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Among the various topics of political interest which have engaged the attention of the public during the past year, not one has excited stronger feelings, or has been argued with more acrimony, than that relating to the admission of Dissenters to the universities. No proposed innovation has, on the one hand, been viewed with more alarm by a large portion of the friends of our constitution in Church and State, nor, on the other, has any been more eagerly urged forward, both by those, whom we may fairly believe to be honest advocates of improvements in our existing institutions with a view to their preservation, and those, who now no longer conceal that their ultimate object, and not distant hope, is to destroy those institutions altogether.

It could hardly be expected that the discussion under these circumstances should not exhibit more heat than reason. Accordingly, on both sides ​clamour has not been wanting; unworthy motives have been freely ascribed: and while such terms as "sectarian bigotry," "grasping monopoly," "selfishness," and "intolerance," have been largely employed by one party, "rancorous hostility to the church," "indifference to all religion," "scepticism," and "atheism," have been as fully retorted by the other.

Now, though doubtless there may be some persons on both sides fairly amenable to such charges, I would willingly hope that the majority of the educated part of the community, with whom the decision of the points at issue must ultimately rest, are neither bigots on the one hand, nor enemies of all religion, or of our own established form of it, on the other. I am sure that among those who are opposed to this admission of Dissenters, there are very many men of liberal minds, moderate opinions, and calm and considerate judgment. I fully believe that among those who hold a different opinion, there are very many who are both sincere friends of religion, and true sons of the church. To myself it has appeared throughout, that an extreme want of information as to the point in question has been the most remarkable feature of the case: and that what there has been most room to lament is a want of due appreciation of the difficulties of the subject, arising from ignorance respecting it. Ignorance is commonly accompanied by violence. The fiercest partisans are always found among those ​who are least acquainted with the merits of the case—while there are few subjects on which a charitable allowance for differences of opinion will not be the result of a calm consideration of the arguments on both sides.

The angry feelings excited by the events of the last session of parliament have now probably in some measure subsided. It may, therefore, be not altogether useless, during this brief calm, fairly to reconsider the subject, with a sincere desire to take a just view of the different bearings of the case. Should this attempt to discover some practical means of accommodation be unsuccessful, it may at all events be of service to point out the real difficulties, in the hope that others may be able to devise a satisfactory mode of removing them where I cannot do so myself.

With this purpose I will first state what is the claim advanced, and the grounds on which it is supported; and then consider what are the difficulties in the way of concession, and how those difficulties have been thought capable of being overcome.

The claim is simply this—"Free admission to the national universities for all members of the nation; and a full participation in the education there given, and in the degrees which are the testimonials of proficiency, without the necessity for any declaration of religious opinions, or conformity to the religious observances of any particular sect."

​I conceive this to be the real thing required; for though the demand is not always put in so specific a form, and the bill which passed the House of Commons did not contain any very definite provisions for effecting this object; still the real advocates of that bill always admitted that this was the ultimate point aimed at; and the principle on which the demand is founded, plainly carries us to this extent.

Now the whole force of the argument involved in the above demand, plainly rests on the use of the word "national." Two points are assumed. 1st, That the universities are "national institutions." 2ndly, That into all national institutions all members of the nation have a right to claim admittance.

Perhaps in the sense in which these propositions are urged, both of them may fairly be disputed; while others, apparently contradictory, may be advanced with an equal appearance of reason; as for instance, that the universities being chartered bodies have a right to expect that their charters shall not be interfered with, unless they can be shown to have been transgressed;—that the colleges, through which alone there is admission to the university, are not national bodies, and that there can be no right to interfere with their internal arrangements.

While the question is debated on these points of right, there seems little hope of arriving at any agreement. Abstract questions of right, are, of all ​subjects of dispute, the most hopeless to adjust; and when they are adjusted, you are frequently as far removed from any practical result as you were before.

Let it, for the sake of argument, be conceded on the one hand, that the universities are national institutions. Is it therefore a necessary consequence that all members of the nation have a right to be admitted into them? Surely not. All that seems fairly to follow from an institution being "national," is that it should be so conducted as best to promote the national welfare; and it is quite possible that this may be more effectually done with restrictions than without them. If indeed we admit that it would be for the good of the nation that the restrictions should be removed, I allow that from these premises the desired conclusion would result. But this point of national good is the very question to be settled in detail before any consequence can be drawn from the sweeping generality of the assertion about "national institutions," even if that assertion be admitted to be just.

Again, on the other hand, let it be allowed that the universities are not national institutions in the sense in which the advocates of the Dissenters assert that they are; but that they stand on the same footing as all other corporate bodies, holding the privileges granted to them subject to the conditions of their charter, and regulating their internal affairs by ​