Keith Ansell-Pearson
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NIETZSCHE'S DAWN

Philosophy, Ethics, and the Passion of Knowledge

Nietzsche's *Dawn*

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KEITH ANSELL-PEARSON
REBECCA BAMFORD

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The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

— *Henry David Thoreau,* Walden

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Editions of Nietzsche's Writings Used with Abbreviations

AC *The Anti-Christ*, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

AOM *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* in *Human, All Too Human*, volume II, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Marion Faber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

BT *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

D *Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

EH *Ecce Homo*, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

GM *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

GS *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974).

HH *Human, All Too Human*, volume one, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

HH II *Human, All Too Human*, volume two, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

KGB *Nietzsche Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin and NewYork: Walter de Gruyter, 1981).

KGW *Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–).

KSA *Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin and New York/Munich: dtv and Walter de Gruyter, 1967–77 and 1998).

KSB *Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (in 8 volumes) (Berlin and New York/Munich: dtv and Walter de Gruyter, 1975–84).

PT *Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979).

PTAG *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington DC: Regnery Press, 1962).

PP *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans. and ed. Greg Whitlock (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).

TI *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

TSZ *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Middlesex: Penguin: 1969).

UO I *David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer*, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

UO II *Unfashionable Observations. On the Utility and Liability of History for Life*, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

UO III *Unfashionable Observations. Schopenhauer as Educator*, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

UO IV *Unfashionable Observations. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

WP *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968).

WS *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, in HH II.

Note: References in the text to Nietzsche's writings are to section and aphorism numbers, unless stated otherwise.

Introduction

Many of Nietzsche's texts, particularly those that form part of his later writings, have received significant individual attention within English-speaking Nietzsche studies. *Beyond Good and Evil* is the focus of two studies, one by Christa Davis Acampora and Keith Ansell-Pearson, and the other by Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick.[1] Significant scholarly attention has also been given to Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the form of monograph-length studies of this text by Laurence Lampert, Robert Gooding-Williams, and Paul S. Loeb.[2] And four separate book-length studies of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, written by Daniel Conway, Lawrence Hatab, Christopher Janaway, and David Owen, were published between 2006 and 2008, along with an issue of the *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* devoted to these works.[3] The same is not true of *Dawn*. Ruth Abbey, Paul Franco, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and Matthew Meyer, have all written monograph-length studies on Nietzsche's middle writings.[4] Yet their investigations examine *Dawn* as part of a group of Nietzsche's texts focused on the theme of the free spirit — *Human, All Too Human*, *Dawn*, and *The Gay Science* — rather than examining *Dawn* as an individual work. While Jonathan R. Cohen has written a book-length study that focuses on a single text from the middle writings, namely *Human, All Too Human*, and Kathleen M. Higgins, Monika M. Langer, and Michael Ure have written book-length analyses of *The Gay Science*, a study of *Dawn* has been missing from the available scholarly literature in English.[5]

Although a worthwhile line by line commentary on *Dawn* by Jochen Schmidt was published in German in 2015, our project here is the first book-length study in Anglophone Nietzsche studies that focuses solely on providing critical engagement with Nietzsche's philosophical project in *Dawn*.[6] As an individual work, *Dawn* has been mostly neglected by Nietzsche studies; however, simply filling a gap in the available literature is not our primary reason for undertaking this project. Our main aim is to provide a sustained analysis of *Dawn* as a distinct, internally coherent,

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Keith Ansell-Pearson and Rebecca Bamford.
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philosophical project. Rather than treating this text as being no more than a precursor to Nietzsche's later writings, or a mere elaboration on themes from his earlier middle writings, we claim that *Dawn* itself is a significant work that makes a distinctive contribution to Nietzsche's philosophy. While we do trace out important connections and significant disjunctions between *Dawn* and Nietzsche's earlier and later works in the chapters that follow, our aim throughout is to show why *Dawn* is significant and innovative in its own right. Unlike others of Nietzsche's texts, *Dawn* is not focused on a master concept such as "will to power" or "eternal recurrence" or the "superhuman [*Übermensch*]." Instead, as we show, *Dawn* is genuinely exploratory and experimental, and we contend that the text is worthwhile because of this dimension. It means that Nietzsche's text is completely free of unnecessary metaphysical baggage and there is no risk of him doing what he rightly criticizes Schopenhauer of doing with his doctrine of the will to life, namely, indulging in the philosopher's rage for generalization, as that always proves to be a disaster for science (AOM 5).

