once the violence had been curtailed. Lytton expressed the hope that should any situation arise, states would meet and 'decide in conference what each was prepared to do to maintain the peace of the world.' Lytton suggested that such an approach might satisfy states such as Britain which were wary of entering into obligations in advance and those states demanding security guarantees.[7]

The French position in relation to the nexus between security and disarmament was a central feature of an address by Otto Hoetzsch at the RIIA on 17 November. Hoetzsch was a noted expert in Russian history at the University of Berlin where he lectured in foreign policy and Russian and Eastern European history and a member of faculty at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German Political Academy or German Academy of Political Science) in Berlin where he taught courses in international politics. He chaired and was a founding member of the German coordinating committee for international studies, that is, the Committee for Foreign Affairs (Ausschuss für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten). The Committee for Foreign Affairs would become the German unit of the Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations (CISSIR), an association which was established following an international meeting of experts interested in the study of international relations. This meeting was held at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP) in March 1928 and was attended by Hoetzsch along with other members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. As the RIIA was the host organisation of the CISSIR's British unit, that is, the British Coordinating Committee for International Studies (BCCIS), the institutional link between Hoetzsch and the RIIA should be clear. Hoetzsch's address had been arranged in light of the adoption by the CISSIR, which was soon to be renamed the International Studies Conference (ISC), of a proposal issued by Arnold J. Toynbee, director of studies at the RIIA, for an exchange of speakers on disarmament in the period just prior to the opening of the Disarmament Conference. At a conference in Copenhagen in June 1931, Toynbee had told members of the CISSIR that he thought such an exchange would

[7] Ibid., 750–2.

help facilitate comprehension of the different national points of view on the question of disarmament. For this reason, Toynbee probably would have been pleased to see that Hoetzsch's address garnered some publicity. For example, a version of it was later published in the *Spectator* under the heading of 'Germany and Disarmament.'[8]

In his address, Hoetzsch expressed support for the LON and for the Pact of Paris or what Hoetzsch preferred to refer to as the Kellogg Pact after one of its two principal sponsors: the former American secretary of state Frank B. Kellogg. The probable reason why Hoetzsch preferred to label the pact in this way, a practice common among American commentators, was because he ascribed its creation to the United States alone. In his address at the RIIA, he declared that the pact was 'the work of the first Great Power in the world' and that it fulfilled the 'demand of the movement for outlawry of war' without denying to states the 'right of self-help and the right of self-defence.' Having thus lauded the Pact of Paris, Hoetzsch noted that its practical application was being sorely tested by the Sino-Japanese dispute.[9]

Hoetzsch observed that states 'represent a society of moral personalities' and that therefore their relations must be 'governed according to the laws of justice and morality.' Such a requirement, he added, in no measure diminished the 'independence and the sovereignty' of states. To the contrary he stated, drawing on Georg Hegel's notion that states receive their ultimate legitimation through reciprocal recognition, it is only on the basis of participating in a society of moral personalities that the 'real essence' of the state, that is, its 'moral spirit,' can become an 'organic reality.'[10] Turning to the German demands in relation to the question of disarmament, Hoetzsch stated that the German view was that a 'just solution' based on the principle of 'equality of right' required that disarmament must be undertaken 'by all states on the same basis and by the same methods.'[11] He claimed that the

[8]'Can War Be Abolished?' *Signs of the Times* 47, no. 22 (1932): 3. For the meeting of savants in Berlin in March 1928, see 'Experts pour la coordination des hautes études internationales: Réunion des 22–24 Mars 1928—Berlin,' *Bulletin de la Section d'Information et de Documentation*, no. 19 (1928): 8–10, 9. This bulletin was published under the auspices of Institut International de la Coopération Intellectuelle (IICI) and the Société des Nations (SDN).

[9]Otto Hoetzsch, 'The German View of Disarmament,' *International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (1932): 40–54, 42–5, 53–4.

[10]Ibid., 44.

[11]Ibid., 48.

French and German positions on the question were 'irreconcilable': the staggered French approach to disarmament, that is, the French demand for security first, arbitration second and disarmament third, could not be reconciled with the German insistence that 'these three be taken as a whole because of their closely connected relationship.'[12] Hoetzsch then echoed a key theme of the lectures he had given on Germany's domestic and foreign policies at the eighth session of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown in the United States in 1928:

> The only way to abolish war is to find means for a peaceful consideration of the conflicts which cause war, and through their settlement through arbitration. This thought must underlie all discussions concerning the attainment of peace. To approach the subject from the principle of war and of military sanctions is an impossible method. War is not averted by preparing for war against war, but by removing the fundamental causes. A system of sanctions would be practical if a settlement of the problem of armaments is reached. Unless this takes place, there will never be League action against a strongly armed State, but only League action by armed States against weaker States.[13]

Essentially, Hoetzsch was arguing that the key to disarmament lay with treaty revision: the League system had to be flexible enough to accommodate demands for just change. Such flexibility required, he argued, a revivification of Article 19 of the covenant which provided that the assembly 'may from time to time advise the reconsideration…of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'[14] Hoetzsch warned that unless this article was operationalised and strengthened or some other means of ensuring the 'necessary revision' was found, there was little if any chance of eliminating the frictions among states in Europe. He suggested that if left unaddressed, these frictions

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid. See also Otto Hoetzsch, *Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929).

