But in new Princedoms difficulties abound. And, first, if the
Princedom be not wholly new, but joined on to the ancient dominions
of the Prince, so as to form with them what may be termed a mixed
Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all new States,
namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always
ready to change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms
against any ruler; wherein they deceive themselves, and find
afterwards by experience that they are worse off than before. This
again results naturally and necessarily from the circumstance that
the Prince cannot avoid giving offence to his new subjects, either
in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or of some other of
the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in
this way you may find that you have enemies in all those whom you
have injured in seizing the Princedom, yet cannot keep the
friendship of those who helped you to gain it; since you can
neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being under
obligations to them, use violent remedies against them. For however
strong you may be in respect of your army, it is essential that in
entering a new Province you should have the good will of its
inhabitants.
Hence it happened that Louis XII of France, speedily gaining
possession of Milan, as speedily lost it; and that on the occasion
of its first capture, Lodovico Sforza was able with his own forces
only to take it from him. For the very people who had opened the
gates to the French King, when they found themselves deceived in
their expectations and hopes of future benefits, could not put up
with the insolence of their new ruler. True it is that when a State
rebels and is again got under, it will not afterwards be lost so
easily. For the Prince, using the rebellion as a pretext, will not
scruple to secure himself by punishing the guilty, bringing the
suspected to trial, and otherwise strengthening his position in the
points where it was weak. So that if to recover Milan from the
French it was enough on the first occasion that a Duke Lodovico
should raise alarms on the frontiers to wrest it from them a second
time the whole world had to be ranged against them, and their
armies destroyed and driven out of Italy. And this for the reasons
above assigned. And yet, for a second time, Milan was lost to the
King. The general causes of its first loss have been shown. It
remains to note the causes of the second, and to point out the
remedies which the French King had, or which might have been used
by another in like circumstances to maintain his conquest more
successfully than he did.
I say, then, that those States which upon their acquisition are
joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince who acquires them,
are either of the same Province and tongue as the people of these
dominions, or they are not. When they are, there is a great ease in
retaining them, especially when they have not been accustomed to
live in freedom. To hold them securely it is enough to have rooted
out the line of the reigning Prince; because if in other respects
the old condition of things be continued, and there be no
discordance in their customs, men live peaceably with one another,
as we see to have been the case in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and
Normandy, which have so long been united to France. For although
there be some slight difference in their languages, their customs
are similar, and they can easily get on together. He, therefore,
who acquires such a State, if he mean to keep it, must see to two
things; first, that the blood of the ancient line of Princes be
destroyed; second, that no change be made in respect of laws or
taxes; for in this way the newly acquired State speedily becomes
incorporated with the hereditary.
But when States are acquired in a country differing in language,
usages, and laws, difficulties multiply, and great good fortune, as
well as address, is needed to overcome them. One of the best and
most efficacious methods for dealing with such a State, is for the
Prince who acquires it to go and dwell there in person, since this
will tend to make his tenure more secure and lasting. This course
has been followed by the Turk with regard to Greece, who, had he
not, in addition to all his other precautions for securing that
Province, himself come to live in it, could never have kept his
hold of it. For when you are on the spot, disorders are detected in
their beginnings and remedies can be readily applied; but when you
are at a distance, they are not heard of until they have gathered
strength and the case is past cure. Moreover, the Province in which
you take up your abode is not pillaged by your officers; the people
are pleased to have a ready recourse to their Prince; and have all
the more reason if they are well disposed, to love, if disaffected,
to fear him. A foreign enemy desiring to attack that State would be
cautious how he did so. In short, where the Prince resides in
person, it will be extremely difficult to oust him.
Another excellent expedient is to send colonies into one or two
places, so that these may become, as it were, the keys of the
Province; for you must either do this, or else keep up a numerous
force of men-at-arms and foot soldiers. A Prince need not spend
much on colonies. He can send them out and support them at little
or no charge to himself, and the only persons to whom he gives
offence are those whom he deprives of their fields and houses to
bestow them on the new inhabitants. Those who are thus injured form
but a small part of the community, and remaining scattered and poor
can never become dangerous. All others being left unmolested, are
in consequence easily quieted, and at the same time are afraid to
make a false move, lest they share the fate of those who have been
deprived of their possessions. In few words, these colonies cost
less than soldiers, are more faithful, and give less offence, while
those who are offended, being, as I have said, poor and dispersed,
cannot hurt. And let it here be noted that men are either to be
kindly treated, or utterly crushed, since they can revenge lighter
injuries, but not graver. Wherefore the injury we do to a man
should be of a sort to leave no fear of reprisals.