We argue that Nietzsche's core critical innovations in *Dawn* are in identifying why customary morality (*Sittlichkeit der Sitte*) (D 9) is a significant problem for humanity, and in developing a sustained critique of this form of morality in order to motivate our critical re-engagement with the ethical.[7] In *Dawn*, Nietzsche attacks the view that everything that exists has a connection with morality and thus a moral significance can be projected onto the world (D 3, 90, 100, 197, 563). He voices an opposition to both "picturesque morality" (D 141) and "petty bourgeois morality" (D 146), and speaks of his own "audacious morality" (*verwegenen Moralität*) (D 432). With regards to the modern prejudice, which is one of the main foci of his polemic in the book, here there is the presumption that we know "what actually constitutes morality":

> It seems *to do* every single person *good* these days to hear that society is on the road to *adapting* the individual to fit the needs of the throng and that the *individual's happiness as well as his sacrifice* consist in feeling himself to be a useful member of the whole (D 132)

As Nietzsche sees it, then, a particular modern emphasis is on defining the moral in terms of the sympathetic affects and compassion (*Mitleid*). We can, he thinks, explain the modern in terms of a movement toward managing more cheaply, safely, and uniformly individuals in terms of "*large bodies and their limbs*." This, he says, is "*the basic moral current of our age*": "Everything that in some way supports both this drive to form bodies and limbs and its abetting drives is felt to be *good*" (D 132). And, as Nietzsche points out, philosophers have not been immune to this modern emphasis; the "boundless ambition" and "jubilation" at being what Nietzsche calls "the unriddler of the world" have been "the stuff of the thinker's dreams" because, in the context of

customary morality, philosophy has become "a sort of supreme struggle for the tyrannical rulership of the spirit" (D 547). What this means is that the scope of Nietzsche's critique of customary morality is not limited to morality: it involves inquiry itself. As he writes, "the quest for knowledge, by and large, has been held back by the *moral narrow-mindedness* of its disciples"; he suggests that "in the future it must be pursued with a higher and *more magnanimous* basic feeling" and that the question, "'What do I matter?' stands over the door of the future thinker." (D 547).

What we take Nietzsche to be calling into question is morality that is grounded in dogmatic and uncritical obedience to moral norms that have become deeply embedded in and expressed through social customs, feelings, and actions. This carries harmful consequences for individuals and for social groups, since the demand for obedience inhibits investigating and understanding of oneself and the world. Yet Nietzsche does affirm the possibility of the ethical, even while he calls customary morality into question.[8] This distinction between a problematic morality that is based on obedience to moral norms, and the possibility of an ethics that admits of unbounded inquiry into oneself and the world, is also found in others of his middle writings, for instance in his call for the practice of "continual self-command and self-overcoming ... in great things and in the smallest" (WS 45; 212). In *Dawn*, we suggest, Nietzsche is particularly concerned to address the unhealthy effects of obedience to customary morality and the way in which it limits human flourishing, including human intellectual flourishing. He points out, for example, that we need to develop "new physicians of the soul" who will expose the "scandalous quackery" with which humanity has been treating its "diseases of the soul" (D 52). According to Nietzsche, the problem is that we have mistaken "consolations" for "remedies"; "the human being's greatest disease," he asserts, has grown out of the battle to treat its diseases, and the "apparent remedies" for our suffering have produced something "much worse than what they were supposed to eliminate" (D 52).

The emphasis that Nietzsche places on an experimental morality (D 453; see also WP 260) in which one gives oneself a goal should not be seen as something simply idiosyncratic or even self-promoting. As Richard Schacht has noted, indifference to oneself, rather than preoccupation with oneself in the narrow bourgeois sense, along with hardness toward oneself for the sake of goals that go beyond one's own limited existence, are the key features of spiritual superiority for Nietzsche.[9] The ethics that Nietzsche posits for the future therefore might best be described as "supra-individualistic," even if it is specific individuals who practice the experimental life and lead the way by offering themselves and their lives as sacrifices to knowledge (D 146). Here the goal is a new "plowshare" of potential universal benefit and enrichment that can "cleave the ground, rendering it fruitful for all," leading to a strengthening and elevation of the human feeling of power (D 146).[10]

