

Edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli



THE GLOBALIZATION READER

Sixth Edition

WILEY Blackwell

The Globalization Reader

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Edited by

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Preface to the Sixth Edition

In this sixth edition of *The Globalization Reader*, we retain several features of the previous editions:

- *Purpose:* Our goal is to provide a variety of perspectives on different dimensions of globalization, thus conveying its importance and complexity.
- *Structure:* Like its predecessors, this book is organized into sections covering many aspects of globalization, from theoretical to experiential, and from economic to cultural.
- *Issues:* The *Reader* illustrates many issues related to globalization, including trends in global inequality, the specter of greater cultural homogeneity, and the movement for global justice.
- *Selections:* As in previous editions, we draw from several disciplines to offer a diverse sample of high-quality, readable scholarly work on globalization.

To reflect new developments and to make the *Reader* even more useful and engaging, we have also made some changes:

- *Introductions:* We have updated several editorial introductions.
- *Revised sections:* We have enhanced various sections as follows:
 - A new item on the UN Millennium Goals in the debate section
 - New selections on virtual migration and medical tourism in the section on experiencing globalization
 - A new item on the US as a “sticky superpower” in the economic section
 - New selections dealing with policies on sexual relations and abortion in the section on the nation-state
 - A new item on the UN Global Compact in the section on governance
 - A new item on the role of NGOs addressing climate change in the civil society section
 - A new item on the Korean Wave in the media section

- A new item on Asian religious practices in the religion section
- A new item on cosmopolitanism in the identity section
- A new item on climate justice movements in the environment section
- New selections on critical and populist responses to globalization in the final section on contesting globalization.
- *An expanded range of voices:* The selections represent both established and younger scholars with diverse backgrounds, now including contributors from Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden, and the UK.

As always, we hope this updated edition will help both new and returning readers make better sense of globalization.

Frank J. Lechner and John Boli

General Introduction

Globalization means different things to different people. To a Korean Pentecostal missionary, it means new opportunities to spread the faith and convert lost souls abroad. To a Dominican immigrant in the United States, it means growing new roots while staying deeply involved in the home village. To an Indian television viewer, it means sampling a variety of new shows, some adapted from foreign formats. To a Chinese apparel worker, it means a chance to escape rural poverty by cutting threads off designer jeans. To an American shoe company executive, it means managing a far-flung supply chain to get products to stores. To a Filipino global justice advocate, it means rules of the global game that favor the rich North over the poor South. For all their diversity, these examples have something in common. They indicate some of the many ways in which more people become more closely connected across larger distances, and grow more aware of their connections as well. “Globalization” captures that process. Of course, new connections entail new risks, as the economic crisis that started in 2007 brought home to many people, when the troubles of Americans unable to pay their mortgages cascaded across the world economy. As the pull-back in trade and investment during that episode showed, connections can be broken, our shared awareness can be put to the test; globalization does not march forward along a smooth path. Caveats aside, however, the record of global change since World War II is quite striking: more people and places have become more interdependent and have organized their new connections in more intricate ways. For all the fault lines it still displays, a new global society, not just a world economy, has been growing all around us. How to guide its growth, how to make it work for most, and how to understand the process are key challenges of the years to come. As a way to help meet those challenges, the selections compiled in this *Reader* aim to describe and explain the course of globalization and the shape of its outcomes.

What does globalization involve? Globalization refers to the processes by which more people across large distances become connected in more and different ways. They can become connected very simply by doing or experiencing the same sort of thing. For example, Japanese cuisine “globalizes” when more people on different continents enjoy the taste of sushi. Since the nineteenth century soccer has become globalized as players and fans in many countries took an interest in the game. Though many people lack access to good medicine, parents the world over routinely decide to immunize their children against major diseases. These are instances of diffusion: ways of thinking, acting, or feeling spread widely. Such diffusion increased greatly in recent decades as the infrastructure for communication and transportation improved dramatically, connecting groups, institutions, and countries in new ways. The spread of sushi involved not just a shared consumer experience; it also made many American fishermen dependent on a Japanese market as tuna caught off the US coast is sold and shipped overseas. In soccer, the professional prospects of great players from South America depend on the demand from European teams. The health of many children depends on breakthroughs in distant laboratories and an intricate global system for dispensing medication; at the same time, the movement of people around the globe also exposes people to new health risks. For good and ill, such links make more people more interdependent. These links are molded into new organizational forms as regional institutions go global or new ones take shape on the world stage. For example, international law governs who can fish in coastal waters, and the World Trade Organization handles disputes between members, including the United States and Japan. FIFA is an international nongovernmental organization that sets the rules of soccer and organizes major tournaments such as the World Cup. The World Health Organization, as well as more informal networks of professionals and volunteers, organizes campaigns to address major health threats.

