GE2020: Fair or Foul?

Bertha Henson

ISBN: 978-981-49-0152-9
First Edition, October 2020
Copyright © 2020 Bertha Henson

Cover design by Diane Lim
Author photo by Diane Lim
Published in Singapore by Epigram Books
www.epigrambooks.sg
All rights reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Table of Contents

PREFACE

CHAPTER 1: Shifting Goal Posts

Boundaries report: What’s changed and why it matters

CHAPTER 2: The Rules of the Game

Covid-19: To GE or not to GE?

CHAPTER 3: Debuts, Re-entries— and Getting Benched

PAP should give new candidates more play

CHAPTER 4: Nomination Day — The Kick-Off

PAP’s GE2020 tactics show ingenuity of GRC system

CHAPTER 5: Most Valuable Player(s)

Goh Chok Tong: A personal assessment

CHAPTER 6: Strategies and Tactics

Party manifesto: Pressing issues versus long-standing issues

CHAPTER 7: Who's Freaking Out?

GE2020: Do you want another sort of “freak election”?

CHAPTER 8: NCMP—Substitutes

The NCMP scheme is good for whom, exactly?

CHAPTER 9: Grassroots Advisers— Pre-match Warm-up

Municipal projects: Which town councils got how much in CIPC funds?

CHAPTER 10: POFMA—Playing the Referee

Dancing around 10 million people

CHAPTER 11: Worthy of a Yellow Card?

WP, Raeesah Khan need to be more upfront over “insensitive” remarks saga

CHAPTER 12: 4G—Still in Reserve?

Voting for an MP or PM-to-be?

CHAPTER 13: Match Report

Can we have a better report card in constituency broadcasts?

CHAPTER 14: Measuring Score Lines

PAP should clarify what it means by “strong mandate”

CHAPTER 15: A New Playbook Needed

Singapore, we deserve an A

Endnotes

Acknowledgements

About the Author

“Read this book if you want to know everything about elections in Singapore—the good, the bad and the ugly. Bertha brings her journalistic experience to bear on the issues that make politics here one of a kind in the world.”

—Han Fook Kwang, Editor-at-Large, The Straits Times

For my nephew and godson, Ethan James Henson, and my great friend Carl Skadian, whose editing advice I always treasure.

PREFACE

I have always been told that I should write a book detailing my experiences as a member of the media, first, among the newspapers in the Singapore Press Holdings stable and later, as the founder of two websites, Breakfast Network and The Middle Ground. People are interested in the ins-and-outs of a media operation, and its dealings with newsmakers and the government. I don’t think I can do better than my old boss Cheong Yip Seng, whose book OB Markers: My Straits Times Story details that fragile relationship between the press and the government. So this is not a tell-all.

Instead, this book is about the Singapore electoral system and its lesser-known aspects, with GE2020 as its focal point.

I have always involved myself in political journalism, writing columns on my blog Bertha Harian and now teaching at the National University of Singapore’s Communications and New Media Department in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. As a Professor of Practice, I thought it would be a great experience for aspiring journalists to report and do research to help voters navigate the coming general election. The portal Class Notes is the result of a year’s work by a dozen students who combed through electoral maps, legislation and parliamentary records, and pounded the pavement in neighbourhoods and the halls of Parliament to see political work in action.

Although GE2020 was called just after they graduated, some have continued to help me in reporting and writing about the election. Having reported and observed Singapore’s elections since 1988, and with Class Notes reporting and research in hand, I thought this would be a good time to talk about the uneven playing field and the meaning of the vote. It is my hope that over time, the inequities of the system will be erased lest future generations of citizens lose heart in the role they play in the well-being of the country.

Bertha Henson

CHAPTER 1: Shifting Goal Posts

I was at the People’s Action Party (PAP)’s Anson branch the day news broke that the constituency would be wiped off the Singapore electoral map. That was 14 June 1988.

Ng Pock Too, then 43, who had lost the Anson fight against the Workers’ Party (WP) J. B. Jeyaretnam in the 1984 general election, was standing straight and stiff-backed, doling out consoling words to mournful-looking party activists. Regret and frustration were written all over his face. The thick, black-rimmed spectacles couldn’t hide the sign that tears were threatening to well up in his eyes. Anson had been broken up into four pieces—Kreta Ayer, Radin Mas, Tanjong Pagar and Tiong Bahru.

