The moral right of Frank McDonough to be identiﬁed as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.

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MAPS

Territory lost by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles

German Expansion from 1933–1939

German and Soviet invasion of Poland, September 1939

INTRODUCTION

The Third Reich was dominated by Adolf Hitler, who boasted that it would last for a thousand years. It ended catastrophically twelve years and four months later. Hitler’s destruction of democracy in Germany, his attempt to dominate the world by force, and the horrific Holocaust he ordered are central events in history. Up to the end of 1941 Hitler’s armies conquered larger areas of territory than Julius Caesar, Attila the Hun and Napoleon. The ghost of Hitler is ever present in political discussions, in modern culture, in the media and throughout historical debate. Hitler remains the epitome of horror, but also a source of endless fascination.

The Hitler Years aims to tell the story of the history of the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945 in two volumes. I adopt a chronological explanation. Each chapter deals with a particular year to give a blow-by-blow account. Sections in each of the chapters explore various themes to provide further context to the events under discussion. This allows the reader to see how events evolved and fitted into the overall development of Hitler’s rule.

Narrative history incorporating analysis and interpretation is, in my view, preferable to a thematic structure, which might be suitable for students looking at various aspects on a university module, but can become extremely difficult to follow for the general reader. So many new books appear each year on various aspects of the history of the Third Reich but there are few general histories and a new one is thoroughly warranted.1

This first volume, Triumph, covers the period 1933 to 1939. It begins with the dramatic intrigues that brought Hitler to power, and ends shortly after his swift conquest of Poland in 1939. The second volume, Disaster, starts with the build-up to the attack on Western Europe in 1940, then moves on to examine the key battles of the Second World War and the Holocaust and concludes with the catastrophic German defeat in 1945. Each volume can be read as a distinct examination of each period but taken together they make up a comprehensive history of the period Hitler ruled Germany between 1933 and 1945.

These two volumes draw on a wide range of sources, including letters, speeches, newspapers, government documents, party records, army memoranda, SS and Foreign Ministry documents, war-trial evidence, interviews with contemporary witnesses, diaries and memoirs. Some sources give the view from the top, others the reaction of ordinary people from below. The way these different viewpoints interact gives us a rich and vivid picture of events as they unfold. These books would have been impossible to write without drawing on the major achievements of recent political, diplomatic, economic, social and military historians.

The monumental events related in the following pages are not, in my view, susceptible to any simple thesis. However, my interpretation of each episode, which grows out of the sources assembled, makes clear my position at every stage and new insights emerge repeatedly. These two books will correct many of the myths that have developed over many decades concerning Hitler’s foreign and racial policies and life inside the Third Reich.

There are hundreds of thousands of historical studies of Hitler’s Germany. Old disagreements among academic historians – between the ‘intentionalists’, who believe Hitler was an all-powerful ‘master of the Third Reich’, and the ‘structuralists’, who view him as a ‘weak dictator’ presiding over a chaotic political system – now seem inconclusive. It is possible to argue in favour of either case in different policy areas.2

There were some historians who argued that Germany followed a Sonderweg or ‘special path’ of abnormal development over centuries that rejected democracy and modernity in favour of a militaristic and aristocratic will to create a European empire. This made German militarism and its association with Hitler seem wholly inevitable. However, this idea that Germany’s politics and economy developed differently from other major European nations is now viewed as flawed and too deterministic.3

The same is true of writers who depicted the Third Reich as a totalitarian dictatorship. One of the prime examples was Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) which suggested that Hitler’s regime was very similar to Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. In practice, however, Nazi government was much less totalitarian than the USSR. The German public had far greater latitude to grumble and criticize than was previously supposed. The original concept of totalitarianism now seems a deeply flawed way to explain Hitler’s rule.4

Even if Hitler had never come to power Germany would probably have had a right-wing nationalist coalition during this period. Conservative power brokers in German politics had never accepted Germany’s defeat in the Great War and they had utter contempt for democracy. A right-wing nationalistic regime, supported by the army, would have almost certainly attempted to revise the Treaty of Versailles, which was regarded by most Germans as a gross injustice, and they may even have done so with the blessing of the British and the French governments. However, without Hitler as leader, it is extremely doubtful that such a conservative-nationalist regime would have resorted to mass genocide founded upon racist and anti-Semitic ideas.

Hitler and his radical National Socialism was therefore central to what happened in Germany from 1933 to 1945. It is impossible to believe that German – or indeed world – history would have taken the same course had Adolf Hitler never lived. Yet Hitler did not create the very specific circumstances that persuaded him to pursue a career in politics and which crowned him leader. Without the Great War and Germany’s strong sense of humiliation, the Nazi Party would not have needed to exist.