[14] Ibid., 49–50. William Horsfall Carter claimed that the guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity under Article 10 of the covenant, 'was originally bound up with a guarantee of peaceful change, as adumbrated in the present Article 19, and was disjoined from it only in one of the later meetings of the League of Nations Commission.' W. Horsfall Carter, 'Naming the Aggressor,' *The New Commonwealth: Being the Monthly Organ of a Society for the Promotion of International Law and Order* 2, no. 10 (1934): 142–4, 142.

might culminate in a 'clash of empires' in which the 'cultural values' of Europe would be destroyed and out of which Bolshevism would emerge triumphant.[15]

Towards the end of his address, Hoetzsch issued a warning concerning Germany specifically: he advised his audience that while the younger generation of Germans appreciated the importance of disarmament and international understanding, they also strongly believed that states should enjoy equal rights. The younger generation believed this so strongly, he added, that they felt that an 'offence to the dignity' of the state is even 'greater than to that of a man.' Hoetzsch stated that it was for this reason that the younger generation of Germans, among whom the LON was not popular he said, were vehemently opposed to 'unequal treaties' and were calling for the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Alongside the resolution of the Sino-Japanese dispute, Hoetzsch insisted in concluding, the revision of the Versailles settlement was the 'most serious test' that the LON would face in the months to come.[16]

Henri Bonnet was the director of the Paris-based International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) which served as the executive organ of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) of the LON. The IIIC also served as the secretariat of the CISSIR. The IIIC's role in relation to the CISSIR grew out of the fact that the meeting of experts in March 1928 which lead to the creation of the CISSIR had been initiated within the framework of the IIIC by the IIIC's deputy director Alfred E. Zimmern whose official duties encompassed the promotion of instruction in the aims and ideals of the LON: what was sometimes referred to as *League of Nations Teaching*. Zimmern served as the Berlin meeting's rapporteur which he attended as a representative of the Geneva School of International Studies of which he was the founder and director. The IIIC was represented in Berlin by Julien Luchaire, Bonnet's predecessor in the role of director; by Werner Picht, who had been appointed head of the IIIC's University Relations Section in 1927; and by Margarete Rothbarth. Rothbarth, who before her appointment to the IIIC had been a member of faculty at the DHP, was the head of the IIIC's German service which had been established following Germany's admission to the LON in September 1926 with the aid of a German subvention. (Although this subvention ostensibly came from the DHP, there is evidence that it actually

[15] Hoetzsch, 'The German View of Disarmament,' 50.

[16] Ibid., 50–1, 54.

came from the German Foreign Office.) It is noteworthy that at its conclusion, the meeting of experts issued a resolution calling on the ICIC to facilitate the convening of another such meeting as soon as possible and decided to form a committee with a view to ensuring continuing collaboration between the institutions represented at the meeting and the IIIC. In October 1931, Hoetzsch informed Bonnet that he would be coming to Paris in November as a member of the German delegation to the Congrés international d'études pour le désarmement: an international congress of private disarmament organisations.[17]

The congress met on 26 and 27 November in the form of three study meetings, all of which were held in the large conference hall of the IIIC and a public meeting which was held in the grand amphitheatre of the Palais

[17] Otto Hoetzsch to Henri Bonnet, 23 October 1931, Conférence des Institutions pour l'étude scientifique des relations internationales, 1 October 1931–31 March 1932, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.d, UA. Werner Picht's appointment as head of the University Relations Section was announced in a bulletin which appeared on 15 July 1927. See 'Appointments,' *Bulletin of the Section of Information and Reference*, nos. 9–10 (1927), 2. This bulletin was published under the auspices of the League of Nations (LON) and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC). For details of the meeting of experts in Berlin, see *Bulletin de la Section d'Information et de Documentation*, no. 19 (1928), 8–9. For Margarete Rothbarth, see Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), 239. In a letter addressed to the president of the ICIC in November 1926, Julien Luchaire stated that he had concluded an agreement with the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP) as a result of which the DHP had given the IIIC a grant. In view of this grant, Luchaire stated, that Rothbarth, a professor at the DHP, had been accorded a role at the IIIC. According to Renoliet, Rothbarth, who was born in Frankfurt, remained at the IIIC until 1940. See also Ute Lemke, '"La femme, la clandestine de l'histoire" Margarete Rothbarth—ein Engagement für den Völkerbund,' *Lendemain* 37, nos. 146–147 (2012): 45–58, https://www.periodicals.narr.de/index.php/Lendemain/article/view/472/450. Ute Lemke quotes a letter penned by Luchaire in October 1926, in which he states that the IIIC had created a 'German service' in the Section of Information and Documentation and that Rothbarth would be responsible for the service. Her 'mission' was to 'observe the intellectuals of Germany from the point of view of international cooperation' and to concern herself with all those matters addressed by the IIIC insofar as they interested Germany. Julien Luchaire, 1926, quoted in Lemke, '"La femme, la clandestine de l'histoire" Margarete Rothbarth—ein Engagement für den Völkerbund,' 52. Citing a letter penned by Hugo Andres Krüss, the head of the Prussian State Archives who sometimes stood in for Einstein at meetings associated with the ICIC before going on to replace him on the committee following Einstein's resignation from it, Lemke states that the funding for Rothbarth's position did not in fact emanate from the DHP but came from the German Foreign Office. Lemke points out that when Germany withdrew German from the LON in October 1933, Rothbarth remained at the IIIC because '[f]or her as a Jew, the return to a now National Socialist Germany had become impossible.' Lemke, '"La femme, la clandestine de l' histoire" Margarete Rothbarth—ein Engagement für den Völkerbund,' 53.