On the one hand, in *Dawn*, Nietzsche claims that we live in a "moral interregnum," in which there is a need to construct anew the laws of life and action; he suggests that the necessary reconstruction will be inspired by the sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology, and solitude that will provide the foundation stone for our positing of new ideals, if not the ideals themselves (D 453). On the other hand, Nietzsche points out that once we become "free of morality" — as a result of our minds becoming less and less narrow and inhibited by customary morality — then morality, in the sense of what has become "inherited, handed down, instinctual acting in accordance with so-called moral feelings," will decline. The individual virtues (moderation, justice, repose of the soul, etc.) may well continue to be esteemed in a revitalized ethics, but for different reasons than would be given from a customary moral perspective; virtues will have a vital role to play in ethical training and learning the "art of living."

While we contend that Nietzsche's project in *Dawn* focuses on addressing the presumptions and prejudices of customary morality, we also discuss other important dimensions to *Dawn* that grow out of this grounding concern, such as Nietzsche's thinking on the passion of knowledge and the value that the suffering of the infirm can bring to knowing (e.g. D 114), his exploration of drive psychology and subjectivity (e.g. D 109, 501), of the effect of language upon human life (D 47, 115), and his engagements with Christianity (D 58, 76, 89, 321), with human existence and its relation to death and dying (D 33–36, 211), and with the political (e.g. D 174, 204, 206). Moreover, as we show, many of the aphorisms that make up book five of *Dawn* are ones that Nietzsche writes for the purposes of encouraging his readers to cultivate the pleasures of learning and knowing, which aim to foster philosophical meditation and contemplation. We trace out these other important concerns, and examine their connection to Nietzsche's wider thinking in *Dawn*. We also explore some of the ways in which developing a better understanding of *Dawn* as an independent project may help to shed light on problems within Nietzsche scholarship, and may prove worthwhile to philosophy more broadly.

One of the most significant challenges to understanding the philosophical contribution that Nietzsche makes in *Dawn* lies with understanding its specific place and role within the complexity of Nietzsche's body of writings. Paul S. Loeb has pointed out that while "scholars usually take it for granted that a philosopher's later thinking supersedes his earlier thinking," things are more complicated in Nietzsche's case.[11] According to Loeb, Nietzsche privileges *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* over later works such as *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals* (EH Books BGE), as well as privileging it over earlier works such as *Dawn*.[12] A further wrinkle of the complication that Loeb points out in the case of understanding *Zarathustra*'s significance is an issue of content: like his *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche's middle writings each have distinct areas of contribution and purpose, as do his post-1886 writings. Nietzsche himself provided a helpful clarification of

this issue in his philosophical autobiography, *Ecce Homo*. There, Nietzsche divides his main task in the works that he completed between 1878 and 1888 into two parts: first, an "affirmative" or "Yes-saying part," and second, a "No-saying" part (EH Books BGE).[13] In the works that he completed between 1878 and 1882, which are often referred to as his middle writings, Nietzsche focused on developing the "Yes-saying part" of his task (EH Books BGE). However, in his writings from 1886 onwards, which includes *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche's focus was redirected toward what he called the "No-saying" and "No-*doing*" part of his task, which engaged him in pursuit of a transvaluation of all values (EH Books BGE).[14] And, as Loeb has argued, *Zarathustra* occupies a distinct place within Nietzsche's works.[15] Completed between 1882 and 1885, Nietzsche says that, in *Zarathustra*, the "Yes-saying part of my task had been solved" (EH Books BGE).[16] While it forms the beginning of his campaign against morality, and thus might at first glance appear to be No-saying, it is clear that *Dawn* should be understood as a part of the Yes-saying aspect of Nietzsche's task.[17] In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche himself specifically describes *Dawn* as an "*affirmative* book" — affirmative not least because it affirms what has previously been forbidden, despised, or accursed (EH III "Daybreak" 1). Nietzsche further suggests that the text endeavors to restore to "evil things" a good conscience and the "exalted right and *privilege* to exist" (EH III "Daybreak" 1). Our analysis examines the extent to which Nietzsche's claim for Dawn as a positive, Yes-saying, book, and his claim that the text essentially transvalues what customary morality deems to be evil, is borne out in the earlier text of *Dawn* itself.