Such institutions, which have emerged in many areas of human activity, reflect increasingly common knowledge and awareness. Eating sushi, watching the World Cup, and getting a hepatitis B shot involve elements of world culture – the meaning of sushi, the application of the offside rule, or the reason for immunization are known to consumers, fans, and patients regardless of their location. Even if they do not know the larger structures, their everyday life is nevertheless embedded in a world culture that transcends their village, town, or country, and that becomes part of individual and collective identities. As people become more intricately connected to many others across large distances – not all people to the same extent, of course – the world is becoming a “single place.” Globalization thus involves growing diffusion, expanding interdependence, more transnational institutions, and an emerging world culture and consciousness – all aspects of the connectedness at the heart of globalization, all elements of the world society globalization is creating.

Is globalization new? Many scholars point to sixteenth-century Europe as the original source of globalization. After all, the Europeans established worldwide trade connections on their own terms, brought their culture to different regions by settling vast areas, and defined the ways in which different peoples were to interact with each other. Economically and culturally, the modern world system already existed nearly five centuries ago. Others point to the late nineteenth century as a period of intense globalization, when millions migrated, trade greatly expanded, and new norms and

organizations came to govern international conduct. At the beginning of the twentieth century, such scholars would stress, the movement of people, goods, and finance across national borders was at least as free and significant as it is today.

We agree that globalization has been happening for a long time. We also agree that specific features of world society have their roots in earlier periods. We add, however, that the second half of the twentieth century was a significant period of globalization in its own right. World War II gave globalization a new impetus. Obscured by Cold War divisions, the transformation of world society in the past seven decades – in terms of linkages, institutions, and culture and consciousness – was nevertheless profound. This *Reader* includes selections from scholars skeptical of this claim, but it also illustrates by many examples that globalization has entered a new phase.

Is globalization driven by the expanding market? The pursuit of economic opportunity has long sent merchants around the globe, and powerful states have supported their profit-seeking activities. Capitalism knows no bounds, as Marx noted more than a century ago. Marx expected the European economy to become a truly global system, and in many ways it has. In recent years, the integration of financial markets has added a new kind of interdependence. To us, this does not mean that globalization is first and foremost an economic project. While an economic system operating along capitalist lines now encompasses most regions of the world, and economic motives always have been important in creating global linkages, globalization takes place in many spheres for many reasons. The economy may be a driving force in creating global change in some periods, but its effects depend on what happens outside of world markets. To understand the world economy, then, one also needs to understand world society. Accordingly, this *Reader* presents a comprehensive picture of globalization, covering economic, political, cultural, and experiential dimensions.

Does globalization make the world more homogeneous? This question would seem to answer itself: If certain activities or institutions become global, they must displace existing, locally variable activities and institutions. If there are more global linkages, global institutions, and global values, presumably this means that more people will have more in common. To many critics of globalization, this seemingly neutral description is nefarious. Globalization is the work of the West, they argue. Markets set Western rules for economic activity; one kind of Western state has taken hold around the world; by controlling information flows, Western media companies shape global consciousness; the popular culture of “McWorld” is of mostly Western origin. Globalization thus entails cultural imperialism.