du Trocadéro. The IIIC was located at 2 rue de Montpensier in a section of the Palais Royal and the Palais du Trocadéro on the hill of Chaillot. If Hoetzsch was present at the opening meeting of the congress, he would have been part of an audience numbering around 600 persons who heard calls on the part of French and Polish speakers for the creation of an IPF. If he was present at the closing meeting, he would have been among a gathering which, according to the most conservative estimate appearing in French newspapers at the time, numbered 2000 persons, included within that estimate being 1043 delegates representing 362 organisations from thirty different nations.[18]

The arrangements for the congress had commenced on 26 July 1931 at a conference held in Paris at the office of *L'Europe Nouvelle*, a bi-monthly publication founded in 1918 by Louise Weiss which was noted for its focus on international politics and its championing of the LON: *L'Europe Nouvelle* regularly documented major international treaties and the proceedings of the LON.[19] The conference was chaired by its initiator, namely, Robert Cecil, otherwise known as 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. Cecil, a British diplomat, was one of the architects of the LON. At the time of the meeting in Paris, he was president of the British League of Nations Union (LNU). The conference in Paris played host to representatives of about fifty organisations. In addition to the representatives of French organisations, there were representatives from organisations based in the following countries: Britain, Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. In addition to Cecil, the British delegation included Philip Noel-Baker, a former Labour parliamentarian who had served as parliamentary private secretary to Arthur Henderson when he was foreign secretary, and Sir Andrew Macfadyean, a former treasury official, an expert on German war reparations and a member of the RIIA. In addition to Weiss, the French delegation included the following

[18] 'Le Congrés international d'études pour le désarmement tenu hier sa première séance,' *L'Oeuvre*, 27 November 1931; 'Campaign Against Disarmament: French Press Quote Cardinal Bourne,' *Manchester Guardian*, 27 November 1931; 'Une conférence sur le désarmement au Trocadéro,' *L'Oeuvre*, 28 November 1931; 'Les incidents au congrés international d'étude pour le désarmement au Trocadéro,' *Le Matin*, November 28, 1931; and 'War Mentality in Paris: Breaking Up of Peace Meeting,' *Manchester Guardian*, November 30, 1931.

[19] *Louise Weiss (1893–1983) journaliste, féministe et femme politique française*, École nationale d'administration, Centre de documentation, May 2016, 3–5. https://www.ena.fr/…/2/…/Dossier%20WEISS.pdf.

leading Radical Party figures: Édouard Herriot and Henry de Jouvenel, both of whom were on the editorial committee of *L'Europe Nouvelle*, and the Radical Party deputy Pierre Cot, a future minister for air.[20]

The congress of private disarmament organisations was conceived with a view to placing moral pressure on governments on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. In a resolution issuing from the conference of 26 July, the congress was ascribed the following purpose: that of expressing 'the sentiments of the people of all countries in favour of a substantial reduction in armaments by means of an international pact.'[21] To this end, the same resolution proposed that leading representatives of political, social, religious and intellectual organisations from a large number of countries should be brought together 'in an extraordinary international assembly.'[22] In order to focus efforts, facilitate propaganda and contribute to moral disarmament, the conference of 26 July recommended in its resolution that the organisations participating in the congress in Paris in November should adopt the four following resolutions: firstly, that disarmament is vitally important to the organisation of peace and the restoration of the confidence on which economic prosperity depends; secondly, that 'true security' is based not on 'competition in armaments but only on the cooperation and solidarity of civilised peoples with a view to preventing and if necessary stopping war' and that therefore 'it is necessary to establish an international juridical organisation capable of being an obstacle to any aggression'; thirdly, that those powers who signed the peace treaties of 1919 and other international documents were 'bound on their honour' to undertake disarmament; and fourthly that a

> system of limitation and reduction of armaments and of categories should make it possible to impose on all the States under the control of an international commission obligations of the same nature, and to realise progressively by reduction in armaments the equality of the peoples in security. This system should lead to the exclusion of certain…armaments of a particularly aggressive character which in the case of aviation can be realised by the method of internationalisation.[23]

[20] 'New Campaign for Disarmament,' *Manchester Guardian*, July 27, 1931, and *Louise Weiss (1893–1983) journaliste, féministe et femme politique française*, 5.

[21] Conference Resolution, 26 July 1931, quoted in *Manchester Guardian*, July 27, 1931.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

It is useful to note here that in October 1924 during his first incarnation as prime minister, Herriot had introduced at Geneva the 'formula of "arbitration, security, and disarmament," thus indicating the priority of security over the reduction of armament' within the framework of French foreign policy.[24] It would seem that the resolution issuing from the conference of July 26 did not approach the question of security in a way that would have been entirely reassuring for those who insisted on this particular order of priorities: on the priority of security, if not in the form of a strong system of national defence then in the form of the organisation of collective resistance against aggression, over disarmament. Rather, aspects of the resolution were suggestive of the view that security is a byproduct of disarmament itself. In a section of a report published in the *Manchester Guardian* which bore the subheading of 'The French Delegation,' the newspaper's Paris correspondent stated that it was his understanding that the conference had witnessed 'an unsuccessful attempt' to incorporate in the resolution a declaration 'making disarmament depend on "security."' Although the correspondent in question did not specify which delegation made this attempt, it is noteworthy that report went on to complain that the French delegation was not 'as fully representative as it might be of French supporters of disarmament,' that is, it did not include representatives of those members of the Left in France who were inclined to identify security with disarmament.[25] The only parts of the resolution which touched on French security anxieties was a somewhat airy statement concerning the need for an international juridical organisation capable of being an obstacle to any aggression and the proposal that aviation be internationalised.