Ng was moved to Nee Soon Central’s single-seat ward. He won the election but served only one term before he was defeated by Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)’s Cheo Chai Chen in the 1991 general election. After that, Ng left politics altogether. 

That power to create, carve up and erase constituencies lies in the hands of a small group of civil servants who report to the Prime Minister’s Office. They are appointed to pore over the electoral map to see if it was still appropriate for the next election. In the days of a one-party Parliament and single-member constituencies (SMCs), their work was less of an issue with voters. But this voter acceptance or complacency started to change when the electoral innovation of group representation constituencies (GRCs) was introduced in 1988. More angst surfaced when GRCs ballooned in size from three to four (in 1991), and then up to six-member teams (in 1996).

The boundary changes do not disrupt people’s lives on a day-to-day basis. Citizens needed only to know if the name of their constituency had changed and where they had to go to cast their vote. At most, they see new signboards and are told which community centre would serve them after the election. Or they find letters coming from a brand new or different town council to which they have to pay service and conservancy charges.

For some voters living in Jurong and Holland-Bukit Timah GRCs, GE2020 was the first time in almost two decades when they needn’t worry about which constituency they belonged to during the elections. One 72-year-old Faber Hills retiree told Class Notes, a resource portal on the elections, that he had voted in Jurong GRC, Bukit Timah SMC, Holland-Bukit Timah GRC, West Coast GRC and back in Jurong GRC, even though he stayed put in one place all the time.

But while there was no real practical problem for residents, boundary changes were a massive interruption of affairs for politicians who had marked out their territory in advance. Gerrymandering was a word constantly on their lips and it is increasingly being taken up by voters who think that the boundaries are redrawn to give the PAP some sort of political advantage.

Over the years, several constituencies have been wiped off the map and consigned to history books. Eunos GRC, for example, lived for only one term of Parliament after the PAP won with 50.89 per cent of the vote in GE1988 against the WP. If you look at the electoral map today, the area is divided among Pasir Ris-Punggol, Tampines and Aljunied GRCs. 

Cheng San GRC, the scene of another close fight in GE1997, disappeared in the next general election after the PAP team won 54.82 per cent against the WP. It now lies scattered throughout Ang Mo Kio, Aljunied and Sengkang GRCs, as well as Punggol West SMC. 

Likewise, Joo Chiat SMC was merged into Marine Parade GRC in GE2015, much to the chagrin of the WP, which had scored 48.08 per cent in GE2011.

The government’s determined silence about the work of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC) runs counter to its assertion that it values transparency. Minister-in-charge of the Public Service Chan Chun Sing said in February 2019 that the committee should be allowed to work away from media attention. While guided by the terms of references made by the prime minister, the committee, he said, “independently considers and determines how the constituencies are delineated, the size and configuration of the constituencies, as well as the total number of members of Parliament to be returned”.1

The EBRC’s counterparts in some countries—such as the United Kingdom and Australia—invite the public to submit feedback, which are also published. For its last review in 2018, the UK’s Boundary Commission consulted the public thrice in the 30 months it took to generate its report. It also publishes minutes of its meetings online and outlines its decision-making process in a recommendations report, which includes initial re-delineation plans, feedback from the public and the subsequent revisions. These details are also prefaced by administrative considerations such as its legal framework, data source and other non-legislative factors it considers.

In Singapore, the government sets the rules. The prime minister sets the EBRC’s terms of reference. For GE2011, the EBRC fulfilled Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s promise in 2009 to shrink the size of GRCs and increase the number of SMCs to at least 12. It did the same for the 2015 and 2020 reports.

But how it decides on the boundary changes is a mystery. In general, it would only give a “range of electors” as a guide, to determine how many electors a member of Parliament (MP) should represent. This is calculated by dividing the electorate by the number of parliamentary seats and applying a 30 per cent deviation.