But if instead of colonies you send troops, the cost is vastly
greater, and the whole revenues of the country are spent in
guarding it; so that the gain becomes a loss, and much deeper
offence is given; since in shifting the quarters of your soldiers
from place to place the whole country suffers hardship, which as
all feel, all are made enemies; and enemies who remaining, although
vanquished, in their own homes, have power to hurt. In every way,
therefore, this mode of defence is as disadvantageous as that by
colonizing is useful.
The Prince who establishes himself in a Province whose laws and
language differ from those of his own people, ought also to make
himself the head and protector of his feebler neighbours, and
endeavour to weaken the stronger, and must see that by no accident
shall any other stranger as powerful as himself find an entrance
there. For it will always happen that some such person will be
called in by those of the Province who are discontented either
through ambition or fear; as we see of old the Romans brought into
Greece by the Aetolians, and in every other country that they
entered, invited there by its inhabitants. And the usual course of
things is that so soon as a formidable stranger enters a Province,
all the weaker powers side with him, moved thereto by the ill-will
they bear towards him who has hitherto kept them in subjection. So
that in respect of these lesser powers, no trouble is needed to
gain them over, for at once, together, and of their own accord,
they throw in their lot with the government of the stranger. The
new Prince, therefore, has only to see that they do not increase
too much in strength, and with his own forces, aided by their good
will, can easily subdue any who are powerful, so as to remain
supreme in the Province. He who does not manage this matter well,
will soon lose whatever he has gained, and while he retains it will
find in it endless troubles and annoyances.
In dealing with the countries of which they took possession the
Romans diligently followed the methods I have described. They
planted colonies, conciliated weaker powers without adding to their
strength, humbled the great, and never suffered a formidable
stranger to acquire influence. A single example will suffice to
show this. In Greece the Romans took the Achaians and Aetolians
into their pay; the Macedonian monarchy was humbled; Antiochus was
driven out. But the services of the Achaians and Aetolians never
obtained for them any addition to their power; no persuasions on
the part of Philip could induce the Romans to be his friends on the
condition of sparing him humiliation; nor could all the power of
Antiochus bring them to consent to his exercising any authority
within that Province. And in thus acting the Romans did as all wise
rulers should, who have to consider not only present difficulties
but also future, against which they must use all diligence to
provide; for these, if they be foreseen while yet remote, admit of
easy remedy, but if their approach be awaited, are already past
cure, the disorder having become hopeless; realizing what the
physicians tell us of hectic fever, that in its beginning it is
easy to cure, but hard to recognize; whereas, after a time, not
having been detected and treated at the first, it becomes easy to
recognize but impossible to cure.
And so it is with State affairs. For the distempers of a State
being discovered while yet inchoate, which can only be done by a
sagacious ruler, may easily be dealt with; but when, from not being
observed, they are suffered to grow until they are obvious to every
one, there is no longer any remedy. The Romans, therefore,
foreseeing evils while they were yet far off, always provided
against them, and never suffered them to take their course for the
sake of avoiding war; since they knew that war is not so to be
avoided, but is only postponed to the advantage of the other side.
They chose, therefore, to make war with Philip and Antiochus in
Greece, that they might not have to make it with them in Italy,
although for a while they might have escaped both. This they did
not desire, nor did the maxim leave it to Time, which the wise men
of our own day have always on their lips, ever recommend itself to
them. What they looked to enjoy were the fruits of their own valour
and foresight. For Time, driving all things before it, may bring
with it evil as well as good.
But let us now go back to France and examine whether she has
followed any of those methods of which I have made mention. I shall
speak of Louis and not of Charles, because from the former having
held longer possession of Italy, his manner of acting is more
plainly seen. You will find, then, that he has done the direct
opposite of what he should have done in order to retain a foreign
State.