Germany’s defeat in 1918 resulted in the establishment of the Weimar Republic, which lasted from 1918 to 1933. From the very beginning it was beset by economic and political difficulties. It only survived between 1919 and 1923 with the help of the army. Germany was almost bankrupted by the Great Inflation of 1923. Between 1924 and 1929 US loans gave the Weimar Republic some economic stability, but these loans were quickly recalled during the Stock Market Crash of 1929. There was then a ‘run on the banks’ in Germany and unemployment soared from 1.6 million in October 1929 to 6.12 million by February 1932. The government could not afford to pay unemployment benefits, which only added to the misery of the population. Those still in work saw their wages cut. There was starvation in rural areas as agricultural prices plummeted. The collapse of the German economy led to a further mistrust of democracy among the people, many of whom now yearned for a strong leader to revitalize the nation.

On to this stage stepped Adolf Hitler. The popularity of his Nazi Party had increased dramatically during this severe economic downturn as he moved from the radical fringe to the political mainstream. In 1928 just 2.8 per cent (810,000) voted for the Nazis. In 1930 this jumped to 18 per cent (6.4 million). By July 1932 the Nazi Party was polling at 37.2 per cent (13.7 million). This proved the peak of electoral popularity before he came to power. In the November 1932 election support for the Nazi Party fell by 4 per cent. Similarly, the German Communist Party (KPD) saw its vote share increase from 10 to 17 per cent between 1928 and 1932. Combined, this meant that by July 1932 the two parties that promised to destroy democracy were supported by 54.2 per cent of German voters.

The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP) was founded on 24 February 1920 in Munich. It was primarily composed of ex-soldiers who believed that Germany had not lost the Great War, but had been ‘stabbed in the back’ by communists and Jews on the home front. They were defined as the chief enemies of the National Socialist or Nazi Party.

Drawing upon this discontent, the Party’s leader Adolf Hitler, an accomplished public speaker, tried to seize power in November 1923 by overthrowing the Bavarian local government. However, the bungled ‘Beer Hall Putsch’ in Munich was easily suppressed by the army. Hitler was arrested and sentenced to five years for ‘high treason’. During his 264-day imprisonment, he changed tack and decided to seek power legally through democratic elections. He also accepted that he would need the support of the traditional conservative right if he wanted to win power legally.

Support for the Nazi Party came at first from the lower-middle- class voters in rural Protestant areas. By 1932 Hitler was attracting the middle classes in Germany’s big cities: white-collar workers, doctors, civil servants and independent traders and small businessmen all contributed to the huge upsurge in voting support. Hitler had managed to unite conservative voters. No party in a large modern democratic state had ever risen from such obscurity so quickly.

Hitler’s promise to his followers was that he alone could bring order and stability to the chaos of Germany by creating a stable, united, classless ‘National Community’. He would ease the hardships of the Great Depression through public works programmes and job-creation schemes. The German economy would be reorganized to serve the interests of the nation. The perceived grip of Jewish capitalists on the nation’s finances would be weakened. Hitler’s ideas were popular and appealed most markedly to the German middle classes.

Alarmed by Hitler’s popularity and the strong performance of the Nazis in elections, the elderly President Paul von Hindenburg tried to establish a right-wing authoritarian regime, which excluded Hitler and the Nazi Party. Article 48 of the flawed Weimar constitution gave him unlimited emergency powers, so he appointed three conservative chancellors: Heinrich Brüning (1930–32), then Franz von Papen (June–November 1932), and finally General Kurt von Schleicher, who lasted just fifty-seven days. All proved deeply unpopular and none were party leaders.

Hitler later claimed to have ‘seized power’ on 30 January 1933, but in fact his appointment as Chancellor was entirely legal and constitutional. Hindenburg had been persuaded by his narrow conservative group of advisers that Hitler should be given the chance to rule and perhaps he could even be controlled to serve their own ends. So there was no violent revolution in Germany in 1933 as there had been in Russia in 1917 or France in 1789.

Hitler faced a huge dilemma when he came to power which he never fully resolved. His rule began as a coalition involving himself and the Nazi elite working alongside the traditional, conservative elite, the army, the bureaucracy of the civil service and the interests of big business. He was never the puppet of conservative forces, but he constantly had to seek their consent in order to push through his policies.

Furthermore, his utopian vision of a classless, harmonious National Community was never matched by any fundamental social or economic change in Germany. Capitalism was central to the old conservative order and under Hitler it remained largely unchallenged and unreformed. Civil servants – provided they were not Jewish or left-wing – remained in post, their career prospects largely unaffected. The judiciary and prison governors were still old-fashioned conservatives, while the German police remained state employees. Indeed, the newly created Gestapo, which hunted down political opponents, drew its recruits from the existing police force. Finally, the army remained independent of Hitler’s government and he needed its support to remain in power.

Rearmament was an agreed policy. It was popular because it promised to reduce unemployment and aid heavy industry. Hitler thought strong armed forces would improve his bargaining power in diplomatic negotiations. His key aim had always been to avenge Germany’s humiliation after the Great War. Hence, his key allies were the army and big business, both non-Nazi organizations.