But this range is not always adhered to. Between 2001 and 2015, Potong Pasir SMC was untouched despite its electorate size falling below the range. Its obstinate boundaries were once credited to the fact it was an Opposition stronghold till 2011—and changes might be perceived as gerrymandering. The ward has since reverted to the PAP’s hands, with more polling districts added in 2020, but the electorate size remains beneath the mark, with no explanation tendered.

Electoral boundaries aren’t drawn according to the perimeters of a housing estate or any planning parameter of the Urban Redevelopment Authority. As the Faber Hills resident said, he could be a Jurong constituent one day and a Bukit Timah one the next.

While it is easy to compare the changes in the pre-1988 days when only SMCs were delineated, figuring out the changing parts of a shrinking or expanding GRC is beyond the ken of the ordinary voter. One infamous example was how Braddell Heights, which is as far away from the coast as you can get, was deemed part of Marine Parade GRC for GE1997. It is, by the way, still part of Marine Parade GRC. 

The Opposition, even as it complains about the boundaries, have also conceded that the prime minister has the sole authority to say what stays and what goes. SDP’s Chee Soon Juan wanted a straight fight with PAP incumbent Matthias Yao for GE1997. In 1994, Yao asked then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to carve his MacPherson ward out of Marine Parade GRC to become an SMC to allow for this. Prime Minister Goh agreed and the EBRC did so. 

The committee is typically chaired by the Cabinet secretary, with the Elections Department head as its secretary. Its other three members are the heads of the Department of Statistics, Housing Board and Singapore Land Authority. In 2015, Prime Minister Lee said these civil servants are best placed to decide on constituency divisions taking into account population shifts and housing development. They could do this “in a practical sort of way so that you do not have a complete upheaval each time you have a re-demarcation”, he added.

I can imagine that changes in voter addresses, the number of citizens who have reached the voting age of 21 and new citizen numbers would be some basic data the EBRC would look at. New housing developments would be another key element. But I cannot figure out why my own constituency, Fengshan, was carved out of East Coast GRC in 2015 to become a single-seat ward and thrown back into East Coast GRC in GE2020. Like other wards which have disappeared, I wonder if it had to do with the close fight in GE2015, in which the PAP polled 57.5 per cent in Fengshan against the WP.  

Which brings me to the next point: Does the EBRC look at polling data when it redraws the boundaries? In a GRC format, all voters know the total number of votes for the contenders, which can run into 100,000 and more, and not how each subdivision voted. Yet it is an open secret that during ballot counting, an assiduous note taker in the counting station would have an overview of how different areas voted. 

Opposition politicians, instead of pushing for transparency of decision-making processes in the EBRC, are usually more concerned about the timing of the report’s publication, which is a harbinger of an election. The government does not announce the formation of the committee until a question has been asked of it in Parliament. The exception was when the Elections Department released a press statement on the committee’s formation for GE2020 on 4 September 2019. Even so, a question had to be asked in Parliament about exactly when the committee was formed. The answer: 1 August.

The Opposition’s concern about timing is understandable, given the huge disruptions that changes may mean to their ground work.

Minister Chan said that there would be “sufficient time from when the committee’s review report is made public, to the time of the election for candidates and political parties to make their preparations”. But this wasn’t always the case. 

The timings have ranged from one day to three months.

EBRC Report Dates vs Dissolution of Parliament over the Years

GENERAL ELECTION YEAR

EBRC REPORT OUT

ELECTION WRIT ISSUED AND PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED

POLLING DAY

1991

8 August 1991

14 August 1991

31 August 1996

1997

21 November 1996

16 December 1996

2 January 1997

2001

17 October 2001

18 October 2001

3 November 2001

2006

3 March 2006

20 April 2006

6 May 2006

2011

24 February 2011

19 April 2011

7 May 2011

2015

24 July 2015

25 August 2015

11 September 2015

2020

13 March 2020

23 June 2020

10 July 2020

For GE2020, the EBRC took a rather long time to release its report—about seven months after its formation, far surpassing the two to four months it usually took. Again, nobody knows why or what sort of deadline had been set for the EBRC to complete the work.

The EBRC shouldn’t be so opaque about its decisions as it gives rise to legitimate speculation that it is more partisan than independent—a rumbling that will rise in decibels much sooner than later. More information would also be to the government’s credit, making its assertions about transparency more credible. 