The challenge of understanding the philosophical contribution that *Dawn* makes is further complicated by Nietzsche's writing styles: he combines innovative deployment of aphorism and punctuation with use of multiple voices or characters, and a range of rhetorical devices. Thus, for careful readers of *Dawn*, in addition to the question of what Nietzsche is saying, his approach demands that we ask additional questions of the texts, such as who is speaking, to whom, when, and from which perspective. As Tracy Strong has pointed out, in 1882, at the end of his period of focused work on the Yes-saying part of his task, Nietzsche presented ten principles of style to Lou Salomé under the title, "The Doctrine of Style."[18] In this piece, Nietzsche's fourth principle of style reads, "Because many of the means of those who speak [*Vortragenden*] are missing to those who write, the person who writes must have an overall highly developed expressive ability to present speech as a model: the presentation of that which is written must necessarily turn out as much paler."[19] In presenting our account of *Dawn* as a coherent philosophical project, we also aim to clarify why the text is comprised of a collection of aphorisms written in a diverse range of styles. We seek to do justice to Nietzsche's unique modes of philosophizing, where he often approaches topics from oblique angles and with enigmatic perspectives. It is Nietzsche the

extraordinary, philosophically suggestive, writer that especially interests us and that characterizes so much of the philosophizing that we encounter in *Dawn*. We find wisdom in Milan Kundera's appreciation of Nietzsche, and that he provides a more superior insight than Iris Murdoch's view that Nietzsche is a great writer but *not* a philosopher, when Kundera claims that he brings philosophy closer to the novel and in terms of an immense broadening of theme: "the barriers between the various philosophical disciplines, which have kept the real world from being seen in its full range, are fallen and from then on everything human can become the object of a philosopher's thought."[20]

The original text of *Dawn* consists of five hundred and seventy-five aphorisms. The Preface added in 1886 includes an additional five aphorisms. Taken together, the aphorisms incorporate a range of writing styles, including fictionalized dialogue, psychological observation, humor, and logical argument. Nietzsche is explicit about his effort to ensure that his writing provokes his readers; for example, in *Ecce Homo*, he characterizes his readers as "guinea pigs who illustrate for me different reactions to my writings — different in a very instructive manner" (EH III 3).[21] We think that three points about the form of the book are particularly important in this respect. First, the use of diverse styles within the aphorisms, as well as the use of aphorism itself, is a key component of the book, rather than accidental. Second, and relatedly, the strategic purpose of *Dawn*'s aphoristic construction is to engage and provoke the reader's feelings, as well as their intellectual faculties; as Mark Alfano has recently claimed in his analysis of Nietzsche as an exemplarist virtue theorist, an encounter with an exemplar may prompt feelings of respect, pride, and emulation, or may prompt feelings of disgust or contempt and indicate what to avoid.[22] For example, Nietzsche discusses four "supreme exemplars" — "Alexander, Caesar, Mohammed and Napoleon," along with Lord Byron — whose impulse to action is, he suggests, at root a flight "from oneself" (D 549).[23] Even beyond exemplars, we may find diverse affects provoked in ourselves through Nietzsche's writing, particularly with regard to the case of our moral feelings; "*we must learn to think differently*," he claims, "in order finally, perhaps very late, *to feel differently*" (D 103). Nietzsche's point is that since errors drive moral judgments, while we cannot deny that people do experience feelings of morality or immorality, we can challenge why people feel moral or immoral in specific contexts (D 103). Third, the openness of aphorism to interpretation is not an objection to the project that Nietzsche undertakes in the book. It has already been established that Nietzsche deploys a range of writing styles in order to achieve his philosophical objectives.[24] Our contention is that Nietzsche's use of aphorism supports his effort to ground his critique of customary morality in the affects as well as in reason.

Our first chapter examines how Nietzsche's project in *Human, All Too Human* sets the scene for him to commence his project in *Dawn*. We consider how