A further point of unity for Hitler and his conservative partners – as well as for the Nazi Party and most of the German population – was the desire to revise the Treaty of Versailles, which was generally viewed as an Allied conspiracy to keep Germany weak and humbled. Hitler’s underlying long-term aim was to instigate a racial war in order to gain Lebensraum or ‘living space’ for the German people, but he could not openly reveal this while Germany was militarily weak. In public he suggested modest and reasonable treaty revisions. In private he preached expansion through brutal conquest and racial superiority.

One main area of conflict between Hitler’s government and the conservative elites was church policy. Hitler originally wanted to Nazify the Lutheran Protestant Church, but he was forced to drop this proposal after fierce organized resistance. The Catholic Church remained in continuous conflict with Hitler’s government and German Catholics experienced persistent persecution. By 1939, however, it was clear that Hitler’s plan for Nazism to supplant Christianity in the German people’s hearts had failed.

Even radical Nazi groups such as the SS and the violent storm troopers (SA) were not guaranteed access to the centre of power, but had to operate alongside existing conservative-dominated state institutions. The SS under Heinrich Himmler became a progressively more powerful organization, but its officers were recruited from young, university-educated people, many of whom had not been Nazi Party members in 1933.

Hitler also promised to improve German society by removing the ‘enemies’ of national unity. These included communists, trade unionists, liberals and Jews, as well as ‘anti-social’ outsiders such as vagrants, hardened criminals, the long-term unemployed, prostitutes; also those defined as ‘racially unfit’, most notably, the physically and mentally handicapped. All of these groups were progressively marginalized and excluded from the National Community.

Hitler understood that Nazifying German society was a long-term project that would probably take decades to achieve. In the short term he needed to win popular support for his ideas, which is why propaganda became so integral to the Nazi regime. Hitler’s loyal Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels seized control of the press, radio and all aspects of German culture in order to promote the Führer and his aims.

The Hitler Years acknowledges the central importance of Adolf Hitler to the ideological and especially the military prerogatives of his government and restores him to the centre-stage. However, it will also be revealed that he was often forced to compromise and display political flexibility much more than is generally appreciated. Hitler’s actions were often premeditated, but sometimes he had to react to events beyond his control. In the period 1933 to 1939 he was not so much a master planner as a master of flexibility and improvisation.

1

1933

DEMOCRACY
AND
COMMUNISM
DESTROYED

It was icy cold in Munich on New Year’s Day. Adolf Hitler was drinking coffee over breakfast at his luxurious apartment at 16 Prinzregentenplatz. The morning papers made gloomy reading about his political prospects in the coming year. A critical article in the social democratic newspaper Vorwärts headlined ‘Hitler’s Rise and Fall’ suggested the Nazi Party’s electoral popularity had peaked in the July 1932 federal election.1 The Berliner Tageblatt mockingly observed: ‘Everywhere in the world people were talking about – what was his name: Adalbert Hitler. Later? He’s vanished!’2 The official Nazi Party newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, printed Hitler’s ‘Battle Message for 1933’ in which he refused to compromise his principles for ‘a couple of ministerial posts’, and promised to continue his ‘all or nothing strategy’ of remaining in opposition until he was offered the post of Chancellor.3

During the evening of 1 January Hitler attended a performance of Richard Wagner’s comedic opera Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg (The Master-Singers of Nuremberg) at Munich’s Court Theatre.4 Accompanying him were his deferential personal assistant Rudolf Hess, his photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, and Eva Braun. Hoffmann had ‘a weakness for drinking parties and hearty jokes’.5 Braun, tall, blond and strikingly attractive, was an assistant in Hoffmann’s photography studio. This is where she first met Hitler when she was just seventeen. She had slowly emerged as Hitler’s primary female companion after the tragic and somewhat suspicious death of his half-niece Geli Raubal, whose corpse had been found in Hitler’s apartment on 18 September 1931. The inquest concluded that she had shot herself through the heart, using Hitler’s own pistol. Braun’s employment by Hoffmann meant that she could accompany Hitler socially without arousing public suspicion of any romantic involvement between them.

After the performance, they all went to a party at the opulent Munich residence of Hitler’s witty and wealthy friend Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl, a Harvard graduate who joined the Party in the early 1920s. Hitler was in a very optimistic mood that night, Putzi later recalled. After criticizing the talented young conductor Hans Knappertsbusch’s handling of Wagner’s opera, Hitler turned to Putzi and said: ‘This year belongs to us. I will guarantee that to you in writing.’6

At the start of 1933 democratic government in Germany had virtually collapsed. The previous year had seen three different German chancellors: Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher, and two inconclusive national elections in July and November. Each Chancellor failed to establish a government that could command a majority in the German parliament, known as the Reichstag. Papen’s government fell after a vote of no confidence, losing by 512 votes to 42. He was replaced by Schleicher, who took office on 3 December 1932.7 Schleicher was appointed by Germany’s 85-year-old President Paul von Hindenburg using the arbitrary power granted to him under Article 48 of the flawed Weimar constitution. This allowed him to appoint not merely the German Chancellor, but also the other members of the cabinet. As a result, the democratically elected members of the Reichstag were sidelined in the decision-making process. Hindenburg wanted to establish a stable and popular right-wing authoritarian government, excluding all left-wing parties, but since 1930 he had failed to make this a reality.