When the report was released on 13 March 2020, the content was not entirely a surprise. The number of seats was increased from 89 to 93 in line with a growing population, constituencies which saw close contests were merged or wiped away, and there was a minuscule rise in the number of single-seat wards—from 13 to 14. One nice change: no more jumbo GRCs. The two six-member GRCs, Ang Mo Kio and Pasir Ris-Punggol, were trimmed down to five members.

The much-awaited report was released when Singapore was basking in accolades for its handling of the Covid-19 outbreak. There were only 13 new infections that day. The Opposition can be forgiven for thinking that the government might pull a fast one, given that circumstances at that time favoured the incumbent.

Boundaries report: What’s changed and why it matters

By Daryl Choo and Christalle Tay

This article first appeared on Class Notes, a portal by the National University of Singapore’s Communications and New Media Department, on 14 March 2020. Liang Lei and Wong Shiying contributed to the reporting.

So the surprise yesterday was the release of the much-awaited EBRC report. And the fact that it happened in the midst of the Covid-19 outbreak. Opposition parties cried foul while PAP leaders went into a huddle at its Bedok South headquarters. Why now? There’s still a year to go before the deadline for a general election expires.

UK-based political analyst Loke Hoe Yeong, who has written two books about opposition politicians, thinks that the timing puts the Opposition in a Catch-22 situation.

“If the Opposition praises the PAP government for its handling of Covid-19, as has the World Health Organization, it would have the effect of negating any rationale for voting for the Opposition,” he told Class Notes. “If the Opposition criticises the PAP’s handling, it is unlikely to go down well with the bulk of voters who would look around them and see how dire the Covid-19 situation is in some other countries.”

For author and former journalist Peh Shing Huei, the timing of the report’s release was no surprise. “After the Budget and the prime minister’s address to the nation earlier this week, it was clear that election was coming,” he said.

“The government has been loud and clear that it is looking out for the people, through concrete measures in the Budget and recurring rhetoric that it will always look out for Singaporeans. That means the boundaries report had to be released soon so that political parties have time to digest the changes. I believe the general election will be held in the second quarter of this year, although my guess is that it will avoid the Ramadan fasting month.”

We now know that there will be 17 GRCs (up from 16) and 14 SMCs (up from 13). But, so what?

The number of parliamentary seats will be 93

Why it matters: It’s been increasing every election because the electorate is growing.

Parliamentary Seats over the Years

YEAR

ELECTED MP SEATS

POPULATION

POPULATION COUNT DATE

APPROX. NUMBER OF ELECTORS
PER MP*

2001

84

2,035,422

31 August 2001

24,500

2006

84

2,157,840

1 January 2006

26,000

2011

87

2,349,091

1 January 2011

28,000

2015

89

2,460,977

1 August 2015

28,300

2020

93

2,594,740

15 April 2019

29,200

*Based on the number of elected MPs when the respective EBRC report was written

Source: EBRC reports (2001–2020).

This also means that if no opposition candidate wins, the number of parliamentarians will go up to 105, as opposition candidates with the largest share of votes can enter Parliament under the non-constituency member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme. The NCMP numbers used to be nine, until the Constitution was changed in 2016 to raise it to 12. And we’re not even including nominated members of Parliament (NMPs), which is capped at nine.

Just 14 SMCs

Why it matters: The EBRC has always been stingy about increasing SMCs. When the maximum size of GRCs was bumped up to six members in 1996, the number of SMCs almost scratched the legal minimum of eight: it hovered at nine SMCs for three elections between 1996 and 2006. After Prime Minister Lee promised in 2009 and in 2016 to increase the number of SMCs, the EBRC has introduced more SMCs, albeit at an excruciatingly slow pace.

The number of SMCs grew from nine to 12 in 2011, but was increased by one in the three EBRC reports that followed, including the one released on 13 March.

SMC Numbers over the Years

YEAR

TOTAL GRCS

3-MP GRC

4-MP GRC

5-MP GRC

6-MP GRC

TOTAL SMCs

1988

13

13

0

0

0

42

1991

15

0

15

0

0

21

1997

15

0

5

6

4

9

2001

14

0

0

9

5

9

2006

14

0

0

9

5

9

2011

15

0

2

11

2

12

2015

16

0

6

8

2

13

2020

17

0

6

11

0

14

Source: EBRC reports (1988–2020).