Nietzsche explores a new and modest pathway for humanity and its future development in the volumes comprising *Human, All Too Human*. As part of this, we consider Nietzsche's commitment to science and in particular, to the pathos of truth-seeking, his deployment of "aphoristic" style, his break with Schopenhauer, and his skepticism, in each case considering how his thinking in the earlier writings supports his work in *Dawn*. In Chapter 2, we examine why Nietzsche's campaign in *Dawn* is to set out an effective challenge a particular form of morality, customary morality. The significance and power of this form of morality on individual and social behavior and cultural development and innovation is immense, and underappreciated. Nietzsche's key innovation is to identify this, to assess the scope of the problem that customary morality presents, and to provide a means of responding to it. As we argue, customary morality, according to Nietzsche, is harmful because it limits our capacity for flourishing and development, and because it also limits our capacity for inquiry, thus further hampering our capacity to investigate, and respond to, our existential situation. The presuppositions on which customary morality is based make it very difficult for us to question it, as in doing so it becomes incumbent upon us to question those foundational moral presuppositions as well. Raising and responding to critical questions about what we call "morality" is fundamental work in philosophy — but at the same time, undertaking this work is psychologically taxing, as well as socially discouraged, including within many parts of philosophy today.

The challenge that Nietzsche presents to us in *Dawn* is not only a call to arms for humanity to explore his campaign against a system of ethics, and to participate as far as they can in it. He also prompts us to challenge limits that our current conception of morality places on our philosophical and other scholarly inquiries and scientific investigations, and indeed on our way of living. To properly understand and account for this challenge, in Chapter 3, we further extend and support our analysis of Nietzsche's initiation of his campaign against morality by examining how the ethic of compassion counts as one of the chief legacies of the history of Christianity, and by considering how the campaign against morality prompts and demands our critical engagement with Christianity, and with religion more generally.

As we go on to discuss in Chapter 4, critical engagement with compassion is particularly pressing for Nietzsche's project in *Dawn*. Compassion is often treated as a fundamental moral value; Nietzsche's critical engagement with compassion appears to be highly immoral to us, if his critique is assessed from the perspective of customary morality. The challenge, we suggest, is to understand Nietzsche as critical of the moral status quo, while open to seeking fresh ethical insight and, in particular, the development of new ethical agents. He identifies an ethic of compassion as fundamentally flawed given its basis in customary morality, and in contrast, he envisages new possible ethical agents who are self-legislators, and who are capable of creating new values and of punishing themselves should they break their own ethical laws.

Nietzsche's critique of customary morality and of an ethic of compassion, we suggest, also opens up the possibility of a novel account of ethical imagination. As we argue, Nietzsche's analysis of compassion in *Dawn* owes much to his thinking on drive psychology; we examine Nietzsche's drive psychology in greater depth in Chapter 6.

In Chapter 5, we examine the consequences of Nietzsche's campaign against morality for the pursuit of knowledge in philosophy, and specifically, on values and methods of the German Enlightenment. As we show, Nietzsche had to balance his inheritance of the German Enlightenment with his call for affirmation of the passion for knowledge; in order to do so, he had to develop a new sense of enlightenment in which knowledge-seeking is tied to overturning old values and creating new ones, and which therefore involves knowledge-seekers in an experimental, risky, enterprise of inquiry. Since Nietzsche's campaign against customary morality involves challenging the limits that our current conception of morality places on inquiry, his campaign also prompts us to analyze our understanding of the subject of the inquirer — and indeed our own self-understanding. In Chapter 6, we explore Nietzsche's thinking on subjectivity, in order to assess the extent to which knowledge or self-knowledge is possible for Nietzsche in *Dawn*. We argue that the self that Nietzsche envisages as part of his account of subjectivity in *Dawn* is a composite of experiences that counts as an emerging product of the conditions of natural or material subjectivity, in which subjects are in a constant state of change and development. We propose that this approach to subjectivity best explains how a Nietzschean subject as envisaged in *Dawn* can plausibly be said to engage in care of the self, and how such selves can be cultivated, (i) individually and (ii) on a species level.

In Chapter 7, we support this account of the Nietzschean subject in *Dawn* by considering how care of the self is a fundamental part of the task of experimenting with what the ethical, when freed from the constraints of moral fanaticism, might mean. As we show, Nietzsche provides a sustained critique of moral fanaticism that also carries important implications for contemporary analysis of security. Another key constraint that customary morality places on inquiry is a limit on how to respond to the fact of death. As we discuss in Chapter 8, humans have no direct first-person experience of death itself; when combined with culturally inherited beliefs surrounding this phenomenon, death very often appears to us to be the most terrible of all possible punishments, which means that salvation from death in the form of an afterlife (ideally one in which we are not also punished) therefore seems highly attractive to us. We argue that Nietzsche deploys Epicurean thinking strategically, in order to undermine this intense fear of punishment and of death conceived of as the most terrible punishment.