Schleicher had only a few weeks to put together a coalition government that could survive a potential vote of no confidence in the Reichstag. He envisaged an authoritarian regime which would appeal to the working classes, but this was completely out of step with what Hindenburg wanted. Schleicher spent most of December 1932 trying to persuade Gregor Strasser – a high-profile figure on the socialist left of the Nazi Party – to join his cabinet, with the aim of splitting the Nazi Party. On 3 December he offered Strasser the posts of Vice Chancellor and Minister-President of Prussia,8 but Strasser refused both offers. Strasser resigned from the Nazi Party on 8 December, claiming that he could no longer accept Hitler’s uncompromising refusal to become the Chancellor of a coalition government. In his diary Joseph Goebbels, the leading Nazi propagandist, summed up Gregor Strasser’s predicament in two words: ‘Dead man!’9

Franz von Papen, who had not forgiven Schleicher for helping to bring down his own government, wanted to return to power, but he realized that in order to create a viable coalition he needed the cooperation of Adolf Hitler. As the leader of the most electorally popular political party Hitler’s claim to be Germany’s Chancellor was very strong, but he still needed help to get into power.

It was the businessman Baron Kurt von Schröder who opened a fresh dialogue between Hitler and Papen. In evidence presented at the Nuremberg trials after the end of the Second World War, Schröder said Papen asked him to arrange a meeting with Hitler on 10 December 1932.10 In his testimony, Papen claimed that Schröder had simply relayed Hitler’s own request for a meeting.11 Hitler and Papen duly met on 4 January at Schröder’s home in Cologne. Although they arrived separately, they were both photographed entering the house.12 Papen claimed that it was not a press photographer who took the photos, but a policeman tipped off by Chancellor Schleicher.13

The meeting started just before noon.14 Hitler began by criticizing Papen for preventing him from becoming Chancellor in July 1932. Papen responded by claiming that it was Schleicher who blocked Hitler’s appointment.15 Hitler made it clear he would join the cabinet only if he was made Chancellor. However, he was willing to accept a prominent role for Papen and other positions for his conservative allies in his government provided they accepted the need to remove social democrats, communists and Jews from leading positions in German life.16

Schröder later recalled that during their two-hour meeting Papen proposed a conservative-nationalist coalition involving Hitler and the Nazis.17 However, Papen later claimed that the question of Hitler becoming Chancellor was never discussed. Papen was merely suggesting Hitler should cooperate responsibly with the current government, according to his own recollection. All Papen promised was to ask Schleicher to consider bringing Hitler into the cabinet.18 Papen gave Hitler the impression of being ‘dead set against Schleicher’, Goebbels noted in his diary after talking to Hitler. ‘Wants to topple and eradicate him. Has the old man’s [Hindenburg’s] ear. Even stays with him.’19

As they left the house, Papen and Hitler were photographed once again. It was suggested in the newspapers that Hitler had asked Papen to persuade Hindenburg to appoint him as Chancellor.20 The Tägliche Rundschau, a Berlin newspaper sympathetic to Schleicher, led with the headline ‘Hitler and Papen against Schleicher’. The communist newspaper Die Rote Front (The Red Front) claimed that the meeting was part of ‘a capitalist plot to create a fascist dictatorship’.21

After reading these reports Schleicher went to see Hindenburg and accused Papen of extreme disloyalty. Hindenburg told Schleicher that Papen would not meet Hitler in future without his express agreement. In an act of duplicity, Hindenburg secretly authorized Papen to continue his dialogue with the Nazi leader.22 Business interests were alarmed by Schleicher’s willingness to court trade unions and the socialist left. The Agricultural League (Reichslandbund), a pressure group representing Germany’s biggest landowners, suggested that Schleicher was not doing enough to help farmers either.

On 6 January the atmosphere was so febrile that Hitler and Papen were forced to issue a joint press statement denying that they were plotting to bring down the Schleicher government.23 Papen visited the German Chancellor on 9 January to convince him that he was trying to persuade Hitler to join the current government, but Schleicher was not convinced.24 Nevertheless, he told a group of journalists at a dinner on 13 January that according to Papen Hitler wanted to be made Minister of the Interior and Defence Minister.25

Hitler waves to cheering crowds below at the window of the Reich Chancellery on 30 January 1933.