No more jumbo GRCs

Why it matters: Four six-member GRCs were introduced in 1996. It went up to five for the 2001 and 2006 elections. Then it came down to two in 2011 and in 2015, in line with Prime Minister Lee’s promise to shrink GRC sizes. The two were Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC, anchored by then Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean; and Ang Mo Kio GRC, helmed by the prime minister himself. The issue was whether the Opposition could muster the manpower needed to contest jumbo GRCs and whether such a big group could really be said to represent voters’ choice. In GE2015, the six-member Ang Mo Kio GRC had 187,771 electors, almost 11 times that of the smallest single-seat ward Potong Pasir, which had 17,407 electors.

The new boundary report showed Pasir Ris-Punggol and Ang Mo Kio GRCs will return five instead of six MPs. Pasir Ris-Punggol will offload some areas into Tampines GRC and Sengkang GRC and is large enough for a whole new SMC, Punggol West, to appear on the map. Ang Mo Kio had one part carved out to form Yio Chu Kang SMC.

Yio Chu Kang SMC was carved out from Ang Mo Kio GRC:

Ang Mo Kio GRC

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Punggol West SMC was similarly carved out of Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC:

Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Potong Pasir stays, but is expanded

Why it matters: Potong Pasir SMC remains the smallest ward in Singapore, despite having its borders redrawn for the first time in three decades. But it has more voters than in the past, from 17,407 in GE2015 to 18,551 in 2020. It isn’t quite an addition, but more of a chop and change. Some of the ward got drawn into neighbouring Bishan-Toa Payoh but the loss in voters was made up for by some 5,400 voters previously from Marine Parade GRC.

After the ward fell from opposition stalwart Chiam See Tong in 2011 into the PAP fold, there was some speculation that it would be wiped off the electoral map. Since 2001, its size has been below the lower limit set by the Elections Department. It had 17,400 voters in GE2015, below the minimum of 20,000 voters per MP guideline set by the EBRC that still applies for the coming election. Yup, it’s still below.

Potong Pasir Elector Count over the Years

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Note: The number of voters in Potong Pasir SMC has been below the lower limit set by the EBRC since 2001.

Some polling districts from Marine Parade GRC were subsumed into Potong Pasir SMC, which also lost a polling district.

Potong Pasir SMC

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Three SMCs—Sengkang West, Punggol East and Fengshan—disappear

Why it matters: These happen to be wards the WP was active in—they had fielded candidates to contest the wards for as long as they existed, with the exception of Fengshan SMC back in 1984.

Sengkang West SMC was carved out from Ang Mo Kio GRC in 2011. It is held by PAP MP Lam Pin Min, who is the senior minister of state for health and transport. He beat his WP opponent Koh Choong Yong comfortably with 62.1 per cent of the votes in GE2015. More recently, he earned the ignominy of personal mobility device (PMD) riders who swarmed his meet-the-people session after the PMD ban was announced on 4 November 2019.

Punggol East SMC has a more interesting history. PAP’s Michael Palmer won it in GE2011 but he had to quit after his extramarital affair came to light two years later. In the by-election that followed, WP’s Lee Li Lian, with 54.5 per cent of the votes, beat PAP candidate Koh Poh Koon and two others to the post. But when GE2015 rolled around, PAP veteran MP Charles Chong wrested it back with just 51.76 per cent of the vote—the narrowest shave in the election. Lee was offered the NCMP seat but she declined to take it up.

But WP’s Dennis Tan wasn’t so coy. He stood in Fengshan and lost to PAP candidate Cheryl Chan. He got 42.5 per cent of the votes—enough for him to become an NCMP.

The erasure of Fengshan and Punggol East brought back echoes from GE2015, when Joo Chiat SMC was merged with Marine Parade GRC after the WP lost the ward by just 388 votes in 2011.

It clearly hit a nerve with the WP, which said in a statement: “As is its custom, the EBRC has not disclosed how it came to its decisions. For instance, while the number of SMCs has increased from 13 to 14, the EBRC has not explained why it chose to carve out some new SMCs while dissolving Sengkang West, Fengshan and Punggol East SMCs—areas where WP has been active for many years.”