We agree that some things become more similar around the world as globalization proceeds. There is only one World Trade Organization and it enforces one set of trade rules; there is only one kind of bureaucratic state that societies can legitimately adopt. But we do not think this leads to a homogeneous world, for three reasons. First, general rules and models are interpreted in light of local circumstances. Thus, regions respond to similar economic constraints in different ways; countries still have great leeway in structuring their own policies; the same television program means different things to different audiences; McDonald’s adapts its menu and marketing to local tastes. Second, growing similarity provokes reactions. Advocates for many cultures seek to protect their heritage or assert their identity. Witness the efforts of fundamentalists to reinstate what they consider orthodoxy, the actions of indigenous

peoples to claim their right to cultural survival, and the attempt of Asian leaders to put forth a distinctive Asian model of human rights. Third, cultural and political differences have themselves become globally valid. The notion that people and countries are entitled to their particularity or distinctiveness is itself part of global culture. The tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity is integral to globalization, and this *Reader* illustrates it in several ways.

Is globalization harmful? Implicit in the questions we have raised is a widespread sense that globalization may be harmful to the well-being of individuals, countries, and cultures. If the market is the driving force in globalization, many fear, it is bound to exacerbate inequality by creating winners and losers. If globalization makes the world more homogeneous, others fear, many cultures are in trouble. Loss of local autonomy may mean that more people will be vulnerable to economic swings, environmental degradation, and epidemics. For these and other reasons, globalization has become an extremely contentious process. Indeed, the debate about the merits and direction of globalization is itself an important component of global culture. As we already indicated above, we are skeptical of the most sweeping critiques of globalization. But our purpose in this *Reader* is not to offer definitive judgments; the subject is too complex for a clear-cut assessment in any case. Rather, we present a variety of perspectives that convey the thrust of actual debates and ongoing research so that readers can understand the varied consequences of globalization and make their own informed judgments.

What does globalization mean? Activists use the term in denouncing global injustice. Politicians invoke it to explain the problems they face. Academics employ it to describe important trends. Even within these various groups, people disagree. As mentioned, globalization has different meanings for different groups. Not surprisingly, this often provokes complaints that the concept is too fuzzy. However, we detect two common meanings. The simple definition we gave above captures one of these: globalization is the set of processes by which more people become connected in more and different ways across ever-greater distances. A more academic version of this idea is to equate globalization with “deterritorialization,” the process through which the constraints of physical space lose their hold on social relations. This is a generic definition since it captures a wide variety of possible relations. When viewers in India enjoy reality shows that originate in Europe, or when Americans buy baby products made in China, or when Iran plays against Angola in the World Cup, these are all instances of generic globalization. Used in this way, the concept is analytically clear and applicable in many contexts. It does not favor a particular theory or call for a particular judgment.

A second kind of definition is more specific. It identifies globalization with the process by which capitalism expands across the globe as powerful economic actors seek profit in global markets and impose their rules everywhere, a process often labeled “neoliberalism” (as illustrated in the selection by David Harvey in Part II). Though sometimes invoked by defenders of globalization, this is a critical definition that usually serves to challenge the process it tries to capture. Through this lens, generic globalization looks a little different: the export of TV show formats as cultural commodities is driven by media producers in core markets, Chinese workers making baby products are exploited as nodes in a global commodity chain, and the World Cup has turned

into a marketing event for multinational shoe companies and an audition for players seeking professional advancement. This lens filters out much of what the generic view includes but also sharpens the focus, in a way that especially suits contemporary critics of capitalist market society.

The Globalization Reader aims to convey the complexity, importance, and contentiousness of globalization. This is an exciting time in social science scholarship, as many creative minds try to discern the outlines of a new era. The *Reader* includes some of their best work. But making sense of globalization is not just a task for scholars and students. It is a public concern. We hope this *Reader* will assist a diverse audience in understanding the patterns and problems of globalization, which is likely to remain a dominant concern of the twenty-first century.

Note on Selections

1. Footnotes, citations, and sources of quoted passages have been excised. Omitted text is indicated by “[...]”.

Part I

Debating Globalization

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2 How to Judge Globalism <i>Amartya Sen</i>	19
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Introduction

When the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, some in the West proclaimed the “end of history”: from now on, there would be no more deep conflicts about how to organize societies, no more ideological divisions in the world. In the “new world order” heralded by the American president at the time, George H. W. Bush, countries would cooperate peacefully as participants in one worldwide market, pursuing their interests while sharing commitments to basic human values. These triumphant responses to the new global situation heartily embraced economic liberalization and the prosperity and democratization it supposedly entailed. As global trade and investment expanded, more and more people could share in the bounty of a growing economy. Economic and political interdependence would create shared interests that would help prevent destructive conflict and foster support for common values. As vehicles of globalization, international organizations could represent these common values for the benefit of humanity. Globalization, in this rosy scenario, created both wealth and solidarity. The spread of market-oriented policies, democratic polities, and individual rights promised to promote the well-being of billions of people.