Jouvenel, who was among those appointed to the organising committee of the private disarmament congress, had proposed the internationalisation of aviation as a means of furthering the goals of security and disarmament some years earlier. In an article published in October 1928, he pointed out that the LON Assembly had declared in that year's annual disarmament resolution (a resolution more hotly debated than any of its predecessors because of a dispute between France and Germany as whether or not political conditions were ripe for the staging of a disarmament

[24]Walter Lippmann with the assistance of the research staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, *United States in World Affairs*: *An Account of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), 137.

[25] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 July 1931.

conference), that 'a close connection exists between international security and the reduction and limitation of armaments.'[26] Jouvenel stated that this was a proposition he could hardly deny given that it was he who in collaboration with Cecil had won recognition for it at the LON six years earlier. He stated in his article that military aviation was a cause of insecurity for all and a source of security for no one in Europe and he urged France to propose to 'the Commission eternally preparatory for the Conference always hypothetical' the following: the internationalisation of civil aviation; the suppression of military aviation with the sole exception of colonial aviation; the placing of the different forms of aviation at the disposition of the League in times of war; and the placing of commercial craft of no military use to that body at the disposition of the International Red Cross.[27]

Jouvenel maintained that France must take such a step because France could not expect Germany to respect the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles without at the same time itself respecting the article which made German disarmament a preface to general disarmament. He suggested in this regard that France could ill afford to treat the German threat to rearm as hollow. Nor was there any risk to France involved in taking such a step. The French, Jouvenel noted, constantly complained of the German superiority in the field of aviation and of the potential of Germany's aviation industry. He pointed out that this complaint was based on the recognition that the requirements and development of both civil and military aviation closely paralleled each other.[28] Indeed, it was in recognition of this close parallel that the assembly, after having noted the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, resolved in 1927 that 'the development of civil aviation should be directed solely towards economic ends to the exclusion of military interests.'[29] Jouvenel's proposal obviously went further than this: he maintained

[26] 'The League of Nations 1928,' in *Editorial Research Reports 1928*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1928), 1027. http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1928110800, and Henry de Jouvenel, 'Internationalisez l'aviation,' *La Revue des Vivants: Organe des Générations de la Guerre* 2, no. 10 (1928): 725–33, 732.

[27] Jouvenel, 'Internationalisez l'aviation,' 732–3.

[28] Ibid.

[29] League of Nations, *Eight Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations: Arbitration, Security, Disarmament and the Work of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference,* League of Nations Document A. 24. 1927. IX (Geneva: LON, 26 September 1927), 1.

that the only way to control the manufacture of aircraft of military value by Germany (and by Russia), was the internationalisation of the aeronautical industry.[30]

The first session of the congress of private disarmament organisations was held on the morning of 26 November and was chaired by Noel-Baker who would go on to serve as an assistant to the president of the Disarmament Conference, namely, Henderson in the following year. (Noel-Baker also chaired discussions held at the Sorbonne on the occasion of the congress in which 500 students representing the greater part of the world's international students organisations as well as a considerable number of French students' associations took part.) The opening speech at the congress was delivered by Cecil who, according to [*Le*] *Figaro* which deplored the whole event, after 10:30 a.m. was not seen for the rest of the day. Among the speakers were Marie-Elisabeth Lüders, who for thirteen years was a member of the Reichstag and who was now chair of the German Academic Association; Lord Willoughby Dickinson, who on behalf of the World Alliance for International Friendship whose international council he chaired, expressed faith in 'the progressive, simultaneous, and controlled reduction of armaments'; René Cassin, a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris, a member of the French unit of the CISSIR, namely, the Commission française de coordination des hautes études internationales, a deputy-delegate to the assembly from 1924 to 1935 and soon to be a member of the Disarmament Conference's Committee on Moral Disarmament, who insisted that what was to be feared was not armaments themselves but the bringing up of 'thousands of young men…to worship war as a method of settling disputes'; and Nikolaos Politis, the Greek diplomat and lawyer who discussed disarmament as a legal obligation in view of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and Article 8 of the Covenant of the LON and the realisation of security through the further development of international legal instruments and judicial organs.[31]

[30] Jouvenel, 'Internationalisez l'aviation,' 732.

[31] Gaëtan Sanvoisin, 'Le Congrès du Désarmement provoque un discours imprévu et courageux de M. Painlevé,' *Figaro*, November 27, 1931, 5; Maria Vérone, 'La foi dans la Paix,' *L'Oeuvre*, November 28, 1931; René Cassin, 'Moral Disarmament and Intellectual Co-operation,' *League of Nations Educational Survey* 3, no. 22 (1932): 20–9, 20–3; and *L'Oeuvre*, November 27, 1931. Between 1922 and 1933, under the proprietorship of François Coty, *Le Figaro* was entitled *Figaro*. On the discussions held at the Sorbonne, see 'Le désarmement moral et les organisations intellectuelles,' *Bulletin de la Coopération Intellectuelle*, no. 15 (1932): 723–8, 724. IICI/01, UA. The *Bulletin de la Coopération Intellectuelle* was published