Sengkang GRC

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

The WP stomping grounds Sengkang West and Punggol East single-seat wards have been dissolved to form the new Sengkang GRC, which also includes some parts of the Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC.

East Coast GRC

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Fengshan SMC has returned to East Coast GRC, where it was carved out of for GE2015 following a fierce fight in the prior general election.

Four new SMCs appear

Why it matters: What’s more interesting about the four SMCs is who is at the helm of each: Marymount is under the charge of Manpower Minister Josephine Teo; Punggol West’s MP is Sun Xueling, senior parliamentary secretary for home affairs and national development; while Yio Chu Kang’s custodian is Koh Poh Koon, senior minister of state for trade and industry. Only Kebun Baru is held by a backbencher, Henry Kwek.

Office-holders very seldom helm SMCs, much less ministers. Plus the surprise is that Koh seems to be out again for a straight fight. You might recall that he stood and lost against the WP in the 2013 Punggol East by-election and was brought into GE2015 as part of Prime Minister Lee’s six-man GRC team.

Then again, it’s up to the PAP to decide who to field where, and there’s no way of knowing if the incumbents would stay put.

Marymount, Punggol West, Yio Chu Kang and Kebun Baru

Source: Elections Department of Singapore.

Opposition wards Hougang and Aljunied remain intact

Why it matters: The EBRC seldom touches boundaries of wards that have already fallen into opposition hands. Chiam’s stronghold in Potong Pasir had unbudging borders when he held the seat between 1984 and 2011. Ever since Hougang SMC fell to the WP in 1991, it has remained largely intact—save in 2011, when a polling district was brought into Aljunied GRC.

The same year saw a landmark election where the WP wrestled Aljunied GRC from the PAP. Aljunied GRC escaped revisions by the EBRC in 2015 and 2020.

Wards choped by the SDP remain largely unchanged

Why it matters: The SDP was the first (and only) political party to announce the wards it will compete for in the upcoming general election. In August 2019, it named Holland-Bukit Timah GRC and Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC, as well as the Bukit Batok, Bukit Panjang and Yuhua single seats.

These were the same constituencies they had failed to win in GE2015. All were kept intact except for the transfer of some 4,800 voters from Sembawang GRC to Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC. The SDP can breathe easy.

Still no three-member GRCs

Why it matters: The birth of GRCs began in teams of threes in 1988. Legislation governing the GRC size was amended in 1991 to raise the maximum size to four MPs, and this simultaneously saw the extinction of three-member GRCs. Even four-member GRCs took a dive after the Constitution was changed in 1996 to have up to six-member GRCs. While four-member GRCs increased after the prime minister’s resolution to shrink the average size of GRCs, the new report did not see the return of three-member GRCs.

Larger GRC sizes at the two hotly contested coasts

Why it matters: The East Coast and West Coast GRCs, expected to be hot seats in the coming general election, were the only constituencies that increased in MP sizes. Both increased from four- to five-member GRCs.

The WP had put up fierce fights for East Coast GRC in the past elections. The party’s five-man team lost with 45.2 per cent of the vote in GE2011. At the next general election in 2015, Fengshan SMC was carved out of the GRC. The WP contested both the GRC and SMC but failed to take them. But it did well enough to earn them three NCMP seats.

This time round, Fengshan SMC is returning to East Coast GRC, which will now have 120,239 voters. Perhaps, the old WP crew will be back as a five-member team? But who will anchor the PAP side since it is likely that former minister Lim Swee Say will retire from politics?

As for West Coast GRC, it has been a regular stomping ground of the newly formed Progress Singapore Party (PSP) in the past months. That is where its founder, Tan Cheng Bock, had sunk his roots in for 26 years as MP for Ayer Rajah. After boundary changes, some polling districts previously under Chua Chu Kang GRC and Hong Kah North SMC will be drawn into West Coast GRC, with 144,516 voters.

The EBRC took a really, really long time

Why it matters: This EBRC kept everyone guessing because it went beyond the two to four months it usually took to do its work. Because the report has preceded Parliament’s dissolution in the past five elections by a day (GE2001) to almost two months (GE2011), it is seen as a harbinger of general elections. But, there is now something that lies in between the release and dissolution of Parliament.