We acknowledge that Nietzsche is not primarily concerned with the political in *Dawn*. Nonetheless, we think it would be a mistake to assume that the political is

entirely absent from Nietzsche's thinking in this text. In Chapter 9, we therefore examine the remarks that Nietzsche does make with respect to the political in *Dawn*, focusing on his concern with the effects on humanity of capital and industrial development. We also provide an assessment of the political consequences that Nietzsche's campaign against customary morality entails. As we suggest, Nietzsche's remarks in the text add up to a proposal of a minimal politics: specifically, a form of political therapy that is grounded in migration. Unlike accounts that have tended to emphasize only Nietzsche's individual thinking on freedom and the political, our account places greater emphasis on Nietzsche's attention to human species freedom and the political consequences arising from treating species freedom as a political value. Nietzsche's political therapy fits with his broader, and more pressing, challenge to customary morality. We also draw attention to some of the concerns that arise with treating migration as a form of political therapy, such as colonial thinking.[25]

There has been some recent and innovative discussion of Nietzsche's thinking on futurity, and on Nietzsche's status as a philosopher of the future.[26] In Chapter 10, we examine Nietzsche's engagement with this theme in the fifth and final book of *Dawn*. We discuss how the final aphorism of the text, 575, presents a vivid and positive vision of humanity as future-oriented and self-cultivating. As we suggest, this vision has the potential to become a real possibility if humanity could indeed develop the capacity to free itself from the constraints of customary morality. Nietzsche's vision of a future-oriented and self-creating humanity is supported, we propose, by the preceding aphorisms in book five of the *Dawn*. Second, we explore how Nietzsche's vision of humanity is taken up once again by him in his later, No-saying, writings. In tracing out this comparison between *Dawn* and Nietzsche's later texts, we show how *Dawn* may shed light on some key debates in contemporary Nietzsche scholarship.

The focus on custom, health, and futurity that we suggest is a hallmark of *Dawn* was personal for Nietzsche, as well as conceptual. Nietzsche's letters from 1879 and 1880 suggest that his new project was influenced by his efforts to find a way of living that mitigated his ongoing health problems.[27] In a letter to his mother, Nietzsche commented that a more simple and natural way of living, involving physically tiring labor and very limited psychological exertion, would improve his health (July 21, 1879; KSB 5, 427–28). A few months later, he wrote to Heinrich Köselitz of improvements in his headaches and some of his other symptoms, which he thought had been achieved by minimizing his intellectual work (October 5, 1879; KSB 5, 450–52). And early in 1880, in a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, Nietzsche remarked that while his health problems were almost enough to make him welcome the prospect of death, he found real satisfaction in producing work that outlined a way to achieve peace of mind (January 14, 1880; KSB 5, 4–6). Nietzsche discussed the connections he had been exploring between character, virtue, moral

emotions, psychology, and health, and characterized the aphorisms he had been constructing as akin to digging in a moral mine (July 18, 1880; KSB 6, 28–30). He intimated that while working on *Dawn*, he had recently been reading Prosper Mérimée's *The Etruscan Vase*; the tone, style, psychological focus, and in particular, the careful descriptions of the health and physiology of the characters in *The Etruscan Vase,* are reflected in *Dawn*.[28] In an appendix to this volume, we include new translations of Nietzsche's letters of 1881 by Carol Diethe. These letters also attest to Nietzsche's personal, as well as philosophical, concern with health and futurity as *Dawn* was in the process of being completed and published.

In these 1881 letters, Nietzsche reports feeling "so wracked by continual pain" that he "can no longer give an opinion" on the worthiness of *Dawn* for publication, and even considers whether he "might finally be allowed to throw off the whole burden" since he is now the same age as his father was when he died. Yet Nietzsche's ambition was clearly invested in *Dawn*: "This is the book that will probably be clamped to my name," he wrote to Franz Overbeck (March 18, 1881). To Gast, he intimates that the "book will at least not have a *damaging* effect — except that I myself will have to do penance for it! For I give not just the highly moral but also all those decent and plucky people an opportunity to enjoy their morality and pluck at my expense" (March 20, 1881). To his publisher Schmeitzner, he notes, "The content of my book is so important! It is a question of *honour* not to let it fall short in any way, so that it enters the world worthy and immaculate." (March 13, 1881). Nietzsche admits his good cheer with regard to the social risks and benefits of his project: "I want to see how I get away with it; after all, I know better than everyone else can *that everything is still to be done*" (March 20, 1881). On April 10, 1881, he wrote to his sister Elisabeth that, "This is a *decisive* book, I cannot think about it without being greatly moved." Since he could not stop her reading *Dawn*, Nietzsche suggested to Elisabeth that she should read the book "from an entirely personal point of view" and that she should take particular care to read the fifth book, "where much is written between the lines" (mid-July 1881). And he asked his friend Gast to take his copy of *Dawn* to the lido, "read it as a whole and try to make it into a whole for yourself — in other words, a passionate *state*" (June 23, 1881).