According to *Le Temps*, the atmosphere at the morning session of the conference was calm; by contrast, the afternoon session witnessed loud protests (mostly issued, according to certain news reports, in a foreign language), when at the end of the meeting Paul Painlevé spoke in defence of the theory of security.[32] Painlevé was a French mathematician who had served in 1917 and again in 1925 as prime minister and minister of war. He was also a member of the ICIC, having been appointed to it following the retirement of the French philosopher Henri Bergson from the position of president of the ICIC on 11 December 1925 on the ground of ill-health. By virtue of his membership of the ICIC and his nationality, Painlevé was also head of the board of directors of the IIIC, it having been informally agreed by members of the ICIC in July 1925, that the French member of the ICIC should occupy that position, presumably in view of the fact that the IIIC had been placed at the disposition of the LON by the French government.[33]

At the aforementioned afternoon session of the congress held in the great hall of the IIIC, Painlevé insisted with much vigour that it would be madness for France to disarm immediately and without conditions, that is, without guarantees of security. He warned that modern inventions had made total destruction a possibility and that commercial aircraft could be 'transformed overnight into engines of war,'[34] Painlevé complained that people were very forceful in urging France to disarm, yet when asked about the international organisation of security they responded with vagueness and imprecision. Having alluded to the German invasion of French soil during the Franco-German War and the Great War, Painlevé declared that France was always ready to make 'great sacrifices in favour of peace,' however, he added that under the circumstances he believed it his duty as a man who had known 'the responsibilities of power' to speak frankly of the

under the auspices of the IICI and the SDN. The *Bulletin de la Coopération Intellectuelle* became *Coopération Intellectuelle* dating from issue no. 17–18, 1932.

[32] 'Le Congrès international d'études pour le désarmement,' *Le Temps*, November 28, 1931; 'Speakers for Disarmament Guarded by Policy in Paris: Nationalist Threat,' *Manchester Guardian*, 28 November 1931; and Vérone 'La foi dans la paix,' *L'Oeuvre*, November 28, 1931.

[33] Ronald W. Clark, *Einstein: The Life and Times* (London: Hodder and Staunton, 1996), 345; Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée*, 72; and Henri Bonnet, *Intellectual Co-operation in World Organization* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), 9.

[34] *Le Temps*, November 28, 1931.

French position.[35] Although a part of the assembly, the most cosmopolitan part according to *Figaro*, almost booed at the conclusion of his speech (causing a contributor to that newspaper to declare that one could now clearly see to what a 'bolshevizing public people have opened the doors of the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation'), another part responded with lively applause.[36] Presumably among those joining in the applause was Stanislas Stronski, a professor at Warsaw University who too would be appointed to the Moral Disarmament Committee in the following year. At the end of the morning session, Stronski had insisted on behalf of the entire Polish delegation that the word security—as it was understood in the context of the French thesis—be inserted in the conference's resolutions, an amendment that was strongly supported by the Romanian delegation and of which some others were inclined to approve.[37]

After having pointed out that the Radical Party's Painlevé was a man 'well known for his pacifist opinions' and that he was 'no friend of ours,' *Figaro* saluted him for his 'courageous intervention,' affirming that with a 'sureness of tone' he had ably defended the French thesis of 'security first' and awoken minds to just how dangerous was the 'odious propaganda of disarmament at any price.'[38] Suggesting that the conference had lost all credibility as a result of the episode involving Painlevé since this had exposed the sharp cleavage within the ranks of the pacifists, that is, the cleavage between the partisans of the French thesis and the partisans of disarmament without conditions, *Figaro* reported on 27 February that although the Romanian president Nicolae Titulescu had been scheduled to speak at the conference that day, he would not be appearing. It further reported that Paul-Boncour, who embraced the view that one must always

[35] Sanvoisin, 'Le Congrès du Désarmement provoque un discours imprévu et courageux de M. Painlevé,' 5; Gaëtan Sanvoisin, 'Painlevé chez les pacifistes: une courageuse intervention,' *Figaro*, November 27, 1931, 1; and *Le Temps*, November 28, 1931.

[36] Sanvoisin, 'Le Congrès du Désarmement provoque un discours imprévu et courageux de M. Painlevé,' 5; Sanvoisin, 'Painlevé chez les pacifistes: une courageuse intervention,' 1; and *Le Temps*, November 28, 1931.

[37] *Le Temps*, 28 November 1931.

[38] Sanvoisin, 'Painlevé chez les pacifistes: une courageuse intervention,' 1, and Sanvoisin, 'Le Congrès du Désarmement provoque un discours imprévu et courageux de M. Painlevé,' 5.

be mindful of security in the pursuit of disarmament, was hesitating about whether or not to keep his engagement.[39]

Paul-Boncour was at the time the leader of the Union socialiste républicaine but had previously been a member of the Socialist Party and had served in that capacity as deputy for Tarn. At the party's congress at Tours in May 1931, several motions were put forward which heralded a return to the 'easy and traditional' position of the party before the war of 1914 but which had been abandoned from the time when 'the motherland was in danger,' that is, the position that held '[n]ot a man, not a penny for the army of the bourgeois State.'[40] Against this background, quit the party, albeit 'not without mature reflection and without regrets,' and his post as deputy for Tarn (his candidacy for that seat being courtesy of the Socialist Party), following which he was elected senator for Loir-et-Cher.[41] It was in his role as senator that Paul-Boncour spoke at the final study meeting of the international disarmament congress on the afternoon of 27 November, telling the audience the following:

> I fear that…[my view]…is above all the antithesis of the theses that come out of this congress….I do not believe that disarmament is a security, not more moreover than armaments. After 1918, I thought only that a greater willingness to achieve international concord would be born of [the war's] bloody labours. I stand against theories of a mystical peace. Peace, have the courage to say it, is not a virtue in itself.[42]

Echoing Painlevé, Paul-Boncour concluded his speech by stressing the point that there was a solid link between security and disarmament and by insisting on the need for those definite engagements that France had

[39] Sanvoisin, 'Le Congrès du Désarmement provoque un discours imprévu et courageux de M. Painlevé,' 5.