A check of records over the past two decades showed past EBRC reports were always released after the Registers of Electors were revised. This time will see a reversed order as the Elections Department announced on 13 March that another cycle of revision will take place. The current Registers only include Singaporeans who are 21 and older as of 1 February 2019; the revised Registers will include newly eligible voters up to 1 March 2020.

Since a revision of the Registers would include a whole year of electors, it’s unlikely for elections to be called before the new electoral roll is finalised or certified.

The Registers will be open for public inspection from today till 27 March, followed by six days for the Elections Department to process claims or objections to the Registers, and then for them to be certified. So we probably have a good three weeks before the prime minister is able to dissolve Parliament and call an election.

CHAPTER 2: The Rules of the Game

When the boundaries report was released, Singapore looked like it was going to beat the virus. That day, 13 March 2020, the country chalked up only 13 new Covid-19 cases. Health ministry updates were still full of details about how each infected person had been traced to the original source of infection. This brought the number of infected cases to 200. But, hey, half of them had already been discharged and no one had died. Yet.

Worldwide, Singapore was being hailed for its exemplary measures to contain the virus. World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praised Singapore twice, in February and a month later, for its meticulous contact tracing efforts and the setting up of a multi-ministry task force to fight the virus. To many, it looked like the timing was right for the government to call an election. The fourth generation (4G) leaders who were helming the multi-ministry task force also looked like they were up to the job of seeing the country out of the crisis sooner rather than later.2

In fact, The Straits Times polled various academics early during the outbreak who said that how the 4G would handle this crisis would be a “litmus test” or “baptism of fire”. Dr Mustafa Izzuddin, a senior analyst in international affairs in Solaris Strategies Singapore, said that the handling of the crisis will be a “political appraisal”.3

I thought to myself that the government would be silly not to hold an election now, as Singaporeans were notably gratified by the accolades that were pouring in, including from the usually critical Western media.4 Despite the absence of the more senior ministers, the younger lot showed that they were able to mobilise the agencies, resources and the people needed to deal with the virus.

There was also the impact of the first Budget introduced on 18 February, with an eye-popping $6.4 billion plan to help workers and employers ride out the crisis, announced by Heng Swee Keat, deputy prime minister, finance minister and leader of the 4G members of government. The largesse was way beyond the expectations of any economist. Unprecedented measures to cushion workers and families were announced, with the government paying for a part of workers’ salaries and putting cash directly into the hands of those who had lost their jobs.

If an election had been called then, I doubt that Singapore’s motley opposition crew would have had much of a chance going up against such a strong performance by the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). The PAP government showed its technocratic and organisational competence in mobilisation, and a generosity of heart for people distressed at how their jobs seemed to be vanishing because tourists stayed away and people were told to keep a safe distance from each other. It would be churlish not to vote for the PAP.

Nevertheless, the threat of the virus spreading hadn’t abated and by the time Parliament sat on 25 March to discuss the timing of an election, the outbreak had gotten worse, reaching into hundreds per day in crowded migrant worker dormitories in the following month.5 The government had its hands full securing the safety of thousands of migrant workers and setting up health and safety processes to reduce their mingling in the community.

But work on the elections carried on with the Elections Department instructed to put up guidelines for the conduct of a safe election, under a new Bill introduced in April which authorised temporary arrangements.

The Elections Department recommended that voters under stay-home notices (SHN) be allowed to vote outside of their electoral divisions in special polling stations.6 It also suggested that an aspiring candidate under quarantine order, SHN or medical leave would not have to be present in person during nomination proceedings.7 A representative will be allowed to file the nomination papers on his or her behalf.

The Bill also waived the penalty for voters on quarantine orders, SHN and medical leave due to acute respiratory illnesses, if they choose not to vote in the election. Their names would be restored on the Registers of Electors without a fine.