In these remarks, we see a personal source of inspiration for the core points that Nietzsche develops throughout the text of *Dawn*: that customary morality is worthy of criticism, that the risk of challenging this form of morality is considerable, yet potentially highly worthwhile — and that readers have an important role to play in Nietzsche's engagement in his campaign against morality. Our hope in writing this book is to clarify these core points, examine what support for them exists, and in so doing, to reintroduce *Dawn* to contemporary scholarship as a fascinating and worthwhile piece of philosophy, that is of continuing relevance to our efforts to respond to philosophical problems.

Notes

1 Christa D. Acampora and Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil": A Reader's Guide* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, *The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

2 Laurence Lampert. *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (London: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Gooding-Williams. *Zarathustra's Dionysian Modernism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Paul S Loeb. *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

3 Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reaching Nietzsche's "Genealogy"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); David Owen, *Nietzsche's "Genealogy of Morality"* (Acumen 2007); Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals": A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2008); Lawrence J. Hatab, *Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morality": An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

4 Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Franco, *Nietzsche's Enlightenment: The Free-Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche's Search for Philosophy: On the Middle Writings* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Matthew Meyer, *Nietzsche's Free Spirit Works: A Dialectical Reading* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

5 Jonathan R. Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-too-Human* (London: Humanity Books, 2010); Kathleen M. Higgins, *Comic Relief: Nietzsche's Gay Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Monika M. Langer, *Nietzsche's Gay Science: Dancing Coherence* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Michael Ure, *Nietzsche's The Gay Science: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

6 Jochen Schmidt, "Kommentar zu Nietzsches Morgenröthe," in *Historischer und kritischer Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsches Werken* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015).

7 Simon Robertson and Brittain Smith have both pointed out various translation issues with the phrase "Sittlichkeit der Sitte" that affect philosophical analysis of this concept. Robertson suggests "customary life" or "customary ethic" as alternatives to "morality of custom." See Robertson, "The Scope Problem — Nietzsche, The Moral, Ethical, and Quasi-Aesthetic," in *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity*, ed. Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 81–110, 83. Smith notes a range of possibilities for translating "Sitte" including custom, practice, habit, etiquette, and propriety, and opts to use "morality of custom" with the singular "Sitte" translated as

"custom," and the plural "Sitten" translated as "mores," with the exception of D 9, in which he renders "Sitte" as "mores." See Smith's note in *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 291. Paul Franco uses "customary morality" and "morality of custom" interchangeably in *Nietzsche's Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 59, 64, 199. We have chosen to use 'customary morality' throughout. In *Dawn*, as we will show, Nietzsche is explicitly concerned with the effects of a particular form of morality, not with the whole of the ethical. Moreover, as Brian Leiter and Maudemarie Clark have pointed out, Nietzsche's engagement with customary morality is not limited to beliefs based on superstition in early societies; it includes the philosophical–moral sensibilities of later societies, which are based on moral feelings (D 18, 99, 103). See Clark and Leiter, "Introduction," in *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xxxii–iii.

8 See Robert C. Solomon, *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 25, 138. Solomon points out that Nietzsche's thinking on morality is suggested in his middle writings, and that the work in the middle writings incorporates a theory of virtue, but that Nietzsche's thinking on the ethical is spelled out in later texts such as BGE and GM.

9 See Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 469–70.

10 Earlier in *Dawn*, Nietzsche points out the pleasure and virtue in cruelty that stems from the sadist's enjoyment of the feeling of power as forming part of customary morality (D 18). Franco points out that the first mention of power [*Machtgefuhl*] in *Dawn* here is in the context of customary morality. Franco, *Nietzsche's Enlightenment*, 65. This later aphorism (D 146) indicates that for Nietzsche, power is not limited to the confines of customary morality.