[40] Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres: souvenirs de le III*^{0} *République,* vol. 2, *Les lendemain de la victoire 1919–1934* (Paris: Plon, 1945), 264–5. See also Maurice Vaïsse, *Sécurité d'abord: la politique française en matière de désarmement, 9 décembre 1930–17 avril 1934* (Paris: Pedone, 1981), 38, 163; and Serge Berstein, 'Le milieu genevois dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres,' *Les Internationales et le problème de la guerre au XX siècl*e, Actes du colloque de Rome: 22–24 November 1984 (Rome: École française de Rome, 1987), 321–35, 330. https://www.persee.fr/doc/efr_0000-0000_1987_act_95_1_2904.

[41] Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres: souvenirs de le III0 République*, vol. 2, *Les lendemain de la victoire 1919–1934*, 268. See also Vaisse, *Sécurité d'abord*, 38, 162–3, and Berstein, 'Le milieu genevois dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres,' 330.

[42] *Le Temps*, November 29, 1931.

sought but never obtained in relation to the security provisions of the covenant. Although there were no incidents during Paul-Boncour's speech, the applause that greeted it according to *Le Temps* was prompted more by the personal regard in which this sincere internationalist was held rather than enthusiasm for the ideas that he had espoused.[43] Indeed, the *Manchester Guardian* observed that the fact that among those chosen to speak at the congress were figures such as Paul-Boncour and Herriot, both of whom the newspaper described as opponents of disarmament and proponents of a policy that was antithetical to the thrust of the resolutions before the congress, gave it 'a certain unreality.'[44] The newspaper opined that it was their presence at the congress along with that of certain others, that had probably caused the Second International to refuse to participate in it.[45]

Among the foreign dignitaries addressing the closing meeting, over which Herriot presided, were Cecil, Alanson Bigelow Houghton, a former American ambassador at Berlin and London, and Senator William Edgar Borah, this last speaking from Washington via a radio broadcast. On the day of 27 November, *Figaro* published an article entitled 'The good apostles of the Disarmament of France' in which it claimed that certain of the German delegates (one of whom, namely, Joseph Joos, a member of the German Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei) in the Reichstag), was due to speak that evening, were partisans of the German 'right to force.' Following this particular provocation, the newspaper accused Cecil, Borah and Houghton of effectively seeking to undermine French security.[46]

The same article accused Cecil of being openly sympathetic to the German thesis, quoting a statement that he had made at the final meeting of the Preparatory Commission on 9 December 1930: that although he did not believe it likely that the first disarmament conference would embrace the propositions of either the USSR or Germany, 'one can never know, and one must never lose hope.'[47] The article then declared that Borah was 'known for his total ignorance' of European history and politics and

[43] Ibid.

[44] *Manchester Guardian*, November 27, 1931.

[45] Ibid.

[46] 'Les bons apôtres du désarmement de la France,' *Figaro*, November 27, 1931.

[47] Ibid.

for his 'complacency in regard to the Germanophile propaganda.'[48] As to Houghton, the article stated that people would remember that on leaving New York for Paris, he had threatened that should France not cede ground then it might face 'a sort of political blockade.'[49] Houghton remained, the article declared, 'impregnated with the Germanic culture received in his youth.'[50]

A strong police guard was stationed around the Trocadéro on the occasion of the closing meeting of the congress due to nationalist threats of disturbances. It became apparent that nationalist groups had stolen into the audience when a speech by Herriot was met with interruptions that were so noisy that the audience was unable to hear a large part of it. Loud protests greeted many of the speakers throughout evening but were at their most intense during Joos's speech which also saw scuffles break out at different points in the hall. Later, when some calm had been restored, Cecil gave a speech in which he announced that the three elements of the forthcoming conference in Geneva would be reduction, security and equality. Borah's broadcast from Washington, which was relayed after Cecil's speech and in the course of which the senator emphasised how much the cost of armaments weighed on countries, was heard in silence. Painlevé then gave a speech in which he declared that the doctrine of disarmament without conditions was simplistic: only arbitration, pacts of mutual assistance and the internationalisation of aviation would permit a gradual disarmament.[51]

Painlevé's speech appeased the nationalists in the hall and they joined others in applauding it. Later however, a speech by Henri Pichot, a delegate of the Conférence internationale des associations de mutilés de guerre et anciens combattants, raised another tumult. Madariaga, a former head of the Disarmament Section of the League Secretariat, and Houghton tried to control the situation from the stage, the former, 'with some irony' in that he praised the French for their courtesy.[52] François de La Rocque, the vice-president of the Croix de Feu, members of which were numerous

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] *Manchester Guardian*, November 28, 1931; 'War Mentality in Paris: Breaking Up of Peace Meeting,' *Manchester Guardian*, November 30, 1931; *L'Oeuvre*, November 28, 1931; *Le Temps*, November 29, 1931; and *Le Matin*, November 28, 1931.