After meeting Papen, Hitler gave a speech in Detmold in North Rhine-Westphalia on the evening of 4 January. He made no secret of wanting power, ‘not through the back door but rather through the main gate’.26 This was the starting point of a brief election campaign in the tiny German state of Lippe-Detmold, which had an electorate of 117,000. It was the sort of area where the Nazi Party normally fared well, because it was 95 per cent Protestant and predominantly rural. Over the next eleven days Hitler spoke in sixteen small towns in the region. He was concentrating on this local election in the hope of dispelling the view that the Nazi Party was in electoral decline. In the November 1932 federal election the Nazi Party saw its popular vote fall from 13,745,680 in July 1932 to 11,377,395, which resulted in it losing thirty-four Reichstag deputies. As the local newspaper the Lippische Landes-Zeitung wryly observed: ‘The NSDAP [Nazi Party] must be in serious trouble if the great “Führer” himself is travelling to small villages.’27 On his speaking tour, Hitler offered the German people a utopian vision of a racially pure Germany that would ruthlessly eradicate the threat of Marxism.28

Hitler’s ploy paid off. The Nazis saw their vote increase in the Lippe-Detmold election from 34.7 to 39.5 per cent. This was 6,000 votes up on November 1932, although 3,000 lower than the peak of July 1932. Most of the Party’s gains came at the expense of the conservative-nationalist German National People’s Party (DNVP), which was led by an austere businessman called Alfred Hugenberg.29 The election result proved once again that the Nazis had still not been able to win votes from the two main working-class parties: the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD). In private, Hitler claimed the Lippe-Detmold result was a success ‘whose importance it is impossible to underestimate’, because it was evidence of a resurgence of popular support for the Party.30 Behind the scenes, however, there was pessimism about the Nazi Party’s future electoral prospects. Secret Nazi internal polling suggested that the Party’s popular appeal had peaked in July 1932. Hitler was now acutely aware that he needed to gain power if he was to revive his party’s fortunes. According to the Völkischer Beobachter Hitler had denied reports in the left-wing press that he had received 4 million marks from Markus Wallenberg, a Swiss banker, to bolster the Nazis’ election funds. In retaliation, Hitler vowed to rid the nation of ‘the sensationalist press’ if he ever came to power.31

Hitler’s pleasing election result sealed the fate of ‘dead man’ Gregor Strasser. He resigned his Reichstag seat and promised to avoid all political activity for two years. ‘The Strasser case is over,’ Goebbels wrote in his diary. ‘Poor Gregor! His best friends have turned against him.’32 On that same evening Schleicher gave a speech on national radio in which he claimed to support ‘neither socialism nor capitalism’ and promised to boost the wages of working people.33 At a cabinet meeting the next day he suggested it might be a good idea to ask Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag and postpone new elections. It would be an unconstitutional move, but the cabinet agreed all the same.34 Schleicher admitted that a majority in the Reichstag could be attained only with Hitler’s cooperation.35 Goebbels noted in his diary: ‘Everything is still up in the air regarding the ongoing negotiations to form a new government.’36 He was concerned about the strain upon Hitler of all this political manoeuvring: ‘The boss doesn’t feel well at all. He gets too little sleep and doesn’t eat enough.’37

On 17 January Hitler met the DNVP leader Alfred Hugenberg and his parliamentary secretary Otto Schmidt-Hannover in Hermann Göring’s opulent apartment in Berlin. Hugenberg regarded Hitler and the Nazis as a street-fighting rabble, but he had become disillusioned with Schleicher and was keen to have talks with Hitler about the possibility of entering a new coalition government. Hugenberg felt that he and Hitler had found some ‘common ground’, but nothing concrete was agreed. Hugenberg told Hitler there was little hope of him being appointed Chancellor because of Hindenburg’s opposition. ‘Rubbish,’ Hitler replied.38

The next day Hitler met Papen again. Hitler requested the meeting and not Papen as is often supposed.39 Papen denied it ever happened which was untrue.40 They met at the plush villa of Joachim von Ribbentrop, which was located in the affluent Berlin suburb of Dahlem. Goebbels once said that Ribbentrop had ‘bought his name and married his money’. He was a wine merchant with a diplomatic and military background, but had only recently joined the Nazi Party. Ribbentrop and his wife took notes at Hitler and Papen’s meeting.

More care had been taken over the security arrangements for this Hitler-Papen encounter. Ribbentrop’s chauffeur picked up Papen from his home, while Hitler’s chauffeur-driven limousine was driven into the garage of the house. This allowed Hitler to enter the house through the back garden. With Hitler that day were Ernst Röhm, the chief of the Sturmabteilung (SA) or Brownshirts, the Nazi Party’s paramilitary wing, and Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS), which began as a branch of the SA, but was destined to become far more powerful and deadly.41

‘Hitler insists on being Chancellor,’ Ribbentrop noted in his diary. ‘Papen again considers this impossible. His influence with Hindenburg was not strong enough to affect this.’42 Hitler told Papen that he was reluctant to engage in any further talks unless Papen agreed to make him Chancellor. 43 Papen prevaricated, because he still thought Hitler could be persuaded to take the post of Vice Chancellor. In the evening, Hitler went to see The Rebel, a new film released in Berlin on 22 December 1932. It told the tale of Austrian mountaineer Severin Anderlan’s heroic resistance to Napoleon’s occupation of the Austrian Tyrol. Hitler loved it. According to Goebbels, the film really ‘fired him up’. What Hitler had most admired while watching it was how Anderlan had rejected all offers to compromise.44

Hitler with leading members of the Nazi elite at the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin on the day he came to power. From left to right: Justice Minister Hanns Kerrl, Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler, Ernst Röhm; Hermann Göring, Minister Walter Darré, Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, Finance Minister Wilhelm Frick.