This influential perspective on globalization has been challenged by critics who see globalization as a juggernaut of untrammelled capitalism. They fear a world ruled by profit-seeking global corporations. They see economic interdependence making countries more vulnerable to the destructive impact of market shifts. The social fabric – the ties among people all across the globe – is strained when winners in the global game become disconnected from losers. “By allowing market values to become all-important,” said George Soros, himself a significant player in world financial markets, in 1998, “we actually narrow the space for moral judgment and undermine public morality ... Globalization has increased this aberration, because it has actually reduced the power of individual states to determine their destiny.”¹ The process,

other critics add, is lopsided because it imposes the political and cultural standards of one region in the world – namely, the West – on all other regions. Globalization is Westernization by another name. It undermines the cultural integrity of other cultures and is therefore repressive, exploitative, and harmful to most people in most places.

Our selections in this part illustrate the major positions in the global debate about the merits and direction of globalization. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, journalists at *The Economist*, represent the positive view of globalization by arguing that it not only produces greater economic efficiency and prosperity but also extends the “idea of liberty.” Globalization opens up societies and reduces the “tyranny of place.” In a more globalized world, more people can freely exercise their talents, decide where they want to live, and fashion their own identities. Like Micklethwait and Wooldridge, Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, recognizes the potential benefits of global integration. Briefly illustrating worldwide contributions to the process, he refutes the idea that it is a “new Western curse.” Yet he agrees with critics of globalization that it is profoundly unjust in its consequences. To him, however, the central question is not whether to use the global market economy, but how to create institutions that can lead to a more equitable distribution of its benefits.

Dutch professor of communications Cees J. Hamelink reviews many different aspects of globalization and the corresponding disputes that have arisen regarding its substance and significance. Using a discursive approach pitting “supporters” and “sceptics” of the concept against one another, he provides a useful framework for developing an informed understanding of globalization’s dimensions and complexities but does not try to resolve the many controversies surrounding the concept.

The next selection finds Samuel P. Huntington, an American scholar, arguing that the rising trend of defending distinct cultural values, frequently associated with religious fundamentalism, is not merely a reaction against globalization. Rather, he points out, the globe is now divided into several civilizations with often irreconcilable worldviews. Resisting incorporation into a single, uniform world society, these civilizations struggle with one another in profound conflicts that ultimately will reduce the influence of the West.

The *Millennium Development Goals Report* by the United Nations reviews the progress made, and not made, in eight areas targeted by the world body in 2000. The report documents considerable progress in many areas but notes that “the poorest and most vulnerable people are being left behind,” even though they were a central concern of the MDG program. Gender inequality, environmental degradation, conflicts that have made refugees of more than 60 million people, hundreds of millions of people suffering from hunger – the problems remain enormous. The UN calls for continued concerted global action to further the pursuit of sustainable development that will lift the poor out of poverty and deprivation.

The critics thus share a fear of the unrestrained capitalist system. Some lament its imperial obliteration of cultural distinctions and advocate preserving or reviving traditional cultural distinctions. Others are more concerned about the impact on solidarity within societies and advocate stronger self-governance in democratic states. Still others worry most about the economic, political, and cultural divisions that

result from globalization and advocate the cosmopolitan pursuit of a unified but just world. Such critical views of globalization themselves affect the course of the process. The increasingly deliberate efforts from many quarters to define the proper shape of world society also contribute significantly to its formation, an issue to which we return in the last section of this book. At the very least, the debate expresses a common global consciousness, though not, of course, a global consensus.

Note

1. Quoted in Timothy O'Brien, "He's seen the enemy: It looks like him," *New York Times*, December 6, 1998.

The Hidden Promise

Liberty Renewed

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge

[...] Karl Marx's tomb in Highgate Cemetery is a sorry place. The sculpture of his great bearded head is sometimes soiled with pigeon droppings; the army of celebrated intellectuals and communist dignitaries that used to come to pay its respects to the master has dwindled into a tiny band of eccentrics. In one way, this is a pity. As a prophet of socialism, Marx may be kaput; but as a prophet of "the universal interdependence of nations," as he called globalization, he can still seem startlingly relevant.