[52] *Le Temps*, November 29, 1931, and *Le Matin*, November 28, 1931.

among the demonstrators, then climbed on stage and tried to speak but was seized by the secretary of the League of Pacifist War Veterans (Ligue des anciens combattants pacifistes) and was forced to withdraw at which point a brawl erupted with the result that the meeting ended in complete uproar.[53]

The scandal of the Trocadéro, as one German newspaper described it, was covered at length in the German nationalist press which drew particular attention to the treatment of Joos. The same press cited the incident as proof that France did not want to disarm.[54] The nationalist demonstration was not just a gift to anti-French propaganda in Germany. As the *Manchester Guardian* noted under the heading of 'War Mentality in Paris,' the fact that speakers on disarmament, as the French papers of the left acknowledged in decrying the incident, were denied a hearing in Paris was damaging to France's reputation around the world. The newspaper stated that although the majority of the French people wanted peace, it was very disturbing that the sabotage of the closing meeting had met with the approval of the French press of the right without exception The *Manchester Guardian* pointed out that *Figaro* had gone as far as to threaten that if another international disarmament congress were staged in Paris, foreign dignitaries attending it would not escape 'personal violence.'[55]

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: The Polish Memorandum and Moral Disarmament

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments opened on 2 February 1932, and would continue its work over two and half years with periods of adjournment.[56] From the outset, there was much nervousness about its outcome, especially as it opened against a background of bombs raining down on Manchuria. Archibald Hamilton Charteris was a

[53] *L'Oeuvre*, November 28, 1931, and *Le Temps*, November 29, 1931.

[54] 'La manifestation du Trocadéro et l'opinion allemande,' *L'Oeuvre*, November 29, 1931.

[55] *Manchester Guardian*, November 139, 931. See also Vaïsse, *Sécurité d'abord*, 154.

[56] United Nations Library (Geneva), League of Nations Archives, 'The Geneva Protocol and the Disarmament Conference of 1932,' in United Nations Library (Geneva), League of Nations Archives, *The League of Nations, 1920–1946: Organization and Accomplishments; A Retrospective of the First Organization for the Establishment of World Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1996), 143.

professor of international law at the University of Sydney and a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The IPR had been established in Honolulu in 1925 with a view to studying international relations in the Pacific area. Notably, it was the chief model on which the CISSIR was based both at the time of its first incarnation in Berlin in 1928 and in the years 1930 and 1931 when it was transformed into a study conference. Indeed, this transformation took place under the guidance of two key figures from the IPR: John Bell Condliffe, research secretary at the International Secretariat of the IPR in Honolulu and Edward C. Carter, the secretary of the American Council of the IPR in New York. Charteris observed in July 1933 that when the delegates to the Disarmament Conference first convened in February 1932, the 'long shadow' of the bombardment of Manchuria 'lay so heavily on Geneva that it was but natural to waste five months in futile discussions on qualitative disarmament—as who should say—on the question of whether a stair led up or down.'[57] At the same time, many pinned great hopes on the conference and it is telling of these hopes that Radio-Nations, the LON's wireless station which was located at Prangins on Lake Geneva, commenced its broadcasts with a transmission of its opening proceedings.[58]

Much of the fanfare surrounding the conference was the result of the work of peace groups, these having increased their activism in the degree that the international political temperature had risen. By the time the conference commenced, a truly international peace campaign had emerged and it should be pointed out that certain participants in this campaign would also serve as delegates to the conference. For example, Cecil, who in addition to his other activities chaired the Disarmament Committee of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, represented Britain at the conference and Christian L. Lange, the chairman of the Disarmament Committee of the Inter-parliamentary Union, represented Norway.[59]

[57] A. H. Charteris, 'Germany and the Disarmament Conference,' *Australian Quarterly* 5, no. 18 (1933): 69–79, 72–3. See also Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Co-operation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of UNESCO* (Wraclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1962), 1, 124.

[58] 'Publicity and Press,' in United Nations Library (Geneva), League of Nations Archives, *The League of Nations, 1920–1946*, 132 and S. H. Bailey, *International Studies in Great Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 291.

[59] Kolasa, *International Intellectual Co-operation*, 113–4.

Writing from the vantage point of 1935 and chiefly in relation to French public opinion at the time of the Disarmament Conference, Cassin and Georges Scelle, the latter being a professor of public international law at the University of Paris, a technical advisor to the French delegation at the Fifth Assembly in 1924 and another member of the French unit of the CISSIR, stated that the opening of the conference witnessed the 'most remarkable upheaval of opinion, the last movement of enthusiasm' for the Geneva institutions. They noted that at the public session of the conference at the Bâtiment électoral which served as the reception point for the massive petitions pouring into Geneva, the French orators attracted 'particular attention by the generous tone of their speeches and by the bold ideas they expressed.' Cassin and Scelle observed that the general mood at the time was one of fervent hope: it was hoped that a 'different atmosphere was about to be created' and that governments would be willing to leave to one side their 'technical preoccupations and secret political purposes' and 'act boldly.' They recalled that such was the 'passionate longing for an age of fraternity,' that it was as if public opinion had been swept up in a 'wave of mysticism,' adding that in reality that section of public opinion 'inclined towards a mystical state of mind' was expecting nothing less than a 'miracle.' Meanwhile, Cassin and Scelle continued, 'other more practical minds' surveying the general situation, 'could not fail to observe' that conditions were 'unfavourable as possible' to a satisfactory resolution of the problem and could not help but wonder whether the 'favourable moment had not already gone by.'[60]