On 20 January the Reichstag Steering Committee postponed the opening of the first Reichstag session of 1933 from 24 to 31 January. On the same day a Nazi-sponsored resolution on foreign policy was passed in the Reichstag thanks to the combined support of the Nazi and the Communist parties.45 This gave a clear indication that Schleicher’s government stood little chance of winning a parliamentary vote of no confidence. In the evening Hitler spoke before a full house at the Berlin Sport Palace (Sportpalast). Hitler told his supporters they should not be discouraged by setbacks, but instead work for the establishment of a ‘new ethnic-popular community’.46 The Nazi newspaper Der Angriff observed that at the end of his speech: ‘A storm of applause erupted such as cannot be described in words.’47

The most important day of clandestine discussions to bring Hitler to power was undoubtedly 22 January. It began with Hitler unveiling a memorial at the St Nicholas and St Mary I Cemetery (St. Marien- und St. Nikolai-Friedhof I) in Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin. The memorial was dedicated to Horst Wessel, an SA street-fighter who had been murdered by communists in February 1930 and subsequently elevated to martyrdom via a hugely popular Nazi battle song called ‘Raise the Flag’ (‘Die Fahne Hoch’), popularly known as the ‘Horst Wessel Song’.48 Afterwards, 35,000 Brownshirts demonstrated noisily outside Karl-Liebknecht House on Bulöwplatz, the headquarters of the KPD. The social democrat newspaper Vorwärts noted: ‘The fact that on 22 January 1933 in Berlin Hitler’s brown hordes were allowed to march outside the windows of the KPD headquarters with the conscious intention of challenging and humiliating their enemies, and that they were able to do so without any possibility of effective resistance, was a very bitter blow for the entire labour movement.’49

In the evening Hitler gave another rabble-rousing speech at the Sport Palace, primarily dedicated to the memory of Horst Wessel. He left just before 10 p.m. and travelled by limousine in the company of Wilhelm Frick and Hermann Göring for yet another secret meeting with Papen, once again at the home of Ribbentrop, who was emerging as a key player in the dark art of clandestine political intrigue. Papen later recalled that it was Hitler who had requested this meeting. Papen told Hindenburg about it and gave his consent for him to attend.50 Accompanying Papen was Hindenburg’s son Oskar, as well as Otto Meissner, Hindenburg’s State Secretary. Papen had invited them both,51 because they had considerable influence over Hindenburg. Meissner, who was secretive and devious, had been a member of the presidential staff since 1920. Oskar was once described by the French ambassador André François-Poncet as ‘tall and massive as his father, but without the gracious demeanour’.52 Oskar was, however, very close to his father and he trusted his judgement. Oskar had previously been friendly with Schleicher, but their relationship had recently cooled. Up to this this point, Oskar had shown little sympathy for Hitler and National Socialism. In a prescient memorandum just two months before this meeting Oskar had warned his father that Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor would inevitably lead to a one-party dictatorship.53 Meissner told the Nuremberg trials that the key reason why Hitler was brought into discussions about a future coalition was because it had become clear that Schleicher had failed to gain Nazi support or to create a viable right-wing coalition.54

It seems that Oskar had other worries on his mind at this time. The SPD and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) had set up a Reichstag enquiry into recent dodgy property deals under the so-called Eastern Aid programme. This had been created to bail out ailing Junker farming estates in East Prussia, but serious allegations began to emerge indicating that government funds were diverted from the scheme to buy property, racehorses, cars and luxury goods. Some of those under investigation were friends and relatives of President Hindenburg. These revelations were front-page news. Oskar’s involvement in this scandal might have come to light under parliamentary scrutiny. This raises the distinct possibility that during their meeting Hitler promised to drop the Eastern Aid investigation if he became Chancellor.55

Elaborate arrangements were put in place to ensure the secrecy of this meeting. Oskar and Meissner, accompanied by their wives, began the evening by attending a performance of Richard Wagner’s two-act opera The Ban on Love (Das Liebesverbot), based on William Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, at the Prussian State Opera House on the Unter den Linden. During the interval, both were seen talking to guests, but when the lights went down for the final act to begin they collected their overcoats from the cloakroom and slipped away by a side entrance, taking a taxi to Ribbentrop’s house. It was snowing very heavily when they finally arrived.56

At the meeting Papen stressed that Hindenburg remained unconvinced of Hitler’s suitability as Chancellor. Hitler said that he would not join Schleicher’s cabinet and the Nazi Party would not support Schleicher’s government in the Reichstag. He was prepared to cooperate only in a coalition in which he was appointed Chancellor.57 Once this brief exchange of views was over, Hitler invited Oskar to an adjacent room for a private talk. This meeting reportedly lasted for just over an hour. Neither man kept a record of what was said, but at the Nuremburg trials Oskar said that Hitler had dominated the conversation. He stressed that he alone could save Germany from civil war and crush the communist threat and he reminded Oskar that no government could survive without the support of the Nazi Party.58

Franz von Papen, German politician (centre), with Adolf Hitler (left) and Werner von Blomberg (right) on 12 March 1933, a day of general mourning for German soldiers killed in the First World War.