11 Paul S. Loeb, *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 207.

12 Loeb, *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, 207.

13 Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Friedrich Nietzsche: An Introduction to his Thought, Life, and Work," in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 15.

14 Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil* (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 2. Ansell-Pearson, "Friedrich Nietzsche," 15. See also Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche's Search for Philosophy*, 65.

15 See Loeb, *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra*.

16 Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task*, 2.

17 Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche's Search for Philosophy: On the Middle Writings* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 65.

18 Tracy B. Strong. 2013. “In Defense of Rhetoric: Or How Hard It Is to Take a Writer Seriously: The Case of Nietzsche.” *Political Theory* 41(4): 507–32, 514.

19 WKG VII-1, 34; Strong, “In Defense of Rhetoric,” 507–32, 514.

20 Milan Kundera, “Works and Spiders,” in *Testaments Betrayed* (London: Faber & Faber, 1995), 147–79; 175–76; Murdoch, “Literature and Philosophy: A Conversation with Bryan Magee,” in *Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics* (London and New York: Penguin, 1999), 3–31, 4.

21 See Rebecca Bamford, “*Ecce Homo*: Philosophical Autobiography in the Flesh,” in *Nietzsche’s “Ecce Homo,”* ed. Duncan Large and Nicholas Martin (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming), for a more complete discussion of style in *Ecce Homo*.

22 Mark Alfano, *Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 87–88.

23 Alfano, *Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology*, 111–12.

24 See Richard White, *Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 150–73; Jill Marsden, “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism,” in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 22–37; Christa Davis Acampora, “Naturalism and Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology,” in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 314–33.

25 On Nietzsche and colonialism, see e.g. Rebecca Bamford, “The Liberatory Limits of Nietzsche’s Colonial Imagination in *Dawn* §206,” in *Nietzsche’s Political Philosophy*, ed. Barry Stocker and Manuel Knoll (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2014), 59–76.

26 Paul S. Loeb. 2018. “Nietzsche’s Futurism,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 49(2): 253–59; Matthew Meyer, *Nietzsche’s Free Spirit Works: A Dialectical Reading* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 241.

27 These examples are also discussed in Rebecca Bamford, “*Daybreak*,” in *A Companion to the Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Paul C. Bishop, (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer [Camden House]), 139–57.

28 For a more detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s letters as he worked on the original aphorisms of *Dawn*, and key literary influences upon him at this time, see Bamford, “*Daybreak*,” 139–57.

1

From *Human, All Too Human* to *Dawn*

In this initial chapter, we consider how and why Nietzsche makes the move from his investigations in the three texts that comprise *Human, All Too Human*: *Human, All Too Human*, *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (in HH II), and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (in HH II). The initial publication of *Human, All Too Human* in 1878 makes it evident that Nietzsche's thinking undergoes a truly fundamental turn; from this point on in his work he commits himself to science [*Wissenschaft*] and as part of this, to the promotion of the *pathos* of the search for truth and knowledge. Nietzsche makes an important distinction between "the pathos of possessing truth," and the "gentler and less noisy pathos of seeking truth"; he prefers the latter since it focuses on "learning and examining anew" (HH 633).[1] He contends that opinions grow out of passions, then stiffen into convictions through the "inertia of the spirit"; however, he suggests, a person whose "spirit is free and relentlessly alive" could, he thinks, resist such inertia through "continual change" (HH 637).

That Nietzsche's thinking over the two decades of his productive life underwent considerable and complex intellectual development is something Nietzsche took pride in, and to which he accorded significant value. As with his thinking on the pathos of seeking truth, such development is not only rational but affective. As he tells his readers in *Ecce Homo* his text of 1878, *Human, All Too Human*, represents the "monument to a crisis" (EH, "Human, all too Human"). In *Dawn*, he makes it clear that he prizes certain thinkers over others, such as Spinoza, Pascal, Rousseau, and Goethe over Kant and Schopenhauer, because their work testifies to what he calls "a passionate history of the soul" marked by crises and catastrophes. In the case of Kant, we have a thinker whose work is little more than an involuntary biography not of the soul, but of the head, while in Schopenhauer's case there is "the description and mirroring of a *character*", albeit one characterized by an interesting vehement ugliness (D 481). In neither Kant nor Schopenhauer do

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