During the debate on the Bill on 4 May, members of Parliament (MPs) noted that while temporary arrangements were made for those on SHN to vote, no arrangements had been made for those being quarantined. This group of voters cannot leave their places of accommodation to vote because of the Infectious Diseases Act and likewise, those infected with Covid-19. At the time of the debate, the number of citizens of voting age under quarantine orders was said to be fewer than 1,000.8

The government rejected suggestions from MPs—such as postal voting, which was implemented in South Korea’s election on 15 April for Covid-19 patients, and online voting. Minister Chan Chun Sing briefly explained that it was still difficult to prevent impersonation and ensure voting secrecy through online voting.

To reduce the size of crowds on polling day, the Elections Department increased the number of polling stations from 880 to 1,100, allocated time-bands for voters to cast their ballots and offered a way for voters to check the length of queues online. As in GE2015, all seats, totalling 93, were contested this time.

But long queues still formed in some polling stations on polling day on 10 July. The Elections Department apologised twice that day and decided to do away with some requirements, such as getting voters to wear disposable gloves, midway through the day. At about 6.30pm, the returning officer made the unprecedented move of extending polling hours from 8pm to 10pm, leading many opposition parties to cry foul even though the move was legally above board.9

So how many people voted in all? Were people spooked by the prospect of being infected while exercising their rights as citizens? By polling day, 1,280 Singapore citizens and permanent residents (non-imported cases) had been infected with the virus. The health ministry does not provide a breakdown on citizens and PRs. There were 1,130 people quarantined in homes on polling day.

Despite the virus, the total turnout rate inclusive of overseas votes cast was an impressive 95.81 per cent, higher than the 93.56 per cent in GE2015. It was a record turnout since GE1997, which had 95.91 per cent of the electorate voting.

So voters put their faith in the safety procedures after all, even as there were mutterings about “opportunism” on the part of the PAP. Opposition parties, while predictably chafing at the arrangements which restricted access to voters, had been accusing the government of caring less for the health and safety of voters, than getting a favourable vote because of the so-called flight to safety approach that voters would take.

They also had another card to play: by the time the writ was issued on 23 June, over 40,000 foreign workers living in dormitories were infected with the virus. Opposition parties accused the government of mishandling the outbreak by taking its eye off foreign worker dormitories despite being warned by non-governmental organisations that the dormitories could be hotbeds for the virus.

Truth be told, the prime minister appeared to have timed his move carefully. He asked for the writ three days after a relay of six ministers went on prime-time television to talk about tackling various aspects of the virus. For political watchers, it looked like a dress rehearsal for the elections to come. 

The election was called during the second phase of the country’s reopening after the lockdown, known as the circuit breaker. This period allowed small-group social gatherings of up to five people, which is a nice figure for a candidate going on a walkabout with supporters, but ruled out large gatherings such as physical rallies.

I stand with the government on the timing of the election, which had to have been held by April 2021. No one could have predicted a “safe” period to hold the poll. It was a judgement call. It is clear to all now that the virus isn’t about to go away soon. Given that the prime minister has the authority to call for an election, it should be expected that he would do so when it would best suit his own party’s chances.

The conduct of a “safe election” and what transpired on polling day, however, made me wonder if we should have taken more time to think about voters’ rights.

Nobody, for example, asked those infected or quarantined if they wanted to vote. Instead, these citizens were told not to worry about not voting, which is compulsory in Singapore. I am not even convinced that the Elections Department explored other forms of voting for them, sticking instead to the tried-and-tested physical vote. Is it too much to expect that a system be devised for that small unfortunate group of infected or quarantined voters?

Despite the bureaucracy’s much-vaunted administrative, logistical and technocratic abilities, the polling process didn’t go as smoothly as in the past. Extra steps such as temperature screening can be blamed, but polling officers at different stations seemed unable to exercise any sort of initiative to ease the queues or refine procedures. Was this forbidden? Or did it reflect a Singapore system which is dependent on following set rules?

Voters turned up to vote, confident in the promise of safe and efficient polling. But for some, it was a frustrating wait in the queue, if not a frightening one. The sight of the elderly with walking sticks and in wheelchairs, crammed together during the early morning hours, waiting for their turn to vote was both inspiring (to younger people like me) and upsetting.

If the government wanted to showcase its administrative prowess and ability to deal with curve balls, polling day was not its day.

Covid-19: To GE or not to GE?

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