A one-pot dinner followed, accompanied by champagne, although Hitler stuck to his usual tipple of mineral water. Oskar and Meissner were the first to leave. ‘In the taxi on the way back,’ Meissner recalled, ‘Oskar von Hindenburg was very silent; the only remark he made was that there was no help for it, the Nazis had to be taken into the government. My impression was that Hitler had succeeded in getting him under his spell.’59 Hitler told Goebbels two days later that he doubted whether he had really won over Oskar, whom he described as the ‘personification of stupidity’.60 For his part, Papen later commented: ‘I want to make it clear the actual question of forming a cabinet with Hitler as Chancellor was not discussed by Oskar Hindenburg, Meissner or myself.’61 This is contradicted by Ribbentrop’s more reliable contemporary diary entry. ‘Papen will now press for Hitler as Chancellor,’ he wrote, ‘but tells Hitler he will withdraw from these negotiations forthwith if Hitler has no confidence in him.’62

In Papen’s own report of the meeting, which he submitted to Hindenburg, he suggested Schleicher should be given more time to secure support in the Reichstag. Papen also ruled out taking over as Chancellor himself. Significantly, he did not recommend that Hitler should be made Chancellor at this stage.63 Meissner later recalled that despite Papen’s persuasive arguments, Hindenburg remained ‘extremely hesitant’ about appointing Hitler as Chancellor. He still wanted Papen to assume that role again.64

In spite of all the secrecy surrounding the meeting, Schleicher’s spies found out about it. Schleicher bluntly asked Meissner in a telephone call if he had enjoyed his meal at Ribbentrop’s house. On 23 January Schleicher met Hindenburg and told him that his negotiations to form a coalition, which might survive a vote of no confidence in the Reichstag, had failed.65 Now the only alternative to a Hitler-led government, Schleicher said, was a ‘military dictatorship’. He asked Hindenburg for a permanent suspension of the Reichstag and to cancel all further elections. He also wanted the Nazi Party and the German Communist Party banned. His dictatorship would be kept in power by the army.66 Hindenburg rejected Schleicher’s proposals out of hand. Even worse for Schleicher, his plan for a military dictatorship was leaked to the press, which led to a general outcry from all his political opponents.

On 27 January the Reichstag Steering Committee met again and affirmed that the parliamentary session would begin on 31 January.67 On that same day Hitler met the DNVP leader Alfred Hugenberg, informing him that Papen now supported his appointment as Chancellor. Hugenberg objected to Hitler’s demand that a Nazi should be appointed Prussian Interior Minister, because this would give the Nazis full control of the police force.68 Ribbentrop was present and noted the meeting ended ‘in a quarrel’ between Hugenberg and Hitler with nothing decided. Hitler described the leaders of the DNVP as ‘one gang of swindlers’.69

Meanwhile, Göring met Meissner at the presidential palace to reassure him that Hitler had no intention whatsoever of violating the Weimar constitution if given power and the Nazi Party would oppose any attempt by Schleicher to govern without parliamentary support.70 Even at the last minute Hitler thought that Papen might double-cross him. Ribbentrop noted in his diary: ‘Hitler very indignant, wants to leave for Munich immediately. Göring persuades him to stay.’71 At 11 a.m. on this very eventful day, Ribbentrop met with Papen and told him that after a long talk with Hindenburg he now believed that Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor was a real possibility.72

At an emergency cabinet meeting on 28 January Schleicher told his colleagues that he would ask Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag, then to delay elections and allow him to govern in a ‘presidential cabinet’. If Hindenburg refused, Schleicher would immediately resign.73 He then asked the President to carry out his plans. ‘No,’ was Hindenburg’s blunt reply. Schleicher was left with no alternative but to resign. Hindenburg explained that he needed to find a majority government that could stabilize Germany. ‘Whether what I am doing now is right, my dear Schleicher,’ he added, ‘I do not know, but I shall know soon enough when I am up there, [pointing heavenward].’ Schleicher pondered this statement before replying: ‘After this breach of trust, sir, I am not sure that you will go to heaven.’74

Hindenburg next summoned Papen, in the presence of his son Oskar and Meissner, and urged him to take the post of Chancellor. Papen declined the offer, and he, Oskar and Meissner said Hitler was now the only logical choice. Hindenburg finally conceded defeat. ‘It is my unpleasant duty,’ he replied, ‘to appoint this fellow Hitler as Chancellor.’ However, he insisted that if Hitler became Chancellor it must be in a coalition arrangement under which he could be contained by reliable conservatives. Furthermore, Hitler’s cabinet must include General Werner von Blomberg as Minister of Defence. Hindenburg mistakenly believed that Blomberg was a ‘non-political soldier’ and therefore a safe pair of hands. In fact he was a pro-Nazi and a passionate advocate of rearmament.75 Hindenburg had been deeply influenced by Papen in finally agreeing to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. As Otto Meissner put it: ‘Papen finally won him [Hindenburg] over to Hitler with the argument that the representatives of the other right-wing parties, which would belong to the government, would restrict Hitler’s freedom of action.’76