Certainly, Cassin and Scelle considered that the prevalent mood in France in respect to disarmament was one of doubt. Although the 'flame of enthusiasm' for the Geneva institutions had been 'rekindled' in France in February 1932, it was quickly extinguished against the background of certain events in Germany. In this regard, Scelle and Cassin pointed to

> the disappointment caused by the 'reprisals' which followed the evacuation of the Rhineland, the disturbed conditions which marked the end of the presidency of the Marshal, the difficulties experienced by the Brüning, von and Schleicher Governments, the sterility of the visit to Berlin of M. M.

[60] Georges Scelle and René Cassin, 'French Public Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,' in Maurice Bourquin, ed., *Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Study Conferences, Paris 1934-London 1935* (Paris: IIIC, 1936), 73–74. On the petitions arriving in Geneva, see Kolasa, *International Intellectual Co-operation*, 114.

> Laval and Briand, and especially the increasing growth since 1929 and the final triumph of the Hitlerian movement.[61]

They wrote in connection with this last the following:

> *Mein Kamph* was translated into French and…the press gave wide publicity to the passages which were the most characteristic, the most violent and the most filled with hate toward France, those in which the aims of war and of revenge were stated with greatest brutality. The adversaries of the policy of Aristide Briand had already made use of the papers of Stresemann and of the famous '*finassieren*', but these documents were open to interpretation and discussion, whereas the Hitlerian credos were glaringly clear. It is to be noted also that this was the time of the twilight of Briand's policy, of his failure to be elected President, and the passing of that statesman.[62]

The LON's Intellectual Cooperation Organisation (ICO), which was composed of the ICIC, the IIIC, the National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation, and the delegates of state appointed to IIIC, welcomed the dawning of the Disarmament Conference, not least because of the organisation's hope that it would find itself assigned a central role in the campaign for moral disarmament, a subject due to be brought to the conference's attention. The expression *moral disarmament* had long been in use in League and related circles. At a plenary meeting of the Third Assembly on 27 September 1922, the assembly, after having adopted fifteen other resolutions on disarmament (one of which concerned a treaty of mutual guarantee which was declared at the time to be the means of achieving a general reduction of armaments and three of which concerned the Washington Naval Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments of 6 February 1922), resolved the following: 'moral disarmament is an essential preliminary condition of material disarmament, and that this moral disarmament can only be achieved in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and security.'[63] In 1925, when the assembly's Second Committee discussed the revision of school textbooks, it took note of a resolution submitted by the delegation

[61] Scelle and Cassin, 'French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,' 74.

[62] Ibid.

[63] League of Nations [hereafter LON], special supplement, *Official Journal* [hereafter *OJ*], no. 9 (1922): 25–7. In the publications of the International Cooperation Organisation, the ICO was often referred to in English as the Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation. In French, it was called the Organisation de Coopération Intellectuelle.

of Haiti which urged a reduction of 'the space in history manuals devoted to war and Jingoism…[with]…a view to moral disarmament.'[64] In 1927, the Conference of Press Experts, which was held in Geneva at the behest of the LON, issued in a 'warm appeal to the Press of the world to contribute by every means at its disposal to the consolidation of peace, to combat hatred between nationalities and between classes, which are the greatest danger to peace, and to prepare the way for moral disarmament.'[65]

With the same concerns in mind as the conference of press experts, the fifteenth plenary Congress of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies at a meeting in Budapest held from 24 to 28 May 1931, resolved that 'false and tendentious news' and 'hostile opinion' was a 'grave danger' to peace among nations. It called on the assembly to establish mechanisms for an *international right of reply* in response to press reports or radio broadcasts that were either false or 'calculated to disturb international relations'; a *summary procedure of international inquiry* into the diffusion of information calculated to achieve this last; and for the *penal repression* in each state of the 'mischievous diffusion of inexact information or of false documents' with the intention of disturbing the peace among nations. The Budapest meeting resolved that the cause of moral disarmament could be greatly advanced through the 'abandonment of bellicose or aggressive propaganda' and that the LON should consider measures appropriate to that end.[66] Finally in this context, we might note that in Brussels between 5 and 10 July of that same year, the Twenty-Eighth Universal Peace Congress insisted on 'intellectual and moral disarmament by means of education in the home and teaching in the schools, through the medium of the Press and by action on the part of the Church' and that this was both the condition and guarantee of military disarmament.[67]

The aforementioned international conferences all had a direct bearing on the famous memorandum which the Polish government sent to the secretary-general on 17 September 1931: the *Memorandum from the Polish Government Concerning the Attainment of Moral Disarmament*. This

[64] LON, special supplement, *OJ*, no. 35 (1925): 35.

[65] *Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government* (Geneva, LON, 23 September 1931), Désarmement moral, 1931–1937, AG 1-IICI-B-V-9, UA. See also Kolasa, *International Intellectual Co-operation*, 114–5.

[66] *Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government*, AG 1-IICI-B-V-9, UA.

[67] Twenty-Eighth Universal Peace Congress, 1931, quoted ibid. See also Kolasa, *International Intellectual Co-operation*, 115.