For all his hatred of the Victorian bourgeoisie, Marx could not conceal his admiration for its ability to turn the world into a single marketplace. Some of this admiration was mere *schadenfreude*, to be sure, born of his belief that in creating a global working class the bourgeoisie was also creating its very own grave diggers; but a surprising amount of this respect was genuine, like a prizefighter's respect for his muscle-bound opponent. In less than a hundred years, Marx argued, the bourgeoisie had "accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals"; had conducted "expeditions that put in the shade all former exoduses of nations and crusades"; and had "created more massive and more colossal productive forces" than all preceding generations put together. In achieving all this, it had begun to transform an agglomeration of warring nations and petty principalities into a global marketplace.

Marx was at his most expansive on globalization in *The Communist Manifesto*, which he cowrote with Friedrich Engels, a factory owner turned revolutionary,

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and published in 1848, a year in which ancien régimes were tottering throughout Europe.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. ... In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant land and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.

Even Marx's final resting place is, to some extent, a vindication of this great insight. Opposite him in Highgate lies William Nassar Kennedy, a colonel of the Winnipeg Rifles who was "called home" in 1885 while returning to Canada from Egypt, where he was in command of the Nile Voyageurs. A little further down there is John MacKinlay and his wife, Caroline Louisa, "late of Bombay." Highgate Cemetery is strewn with the graves of Victorian soldiers, bureaucrats, and merchants who devoted their lives to turning the world into a single market.

What would Marx make of the world today? Imagine for a moment that the prayers of the faithful were answered and the great man awoke from his slumber. Having climbed out of his mausoleum, dusted himself off, and taken a frustrated sniff at the bottle of scotch, what would Marx find? There would, of course, be the shock of discovering that, on all the big issues, he had been proved hopelessly wrong. It was communism that succumbed to its own internal contradictions and capitalism that swept all before it. But he might at least console himself with the thought that his description of globalization remains as sharp today as it was 150 years ago.

Wandering down Highgate Hill, Marx would discover the Bank of Cyprus (which services the three hundred thousand Cypriots that live in London), several curry houses (now England's most popular sort of eatery), and a *Restaurante do Brazil*. He might be less surprised to find a large Irish community. But the sign inviting him to watch "Irish Sports Live," thanks to a pub's satellite-television linkup, might intrigue him. On the skyline, he would soon spot the twin towers of Canary Wharf, built by Canadian developers with money borrowed from Japanese banks and now occupied mostly by American investment banks.

Marx would hear Asian voices and see white schoolchildren proudly wearing T-shirts with pictures of black English soccer stars. Multicultural London (which is now home to thirty-three ethnic communities, each with a population of more than ten thousand) might well exhilarate a man who was called "the Moor" by his own children because of his dark complexion. He could stop at almost any newsstand and pick up a copy of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that would be no more than a day old. Nearly swept off his feet by a passing Rolls-Royce, he might be more surprised to discover that the vehicle, like the rest of Britain's car industry, was now owned by a German company.

If Marx were to venture back to his old haunts in Soho, he would find a cluster of video-production companies and advertising agencies that sells its services to the

world. If he climbed up to Hampstead Heath, the Marx family's favorite picnic spot, he might be surprised to discover that the neighborhood's most expensive house is now owned by an Indian, Lakshmi Mittal, who has built up one of the world's biggest steel companies. London is home to around a quarter of Europe's five hundred biggest companies. Its financial-services industry alone employs directly or indirectly 850,000 people, more than the population of the city of Frankfurt.

Yet even as Marx marveled at these new creations of the bourgeoisie and perhaps applauded its meritocratic dynamism, it is hard to believe that some of the old revolutionary fires would not burn anew. Poverty of the grinding sort that inspired Engels to write *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845) might have disappeared; the rigid class system of the Victorians might have evaporated: Marx might even have been slightly shocked by the absence of domestic servants. But the founder of communism would have no trouble tracking down inequality and sensing that it was on the increase.