A hectic day of discussions followed concerning the composition of Hitler’s cabinet on 29 January. At 11 a.m. Hitler met Papen and agreed to the formation of a national coalition government, containing only two other Nazis. After coming to power, Hitler wanted to call an immediate general election and pass an Enabling Act to dispense legally with the Reichstag. Papen relayed these proposals to Hindenburg, who was surprised by how moderate they were.77 ‘Don’t worry, we’ve hired him,’ Papen told Hindenburg.78 In the afternoon Hitler was informed by Papen that he would be appointed the Chancellor of Germany at 11 a.m. on the following day.

It was -4°C on 30 January. Hitler had just one more problem left to resolve before he took office. Hugenberg, the DNVP leader, had raised a last-minute objection to Hitler’s desire for a general election. A frustrated Papen shouted at Hugenberg: ‘If the new government is not formed by eleven o’clock, the army is going to march. Schleicher may establish a military dictatorship.’79 Hitler tried to appease Hugenberg by assuring him that whatever the result of the election every cabinet minister would keep his job.

At 11.15 a.m. Hitler’s Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) finally walked into Hindenburg’s office and the President gave a short speech, emphasizing the need for cooperation in this new government.80 At 11.30 a.m. Hitler took the oath of office to become the German Chancellor. In an impromptu speech, he vowed to uphold the Weimar constitution. After speaking, Hitler waited for Hindenburg to say a few positive things about him, but all Hindenburg could say was: ‘And now gentlemen, forward with God.’81 Hitler went to the Hotel Kaiserhof for lunch. ‘We all had tears in our eyes,’ Goebbels noted in his diary. ‘We shook Hitler’s hand. He deserved this. Enormous celebrations.’82

Hitler had become the Chancellor of what was officially described as ‘A Government of National Concentration’. Only two other Nazis were included in Hitler’s cabinet: Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior, a career civil servant and a moderate Nazi. The other was the Reichstag President (Speaker) Hermann Göring, effectively Hitler’s deputy, who was given the role of Minister without Portfolio, plus the additional post of Prussian Deputy Minister of the Interior. Papen was appointed Vice Chancellor, but he remained Prime Minister of Prussia and was nominally Göring’s line manager.83

Hitler took over a highly sophisticated state machine, but he had no cabinet or civil service experience. He had been brought in by the conservative elite as the front man for a popular authoritarian regime. This is why his cabinet, which had been chosen by Hindenburg and Papen, was predominantly conservative. Hitler had never even met several of his cabinet colleagues before. Four of them had served in Schleicher’s outgoing cabinet: Konstantin von Neurath (Foreign Minister), Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk (Finance Minister), Paul von Eltz-Rübenach (Postmaster General and Transport Minister) and Franz Gürtner (Justice Minister). The new non-Nazi entrants were: Werner von Blomberg (Minister of War), Alfred Hugenberg (Economics and Food and Agriculture Minister) and Franz Seldte, the Labour Minister and leader of the paramilitary Steel Helmet League of Front Soldiers (Stahlhelm). Although Papen sat in the cabinet as Vice Chancellor, he had no ministry of his own. Hugenberg, the head of the DNVP, was the only other party leader in the cabinet. In addition, Dr Perecke attended cabinet as Reich Commissar for Procurement of Labour. Two state secretaries – Dr Hans Lammers of the Reich Chancellery and Otto Meissner of the Presidential Chancellery – also attended. Walther Funk was appointed Reich Press Chief, a post that had been expected to go to Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief.84

Many of these conservative individuals remained in Hitler’s cabinet for long periods.85 Typical was Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, the Finance Minister. The first time he ever met Hitler was on the day he became Chancellor. He was an upper-class conservative, who kept his comments in cabinet ‘short, clear and always to the point’.86 He remained in office from 1933 to 1945. A loyal German bureaucrat, he did not even regard himself as a politician. André François-Poncet, the French ambassador, knew him well and described him as ‘the embodiment of a reliable, correct and decent German official’.87 Schwerin von Krosigk later told Hans Luther: ‘Before National Socialism came to power I had great respect for its idealistic goals, but serious reservations about its violent methods and rowdy followers.’88

The first meeting of Hitler’s cabinet took place on 30 January at 5 p.m. Hitler simply asked his colleagues for their full support at this difficult time.89 Hugenberg suggested that the Communist Party should be banned immediately. ‘It is nothing short of impossible to ban six million people who stand behind the KPD,’ Hitler replied.90 Hugenberg never developed a close relationship with Hitler. Indeed, their mutual dislike was obvious to other cabinet members.

CONTENTS

MAPS

INTRODUCTION

1

1933

DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM DESTROYED

DEMOCRACY
AND
COMMUNISM
DESTROYED