Barely ten miles separate elegant Chelsea (where ironically enough the Marx family lived when they first came to London, before being evicted for not paying the rent) from the crumbling wasteland of Newham, but they seem like two different countries. In one, you might be forgiven for thinking that the biggest problem is the availability of residential parking permits; in the other, two thirds of the sixteen-year-olds fail their basic high-school exams, and the mortality rate for people under twenty-five is 50 percent above the national average. As he studied the newspaper and looked at the pictures on the flashing television screens of, say, Somalia or even parts of Los Angeles, Marx might well see globalization as a process that is only just beginning – a job half done. Once again, he might consider, the world is hurtling toward a “crisis of capitalism” – not unlike the last one that his own theories did so much to make ruinous.

The Priority of Liberty

This, then, is the beginning of the future, perfect or not, that we have tried to describe in this book. The fact that it has much in common with the world of yesterday (and especially the world of a century ago) is not surprising. History condemns us to repeat ourselves, though not necessarily to repeat all our mistakes.

[...] we have tried to build a measured defense of globalization. Yes, it does increase inequality, but it does not create a winner-take-all society, and the winners hugely outnumber the losers. Yes, it leaves some people behind, but it helps millions more to leap ahead. Yes, it can make bad government worse, but the onus should be on crafting better government, not blaming globalization. Yes, it curtails some of the power of nation-states, but they remain the fundamental unit of modern politics. Globalization is not destroying geography, merely enhancing it.

In most cases, the bulwarks of our defense have been economic. The simple fact is that globalization makes us richer – or makes enough of us richer to make the whole process worthwhile. Globalization clearly benefits producers by giving them greater choice over their raw materials, production techniques, and human talent, not to

mention over the markets where they sell their goods. Equally clearly, globalization benefits consumers by providing them with better goods at better prices. Globalization increases efficiency and thus prosperity.

These economic arguments need to be made, and with far more eloquence, by our leaders. Too many politicians take the Clintonesque tack of defending the easy bits of globalization – typically, the successes of their own country's exports – and shying away from talking about the benefits that flow, say, from imports or foreign takeovers of "their" companies. This is not only economically illiterate but dangerous, because it allows myths to emerge, such as the idea that globalization is a zero-sum game. But there is also a broader need to wrench globalization from all the dry talk of markets penetrated, currencies depreciated, and GDPs accelerated and to place the process in its proper political context: as an extension of the idea of liberty and as a chance to renew the fundamental rights of the individual. [...]

The Open Society

Globalization redresses this balance in two ways. The most obvious is that it puts limits on the power of government. This advantage is most obvious in commerce. Free trade makes it easier for businesspeople to escape from interfering officials by moving their money and operations abroad. As we have pointed out, companies seldom want to flee, but the very fact that they might acts as a brake on those officials. The sullen fury of a Bangalore bureaucrat staring at the satellite dishes that allow "his" software companies to export their products without his grasping fingers interfering would delight Mill (even though he worked for the often more extortionate East India Company). More important still, free trade allows ordinary people to buy products from companies who make the best of their kind rather than from those that enjoy cozy relationships with governments. Similarly, they can put their retirement money in pension funds that are not tied to schemes of national aggrandizement.

Governments are not retreating from this easily. They can still slap controls on the flow of capital (as Malaysia did in the wake of the Asian crisis) or even on the flow of information. (Singapore employs a staff of censors whose job is to surf the Internet ceaselessly looking for objectionable information to block.) But the world is nevertheless a lot freer today than it was just a few decades ago, before globalization got into high gear. In 1966, for example, the British Labour government imposed a travel allowance that virtually confined Britons to their own country except for two weeks' worth of penny-pinching foreign vacation. Today, any politician who suggested such a restriction would be carted off to an asylum.

Indeed, the recent history of globalization can be written as a story, albeit an uneven story, of spreading a political culture that is based on individual liberty to areas that have been longing to embrace it for years. The last dozen years of the twentieth century saw not only the spectacular death of the biggest alternative to liberal democracy, totalitarian communism, but also the slow death of other collectivist models. Around the world, countries have abandoned attempts to plan their way to prosperity. Even the Asian crisis, in its own awful way, has made it more difficult for